Euthanasia, consensual homicide, and refusal of treatment

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia.

Killing in the name of: A merciful death?

"Mercy" holds a well-established place in the discourse on assisted death (AD), with mercy rhetoric used by both proponents and opponents of AD alike. In this paper, I interrogate the relationship between mercy, mercy killing and AD. Appeals to mercy introduce an ambiguity that carries implications for the enduring debate about healthcare professionals' participation in this controversial practice. The term "mercy killing" is used at different times to mean all of the following: killings that are acts of punitive leniency, killings motivated by pity, killings motivated by compassion, and acts of voluntary, involuntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia. I argue that killings that are acts of punitive leniency "track" a conceptually useful understanding of mercy and, by extension, mercy killing. However, if mercy is understood in this way, then "mercy killing" is a problematic way of characterizing physician-AD. While reference to mercy killing has been weeded out of AD legislation over time, the same cannot be said of public discourse, where the debate about physicians' character-and the locus of power with respect to who gets to decide when a life can rightly be ended-continues.

Vital prostheses: Killing, letting die, and the ethics of de-implantation

Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them-and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient's heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, however, about cases at the boundary-procedures involving items that seem bodily in some respects, but not others? When, for instance, does deactivating an implanted device like a pacemaker count as killing, and when as letting die? Contra existing proposals, I argue that the boundaries of the body for this purpose are not drawn at the boundaries of the self, or (if this is different) the human organism. Nor should we determine when we are killing and when we are letting die by deferring to existing practices for distinguishing ongoing from completed treatment. Rather, I argue that whether something (organic or inorganic) counts as body part for purposes of this distinction depends on the results of a normative analysis of the particular character of our rights in it-particularly, whether and in what way these rights ought to be alienable. I conclude by arguing that there are likely good reasons to recognize distinctively "bodily" rights and restrictions in at least some implantable devices.

How do people use 'killing', 'letting die' and related bioethical concepts? Contrasting descriptive and normative hypotheses

Bioethicists involved in end-of-life debates routinely distinguish between 'killing' and 'letting die'. Meanwhile, previous work in cognitive science has revealed that when people characterize behaviour as either actively 'doing' or passively 'allowing', they do so not purely on descriptive grounds, but also as a function of the behaviour's perceived morality. In the present report, we extend this line of research by examining how medical students and professionals (N = 184) and laypeople (N = 122) describe physicians' behaviour in end-of-life scenarios. We show that the distinction between 'ending' a patient's life and 'allowing' it to end arises from morally motivated causal selection. That is, when a patient wishes to die, her illness is treated as the cause of death and the doctor is seen as merely allowing her life to end. In contrast, when a patient does not wish to die, the doctor's behaviour is treated as the cause of death and, consequently, the doctor is described as ending the patient's life. This effect emerged regardless of whether the doctor's behaviour was omissive (as in withholding treatment) or commissive (as in applying a lethal injection). In other words, patient consent shapes causal selection in end-of-life situations, and in turn determines whether physicians are seen as 'killing' patients, or merely as 'enabling' their death.

What passive euthanasia is

BACKGROUND

Euthanasia can be thought of as being either active or passive; but the precise definition of "passive euthanasia" is not always clear. Though all passive euthanasia involves the withholding of life-sustaining treatment, there would appear to be some disagreement about whether all such withholding should be seen as passive euthanasia.

MAIN TEXT

At the core of the disagreement is the question of the importance of an intention to bring about death: must one intend to bring about the death of the patient in order for withholding treatment to count as passive euthanasia, as some sources would indicate, or does withholding in which death is merely foreseen belong to that category? We may expect that this unclarity would be important in medical practice, in law, and in policy. The idea that withholding life-sustaining treatment is passive euthanasia is traced to James Rachels's arguments, which lend themselves to the claim that passive euthanasia does not require intention to end life. Yet the argument here is that Rachels's arguments are flawed, and we have good reasons to think that intention is important in understanding the moral nature of actions. As such, we should reject any understanding of passive euthanasia that does not pay attention to intent.

