A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Pay-for-Performance Initiative to Reduce Costs of Care for High-Need Psychiatric Patients

OBJECTIVE

Pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives hold promise for improving health care delivery but are rarely applied to behavioral health or tested in randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This RCT examined the effectiveness of a P4P initiative to reduce total cost of 24-hour care among patients with high needs for psychiatric care in a large county in California.

METHODS

From August 2016 to March 2022, a total of 652 adult residents of Santa Clara County, California, were enrolled in a P4P initiative (mean±SD age=46.7±13.3 years, 61% male, 51% White, and 60% diagnosed as having a bipolar or psychotic disorder). Participants were randomly assigned to usual full-service partnerships from the county (N=327) or a comparable level of care from a contractor who agreed to a schedule of financial penalties and rewards based on whether enrollees (N=325) used more or less care than a historical cohort of similar county patients. The primary outcome was total cost of 24-hour psychiatric services. Secondary outcomes were costs of each of the 24-hour care services.

RESULTS

The proportion of the total sample that used 24-hour psychiatric services decreased over the 36-month study period. Intent-to-treat analyses revealed no differences between the two study conditions in total care costs during the follow-up period. No significant care utilization differences were observed between the two conditions in most of the individual 24-hour services.

CONCLUSIONS

A P4P initiative for high-need patients was no more effective than usual care for reducing costs of 24-hour psychiatric care.

Pricing, Procurement and Reimbursement Policies for Incentivizing Market Entry of Novel Antibiotics and Diagnostics: Learnings from 10 Countries Globally

BACKGROUND

Fostering market entry of novel antibiotics and enhanced use of diagnostics to improve the quality of antibiotic prescribing are avenues to tackle antimicrobial resistance (AMR), which is a major public health threat. Pricing, procurement and reimbursement policies may work as AMR 'pull incentives' to support these objectives. This paper studies pull incentives in pricing, procurement and reimbursement policies (e.g., additions to, modifications of, and exemptions from standard policies) for novel antibiotics, diagnostics and health products with a similar profile in 10 study countries. It also explores whether incentives for non-AMR health products could be transferred to AMR health products.

METHODS

This research included a review of policies in 10 G20 countries based on literature and unpublished documents, and the production of country fact sheets that were validated by country experts. Initial research was conducted in 2020 and updated in 2023.

RESULTS

Identified pull incentives in pricing policies include free pricing, higher prices at launch and price increases over time, managed-entry agreements, and waiving or reducing mandatory discounts. Incentives in procurement comprise value-based procurement, pooled procurement and models that delink prices from volumes (subscription-based schemes), whereas incentives in reimbursement include lower evidence requirements for inclusion in the reimbursement scheme, accelerated reimbursement processes, separate budgets that offer add-on funding, and adapted prescribing conditions.

CONCLUSIONS

While a few pull incentives have been piloted or implemented for antibiotics in recent years, these mechanisms have been mainly used to incentivize launch of certain non-AMR health products, such as orphan medicines. Given similarities in their product characteristics, transferability of some of these pull incentives appears to be possible; however, it would be essential to conduct impact assessments of these incentives. Trade-offs between incentives to foster market entry and thus potentially improve access and the financial sustainability for payers need to be addressed.

Understanding the municipal-level design and adaptation of pay-for-performance schemes across two states of Brazil

