Within your rights: Dissociating wrongness and permissibility in moral judgement

Are we ever morally permitted to do what is morally wrong? It seems intuitive that we are, but evidence for dissociations among judgement of permissibility and wrongness is relatively scarce. Across four experiments (N = 1438), we show that people judge that some behaviours can be morally wrong and permissible. The dissociations arise because these judgements track different morally relevant aspects of everyday moral encounters. Judgements of individual rights predicted permissibility but not wrongness, while character assessment predicted wrongness but not permissibility. These findings suggest a picture in which moral evaluation is granular enough to express reasoning about different types of normative considerations, notably the possibility that people can exercise their rights in morally problematic ways.

Is it true that negative emotions cause more utilitarian judgements? from the influence of emotion and cognition

ABSTRACTThe affect-as-information (AAI) model proposes that emotions influence the accessibility and value of information (Avramova & Inbar, 2013). Furthermore, according to the dual-process model of moral judgement, emotions and cognition influence moral judgement (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2001, 2008); however, there is no direct evidence of a causal chain to support this model's proposition. By using a 3 (emotions: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (primed rule: save lives vs. do not kill) between-participants design, we examined two hypotheses in two experiments: supraliminal (Experiment 1) and subliminal (Experiment 2) priming. Our results partially supported the AAI model and confirmed that emotions and cognition independently influence moral judgement. Specifically, the positive emotions group made more utilitarian decisions after being primed with the "save lives" rule and more deontological decisions after being primed with the do not kill rule. However, priming did not affect moral judgement in the negative emotion condition. Further, irrespective of whether priming was done, the negative emotion group mostly made utilitarian decisions. Accordingly, we propose a dynamic dual-process model of moral judgement, that can help clarify how emotion and cognition influence moral judgement.

Sensemaking in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic: A narrative exploration of polarised morality in an NHS Trust

This article presents an analysis of personal diaries kept by health-care staff within a specialist NHS Trust in England during the initial 3 months of the COVID-19 pandemic. It adopts a moral sensemaking perspective to explore how NHS employees mobilised and reframed ideas of right and wrong in order to make sense of unprecedented uncertainty and displacement. By focussing on how the macro and micro politics of the pandemic were played out in the organisation, the study finds that polarised moral judgements were invoked in order to justify and rationalise a broad array of associated emergent emotions, intuitions, behaviours and practices. This polarisation of moral responses could be seen as a desire to bring order out of chaos and put matters back into place following displacement. This is inevitably an ongoing, complex and variegated enterprise whose results can be as often discomforting as they can be reassuring. Indeed, while moral sensemaking was partly beneficial for staff in that it promoted a greater sense of camaraderie and support for others, it also appeared to have darker consequences in terms of staff wellbeing and the development of more impermeable social boundaries across the organisation through processes of moral 'othering'.

Polarized imagination: partisanship influences the direction and consequences of counterfactual thinking

Four studies examine how political partisanship qualifies previously documented regularities in people's counterfactual thinking (n = 1186 Democrats and Republicans). First, whereas prior work finds that people generally prefer to think about how things could have been better instead of worse (i.e. entertain counterfactuals in an upward versus downward direction), studies 1a-2 find that partisans are more likely to generate and endorse counterfactuals in whichever direction best aligns with their political views. Second, previous research finds that the closer someone comes to causing a negative event, the more blame that person receives; study 3 finds that this effect is more pronounced among partisans who oppose (versus support) a leader who 'almost' caused a negative event. Thus, partisan reasoning may influence which alternatives to reality people will find most plausible, will be most likely to imagine spontaneously, and will view as sufficient grounds for blame. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Should I Help? Prosocial Behaviour during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Movement Control Order (MCO) enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly altered the social life and behaviour of the Malaysian population. Because the society is facing huge social and economic challenges that need individuals to work together to solve, prosocial behaviour is regarded as one of the most important social determinants. Because it is related with individual and societal benefits, participating in prosocial activities may be a major protective factor during times of global crisis. Rather than focusing only on medical and psychiatric paradigms, perhaps all that is necessary to overcome the COVID-19 risks is for individuals to make personal sacrifices for the sake of others. In reality, a large number of initiatives proven to be beneficial in decreasing viral transmission include a trade-off between individual and collective interests. Given its crucial importance, the purpose of this concept paper is to provide some insight into prosocial behaviour during the COVID-19 period. Understanding prosocial behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic is crucial because it may assist in the establishment of a post-COVID society and provide useful strategies for coping with future crises.