SHORT CONCLUSION

James Rachels's work on active and passive euthanasia has been immensely influential; but this is an influence that we ought to resist.

Comparison of attitudes towards five end-of-life care interventions (active pain control, withdrawal of futile life-sustaining treatment, passive euthanasia, active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide): a multicentred cross-sectional survey of Korean patients with cancer, their family caregivers, physicians and the general Korean population

OBJECTIVES

This study determined attitudes of four groups-Korean patients with cancer, their family caregivers, physicians and the general Korean population-towards five critical end-of-life (EOL) interventions-active pain control, withdrawal of futile life-sustaining treatment (LST), passive euthanasia, active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.

DESIGN AND SETTING

We enrolled 1001 patients with cancer and 1006 caregivers from 12 large hospitals in Korea, 1241 members of the general population and 928 physicians from each of the 12 hospitals and the Korean Medical Association. We analysed the associations of demographic factors, attitudes towards death and the important components of a 'good death' with critical interventions at EoL care.

RESULTS

All participant groups strongly favoured active pain control and withdrawal of futile LST but differed in attitudes towards the other four EoL interventions. Physicians (98.9%) favoured passive euthanasia more than the other three groups. Lower proportions of the four groups favoured active euthanasia or PAS. Multiple logistic regression showed that education (adjusted OR (aOR) 1.77, 95% CI 1.33 to 2.36), caregiver role (aOR 1.67, 95% CI 1.34 to 2.08) and considering death as the ending of life (aOR 1.66, 95% CI 1.05 to 1.61) were associated with preference for active pain control. Attitudes towards death, including belief in being remembered (aOR 2.03, 95% CI 1.48 to 2.79) and feeling 'life was meaningful' (aOR 2.56, 95% CI 1.58 to 4.15) were both strong correlates of withdrawal of LST with the level of monthly income (aOR 2.56, 95% CI 1.58 to 4.15). Believing 'freedom from pain' negatively predicted preference for passive euthanasia (aOR 0.69, 95% CI 0.55 to 0.85). In addition, 'not being a burden to the family' was positively related to preferences for active euthanasia (aOR 1.62, 95% CI 1.39 to 1.90) and PAS (aOR 1.61, 95% CI 1.37 to 1.89).

CONCLUSION

Groups differed in their attitudes towards the five EoL interventions, and those attitudes were significantly associated with various attitudes towards death.

The sensitivity argument against child euthanasia

Is there a moral difference between euthanasia for terminally ill adults and euthanasia for terminally ill children? Luc Bovens considers five arguments to this effect, and argues that each is unsuccessful. In this paper, I argue that Bovens' dismissal of the sensitivity argument is unconvincing.

Support for Voluntary Euthanasia with No Logical Slippery Slope to Non-Voluntary Euthanasia

This paper demonstrates that acceptance of voluntary euthanasia does not generate commitment to either non-voluntary euthanasia or euthanasia on request. This is accomplished through analysis of John Keown's and David Jones's slippery slope arguments, and rejection of their view that voluntary euthanasia requires physicians to judge patients as better off dead. Instead, voluntary euthanasia merely requires physicians to judge patients as within boundaries of appropriate deference. This paper develops two ways of understanding and defending voluntary euthanasia on this model, one focused on the independent value of patients' autonomy and the other on the evidence of well-being provided by patients' requests. Both avoid the purported slippery slopes and both are independently supported by an analogy to uncontroversial elements of medical practice. Moreover, the proposed analyses of voluntary euthanasia suggest parameters for the design of euthanasia legislation, both supporting and challenging elements of existing laws in Oregon and the Netherlands.

Active and Passive Physician-Assisted Dying and the Terminal Disease Requirement

The view that voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should be made available for terminal patients only is typically warranted by reference to the risks that the procedures are seen to involve. Though they would appear to involve similar risks, the commonly endorsed end-of-life practices referred to as passive euthanasia are available also for non-terminal patients. In this article, I assess whether there is good reason to believe that the risks in question would be bigger in the case of voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide than in that of passive euthanasia. I propose that there is not. On that basis, I suggest that limiting access to voluntary active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide to terminal patients only is not consistent with accepting the existing practices of passive euthanasia.