The design of complex health systems interventions, such as pay for performance (P4P), can be critical to determining such programmes' success. In P4P programmes, the design of financial incentives is crucial in shaping how these programmes work. However, the design of such schemes is usually homogenous across providers within a given scheme. Consequently, there is a limited understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P design elements from the implementers' perspective. This study takes advantage of the unique context of Brazil, where municipalities adapted the federal incentive design, resulting in variations in incentive design across municipalities. The study aims to understand why municipalities in Brazil chose certain P4P design features, the associated challenges and the local adaptations made to address problems in scheme design. This study was a multiple case study design relying on qualitative data from 20 municipalities from two states in Northeastern Brazil. We conducted two key informant interviews with municipal-level stakeholders and focus group discussions with primary care providers. We also reviewed municipal Primary Care Access and Quality laws in each municipality. We found substantial variation in the design choices made by municipalities regarding 'who was incentivized', the 'payment size' and 'frequency'. Design choices affected relationships within municipalities and within teams. Challenges were chiefly associated with fairness relating to 'who received the incentive', 'what is incentivized' and the 'incentive size'. Adaptations were made to improve fairness, mostly in response to pressure from the healthcare workers. The significant variation in design choices across municipalities and providers' response to them highlights the importance of considering local context in the design and implementation of P4P schemes and ensuring flexibility to accommodate local preferences and emerging needs. Attention is needed to ensure that the choice of 'who is incentivized' and the 'size of incentives' are inclusive and fair and the allocation and 'use of funds' are transparent.

Positive Effect of a Financial Incentive on Radiologist Compliance With Quality Metric Placement in Knee Radiography Reports

PURPOSE

Ongoing quality improvement (QI) processes in the authors' department include the insertion of a Kellgren-Lawrence (KL) osteoarthritis grading template in knee radiography reports to decrease unnecessary MRI. However, uniform adoption of this grading system is lacking. Department-wide financial incentives were instituted to improve compliance with QI metrics. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of a financial incentive on KL grading system use and to compare compliance rates of musculoskeletal (MSK) radiologists with those of general radiologists who were not financially incentivized to use KL grading.

METHODS

Percentages of all knee radiography reports containing KL grading with standardized follow-up recommendations were determined by querying the departmental radiology database before and after the introduction of the new quality-based financial incentive. Preincentive compliance rates for MSK and general radiologists were compared with an adoption period and two separate 6-month postincentive periods.

RESULTS

In total, 52,673 reports were retrospectively analyzed for KL grading use (41,670 reports interpreted by MSK radiologists and 11,003 interpreted by general radiologists). Increase in compliance was greatest among MSK radiologists' reports during the incentivized adoption period (from 36.1% to 53.2%). This improvement was sustained among MSK radiologists and averaged 62.7% during the most recently studied postimplementation period. A lesser degree of improvement in compliance was observed in nonincentivized general radiologists' reports (from 19.3% to 27.5%); during the postimplementation follow-up period, their compliance decreased to 26.5%.

CONCLUSIONS

The introduction of a financial incentive resulted in significantly increased adoption of QI practices with sustained improvement among incentivized MSK radiologists compared with nonincentivized general radiologists.

Assessing the uptake of incentivised physical health checks for people with serious mental illness: a cohort study in primary care

BACKGROUND

People with serious mental illness are more likely to experience physical illnesses. The onset of many of these illnesses can be prevented if detected early. Physical health screening for people with serious mental illness is incentivised in primary care in England through the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF). GPs are paid to conduct annual physical health checks on patients with serious mental illness, including checks of body mass index (BMI), cholesterol, and alcohol consumption.

AIM

To assess the impact of removing and reintroducing QOF financial incentives on uptake of three physical health checks (BMI, cholesterol, and alcohol consumption) for patients with serious mental illness.

DESIGN AND SETTING

Cohort study using UK primary care data from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink between April 2011 and March 2020.

METHOD

A difference-in-difference analysis was employed to compare differences in the uptake of physical health checks before and after the intervention, accounting for relevant observed and unobserved confounders.

RESULTS

An immediate change was found in uptake after physical health checks were removed from, and after they were added back to, the QOF list. For BMI, cholesterol, and alcohol checks, the overall impact of removal was a reduction in uptake of 14.3, 6.8, and 11.9 percentage points, respectively. The reintroduction of BMI screening in the QOF increased the uptake by 10.2 percentage points.

CONCLUSION

This analysis supports the hypothesis that QOF incentives lead to better uptake of physical health checks.

Pay-for-Performance incentives for specialised services in England: a mixed methods evaluation

BACKGROUND

A Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programme, known as Prescribed Specialised Services Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (PSS CQUIN), was introduced for specialised services in the English NHS in 2013/2014. These services treat patients with rare and complex conditions. We evaluate the implementation of PSS CQUIN contracts between 2016/2017 and 2018/2019.

