Media Use Is Linked to Lower Psychological Well-Being: Evidence from Three Datasets

Adolescents spend a substantial and increasing amount of time using digital media (smartphones, computers, social media, gaming, Internet), but existing studies do not agree on whether time spent on digital media is associated with lower psychological well-being (including happiness, general well-being, and indicators of low well-being such as depression, suicidal ideation, and suicide attempts). Across three large surveys of adolescents in two countries (n = 221,096), light users (<1 h a day) of digital media reported substantially higher psychological well-being than heavy users (5+ hours a day). Datasets initially presented as supporting opposite conclusions produced similar effect sizes when analyzed using the same strategy. Heavy users (vs. light) of digital media were 48% to 171% more likely to be unhappy, to be in low in well-being, or to have suicide risk factors such as depression, suicidal ideation, or past suicide attempts. Heavy users (vs. light) were twice as likely to report having attempted suicide. Light users (rather than non- or moderate users) were highest in well-being, and for most digital media use the largest drop in well-being occurred between moderate use and heavy use. The limitations of using percent variance explained as a gauge of practical impact are discussed.

More Time on Technology, Less Happiness? Associations Between Digital-Media Use and Psychological Well-Being

Studies using large samples consistently find that more frequent users of digital media are lower in psychological well-being than less frequent users; even data sets used as evidence for weak effects show that twice as many heavy users (vs. light users) are low in well-being. Differences in perspective may stem from the statistics used; I argue that comparing well-being across levels of digital-media use is more useful than the percentage of variance explained, as most studies on digital-media use do not measure other influences on well-being (e.g., genetics, trauma), and these other influences, unlike frequency of digital-media use, are rarely controllable. Nonusers are generally lower in well-being than light users of digital media, however, suggesting that limited use may be beneficial. Longitudinal and experimental studies suggest that at least some of the causation moves from digital-media use to lower well-being. Mechanisms may include the displacement of activities more beneficial to well-being (sleep, face-to-face social interaction), upward social comparison, and cyberbullying.

Emerging adult reactions to labeling regarding age-group differences in narcissism and entitlement

Both academic and popular literatures have repeatedly contended that emerging adults are the most narcissistic and entitled age-group in modern times. Although this contention is fiercely debated, the message that emerging adults are narcissistic and entitled has saturated popular culture. Despite this saturation, relatively little empirical work has examined how emerging adults might react to such labels. Across three studies in five samples in the U.S., the present work sought to address this deficit in research. Results from cross-sectional samples of university students at two universities, as well as an online convenience sample of web-using adults (Study 1), indicated that emerging adults believe their age-group and the one following them (e.g., adolescents) to be the most narcissistic and entitled age-groups, that they have generally negative opinions of narcissism and entitlement, and that they respond negatively to being labeled as narcissistic and entitled. Additionally, results from adult web-users revealed that, while all age groups tend to view adolescents and emerging adults as more narcissistic and entitled than older age-groups, these opinions are more exaggerated among members of older age-groups. Finally, across two experimental studies (Studies 2 & 3), results indicated that emerging adults react negatively to labeling of their age-group as narcissistic and entitled, but no more negatively than they do to potentially related undesirable labels (e.g., oversensitive). Collectively, these results indicate that emerging adults are aware of and somewhat distressed by messaging that casts their age-group as the most narcissistic and entitled age-group ever.

Age, period, and cohort trends in mood disorder indicators and suicide-related outcomes in a nationally representative dataset, 2005-2017