Killing or letting die? Proposal of a (somewhat) new answer to a perennial question

There is as yet no widely agreed-upon solution to the standard textbook problem whether actively shutting off a life-sustaining medical device, e.g. a respirator, and thus bringing about a patient's death amounts to active killing or just to an omission of further treatment. Apart from a range of astutely contrived case examples and respective particular solutions proposed in the literature, there seems to be no consensus on the normative principles such solutions should be grounded in, not even on the need for such principles beyond sheer intuition. The present paper attempts to develop a normative approach based on fundamental principles of law. From this perspective, what is decisive for the question of 'killing or letting die' in such cases is not that death ensues from a behaviour that is active and relevantly causative, but rather, whether or not the agent in performing the deadly act transgresses the boundaries of the domain of his or her sole normative authority, and thereby intervenes in the protected sphere of another. Unless he or she does so, their behaviour cannot be classified as active commission regardless of the amount of causal activity it may display and regardless of its potentially harmful consequences. This conception is spelled out in detail and tested in a range of case examples, as are several of its corollaries that deviate from standard type solutions.

Death, treatment decisions and the permanent vegetative state: evidence from families and experts

Some brain injured patients are left in a permanent vegetative state, i.e., they have irreversibly lost their capacity for consciousness but retained some autonomic physiological functions, such as breathing unaided. Having discussed the controversial nature of the permanent vegetative state as a diagnostic category, we turn to the question of the patients' ontological status. Are the permanently vegetative alive, dead, or in some other state? We present empirical data from interviews with relatives of patients, and with experts, to support the view that the ontological state of permanently vegetative patients is unclear: such patients are neither straightforwardly alive nor simply dead. Having defended this view from counter-arguments we turn to the practical question as to how these patients ought to be treated. Some relatives and experts believe it is right for patients to be shifted from their currently unclear ontological state to that of being straightforwardly dead, but many are concerned or even horrified by the only legally sanctioned method guaranteed to achieve this, namely withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration. A way of addressing this distress would be to allow active euthanasia for these patients. This is highly controversial; but we argue that standard objections to allowing active euthanasia for this particular class of permanently vegetative patients are weakened by these patients' distinctive ontological status.

[General practitioner and palliative sedation]

Recent publications in Dutch national newspapers on palliative sedation have raised concerns about its use in general practice. There is now evidence that there is no significant increase in the incidence of palliative sedation. Euthanasia requests were pending in 20.8% of the cases in which palliative sedation was performed, but the general practitioners could clearly justify why they made this choice. This is important because it indicates that they are aware of a sharp distinction between euthanasia and palliative sedation. Although the decision to perform palliative sedation was discussed with almost all cancer patients, patient involvement was less present in non-cancer conditions. This may be related to different disease trajectories, but it also indicates that attention should be devoted to earlier identification of patients in need of palliative care. The findings confirm that the practice of palliative sedation by general practitioners largely reflects the recommendations of the Dutch National Guideline on Palliative Sedation.

[Written advance directives in dementia: useful and relevant]

According to the Dutch euthanasia law, the current wishes of the patient can be replaced by an advance directive if the patient is unable to give consent. However, Dutch physicians say they have difficulty responding to advance directives in people with dementia. A crucial issue is how to establish whether the patient actually suffers in a specific situation. We argue that the patient's wishes, views and decisions should be discussed in a timely manner, and laid down both in patient directives and in the doctor's files. We also ask for regular discussion, updating and reaffirmation of the advance directive so that the patient can trust the doctor knowing the patient's wishes and what constitutes unbearable suffering for that patient. Through frequent discussion and reaffirmation, the advance directive can play the role intended by the law on euthanasia.

