Global taxonomic, functional, and phylogenetic diversity of bees in apple orchards

An essential prerequisite to safeguard pollinator species is characterisation of the multifaceted diversity of crop pollinators and identification of the drivers of pollinator community changes across biogeographical gradients. The extent to which intensive agriculture is associated with the homogenisation of biological communities at large spatial scales remains poorly understood. In this study, we investigated diversity drivers for 644 bee species/morphospecies in 177 commercial apple orchards across 33 countries and four global biogeographical biomes. Our findings reveal significant taxonomic dissimilarity among biogeographical zones. Interestingly, despite this dissimilarity, species from different zones share similar higher-level phylogenetic groups and similar ecological and behavioural traits (i.e. functional traits), likely due to habitat filtering caused by perennial monoculture systems managed intensively for crop production. Honey bee species dominated orchard communities, while other managed/manageable and wild species were collected in lower numbers. Moreover, the presence of herbaceous, uncultivated open areas and organic management practices were associated with increased wild bee diversity. Overall, our study sheds light on the importance of large-scale analyses contributing to the emerging fields of functional and phylogenetic diversity, which can be related to ecosystem function to promote biodiversity as a key asset in agroecosystems in the face of global change pressures.

Implying implausibility and undermining versus accepting peoples' experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm in Emergency Department psychosocial assessments

Background

Patients seeking emergency care for self-harm and suicidality report varying experiences from being believed and taken seriously to not being believed and taken seriously. Epistemic injustice provides a conceptual framework to explore how peoples' experiences of self-harm and suicidality are believed or not. We use an empirical method -conversation analysis - to analyze epistemics in clinical communication, focusing on how knowledge is claimed, contested and negotiated. In courtroom, police and political interaction, conversation analysis has identified communication practices implying implausibility in a person's story to contest and recharacterize their accounts.

Aims

To investigate communication practices in Emergency Department (ED) biopsychosocial assessments that may (1) undermine, imply implausibility and recharacterize or (2) accept peoples' experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm.

Methods

Using conversation analysis, we micro-analyzed verbal and non-verbal communication in five video-recorded biopsychosocial assessments with people presenting to the ED with self-harm or suicidal ideation, and conducted supplementary analysis of participants' medical records and post-visit interviews. We present three cases where experiences were not accepted and undermined/recharacterized and two cases where experiences were accepted and validated.

Results

When peoples' experiences of suicidality and self-harm were not accepted or were undermined, questioners: did not acknowledge or accept the person's account; asked questions that implied inconsistency or implausibility ("Didn't you tell your GP that you were coping okay?"); juxtaposed contrasting information to undermine the person's account ("You said you were coping okay before, and now you're saying you feel suicidal"); asked questions asserting that, e.g., asking for help implied they were not intending to end their life ("So when you called 111 what were you expecting them to do"); and resistinged or directly questioned the person's account. Multiple practices across the assessment built on each other to assert that the person was not suicidal, did not look or act like they were suicidal; that the person's decision to attend the ED was not justified; that an overdose was impulsive and not intended to end life; asking why the person didn't take a more harmful medication to overdose; that self-harming behaviors were not that serious and should be in the person's control. Alternative characterizations were used to justify decisions not to provide further support or referrals to specialist services. At times, these practices were also delivered when speaking over the patient. When peoples' experiences were accepted, practitioners acknowledged, accepted, validated suicidality/self-harm and introduced a shared understanding of experiences that patients found helpful. Non-verbal feedback such as nodding and eye contact was central in acceptance of patients' accounts.

Conclusion

These findings advance our understanding of how peoples' experiences of suicidality or self-harm are undermined or accepted in mental health encounters in the ED. They have important clinical implications: patients report that when their experiences are not accepted or undermined, this makes them more distressed, less hopeful about the future and discourages future help-seeking when in crisis. Conversely, acknowledging, accepting and validating suicidality/self-harm and introducing a new ways of understanding peoples' experiences may make people less suicidal and more hopeful, generates shared understanding and encourages future help-seeking.

Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories?

According to a naturalist conception of what counts as a disorder, conspiracy beliefs are pathological beliefs if they are the outcome of a cognitive dysfunction. In this article, I take issue with the view that it is pathological to believe a conspiracy theory. After reviewing several approaches to the aetiology of conspiracy beliefs, I find that no approach compels us to view conspiracy beliefs as the outcome of a dysfunction: a speaker's conspiracy beliefs can appear as implausible and unshakeable to an interpreter, but in a naturalist framework it is not pathological for the speaker to adopt and maintain such beliefs.