METHODS

We used a mixed methods evaluative approach. In the quantitative analysis, we used a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the effectiveness of ten PSS CQUIN schemes across a range of targeted outcomes. Potential selection bias was addressed using propensity score matching. We also estimated impacts on costs by scheme and financial year. In the qualitative analysis, we conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to gain insights into the complexities of contract design and programme implementation. Qualitative data analysis was based on the constant comparative method, inductively generating themes.

RESULTS

The ten PSS CQUIN schemes had limited impact on the targeted outcomes. A statistically significant improvement was found for only one scheme: in the clinical area of trauma, the incentive scheme increased the probability of being discharged from Adult Critical Care within four hours of being clinically ready by 7%. The limited impact may be due to the size of the incentive payments, the complexity of the schemes' design, and issues around ownership, contracting and flexibility.

CONCLUSION

The PSS CQUIN schemes had little or no impact on quality improvements in specialised services. Future P4P programmes in healthcare could benefit from lessons learnt from this study on incentive design and programme implementation.

Pay-for-Performance Incentives for Home Dialysis Use and Kidney Transplant

Importance

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' mandatory End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choices (ETC) model, launched on January 1, 2021, randomly assigned approximately 30% of US dialysis facilities and managing clinicians to financial incentives to increase the use of home dialysis and kidney transplant.

Objective

To assess the ETC's association with use of home dialysis and kidney transplant during the model's first 2 years and examine changes in these outcomes by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status.

Design, Setting, and Participants

This retrospective cross-sectional study used claims and enrollment data for traditional Medicare beneficiaries with kidney failure from 2017 to 2022 linked to same-period transplant data from the United Network for Organ Sharing. The study data span 4 years (2017-2020) before the implementation of the ETC model on January 1, 2021, and 2 years (2021-2022) following the model's implementation.

Exposure

Receiving dialysis treatment in a region randomly assigned to the ETC model.

Main Outcomes and Measures

Primary outcomes were use of home dialysis and kidney transplant. A difference-in-differences (DiD) approach was used to estimate changes in outcomes among patients treated in regions randomly selected for ETC participation compared with concurrent changes among patients treated in control regions.

Results

The study population included 724 406 persons with kidney failure (mean [IQR] age, 62.2 [53-72] years; 42.5% female). The proportion of patients receiving home dialysis increased from 12.1% to 14.3% in ETC regions and from 12.9% to 15.1% in control regions, yielding an adjusted DiD estimate of -0.2 percentage points (pp; 95% CI, -0.7 to 0.3 pp). Similar analysis for transplant yielded an adjusted DiD estimate of 0.02 pp (95% CI, -0.01 to 0.04 pp). When further stratified by sociodemographic measures, including age, sex, race and ethnicity, dual Medicare and Medicaid enrollment, and poverty quartile, there was not a statistically significant difference in home dialysis use across joint strata of characteristics and ETC participation.

Conclusions and Relevance

In this cross-sectional study, the first 2 years of the ETC model were not associated with increased use of home dialysis or kidney transplant, nor changes in racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic disparities in these outcomes.

How personnel diversity and affective bonds affect performance-based financing: a moderator analysis of a difference-in-difference estimator

To spur improvement in health-care service quality and quantity, performance-based financing (PBF) is an increasingly common policy tool, especially in low- and middle-income countries. This study examines how personnel diversity and affective bonds in primary care clinics affect their ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Leveraging data from a large-scale matched PBF intervention in Tajikistan including 208 primary care clinics, we examined how measures of personnel diversity (position and tenure variety) and affective bonds (mutual support and group pride) were associated with changes in the level and variability of clinical knowledge (diagnostic accuracy of 878 clinical vignettes) and care processes (completion of checklist items in 2485 instances of direct observations). We interacted the explanatory variables with exposure to PBF in cluster-robust, linear regressions to assess how these explanatory variables moderated the PBF treatment's association with clinical knowledge and care process improvements. Providers and facilities with higher group pride exhibited higher care process improvement (greater checklist item completion and lower variability of items completed). Personnel diversity and mutual support showed little significant associations with the outcomes. Organizational features of clinics exposed to PBF may help explain variation in outcomes and warrant further research and intervention in practice to identify and test opportunities to leverage them. Group pride may strengthen clinics' ability to improve care quality in PBF arrangements. Improving health-care facilities' pride may be an affordable and effective way to enhance health-care organization adaptation.