Breakdown of utilitarian moral judgement after basolateral amygdala damage

Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a model-free algorithm that emphasizes the intrinsic value of the sacrificial action, while utilitarian (sacrificial) moral judgments are derived from a model-based algorithm that emphasizes the outcome of the sacrificial action. Rodent decision-making research suggests that the model-based algorithm depends on the basolateral amygdala (BLA), but these findings have not yet been translated to human moral decision-making. Here, in five humans with selective, bilateral BLA damage, we show a breakdown of utilitarian sacrificial moral judgments, pointing at deficient model-based moral decision-making. Across an established set of moral dilemmas, healthy controls frequently sacrifice one person to save numerous others, but BLA-damaged humans withhold such sacrificial judgments even at the cost of thousands of lives. Our translational research confirms a neurocomputational hypothesis drawn from rodent decision-making research by indicating that the model-based algorithm which underlies outcome-based, utilitarian moral judgements in humans critically depends on the BLA.

Choice Hygiene for "Consumer Neuroscientists"? Ethical Considerations and Proposals for Future Endeavours

Is the use of psychological and neuroscientific methods for neuromarketing research always aligned with the principles of ethical research practice? Some neuromarketing endeavours have passed from informing consumers about available options, to helping to market as many products to consumers as possible. Needs are being engineered, using knowledge about the human brain to increase consumption further, regardless of individual, societal and environmental needs and capacities. In principle, the ground ethical principle of any scientist is to further individual, societal and environmental health and well-being with their work. If their findings can be used for the opposite, this must be part of the scientist's considerations before engaging in such research and to make sure that the risks for misuse are minimised. Against this backdrop, we provide a series of real-life examples and a non-exhaustive literature review, to discuss in what way some practices in the neuromarketing domain may violate the Helsinki Declaration of Experimentation with Human Subjects. This declaration was set out to regulate biomedical research, but has since its inception been applied internationally also to behavioural and social research. We illustrate, point by point, how these ground ethical principles should be applied also to the neuromarketing domain. Indisputably, the growth in consumption is required due to current prevalent economical models. Thus, in the final part of the paper, we discuss how alternative models may be promotable to a larger public, aided by more ethical marketing endeavours, based on neuroscientific discoveries about the human brain. We propose this as a philosophical question, a point of discussion for the future, to make neuromarketing as a discipline, fit for the future, respecting the ethical implications of this research.

A 21st century cognitive portrait of the Himba, a remote people of Namibia

This research sketches the cognitive portrait of the Himba, a remote population from Northern Namibia living in a non-industrial society almost completely devoid of modern artefacts. We compared the Himba sample to a French sample, exploring cognitive reflection, moral judgement, cooperative behaviour, paranormal beliefs, and happiness. We looked for both differences and similarities across cultures, and for the way cognitive functioning is associated with a range of demographic variables. Results showed some important group differences, with the Himba being more intuitive, more religious, happier, and less utilitarian than the French participants. Further, the predictors of these beliefs and behaviours differed between the two groups. The present results provide additional support to the recent line of research targeting cultural variations and similarities, and call for the need to expand psychology research beyond the Western world.

The Medusa effect reveals levels of mind perception in pictures

Differential treatment of animate and inanimate objects often hinges on mind perception—the attribution of mental states to others. It has already been established that pictures of animate objects can elicit mind perception, albeit at reduced intensity. However, this loss of intensity is assumed to reflect an impoverishment of a rich stimulus, such as the projection of a living being into a static picture plane. The current study overturns this assumption by showing that “pure” abstraction can reduce mind perception independent of stimulus richness. Depicting things with minds raises ethical questions that have not been recognized previously. As these questions emerge from representational structure rather than representational content, they are unlikely to be quashed by improvements in image quality.