Markers for heightened monitoring, imminent death, and euthanasia in aged inbred mice

The goal of this study was to identify objective criteria that would reliably predict spontaneous death in aged inbred mice. We evaluated male and female AKR/J mice, which die at a relatively young age due to the development of lymphoma, as well as male C57BL/6J and BALB/cByJ mice. Mice were implanted subcutaneously with an identification chip that also allowed remote measurement of body temperature. Temperatures and body weights were measured weekly until spontaneous death occurred or until euthanasia was performed for humane reasons. In AKR/J mice, hypothermia and weight loss began about 4 wk prior to death and increased gradually during that antemortem interval. In C57BL/6J and BALB/cByJ mice, these declines began earlier and were more prolonged prior to death. However, C57BL/6J and BALB/cByJ mice developed a relatively precipitous hypothermia during the 2 wk prior to death. For all 3 strains, the derived composite score of temperature × weight, expressed as a percentage of stable values for each mouse, was similarly informative. These changes in individual and composite measures can signal the need for closer observation or euthanasia of individual mice. Validated markers of clinical decline or imminent death can allow the use of endpoints that reduce terminal distress, do not significantly affect longevity or survival data, and permit timely collection of biologic samples.

The Royal College of Nursing guidance on responding to a request to hasten death

In July 2009, when the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) Council in the UK moved to a neutral position on assisted suicide, it also determined that guidance for its members was needed. In October 2011 this guidance was finally published (RCN, 2011). Here the context, scope, and content of this publication are considered.

Exploring the case for assisted dying in the UK

This article discusses the concepts of euthanasia, assisted suicide and physician-assisted suicide, under the umbrella term of assisted dying, from a pro-assisted dying perspective. It outlines the key principles underpinning the debate around assisted dying and refutes the main arguments put forward by those opposing legalisation of assisted dying in the UK.

Do guidelines on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in Dutch hospitals and nursing homes reflect the law? A content analysis

To describe the content of practice guidelines on euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) and to compare differences between settings and guidelines developed before or after enactment of the euthanasia law in 2002 by means of a content analysis. Most guidelines stated that the attending physician is responsible for the decision to grant or refuse an EAS request. Due care criteria were described in the majority of guidelines, but aspects relevant for assessing these criteria were not always described. Half of the guidelines described the role of the nurse in the performance of euthanasia. Compared with hospital guidelines, nursing home guidelines were more often stricter than the law in excluding patients with dementia (30% vs 4%) and incompetent patients (25% vs 4%). As from 2002, the guidelines were less strict in categorically excluding patients groups (32% vs 64%) and in particular incompetent patients (10% vs 29%). Healthcare institutions should accurately state the boundaries of the law, also when they prefer to set stricter boundaries for their own institution. Only then can guidelines provide adequate support for physicians and nurses in the difficult EAS decision-making process.

Moral duties and euthanasia: why to kill is not necessarily the same as to let die

David Shaw's response to Hugh McLachlan's criticism of his proposed new perspective on euthanasia is ineffectual, mistaken and unfair. It is false to say that the latter does not present an argument to support his claim that there is a moral difference between killing and letting die. It is not the consequences alone of actions that constitute their moral worth. It can matter too what duties are breached or fulfilled by the particular moral agents who are involved.

'There is a time to be born and a time to die' (Ecclesiastes 3:2a): Jewish perspectives on euthanasia

Reviewing the publications of prominent American rabbis who have (extensively) published on Jewish biomedical ethics, this article highlights Orthodox, Conservative and Reform opinions on a most pressing contemporary bioethical issue: euthanasia. Reviewing their opinions against the background of the halachic character of Jewish (biomedical) ethics, this article shows how from one traditional Jewish textual source diverse, even contradictory, opinions emerge through different interpretations. In this way, in the Jewish debate on euthanasia the specific methodology of Jewish (bio)ethical reasoning comes forward as well as a diversity of opinion within Judaism and its branches.

Attitudes and experiences of Belgian physicians regarding euthanasia practice and the euthanasia law

CONTEXT

Since the legalization of euthanasia, physicians in Belgium may, under certain conditions, administer life-ending drugs at the explicit request of a patient.

OBJECTIVES

To study the attitudes of Belgian physicians toward the use of life-ending drugs and euthanasia law, factors predicting attitudes, and factors predicting whether a physician has ever performed euthanasia.