Drawing from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH; N = 611,880), a nationally representative survey of U.S. adolescents and adults, we assess age, period, and cohort trends in mood disorders and suicide-related outcomes since the mid-2000s. Rates of major depressive episode in the last year increased 52% 2005-2017 (from 8.7% to 13.2%) among adolescents aged 12 to 17 and 63% 2009-2017 (from 8.1% to 13.2%) among young adults 18-25. Serious psychological distress in the last month and suicide-related outcomes (suicidal ideation, plans, attempts, and deaths by suicide) in the last year also increased among young adults 18-25 from 2008-2017 (with a 71% increase in serious psychological distress), with less consistent and weaker increases among adults ages 26 and over. Hierarchical linear modeling analyses separating the effects of age, period, and birth cohort suggest the trends among adults are primarily due to cohort, with a steady rise in mood disorder and suicide-related outcomes between cohorts born from the early 1980s (Millennials) to the late 1990s (iGen). Cultural trends contributing to an increase in mood disorders and suicidal thoughts and behaviors since the mid-2000s, including the rise of electronic communication and digital media and declines in sleep duration, may have had a larger impact on younger people, creating a cohort effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Associations between screen time and lower psychological well-being among children and adolescents: Evidence from a population-based study

Previous research on associations between screen time and psychological well-being among children and adolescents has been conflicting, leading some researchers to question the limits on screen time suggested by physician organizations. We examined a large (n = 40,337) national random sample of 2- to 17-year-old children and adolescents in the U.S. in 2016 that included comprehensive measures of screen time (including cell phones, computers, electronic devices, electronic games, and TV) and an array of psychological well-being measures. After 1 h/day of use, more hours of daily screen time were associated with lower psychological well-being, including less curiosity, lower self-control, more distractibility, more difficulty making friends, less emotional stability, being more difficult to care for, and inability to finish tasks. Among 14- to 17-year-olds, high users of screens (7+ h/day vs. low users of 1 h/day) were more than twice as likely to ever have been diagnosed with depression (RR 2.39, 95% CI 1.54, 3.70), ever diagnosed with anxiety (RR 2.26, CI 1.59, 3.22), treated by a mental health professional (RR 2.22, CI 1.62, 3.03) or have taken medication for a psychological or behavioral issue (RR 2.99, CI 1.94, 4.62) in the last 12 months. Moderate use of screens (4 h/day) was also associated with lower psychological well-being. Non-users and low users of screens generally did not differ in well-being. Associations between screen time and lower psychological well-being were larger among adolescents than younger children.

Cultural Individualism Is Linked to Later Onset of Adult-Role Responsibilities Across Time and Regions

This article explores links between cultural individualism and the age at which adult-role responsibilities are assumed (the speed of maturation to adulthood). Across 43 years (1973-2015) within the United States, yearly indicators of individualism were positively correlated with later onset of work and family responsibilities (a slow life strategy). The same pattern appeared cross-culturally: Across 53 nations, cultural individualism was significantly correlated with slower maturation to adulthood. These links remained over time and cross-culturally when unemployment rate, an indicator of economic strength, was included in the model. Analyses including GDP showed mixed results, suggesting a complex relationship between economic indicators, individualism, and maturation to adulthood. Across nations and time, more individualistic cultures are also those with slower maturation to adulthood (a slow life strategy).

Decreases in psychological well-being among American adolescents after 2012 and links to screen time during the rise of smartphone technology

In nationally representative yearly surveys of United States 8th, 10th, and 12th graders 1991-2016 (N = 1.1 million), psychological well-being (measured by self-esteem, life satisfaction, and happiness) suddenly decreased after 2012. Adolescents who spent more time on electronic communication and screens (e.g., social media, the Internet, texting, gaming) and less time on nonscreen activities (e.g., in-person social interaction, sports/exercise, homework, attending religious services) had lower psychological well-being. Adolescents spending a small amount of time on electronic communication were the happiest. Psychological well-being was lower in years when adolescents spent more time on screens and higher in years when they spent more time on nonscreen activities, with changes in activities generally preceding declines in well-being. Cyclical economic indicators such as unemployment were not significantly correlated with well-being, suggesting that the Great Recession was not the cause of the decrease in psychological well-being, which may instead be at least partially due to the rapid adoption of smartphones and the subsequent shift in adolescents' time use. (PsycINFO Database Record