Throughout our species history, humans have created pictures. The resulting picture record reveals an overwhelming preference for depicting things with minds. This preference suggests that pictures capture something of the mind that is significant to us, albeit at reduced potency. Here, we show that abstraction dims the perceived mind, even within the same picture. In a series of experiments, people were perceived as more real, and higher in both Agency (ability to do) and Experience (ability to feel), when they were presented as pictures than when they were presented as pictures of pictures. This pattern persisted across different tasks and even when comparators were matched for identity and image size. Viewers spontaneously discriminated between different levels of abstraction during eye tracking and were less willing to share money with a more abstracted person in a dictator game. Given that mind perception underpins moral judgement, our findings suggest that depicted persons will receive greater or lesser ethical consideration, depending on the level of abstraction.

Callous-Unemotional Traits Moderate Anticipated Guilt and Wrongness Judgments to Everyday Moral Transgressions in Adolescents

Callous-unemotional (CU) traits observed during childhood and adolescence are thought to be precursors of psychopathic traits in adulthood. Adults with high levels of psychopathic traits typically present antisocial behavior. Such behavior can be indicative of atypical moral processing. Evidence suggests that moral dysfunction in these individuals may stem from a disruption of affective components of moral processing rather than from an inability to compute moral judgments per se. No study to date has tested if the dissociation between affective and cognitive dimensions of moral processing linked to psychopathic traits in adulthood is also linked to CU traits during development. Here, 47 typically developing adolescents with varying levels of CU traits completed a novel, animated cartoon task depicting everyday moral transgressions and indicated how they would feel in such situations and how morally wrong the situations were. Adolescents with higher CU traits reported reduced anticipated guilt and wrongness appraisals of the transgressions. However, our key finding was a significant interaction between CU traits and anticipated guilt in predicting wrongness judgments. The strength of the association between anticipated guilt and wrongness judgement was significantly weaker for those with higher levels of CU traits. This evidence extends our knowledge on the cognitive-affective processing deficits that may underlie moral dysfunction in youth who are at heightened risk for antisocial behavior and psychopathy in adulthood. Future longitudinal research is required to elucidate whether there is an increased dissociation between different components of moral processing from adolescence to adulthood for those with high psychopathic traits.

Tempted to join in or not? Moral temptation and self-reported behaviour in bullying situations

We investigate the relationship between adolescents' construction of a transgression relating to a hypothetical temptation and bystander behaviour and bullying (offline and online). A total of 331 Swiss eighth graders completed an electronic questionnaire on bystanding, bullying, moral disengagement, and empathy. Moral functioning was assessed in a hypothetical scenario, using different moral judgements (deontic and self-judgement, judging the transgression; paper-and-pencil measure). Cluster analyses were used to identify patterns of moral functioning. For the open situation (deontic and self-judgement), happy transgressors, happy moralists, ashamed moralists, and indifferent moralists were differentiated, and for the transgression (accomplished deed) moralists and happy opportunists. The analyses yielded significant differences between the different cluster groups. Happy transgressors (open situation) reported higher levels of assisting the bullying than unconcerned moralists. Happy transgressors also reported lower levels of helping than ashamed and happy moralists. Opportunists (accomplished deed) reported higher levels of assisting the bullying, offline bullying, and lower levels of helping the victim. The multivariate GEE analyses showed that happy transgressors reported higher levels of assisting the bully and online bullying than the moralist groups (open situation). The study shows that adolescents who construct a favourable interpretation of yielding to temptation in a hypothetical scenario displayed higher levels of both assisting the bully and online bullying, emphasizing the need for incorporating targeted moral education in bullying prevention.

Do 15-month-old infants prefer helpers? A replication of Hamlin et al. (2007)

Hamlin et al. found in 2007 that preverbal infants displayed a preference for helpers over hinderers. The robustness of this finding and the conditions under which infant sociomoral evaluation can be elicited has since been debated. Here, we conducted a replication of the original study, in which we tested 14- to 16-month-olds using a familiarization procedure with three-dimensional animated video stimuli. Unlike previous replication attempts, ours uniquely benefited from detailed procedural advice by Hamlin. In contrast with the original results, only 16 out of 32 infants (50%) in our study reached for the helper; thus, we were not able to replicate the findings. A possible reason for this failure is that infants' preference for prosocial agents may not be reliably elicited with the procedure and stimuli adopted. Alternatively, the effect size of infants' preference may be smaller than originally estimated. The study addresses ongoing methodological debates on the replicability of influential findings in infant cognition.