Is pay for performance promoting inverse inequality in Irish general practice?

BACKGROUND

In 2020, the Chronic Disease Management (CDM) programme was introduced in Ireland. This programme resources GPs to review public (GMS) patients, diagnosed with eight named chronic diseases, twice yearly according to a structured protocol. This pay for performance initiative has been widely adopted by GPs. However, it is hypothesised that private patients (PPs) receive a poorer standard of care, as they may be reluctant to attend due to the cost involved.

AIM

To assess whether the management of eight chronic diseases named in the CDM programme is to the same standard among both PPs and GMS patients.

METHOD

A retrospective audit of GP practices in the Midwest of Ireland. Data relating to 25 GMS patients and 25 PPs, matched by age, gender, and clinical condition, is collected from each practice. Patients have at least 1 of the eight named chronic diseases. Parameters include vaccination status (influenza, pneumococcal, COVID); body mass index; blood pressure; smoking status; renal function; HbA1c; lipid profile; brain natriuretic peptide (BNP) in patients with heart failure; and lung function tests in patients with COPD or asthma. COVID vaccination status acts as a control because it is freely available for both PPs and GMS patients.

RESULTS

Preliminary results from 2 GP practices show large consistent disparities in management between PPs and GMS patients in most parameters.

CONCLUSION

Limiting Pay for Performance to the care of GMS patients only, based on age or income, promotes inverse inequality. We argue that CDM care should be offered to all patients.

Does pay-for-performance design matter? Evidence from Brazil

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have been shown to have mixed effects on health care outcomes. A challenge in interpreting this evidence is that P4P is often considered a homogenous intervention, when in practice schemes vary widely in their design. Our study contributes to this literature by providing a detailed depiction of incentive design across municipalities within a national P4P scheme in Brazil [Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ)] and exploring the association of alternative design typologies with the performance of primary health care providers. We carried out a nation-wide survey of municipal health managers to characterize the scheme design, based on the size of the bonus, the providers incentivized and the frequency of payment. Using OLS regressions and controlling for municipality characteristics, we examined whether each design feature was associated with better family health team (FHT) performance. To capture potential interactions between design features, we used cluster analysis to group municipalities into five design typologies and then examined associations with quality of care. A majority of the municipalities included in our study used some of the PMAQ funds to provide bonuses to FHT workers, while the remaining municipalities spent the funds in the traditional way using input-based budgets. Frequent bonus payments (monthly) and higher size bonus allocations (share of 20-80%) were strongly associated with better team performance, while who within a team was eligible to receive bonuses did not in isolation appear to influence performance. The cluster analysis showed what combinations of design features were associated with better performance. The PMAQ score in the 'large bonus/many workers/high-frequency' cluster was 8.44 points higher than the 'no bonus' cluster, equivalent to a difference of 21.7% in the mean PMAQ score. Evidence from our study shows how design features can potentially influence health provider performance, informing the design of more effective P4P schemes.

Hospital strategies in commercial episode-based reimbursement

OBJECTIVES

To understand hospitals' approaches to spending reduction in commercial episode-based payment programs and inform incentive design.

STUDY DESIGN

Qualitative arm of an explanatory sequential mixed-methods study involving semistructured interviews with hospital leaders participating in a statewide quality improvement collaborative with novel episode-based incentive payments introduced by the state's largest commercial payer.