Communication in youth mental health clinical encounters: Introducing the agential stance

When young people seek support from mental health care practitioners, the encounters may affect the young people's sense of self, and in particular undermine their sense of agency. For this study, an interdisciplinary team of academics and young people collaboratively analysed video-recorded encounters between young people and mental healthcare practitioners in emergency services. They identified five communication techniques that practitioners can use to avoid undermining the young person's sense of agency in the clinical encounter. They conceptualise the use of those techniques as the adoption of an agential stance towards the young person. The agential stance consists of: (a) validating the young person's experiences, (b) legitimising the young person's choice to seek help, (c) refraining from objectifying the young person, (d) affirming the young person's capacity to contribute to positive change, and (e) involving the young person in the decision-making process.

Debating Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Death in People with Psychiatric Disorders

PURPOSE OF REVIEW

Over the last 30 years, medical assistance in dying (MAiD) including euthanasia (EU) and physician-assisted death (or suicide, PAS) has become the center of a large debate, particularly when these practices have involved people with psychiatric illness, including resistant depression, schizophrenia, personality, or other severe psychiatric disorders. We performed a review utilizing several databases, and by including the most relevant studies in full journal articles investigating the problem of MAiD in patients with psychiatric disorders but not in physical terminal conditions (non-terminal, MAiD-NT).

RECENT FINDINGS

Literature has shown that a small percentage of people with psychiatric disorders died by MAiD-NT in comparison with patients with somatic diseases in terminal clinical conditions (e.g., cancer, AIDS). However, the problem in the field is complex and not solved yet as confirmed by the fact that only a few countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg) have legalized MAiD-NT for patients with psychiatric disorders, while most have maintained the practices accessible only to people with somatic disease in a terminal phase. Also, how to make objective the criterion of irremediability of a mental disorder; how to balance suicide prevention with assisted suicide; how to avoid the risk of progressively including in requests for MAiD-NT vulnerable segments of the population, such as minors, elderly, or people with dementia, in a productive-oriented society, are some of the critical points to be discussed. The application of MAiD-NT in people with psychiatric disorders should be further explored to prevent end-of-life rights from contradicting the principles of recovery-oriented care.

Treating disease progression with osimertinib in EGFR-mutated non-small-cell lung cancer: novel targeted agents and combination strategies

A precision medicine approach has been successfully applied in medical oncology for the treatment of non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC) through the identification of targetable driver molecular aberrations; activating mutations of epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) are the most common. Osimertinib, a third-generation, wild-type sparing, irreversible EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor (TKI), originally showed a striking activity after progression to first- and second-generation EGFR-TKIs when T790M resistance mutation was identified. Thereafter, upfront use of osimertinib became the standard of care based on overall survival benefit over first-generation TKIs erlotinib and gefitinib as reported in the FLAURA trial. For patients progressing on osimertinib, identification of resistance mechanisms is crucial to develop novel targeted therapeutic approaches. Moreover, innovative drugs or combination therapies are being developed for cases in which a specific resistance mechanism is not identifiable. In this review, the post-osimertinib treatment options for EGFR-mutated NSCLC are analyzed, with an outlook to ongoing clinical trials. An algorithm to guide clinicians in managing progression on osimertinib is proposed.

Do delusions have and give meaning?

Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; (2) some delusions can also enhance the sense that one's life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one's unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one's endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people's lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions.

Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs

A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users' sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reasons why the sense of epistemic agency may be especially fragile in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs. We argue that it is important to identify and avoid behaviours that can undermine young people's contributions as epistemic agents in the clinical encounter.

Toxicity of the insecticide sulfoxaflor alone and in combination with the fungicide fluxapyroxad in three bee species