HIV Stigma and Moral Judgement: Qualitative Exploration of the Experiences of HIV Stigma and Discrimination among Married Men Living with HIV in Yogyakarta

It is well acknowledged that human immunodeficiency virus stigma (HIV stigma) challenges people living with HIV globally. There is a scarcity of information about determinants of HIV stigma and discrimination among married men in the Indonesian context. This study aimed to explore factors that contribute to stigma and discrimination against HIV-positive men married to women in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted to collect data from participants using a snowball sampling technique. A framework analysis was used to guide the analysis of the data. HIV stigma framework was also applied in the conceptualisation and the discussion of the findings. The findings indicate that participants experienced external stigma within healthcare facilities, communities and families. This external stigma was expressed in various discriminatory attitudes and behaviours by healthcare professionals and community and family members. Similarly, participants experienced anticipated stigma as a result of HIV stigma and discrimination experienced by other people living with HIV. Individual moral judgement associating HIV status with amoral behaviours and participants' negative self-judgement were determinants of perceived stigma. The current findings indicate the need for training programs about HIV stigma issues for healthcare professionals. There is also a need to disseminate HIV information and to improve HIV stigma knowledge among families and communities.

Moral Judgements on the Actions of Self-Driving Cars and Human Drivers in Dilemma Situations From Different Perspectives

Self-driving cars have the potential to greatly improve public safety. However, their introduction onto public roads must overcome both ethical and technical challenges. To further understand the ethical issues of introducing self-driving cars, we conducted two moral judgement studies investigating potential differences in the moral norms applied to human drivers and self-driving cars. In the experiments, participants made judgements on a series of dilemma situations involving human drivers or self-driving cars. We manipulated which perspective situations were presented from in order to ascertain the effect of perspective on moral judgements. Two main findings were apparent from the results of the experiments. First, human drivers and self-driving cars were largely judged similarly. However, there was a stronger tendency to prefer self-driving cars to act in ways to minimize harm, compared to human drivers. Second, there was an indication that perspective influences judgements in some situations. Specifically, when considering situations from the perspective of a pedestrian, people preferred actions that would endanger car occupants instead of themselves. However, they did not show such a self-preservation tendency when the alternative was to endanger other pedestrians to save themselves. This effect was more prevalent for judgements on human drivers than self-driving cars. Overall, the results extend and agree with previous research, again contradicting existing ethical guidelines for self-driving car decision making and highlighting the difficulties with adapting public opinion to decision making algorithms.

When history becomes his story: Shifts in narrative perspective weaken the blame-mitigating force of life-history narratives

Life-history narratives describing how a transgressor developed aversive traits can mitigate blame. How is their effectiveness affected by narrative perspective? In particular, how is blame mitigation impacted when the transgressor appears to be knowledgeable of the story of his self-formation? In three experiments, we compare the effectiveness of narratives that reflect an objective perspective to those that reflect the transgressor's perspective. The experiments contrast two hypotheses. The Perspective Taking hypothesis asserts that the transgressor perspective will be especially effective for blame mitigation because it encourages 'stepping into the shoes' of the transgressor. In contrast, the Should Know Better hypothesis asserts that the transgressor perspective will be especially ineffective because it reveals the transgressor to have self-knowledge, which triggers an inference that he deeply comprehends the suffering he causes. Results support the Should Know Better hypothesis. Furthermore, Experiment 3 shows that the transgressor perspective increases blameworthiness regardless of whether the transgressor's prior life experiences parallel what he inflicts on his victims.

Developing a performance assessment task in the Finnish higher education context: Conceptual and empirical insights

BACKGROUND

Performance assessment development is a three-phase process of (1) defining the construct of what is to be measured, (2) constructing the test items, task, and scoring criteria, and (3) collecting empirical evidence on extent to which they tap into the intended construct.

AIMS

In the light of the three-phase process, this pilot study presents the development of performance assessment for research on critical thinking and moral judgement to be utilized in the Finnish higher education context. In particular, it explores the cognitive processes and moral judgement that occur while completing the assessment and how both task and respondent characteristics are associated with these processes.

SAMPLE

The study was conducted with five participants drawn from purposeful sampling.

METHODS

We collected the data from cognitive laboratories with think-alouds and interviews. The data were analysed using a qualitative abductive approach.