METHODS

In 2009, we sent a questionnaire to a representative sample of 3006 Belgian physicians who, because of their specialty, were likely to be involved in the care of the dying.

RESULTS

Response rate was 34%. Ninety percent of physicians studied were accepting of euthanasia for terminal patients who had extreme uncontrollable pain/symptoms. Sixty-six percent agreed that the euthanasia law contributes to the carefulness of physicians' end-of-life behavior; 10% agreed that the law impedes the development of palliative care. Religious beliefs and geographic region were strong determinants of attitude. Training in palliative care did not influence attitudes regarding euthanasia, but trained physicians were less likely to agree that the euthanasia law impedes the development of palliative care than were nontrained physicians. One in five physicians had performed euthanasia; they were more likely to be nonreligious, older, specialist, trained in palliative care, and to have had more experience in treating the dying.

CONCLUSION

Most physicians studied support euthanasia for terminal patients with extreme uncontrollable pain/symptoms and agree that euthanasia can be part of good end-of-life care. Although physicians had little involvement in the process of legalizing euthanasia, they now generally endorse the euthanasia law.

Doctor-cared dying instead of physician-assisted suicide: a perspective from Germany

The current article deals with the ethics and practice of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and dying. The debate about PAS must take the important legal and ethical context of medical acts at the end of life into consideration, and cannot be examined independently from physicians' duties with respect to care for the terminally ill and dying. The discussion in Germany about active euthanasia, limiting medical intervention at the end of life, patient autonomy, advanced directives, and PAS is not fundamentally different in content and arguments from discussions led in other European countries and the United States. This must be emphasized, since it is occasionally claimed that in Germany a thorough discussion could not be held with the same openness as in other countries due to Germany's recent history. Still, it is worthwhile to portray the debate, which has been held intensively both among experts and the German public, from the German perspective. In general, it can be stated that in Germany debates about questions of medical ethics and bioethics are taking place with relatively large participation of an interested public, as shown, for instance, by the intense recent discussions about the legalisation of advanced directives on June 18 2009, the generation and use of embryonic stem cells in research or the highly difficult challenges for the prioritizing and rationing of scarce resources within the German health care system. Hence, the current article provides some insights into central medical and legal documents and the controversial public debate on the regulation of end-of-life medical care. In conclusion, euthanasia and PAS as practices of direct medical killing or medically assisted killing of vulnerable persons as "due care" is to be strictly rejected. Instead, we propose a more holistically-oriented palliative concept of a compassionate and virtuous doctor-cared dying that is embedded in an ethics of care.

"It's intense, you know." Nurses' experiences in caring for patients requesting euthanasia

The Belgian Act on Euthanasia came into force on 23 September 2002, making Belgium the second country--after the Netherlands--to decriminalize euthanasia under certain due-care conditions. Since then, Belgian nurses have been increasingly involved in euthanasia care. In this paper, we report a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with 18 nurses from Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) who have had experience in caring for patients requesting euthanasia since May 2002 (the approval of the Act). We found that the care process for patients requesting euthanasia is a complex and dynamic process, consisting of several stages, starting from the period preceding the euthanasia request and ending with the aftercare stage. When asked after the way in which they experience their involvement in the euthanasia care process, all nurses described it as a grave and difficult process, not only on an organizational and practical level, but also on an emotional level. "Intense" is the dominant feeling experienced by nurses. This is compounded by the presence of other feelings such as great concern and responsibility on the one hand, being content in truly helping the patient to die serenely, and doing everything in one's power to contribute to this; but also feeling unreal and ambivalent on the other hand, because death is arranged. Nurses feel a discrepancy, because although it is a nice death, which happens in dignity and with respect, it is also an unnatural death. The clinical ethical implications of these findings are discussed.