Declines in Sexual Frequency among American Adults, 1989-2014

American adults had sex about nine fewer times per year in the early 2010s compared to the late 1990s in data from the nationally representative General Social Survey, N = 26,620, 1989-2014. This was partially due to the higher percentage of unpartnered individuals, who have sex less frequently on average. Sexual frequency declined among the partnered (married or living together) but stayed steady among the unpartnered, reducing the marital/partnered advantage for sexual frequency. Declines in sexual frequency were similar across gender, race, region, educational level, and work status and were largest among those in their 50s, those with school-age children, and those who did not watch pornography. In analyses separating the effects of age, time period, and cohort, the decline was primarily due to birth cohort (year of birth, also known as generation). With age and time period controlled, those born in the 1930s (Silent generation) had sex the most often, whereas those born in the 1990s (Millennials and iGen) had sex the least often. The decline was not linked to longer working hours or increased pornography use. Age had a strong effect on sexual frequency: Americans in their 20s had sex an average of about 80 times per year, compared to about 20 times per year for those in their 60s. The results suggest that Americans are having sex less frequently due to two primary factors: An increasing number of individuals without a steady or marital partner and a decline in sexual frequency among those with partners.

Sexual Inactivity During Young Adulthood Is More Common Among U.S. Millennials and iGen: Age, Period, and Cohort Effects on Having No Sexual Partners After Age 18

Examining age, time period, and cohort/generational changes in sexual experience is key to better understanding sociocultural influences on sexuality and relationships. Americans born in the 1980s and 1990s (commonly known as Millennials and iGen) were more likely to report having no sexual partners as adults compared to GenX'ers born in the 1960s and 1970s in the General Social Survey, a nationally representative sample of American adults (N = 26,707). Among those aged 20-24, more than twice as many Millennials born in the 1990s (15 %) had no sexual partners since age 18 compared to GenX'ers born in the 1960s (6 %). Higher rates of sexual inactivity among Millennials and iGen also appeared in analyses using a generalized hierarchical linear modeling technique known as age-period-cohort analysis to control for age and time period effects among adults of all ages. Americans born early in the 20th century also showed elevated rates of adult sexual inactivity. The shift toward higher rates of sexual inactivity among Millennials and iGen'ers was more pronounced among women and absent among Black Americans and those with a college education. Contrary to popular media conceptions of a "hookup generation" more likely to engage in frequent casual sex, a higher percentage of Americans in recent cohorts, particularly Millennials and iGen'ers born in the 1990s, had no sexual partners after age 18.

Self-Esteem and Socioeconomic Status: A Meta-Analytic Review

Socioeconomic status (SES) has a small but significantrelationship with self-esteem (d = .15, r = .08) in a meta-analysis of 446 samples (total participant N = 312,940). Higher SES individuals report higher self-esteem. The effect size is very small in young children, increases substantially during young adulthood, continues higher until middle age, and is then smaller for adults over the age of 60. Gender interacts with birth cohort: The effect size increased over time for women but decreased over time for men. Asians and Asian Americans show a higher effect size, and occupation and education produce higher correlations with self-esteem than income does. The results are most consistent with a social indicator or salience model.

Age and Birth Cohort Differences in Self-Esteem: A Cross-Temporal Meta-Analysis

A meta-analytic review finds that college students' self-esteem increased substantially between 1968 and 1994 when measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE). Children's scores on the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI) show a curvilinear pattern over time, decreasing from 1965 to 1979 and increasing from 1980 to 1993. Children's SEI scores are directly correlated with social statistics (e.g., divorce rate, unemployment) for the corresponding years. Analyses for age differences find that SEI scores decrease slightly during the transition from elementary school to junior high and then rise progressively through high school and college. RSE scores increase steadily with age. Results are discussed in terms of the antecedents of self-esteem, including social acceptance, competencies, and the culture of self-worth.