RESULTS

The instructions together with sources given for completing the assessment triggered participants' critical and moral judgement. The results also indicate that the performance assessment being developed has relevance to everyday life. The theme of assessment was experienced meaningful, and it maintained the participants' interest throughout the completion of the task. The assessment was open-ended and allowed multiple lines of thinking. The participants perceived the task as being challenging. The prior knowledge of the participants, their integrity, and capability to monitor thinking and performance was related to the ways of performing the task.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on preliminary evidence drawn from the pilot data, the study concludes by outlining the strengths of the task as well as modifications that are needed in order to develop this specific performance assessment further.

Moral Judgments Depend on Information Presentation: Evidence for Recency and Transfer Effects

Moral judgements are crucial for social life and rely on the analysis of the agent’s intention and the outcome of the agent’s action. The current study examines to the influence of how the information is presented on moral judgement. The first experiment investigated the effects of the order in which intention and outcome information was presented. The results showed that participants relied more on the last presented information, suggesting a recency effect. The second experiment required participants to make two types of judgments (wrongness vs. punishment) and manipulated the order of the requested two types of judgments. Results showed an asymmetrical transfer effect whereby punishment judgements, but not wrongness judgements were affected by the order of presentation. This asymmetrical transfer effect was likely linked to the ambiguity of the punishment judgement. Altogether, the study showed that the order in which information was presented and the order in which one was asked to think about the wrongness of an action or the punishment that the action deserves were two factors that should be irrelevant, but actually influenced moral judgements. The influence of these factors was mostly observed during the most difficult judgements, precisely in situations where human decision is called upon, such as in court trials.

Moral fatigue: The effects of cognitive fatigue on moral reasoning

We report two experiments that show a moral fatigue effect: participants who are fatigued after they have carried out a tiring cognitive task make different moral judgements compared to participants who are not fatigued. Fatigued participants tend to judge that a moral violation is less permissible even though it would have a beneficial effect, such as killing one person to save the lives of five others. The moral fatigue effect occurs when people make a judgement that focuses on the harmful action, killing one person, but not when they make a judgement that focuses on the beneficial outcome, saving the lives of others, as shown in Experiment 1 ( n = 196). It also occurs for judgements about morally good actions, such as jumping onto railway tracks to save a person who has fallen there, as shown in Experiment 2 ( n = 187). The results have implications for alternative explanations of moral reasoning.

Moral judgement by the disconnected left and right cerebral hemispheres: a split-brain investigation

Owing to the hemispheric isolation resulting from a severed corpus callosum, research on split-brain patients can help elucidate the brain regions necessary and sufficient for moral judgement. Notably, typically developing adults heavily weight the intentions underlying others' moral actions, placing greater importance on valenced intentions versus outcomes when assigning praise and blame. Prioritization of intent in moral judgements may depend on neural activity in the right hemisphere's temporoparietal junction, an area implicated in reasoning about mental states. To date, split-brain research has found that the right hemisphere is necessary for intent-based moral judgement. When testing the left hemisphere using linguistically based moral vignettes, split-brain patients evaluate actions based on outcomes, not intentions. Because the right hemisphere has limited language ability relative to the left, and morality paradigms to date have involved significant linguistic demands, it is currently unknown whether the right hemisphere alone generates intent-based judgements. Here we use nonlinguistic morality plays with split-brain patient J.W. to examine the moral judgements of the disconnected right hemisphere, demonstrating a clear focus on intent. This finding indicates that the right hemisphere is not only necessary but also sufficient for intent-based moral judgement, advancing research into the neural systems supporting the moral sense.

It's immoral, but I'd do it! Psychopathy traits affect decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas and in everyday moral situations

This research investigated whether emotional hyporeactivity affects moral judgements and choices of action in sacrificial moral dilemmas and in everyday moral conflict situations in which harm to other's welfare is differentially involved. Twenty-six participants with high trait psychopathy (HP) and 25 with low trait psychopathy (LP) were selected based on the primary psychopathy scale of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale. HP participants were more likely to sacrifice one person to save others in sacrificial dilemmas and to pursue a personal advantage in everyday moral situations entailing harm to another's good. While deciding in these situations, HP participants experienced lower unpleasantness as compared to LP participants. Conversely, no group differences emerged in choice of action and unpleasantness ratings for everyday moral situations that did not entail harm to others. Importantly, moral judgements did not differ in the two groups. These results suggest that high psychopathy trait affects choices of action in sacrificial dilemmas because of reduced emotional reactivity to harmful acts. The dissociation between choice of action and moral judgement suggests that the former is more closely related to emotional experience. Also, emotion seems to play a critical role in discriminating harmful from harmless acts and in driving decisions accordingly.