Some comments on the substituted judgement standard

On a traditional interpretation of the substituted judgement standard (SJS) a person who makes treatment decisions on behalf of a non-competent patient (e.g. concerning euthanasia) ought to decide as the patient would have decided had she been competent. I propose an alternative interpretation of SJS in which the surrogate is required to infer what the patient actually thought about these end-of-life decisions. In clarifying SJS it is also important to differentiate the patient's consent and preference. If SJS is part of an autonomy ideal of the sort found in Kantian ethics, consent seems more important than preference. From a utilitarian perspective a preference-based reading of SJS seems natural. I argue that the justification of SJS within a utilitarian framework will boil down to the question whether a non-competent patient can be said to have any surviving preferences. If we give a virtue-ethical justification of SJS the relative importance of consent and preferences depends on which virtue one stresses--respect or care. I argue that SJS might be an independent normative method for extending the patient's autonomy, both from a Kantian and a virtue ethical perspective.

Passive and active euthanasia: what is the difference?

In order to discuss the normative aspects of euthanasia one has to clarify what is meant by active and passive euthanasia. Many philosophers deny the possibility of distinguishing the two by purely descriptive means, e.g. on the basis of theories of action or the differences between acting and omitting to act. Against this, such a purely descriptive distinction will be defended in this paper by discussing and refining the theory developed by Dieter Birnbacher in his "Tun und Unterlassen". On this basis I will suggest a new definition of active and passive euthanasia.

A plea for pragmatism in clinical research ethics

Pragmatism is a distinctive approach to clinical research ethics that can guide bioethicists and members of institutional review boards (IRBs) as they struggle to balance the competing values of promoting medical research and protecting human subjects participating in it. After defining our understanding of pragmatism in the setting of clinical research ethics, we show how a pragmatic approach can provide guidance not only for the day-to-day functioning of the IRB, but also for evaluation of policy standards, such as the one that addresses acceptable risks for healthy children in clinical research trials. We also show how pragmatic considerations might influence the debate about the use of deception in clinical research. Finally, we show how a pragmatic approach, by regarding the promotion of human research and the protection of human subjects as equally important values, helps to break down the false dichotomy between science and ethics in clinical research.

[Evaluation of attitude towards euthanasia expressed by first year medical students from Szczecin, Greifswald and Lund medical faculties]

INTRODUCTION

Medical students' attitude towards euthanasia is a very important ethical problem because they may grapple with this question as future doctors. The aim of the study was to compare the attitude to euthanasia in the group of first year medical students from Pomeranian Medical University in Szczecin, Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University Greifswald (Germany) and Lund University (Sweden).

MATERIAL AND METHODS

The study is based on anonymous filling out of the questionnaire about euthanasia by first year medical students. 233 students (61%) answered the questionnaire. There were 65 Polish students, 71 German and 97 Swedish ones. In the group of respondents there were 129 (55%) women and 104 (45%) men. The average age was 22.3 years.

RESULTS

82% of questioned German students declared the acceptance of euthanasia and it was a significantly higher percentage than in comparison to 61% of Swedish students (p < 0.007) and 48% Polish ones (p < 0.0001). Poles were more often against euthanasia (29%) in comparison to 12% of Swedes (p < 0.02) and 3% of Germans (p < 0.001). Unnatural support of patient's life was the most often accepted by students clinical situation to use euthanasia. Significantly more Germans than Poles (79% vs 48%; p < 0.005) and Swedes (79% vs 50%; p < 0.02) accepted euthanasia in the group of questioned students declaring themselves as believers.

CONCLUSIONS

German students in the highest percentage declared the acceptance of euthanasia and Polish ones--the highest objection. It may be connected with religious beliefs as the element of cultural differences among above three countries. It seems very proper to continue the study among older medical students.

Public attitudes to life-sustaining treatments and euthanasia in dementia

BACKGROUND

Issues surrounding end of life care, such as how aggressively to treat life threatening medical conditions in patients with dementia and when, if ever, to withhold or withdraw treatment require further scrutiny and debate.

METHODS

We conducted a cross-sectional survey to elicit the views of the general public on euthanasia and life-sustaining treatments in the face of dementia.