METHODS

We recruited 21 leaders from 8 purposively selected, diverse hospitals with both high and low performance. Video teleconference-based interviews followed a standardized protocol and addressed 4 domains: choice of clinical condition for evaluation, strategies for episode spending reduction, best practices for success in earning incentives, and barriers to achievement. Rapid qualitative analysis with purposeful data reduction was employed to generate a matrix of key themes within the study domains.

RESULTS

Strategies were similar between high- and low-performing hospitals. When selecting conditions, some hospitals focused on areas of underperformance, aiming for improvement opportunities, whereas others chose conditions already achieving highest efficiency. Many tried to synergize with other ongoing improvement initiatives and clinical areas with established leaders and champions. Key strategies included data-driven improvement, care standardization, and protocol dissemination. Best practices for success included readmission prevention and postacute care spending containment.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings highlighted hospitals' most common strategies and approaches, providing several insights into optimal design of commercial episode-based incentives: They must be lucrative enough to earn attention or consistent with larger federal programs; hospitals need opportunities to succeed through both improved performance and sustained excellence; and programs may incur malalignment between hospitals and credentialed physicians.

Can performance-based financing improve efficiency of health centers in Ethiopia? A Malmquist Productivity Index analysis

INTRODUCTION

The Ethiopian government has introduced several healthcare financing reforms intending to improve efficiency. Piloting implementation of performance-based financing is one of these actions. The purpose of this research is to assess the efficiency of healthcare facilities that have implemented performance-based financing compared to those that have not.

METHODS

Efficiency was measured using a nonparametric data envelopment analysis and the Malmquist Productivity Index technique. Total factor productivity change, technical change, and technological change are compared across eight sampled healthcare facilities that are implementing performance-based financing and eight that are not in Ethiopia.

RESULTS

Health facilities implementing performance-based financing have a mean technical efficiency score of 64%, allowing for a potential 36% reduction in inputs without affecting outputs. Their scale efficiency is 88%, indicating a potential 12% increase in total outputs without expanding facilities. In contrast, facilities not implementing performance-based financing have a mean technical efficiency score of 62%, with a potential for 38% input reduction without affecting outputs. Their scale efficiency is 87%, suggesting a potential 13% increase in total outputs without scaling up facilities. Among the 16 healthcare facilities observed, seven experienced a decline in the mean total productivity, while one remained stagnant. The remaining eight facilities witnessed an increase in productivity. The healthcare facilities implementing performance-based financing showed a 1.3% decrease in mean total productivity during the observed period. Among them, five showed an increase and three showed a decrease in the total factor of productivity. The mean total factor of productivity of all healthcare facilities not implementing performance-based financing remained stagnant over the three-year period (2019-2021), with four showing an increase and four showing a decrease in total productivity.

CONCLUSIONS

The study concludes that implementing performance-based financing did not improve productivity levels among healthcare facilities over three years. In fact, productivity decreased among the facilities implementing performance-based financing, while those not implementing it remained stagnant. This shows health facilities that implement performance-based financing tend to utilize more resources for similar outputs, contradicting the anticipated efficiency improvement.

Effects of Performance-Based Financing on Availability, Quality, and Use of Family Planning Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Impact Evaluation

Access to high-quality family planning services remains limited in many low- and middle-income countries, resulting in a high burden of unintended pregnancies and adverse health outcomes. We used data from a large randomized controlled trial in the Democratic Republic of Congo to test whether performance-based financing (PBF) can increase the availability, quality, and use of family planning services. Starting at the end of 2016, 30 health zones were randomly assigned to a PBF program, in which health facilities received financing conditional on the quantity and quality of offered services. Twenty-eight health zones were assigned to a control group in which health facilities received unconditional financing of a similar magnitude. Follow-up data collection took place in 2021-2022 and included 346 health facility assessments, 476 direct clinical observations of family planning consultations, and 9,585 household surveys. Findings from multivariable regression models show that the PBF program had strong positive impacts on the availability and quality of family planning services. Specifically, the program increased the likelihood that health facilities offered any family planning services by 20 percentage points and increased the likelihood that health facilities had contraceptive pills, injectables, and implants available by 23, 24, and 20 percentage points, respectively. The program also improved the process quality of family planning consultations by 0.59 standard deviations. Despite these improvements, and in addition to reductions in service fees, the program had a modest impact on contraceptive use, increasing the modern method use among sexually active women of reproductive age by 4 percentage points (equivalent to a 37 percent increase), with no significant impact on adolescent contraceptive use. These results suggest that although PBF can be an effective approach for improving the supply of family planning services, complementary demand-side interventions are likely needed in a setting with very low baseline utilization.