Moral parochialism and contextual contingency across seven societies

Human moral judgement may have evolved to maximize the individual's welfare given parochial culturally constructed moral systems. If so, then moral condemnation should be more severe when transgressions are recent and local, and should be sensitive to the pronouncements of authority figures (who are often arbiters of moral norms), as the fitness pay-offs of moral disapproval will primarily derive from the ramifications of condemning actions that occur within the immediate social arena. Correspondingly, moral transgressions should be viewed as less objectionable if they occur in other places or times, or if local authorities deem them acceptable. These predictions contrast markedly with those derived from prevailing non-evolutionary perspectives on moral judgement. Both classes of theories predict purportedly species-typical patterns, yet to our knowledge, no study to date has investigated moral judgement across a diverse set of societies, including a range of small-scale communities that differ substantially from large highly urbanized nations. We tested these predictions in five small-scale societies and two large-scale societies, finding substantial evidence of moral parochialism and contextual contingency in adults' moral judgements. Results reveal an overarching pattern in which moral condemnation reflects a concern with immediate local considerations, a pattern consistent with a variety of evolutionary accounts of moral judgement.

Omission bias and perceived intention in children and adults

Omission bias refers to the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 7-8 and 11-12 years, as well as adults, made moral judgements about acts of commission and omission in two conditions in which the protagonist obtained a self-directed benefit. In the antisocial condition, the other person was harmed; in the selfish condition, the other person was not harmed. The results showed that adults and both age groups of children judged that the agent who did something (act of commission) was morally worse than the agent who did nothing (omission) for both antisocial and selfish conditions, although this judgement tendency was clearer in the selfish condition than in the antisocial condition. Agent intention was held constant across commission and omission, but most participants rated the intention of the agent who did something as stronger than that of the agent who did nothing. These results suggest that omission bias occurs regardless of differences in age and situation. In addition, perceived intention appears to change in conjunction with omission bias.

Arrested development: early prefrontal lesions impair the maturation of moral judgement

Learning to make moral judgements based on considerations beyond self-interest is a fundamental aspect of moral development. A deficit in such learning is associated with poor socialization and criminal behaviour. The neural systems required for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency are not well understood. Here we show in a unique sample of neurological patients that focal lesions involving ventromedial prefrontal cortex, acquired during development, result in an abnormally egocentric pattern of moral judgement. In response to simple hypothetical moral scenarios, the patients were more likely than comparison participants to endorse self-interested actions that involved breaking moral rules or physically harming others in order to benefit themselves. This pattern (which we also found in subjects with psychopathy) differs from that of patients with adult-onset ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions--the latter group showed normal rejection of egocentric rule violations. This novel contrast of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions acquired during development versus during adulthood yields new evidence suggesting that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is a critical neural substrate for the acquisition and maturation of moral competency that goes beyond self-interest to consider the welfare of others. Disruption to this affective neural system early in life interrupts moral development.

How does morality work in the brain? A functional and structural perspective of moral behavior

Neural underpinnings of morality are not yet well understood. Researchers in moral neuroscience have tried to find specific structures and processes that shed light on how morality works. Here, we review the main brain areas that have been associated with morality at both structural and functional levels and speculate about how it can be studied. Orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortices are implicated in emotionally-driven moral decisions, while dorsolateral prefrontal cortex appears to moderate its response. These competing processes may be mediated by the anterior cingulate cortex. Parietal and temporal structures play important roles in the attribution of others' beliefs and intentions. The insular cortex is engaged during empathic processes. Other regions seem to play a more complementary role in morality. Morality is supported not by a single brain circuitry or structure, but by several circuits overlapping with other complex processes. The identification of the core features of morality and moral-related processes is needed. Neuroscience can provide meaningful insights in order to delineate the boundaries of morality in conjunction with moral psychology.