The sulfoximine insecticide sulfoxaflor is regarded as a potential substitute for neonicotinoids that were recently banned in the EU due to their side effects on bees. Like neonicotinoids, sulfoxaflor acts as a competitive modulator of nicotinic acetylcholine receptors. In agricultural environments, bees are commonly exposed to combinations of pesticides, and neonicotinoids are known to interact synergistically with fungicides. The objective of our study is to assess the acute oral toxicity of sulfoxaflor alone and in combination with a single dose of fluxapyroxad, a succinate dehydrogenase inhibitor (SDHI) fungicide, in three bee species: Apis mellifera, Bombus terrestris and Osmia bicornis. Because synergism may be dose-dependent, we tested a range of sulfoxaflor doses. Synergistic effects were assessed using three different approaches: Bliss criterion of drugs independence, ratio test comparing LD50s and model deviation ratio. Osmia bicornis was the most sensitive species to sulfoxaflor and both O. bicornis and A. mellifera showed significant synergism between the insecticide and the fungicide. For the most part, these synergistic effects were weak and only occurred at early assessment times and intermediate sulfoxaflor doses. The potential ecological relevance of these effects should be confirmed in field and/or cage studies. Overall, our laboratory results demonstrate that sulfoxaflor is somewhat less toxic than the recently banned neonicotinoids imidacloprid, thiamethoxam and clothianidin, but much more toxic than other neonicotinoids (acetamiprid, thiacloprid) still in use in the EU at the time this study was conducted.

Doctors without ‘Disorders’

On one influential view, the problems that should attract medical attention involve a disorder, because the goals of medical practice are to prevent and treat disorders. Based on this view, if there are no mental disorders then the status of psychiatry as a medical field is challenged. In this paper, I observe that it is often difficult to establish whether the problems that attract medical attention involve a disorder, and argue that none of the notions of disorder proposed so far offers a successful demarcation criterion between medical and non-medical problems. As an illustration, I consider why delusions are considered pathological and whether they attract medical attention in virtue of being pathological, where ‘pathological’ stands for ‘being caused by a disorder’. Although there are several promising answers to what makes delusions pathological, available accounts of the pathological nature of delusions fail to distinguish delusions from other irrational beliefs that are not typically thought of as pathological; and cannot explain why delusions typically attract medical attention whereas other irrational beliefs do not.

Instrumental rationality and suicide in schizophrenia: a case for rational suicide?

It is estimated that up to 7500 people develop schizophrenia each year in the UK. Schizophrenia has significant consequences, with 28% of the excess mortality in schizophrenia being attributed to suicide. Previous research suggests that suicide in schizophrenia may be more related to affective factors such as depression and hopelessness, rather than psychotic symptoms themselves. Considering suicide in schizophrenia within this framework enables us to develop a novel philosophical approach, in which suicide may not be related to loss of self-consciousness, thought processing dysfunctions or perception disturbances. The action of suicide may be due neither to persistent hallucinations nor other psychotic symptoms, such as delusional beliefs, but to other underexamined, perhaps rational reasons, such as extreme social isolation, severe depression or emotional withdrawal. This paper does not examine the moral character of suicide. Instead, it argues that we should conceive the action of suicide in schizophrenia as an act that is not necessarily irrational. People with schizophrenia might end their life based on reasons if suicide is the best means to achieve their ends. However, the paper does not support assisted suicide. It aims to provide a better understanding of the reasons why people take their own lives and suggests that understanding can inform effective interventions to reduce high rates of suicide.

Female volatiles as sex attractants in the invasive population of Vespa velutina nigrithorax

Due to its huge invasion potential and specialization in honeybee predation, the invasive hornet Vespa velutina nigrithorax represents a high-concern species under both an ecological and economical perspective. In light of the development of specific odorant attractants to be used in sustainable control strategies, we carried out both behavioural assays and chemical analyses to investigate the possibility that, in the invasive population of V. velutina nigrithorax, reproductive females emit volatile pheromones to attract males, as demonstrated in a Chinese non-invasive population. We focused on the secretions produced by sternal and venom glands; because of the volatility and complexity of their composition, both of them could potentially allow an attraction and a species-specific response, decreasing therefore non-target species by-catches. Results of chemical analyses and behavioural assays showed that venom volatiles, although population-specific, are unlikely candidates as male attractants since they do not differ in composition or in quantity between reproductive females and workers and do not attract males. Conversely, sternal gland secretion differs between female castes for the presence of some ketoacids exclusive of gynes already reported as sex pheromones for the non-invasive subspecies V. velutina auraria. Despite such a difference, males are attracted by the sternal gland secretion of both workers and gynes. These results provide a first step to understand the reproductive biology of V. velutina nigrithorax in its invasive range and to develop effective and sustainable management strategies for the species.

Are clinical delusions adaptive?