Value-Based Payment to Support Health Care Transition for Young Adults with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities: A Feasibility Study

INTRODUCTION

Only 20% of youth with intellectual and developmental disability (ID/DD) receive health care transition (HCT) preparation from their health care providers (HCPs). To address HCT system gaps, the first-of-its-kind HCT value-based payment (VBP) pilot was conducted for young adults (YA) with ID/DD.

METHODS

This feasibility study examined the acceptability, implementation, and potential for expansion of the pilot, which was conducted within a specialty Medicaid managed care organization (HSCSN) in Washington, DC. With local pediatric and adult HCPs, the HCT intervention included a final pediatric visit, medical summary, joint HCT visit, and initial adult visit. The VBP was a mix of fee-for-service and pay-for-performance incentives. Feasibility was assessed via YA feedback surveys and interviews with HSCSN, participating HCPs, and selected state Medicaid officials.

RESULTS

Regarding acceptability, HSCSN and HCPs found the HCT intervention represented a more organized approach and addressed an unmet need. YA with ID/DD and caregivers reported high satisfaction. Regarding implementation, nine YA with ID/DD participated. Benefits were reported in patient engagement, exchange of health information, and care management and financial support. Challenges included care management support needs, previous patient gaps in care, and scheduling difficulties. Regarding expansion, HSCSN and HCPs agreed that having streamlined care management support, medical summary preparation, and payment for HCT services are critical.

DISCUSSION

This study examined the benefits and challenges of a HCT VBP approach and considerations for future expansion, including payer/HCP collaboration, HCT care management support, and updated system technology and interoperability.

DataDerm: Improving trends in performance measurement

BACKGROUND

Medicare's legacy quality reporting programs were consolidated into the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) in 2015.

PURPOSE

The DataDerm registry of the American Academy of Dermatology was examined to understand the potential for and subsequent rate of improvement across 23 performance measures.

METHODS

We examined the level of performance across 23 performance measures with at least 20 clinicians reporting on at least 50 patients' experience. We calculated the following values: the aggregate performance rate for each measure and the overall aggregate performance rate.

RESULTS

The aggregate performance rate for each measure ranged from 20.4% for AAD 1 (Psoriasis: Assessment of Disease Activity), to 99.9% for measure ACMS 1 (Avoidance of Opioid Prescriptions for Reconstruction After Skin Resection). Three of 23 measures had an aggregate performance over 95%. The overall aggregate performance rate across all 23 measures was 81.2%, indicating an aggregate potential for improvement of 18.8% across the 23 measures. Nine performance measures reported across the first five years of DataDerm's existence were tracked through time to understand trends in performance through time. The performance across the nine performance measures meeting the inclusion criteria consistently improved in the initial years (2016 through 2018) of DataDerm participation and showed some variation in 2019 and 2020.

CONCLUSIONS

These data provide evidence that the very act of participation in a multi-institutional registry and tracking compliance with performance measures can lead to improvements in compliance with the performance measures and therefore improvements in quality of care.