RESULTS

Seven hundred and twenty-five members of the general public completed this questionnaire throughout London and the South East. In the face of severe dementia, less than 40% of respondents would wish to be resuscitated after a heart attack, nearly three-quarters wanted to be allowed to die passively and almost 60% agreed with physician assisted suicide. Respondents were more likely to be in favour of life-sustaining treatments for their partner than for themselves and the opposite was true regarding euthanasia. White respondents were significantly more likely to refuse life-sustaining treatment and to agree to euthanasia compared with black and Asian respondents.

CONCLUSION

Our survey suggests that a large proportion of the UK general public do not wish for life-sustaining treatments if they were to become demented and the majority agreed with various forms of euthanasia.

Physician medical decision-making at the end of life in newborns: insight into implementation at 2 Dutch centers

OBJECTIVE

Decisions regarding end-of-life care in critically ill newborns in The Netherlands have received considerable criticism from the media and from the public. This might be because of a lack of proper information and knowledge. Our purpose was to provide detailed information about how and when the implementation of end-of-life decisions, which are based on quality-of-life considerations, takes place.

METHODS

We reviewed the charts of all infants who died within the first 2 months of life at 2 university hospitals in The Netherlands from January to July 2005 and extracted all relevant information about the end-of-life decisions. We interviewed the responsible neonatologists about the end-of-life decisions and the underlying quality-of-life considerations and about the process of implementation.

RESULTS

Of a total of 30 deaths, 28 were attributable to withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. In 18 of 28 cases, the infant had no chance to survive; in 10 cases, the final decision was based on the poor prognosis of the infant. In 6 patients, 2 successive different end-of-life decisions were made. The arguments that most frequently were used to conclude that quality of life was deemed poor were predicted suffering and predicted inability of verbal and nonverbal communication. Implementation consisted of discontinuation of ventilatory support and alleviation of pain and symptoms. Neuromuscular blockers were added shortly before death in 5 cases to prevent gasping, mostly on parental request.

CONCLUSIONS

The majority of deaths were attributable to withholding or withdrawing treatment. In most cases, the newborn had no chance to survive and prolonging of treatment could not be justified. In the remaining cases, withholding or withdrawing treatment was based on quality-of-life considerations, mostly the predicted suffering and predicted inability of verbal and nonverbal communication. Potentially life-shortening medication played a minor role as a cause of death.

Palliative sedation at end of life—A systematic literature review

Palliative sedation at the end of life to handle unmanageable symptoms has been much debated. A systematic literature review in three phases including a content analysis of 15 articles published between the years 1990 and 2005 has been conducted. The aim was to describe the phenomenon of 'palliative sedation at the end of life' from a nursing perspective. The results can be summarised in three themes: 'Important factors leading to the patient receiving sedation at the end of life', 'Attitudes to palliative sedation at the end of life' and 'Nurses' experience of palliative sedation at the end of a patient's life'. Together, the themes show that palliative sedation is a phenomenon that could be described as sedation given to fewer than 40% of dying patients during their last 4 days of life. It is usually given because of the patient's pain, agitation and/or dyspnoea. Professionals usually have positive attitudes towards it and their view differs from that of the public's view regarding it as continuously deep sedation, whereas the public regards it as being close to euthanasia. Studies focusing on nursing care during palliative sedation are hard to find and this underlines the importance of further research in this area to elucidate the nurses' role during palliative sedation.

National ethical directives and practical aspects of forgoing life-sustaining treatment in newborn infants in a Swiss intensive care unit

QUESTION UNDER STUDY

How do actual aspects of forgoing life supporting therapy (LST) in newborn infants compare with national ethical directives in a Swiss intensive care unit?

METHODS

A prospective set of data on deaths after forgoing LST over a three year period in a single intensive care unit is analysed in view of the directives issued by the Swiss Academy for Medical Sciences (SAMS).