Delusions are symptoms of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and dementia. By and large, delusions are characterized by their behavioral manifestations and defined as irrational beliefs that compromise good functioning. In this overview paper, we ask whether delusions can be adaptive notwithstanding their negative features. Can they be a response to a crisis rather than the source of the crisis? Can they be the beginning of a solution rather than the problem? Some of the psychological, psychiatric, and philosophical literature has recently suggested that they can. We consider different types of delusions and different ways in which they can be considered as adaptive: psychologically (e.g., by increasing wellbeing, purpose in life, intrapsychic coherence, or good functioning) and biologically (e.g., by enhancing genetic fitness). Although further research is needed to map the costs and benefits of adopting and maintaining delusional beliefs, a more nuanced picture of the role of delusions in people's lives has started to emerge.

This article is categorized under:

Philosophy > Representation

Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief

Neuroscience > Cognition

Effects of nonprotein amino acids on survival and locomotion of Osmia bicornis

To investigate the effects of two nectar nonprotein amino acids, β-alanine and γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA), on Osmia bicornis survival and locomotion, two groups of caged bees were fed with sugar syrup enriched with β-alanine and GABA, respectively. A further control group was fed with sugar syrup. Five behavioural categories were chosen according to the principle of parsimony and intrinsic unitary consistency from start to end, and recorded by scan sampling: two states (remaining under paper or in tubes) and three events (walking on net, feeding from flower and flying). We also analysed the amino acid content of haemolymph sampled from an additional 45 bees fed the same diets (15 per diet type). Bees fed with β-alanine had a significantly shorter survival time than those fed with the control and GABA diets. The GABA diet induced higher levels of locomotion than β-alanine. The former nonprotein amino acid was only detected in the haemolymph of bees fed GABA. The results suggest that insects consuming nonprotein amino-acid-rich diets absorb and transfer these substances to the haemolymph and that nonprotein amino acids affect survival and locomotion. Ecological consequences are discussed in the framework of plant reproductive biology.

The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions

In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in people's memory of their past, where people's self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people's capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people's sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological well-being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.

Surgery Followed by Intracavitary plus Systemic Chemotherapy in Malignant Pleural Mesothelioma

Aims and background

Malignant mesothelioma is associated with a median survival of 4 to 12 months. Data from the literature indicate that single modality treatment (surgery or intrapleural and/or systemic chemotherapy) does not significantly affect survival.

Methods

We therefore evaluated a combined approach consisting of surgery (pleurectomy + diaphragmatic or pericardial resection), intrapleural chemotherapy with cisplatin (100 mg/m2) and cytarabine (1,000 mg/m2) for 4 h immediately after pleurectomy, and systemic chemotherapy consisting of epirubicin (60 mg/m2) and mitomycin-C (10 mg/m2) day 1 every 4 weeks for 4 cycles.

Results

Twenty patients were enrolled in the study and were evaluable. Thirteen cases had residual gross disease after pleurectomy and 7 patients only minimal disease. Median time to disease progression was 7.4 months, and median survival was 11.5 months (range, 2-25+). No treatment-related death have been observed. Side effects after intracavitary chemotherapy included renal toxicity, anaemia and pain. Myelosuppression and alopecia were recorded during systemic chemotherapy.

Conclusions

The results of the study indicate that the schedule is feasible, with encouraging results in terms of survival for patients with minimal residual disease after surgery.

Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation

In this paper I discuss the costs and benefits of confabulation, focusing on the type of confabulation people engage in when they offer explanations for their attitudes and choices. What makes confabulation costly? In the philosophical literature confabulation is thought to undermine claims to self-knowledge. I argue that when people confabulate they do not necessarily fail at mental-state self-attributions, but offer ill-grounded explanations which often lead to the adoption of other ill-grounded beliefs. What, if anything, makes confabulation beneficial? As people are unaware of the information that would make their explanations accurate, they are not typically in a position to acknowledge their ignorance or provide better-grounded explanations for their attitudes and choices. In such cases, confabulating can have some advantages over offering no explanation because it makes a distinctive contribution to people's sense of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents. This role of ill-grounded explanations could not be as easily played by better-grounded explanations should these be available. In the end, I speculate about the implications of this conclusion for attempting to eliminate or reduce confabulation.

What is unrealistic optimism?

Here we consider the nature of unrealistic optimism and other related positive illusions. We are interested in whether cognitive states that are unrealistically optimistic are belief states, whether they are false, and whether they are epistemically irrational. We also ask to what extent unrealistically optimistic cognitive states are fixed. Based on the classic and recent empirical literature on unrealistic optimism, we offer some preliminary answers to these questions, thereby laying the foundations for answering further questions about unrealistic optimism, such as whether it has biological, psychological, or epistemic benefits.