Pay-for-performance and patient safety in acute care: A systematic review

Pay-for-performance (p4p) has been tried in all healthcare settings to address ongoing deficiencies in the quality and outcomes of care. The evidence for the effect of these policies has been inconclusive, especially in acute care. This systematic review focused on patient safety p4p in the hospital setting. Using the PRISMA guidelines, we searched five biomedical databases for quantitative studies using at least one outcome metric from database inception to March 2023, supplemented by reference tracking and internet searches. We identified 6,122 potential titles of which 53 were included: 39 original investigations, eight literature reviews and six grey literature reports. Only five system-wide p4p policies have been implemented, and the quality of evidence was low overall. Just over half of the studies (52 %) included failed to observe improvement in outcomes, with positive findings heavily skewed towards poor quality evaluations. The exception was the Fragility Hip Fracture Best Practice Tariff (BPT) in England, where sustained improvement was observed across various evaluations. All policies had a miniscule impact on total hospital revenue. Our findings underscore the importance of simple and transparent design, involvement of the clinical community, explicit links to other quality improvement initiatives, and gradual implementation of p4p initatives. We also propose a research agenda to lift the quality of evidence in this field.

New CMS Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Value Pathway After Total Knee and Hip Arthroplasty: Preparing for Mandatory Reporting

This article discusses the implementation of a new Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Value Pathway (MVPs) applicable to elective total hip and total knee arthroplasty as created by Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) - the Improving Care for Lower Extremity Joint Repair MVP (MVP ID: G0058). We describe specific quality measures, surgeon-hospital collaborations, future developments with Quality Payment Program, and how lessons from early implementation will empower clinicians to participate in the refining of this MVP. The CMS has designed MVPs as a subset of measures relevant to a specialty or medical condition, in an effort to reduce the burden of reporting and improve assessment of care quality. Physicians and payors must be mindful of detrimental effects these measures in their current form may have on surgeons, institutions, and patients, including disincentivizing care for sicker or more vulnerable populations, and increased administrative costs. Early voluntary participation is crucial to gain valuable experience for the orthopedic community and in an effort to work alongside CMS to maximize care while minimizing cost for patients and burden for providers.

Effect on hospital incentive payments and quality performance of a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme in Belgium

BACKGROUND

Belgium initiated a hospital pay for performance (P4P) programme after a decade of fixed bonus budgets for "quality and safety contracts". This study examined the effect of P4P on hospital incentive payments, performance on quality measures, and the association between changes in quality performance and incentive payments over time.

METHODS

The Belgian government provided information on fixed bonus budgets in 2013-2017 and hospital incentive payments as well as hospital performance on quality measures for the P4P programmes in 2018-2020. Descriptive analyses were conducted to map the financial repercussion between the two systems. A difference-in-difference analysis evaluated the association between quality indicator performance and received incentive payments over time.

RESULTS

Data from 87 acute-care hospitals were analyzed. In the transition to a P4P programme, 29% of hospitals received lower incentive payments per bed. During the P4P years, quality performance scores increased yearly for 55% of hospitals and decreased yearly for 5% of hospitals. There was a significant larger drop in incentive payments for hospitals that scored above median with the start of the P4P programme.

CONCLUSIONS

The transition from fixed bonus budgets for quality efforts to a new incentive payment in a P4P programme has led to more hospitals being financially impacted, although the effect is marginal given the small P4P budget. Quality indicators seem to improve over the years, but this does not correlate with an increase in reward per bed for all hospitals due to the closed nature of the budget.

Diagnostic stewardship to improve patient outcomes and healthcare-associated infection (HAI) metrics

Diagnostic stewardship seeks to improve ordering, collection, performance, and reporting of tests. Test results play an important role in reportable HAIs. The inclusion of HAIs in public reporting and pay for performance programs has highlighted the value of diagnostic stewardship as part of infection prevention initiatives. Inappropriate testing should be discouraged, and approaches that seek to alter testing solely to impact a reportable metric should be avoided. HAI definitions should be further adapted to new testing technologies, with focus on actionable and clinically relevant test results that will improve patient care.