RESULTS

Thirty-four newborn infants died after a decision to forgo LST, 21 after withdrawing and 13 after withholding. The decision making process was confined to the caregivers' team. Parents rarely initiated the discussion but participated in all decisions and were considered as willing in 32% and consenting in 68%. Futility was invoked in 79% of cases and poor developmental outcome in 21%. Respiratory support was forgone in 59%, circulatory support in 6% and both in 35%. The mother assisted the child at the time of death in 91%. At that time, 82% of infants were receiving opiates and 18% benzodiazepines, some in a higher than usual dose. Death occurred at a median of 13 (25-75% = 6-25) minutes after withdrawing LST and 70 (27.5-147.5) after withholding (p <0.001) without correlation with the dose of analgesic or sedative administered. None of these observations obviously departed from the Swiss ethical directives.

CONCLUSIONS

Practices surrounding forgoing LST in newborn infants in a Swiss intensive care unit match ethical directives. Factors leading to occasional use of unusually high dose of analgesic and sedative drugs remain to be identified.

Terminal sedation and euthanasia: a comparison of clinical practices

BACKGROUND

An important issue in the debate about terminal sedation is the extent to which it differs from euthanasia. We studied clinical differences and similarities between both practices in the Netherlands.

METHODS

Personal interviews were held with a nationwide stratified sample of 410 physicians (response rate, 85%) about the most recent cases in which they used terminal sedation, defined as administering drugs to keep the patient continuously in deep sedation or coma until death without giving artificial nutrition or hydration (n = 211), or performed euthanasia, defined as administering a lethal drug at the request of a patient with the explicit intention to hasten death (n = 123). We compared characteristics of the patients, the decision-making process, and medical care of both practices.

RESULTS

Terminal sedation and euthanasia both mostly concerned patients with cancer. Patients receiving terminal sedation were more often anxious (37%) and confused (24%) than patients receiving euthanasia (15% and 2%, respectively). Euthanasia requests were typically related to loss of dignity and a sense of suffering without improving, whereas requesting terminal sedation was more often related to severe pain. Physicians applying terminal sedation estimated that the patient's life had been shortened by more than 1 week in 27% of cases, compared with 73% in euthanasia cases.

CONCLUSIONS

Terminal sedation and euthanasia both are often applied to address severe suffering in terminally ill patients. However, terminal sedation is typically used to address severe physical and psychological suffering in dying patients, whereas perceived loss of dignity during the last phase of life is a major problem for patients requesting euthanasia.

After the slippery slope: Dutch experiences on regulating active euthanasia

"When a country legalizes active euthanasia, it puts itself on a slippery slope from where it may well go further downward." If true, this is a forceful argument in the battle of those who try to prevent euthanasia from becoming legal. The force of any slippery slope argument, however, is by definition limited by its reference to future developments which cannot empirically be sustained. Experience in the Netherlands--where a law regulating active euthanasia was accepted in April 2001--may shed light on the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the slippery slope argument in the context of the euthanasia debate. This paper consists of three parts. First, it clarifies the Dutch legislation on euthanasia and explains the cultural context in which it originated. Second, it looks at the argument of the slippery slope. A logical and an empirical version are distinguished, and the latter, though philosophically less interesting, proves to be most relevant in the discussion on euthanasia. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether Dutch experiences in the process of legalizing euthanasia justify the fear of the slippery slope. The conclusion is that Dutch experiences justify some caution.

Palliative sedation in dying patients: "we turn to it when everything else hasn't worked"

Despite skilled palliative care, some dying patients experience distressing symptoms that cannot be adequately relieved. A patient with metastatic breast cancer, receiving high doses of opioids administered to relieve pain, developed myoclonus. After other approaches proved ineffective, palliative sedation was an option of last resort. The doctrine of double effect, the traditional justification for palliative sedation, permits physicians to provide high doses of opioids and sedatives to relieve suffering, provided that the intention is not to cause the patient's death and that certain other conditions are met. Such high doses are permissible even if the risk of hastening death is foreseen. Because intention plays a key role in this doctrine, clinicians must understand and document which actions are consistent with an intention to relieve symptoms rather than to hasten death. The patient or family should agree with plans for palliative sedation. The attending physician needs to explain to them, as well as to the medical and nursing staff, the details of care and the justification for palliative sedation. Because cases involving palliative sedation are emotionally stressful, the patient, family, and health care workers can all benefit from talking about the complex medical, ethical, and emotional issues they raise.