Low-dose aspirin for prevention of cardiovascular mortality in patients with type 2 diabetes and chronic kidney disease: A real-world nationwide cohort study

AIMS/INTRODUCTION

Cardiovascular mortality risk is elevated among patients with diabetes and concurrent chronic kidney disease. However, controversy surrounds the use of aspirin for primary prevention within this population. This study aims to assess the effectiveness and safety of low-dose aspirin for primary prevention in patients with diabetes and pre-end-stage renal disease.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This was a retrospective population-based cohort study using the National Health Insurance Research Database in Taiwan. The study included adults with type 2 diabetes who were enrolled in the pre-end-stage renal disease pay-for-performance program and had no atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. We used propensity score analysis to control baseline characteristics between the two groups. Clinical outcomes including cardiovascular mortality, all-cause mortality, major bleeding, and renal disease progression were compared between patients who first received aspirin and those who did not.

RESULTS

Between January 2012 and December 2015, a total of 2,155 low-dose aspirin users and 6,737 nonaspirin users were identified. Following propensity score adjustment, aspirin use exhibited a comparable risk of cardiovascular death compared with nonaspirin users (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR] 1.12; 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.65-1.95; P = 0.681). The risk of all-cause mortality was similar between the two groups (aHR 1.07; 95% CI 0.92-1.24; P = 0.385). Similar risks were observed in terms of major bleeding and renal disease progression.

CONCLUSIONS

In patients with diabetes and pre-end-stage renal disease who lacked atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, low-dose aspirin did not demonstrate a reduction in mortality. These findings do not support the use of aspirin for primary prevention in this high-risk population.

Improving Sepsis Outcomes in the Era of Pay-for-Performance and Electronic Quality Measures: A Joint IDSA/ACEP/PIDS/SHEA/SHM/SIDP Position Paper

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced the Severe Sepsis/Septic Shock Management Bundle (SEP-1) as a pay-for-reporting measure in 2015 and is now planning to make it a pay-for-performance measure by incorporating it into the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program. This joint IDSA/ACEP/PIDS/SHEA/SHM/SIPD position paper highlights concerns with this change. Multiple studies indicate that SEP-1 implementation was associated with increased broad-spectrum antibiotic use, lactate measurements, and aggressive fluid resuscitation for patients with suspected sepsis but not with decreased mortality rates. Increased focus on SEP-1 risks further diverting attention and resources from more effective measures and comprehensive sepsis care. We recommend retiring SEP-1 rather than using it in a payment model and shifting instead to new sepsis metrics that focus on patient outcomes. CMS is developing a community-onset sepsis 30-day mortality electronic clinical quality measure (eCQM) that is an important step in this direction. The eCQM preliminarily identifies sepsis using systemic inflammatory response syndrome (SIRS) criteria, antibiotic administrations or diagnosis codes for infection or sepsis, and clinical indicators of acute organ dysfunction. We support the eCQM but recommend removing SIRS criteria and diagnosis codes to streamline implementation, decrease variability between hospitals, maintain vigilance for patients with sepsis but without SIRS, and avoid promoting antibiotic use in uninfected patients with SIRS. We further advocate for CMS to harmonize the eCQM with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Adult Sepsis Event surveillance metric to promote unity in federal measures, decrease reporting burden for hospitals, and facilitate shared prevention initiatives. These steps will result in a more robust measure that will encourage hospitals to pay more attention to the full breadth of sepsis care, stimulate new innovations in diagnosis and treatment, and ultimately bring us closer to our shared goal of improving outcomes for patients.

Pay-for-performance programs effectiveness in healthcare: the case of the end-stage renal disease quality incentive program

This paper focuses on Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program (QIP). QIP aims to promote high-quality services in outpatient dialysis facilities by tying their payments to their performance on pre-specified quality measures. In this paper, employing principal-agent theory, we examine the effectiveness of QIP by exploring the changes in various clinical/operational measures when they become a part of the program as a performance measure. We study five QIP quality measures; two are operational: hospitalization and readmission. And three others are clinical: blood transfusion, hypercalcemia, and dialysis adequacy. Overall, we observe a significant improvement in all QIP quality measures after being included in the program, except for readmission. We recommend adjusting the weight and redesigning the readmission measure for Medicare to incentivize providers to reduce readmission. We also discuss establishing care coordination and employing data-driven clinical decision support systems as opportunities for dialysis facilities to improve the care delivery process.