It's Beyond My Control: A Cross-Temporal Meta-Analysis of Increasing Externality in Locus of Control, 1960-2002

Two meta-analyses found that young Americans increasingly believe their lives are controlled by outside forces rather than their own efforts. Locus of control scores became substantially more external (about .80 standard deviations) in college student and child samples between 1960 and 2002. The average college student in 2002 had a more external locus of control than 80% of college students in the early 1960s. Birth cohort/time period explains 14% of the variance in locus of control scores. The data included 97 samples of college students (n = 18,310) and 41 samples of children ages 9 to 14 (n = 6,554) gathered from dissertation research. The results are consistent with an alienation model positing increases in cynicism, individualism, and the self-serving bias. The implications are almost uniformly negative, as externality is correlated with poor school achievement, helplessness, ineffective stress management, decreased self-control, and depression.

The Disruptive Effect of Self-Objectification on Performance

Self-objectification is the act of viewing the self, particularly the body, from a third-person perspective. Objectification theory proposes numerous negative consequences for those who self-objectify, including decreased performance through the disruption of focused attention. In the current study, we examined whether women in a state of self-objectification were slower to respond to a basic Stroop color-naming task. Results showed that regardless of the type of word (color words, body words, or neutral words), participants in a state of self-objectification exhibited decreased performance. This study lends further evidence to objectification theory and highlights the negative performance ramifications of state self-objectification.

Changes in American Adults' Reported Same-Sex Sexual Experiences and Attitudes, 1973-2014

We examined change over time in the reported prevalence of men having sex with men and women having sex with women and acceptance of those behaviors in the nationally representative General Social Survey of U.S. adults (n's = 28,161-33,728, ages 18-96 years), 1972-2014. The number of U.S. adults who had at least one same-sex partner since age 18 doubled between the early 1990s and early 2010s (from 3.6 to 8.7 % for women and from 4.5 to 8.2 % for men). Bisexual behavior (having sex with both male and female partners) increased from 3.1 to 7.7 %, accounting for much of the rise, with little consistent change in those having sex exclusively with same-sex partners. The increase in same-sex partners was larger for women than for men, consistent with erotic plasticity theory. Attitudes toward same-sex sexual behavior also became substantially more accepting, d = .75, between the early 1970s and early 2010s. By 2014, 49 % of American adults believed that same-sex sexual activity was "not wrong at all," up from 11 % in 1973 and 13 % in 1990. Controlling for acceptance reduced, but did not eliminate, the increase in same-sex behavior over time. Mixed effects (hierarchical linear modeling) analyses separating age, time period, and cohort showed that the trends were primarily due to time period. Increases in same-sex sexual behavior were largest in the South and Midwest and among Whites, were mostly absent among Blacks, and were smaller among the religious. Overall, same-sex sexual behavior has become both more common (or at least more commonly reported) and more accepted.

More Polarized but More Independent

In three nationally representative surveys of U.S. residents ( N = 10 million) from 1970 to 2015, more Americans in the early 2010s (vs. previous decades) identified as Independent, including when age effects were controlled. More in the early 2010s (vs. previous decades) expressed polarized political views, including stronger political party affiliation or more extreme ideological self-categorization (liberal vs. conservative) with fewer identifying as moderate. The correlation between party affiliation and ideological views grew stronger over time. The overall trend since the 1970s was toward more Americans identifying as Republican or conservative. Older adults were more likely to identify as conservative and Republican. More Millennials (born 1980-1994) identify as conservative than either GenXers or Boomers did at the same age, and fewer are Democrats compared with Boomers. These trends are discussed in the context of social identification processes and their implications for the political dynamics in the United States.

“Isn’t It Fun to Get the Respect That We’re Going to Deserve?” Narcissism, Social Rejection, and Aggression

Across four studies, narcissists were more angry and aggressive after experiencing a social rejection than were nonnarcissists. In Study 1, narcissism was positively correlated with feelings of anger and negatively correlated with more internalized negative emotions in a self-reported, past episode of social rejection. Study 2 replicated this effect for a concurrent lab manipulation of social rejection. In Study 3, narcissists aggressed more against someone who rejected them (i.e., direct aggression). In Study 4, narcissists were also more aggressive toward an innocent third party after experiencing social rejection (i.e., displaced aggression). Narcissists were not more aggressive after social acceptance. Self-esteem plays little role in predicting aggression in response to rejection. These results suggest that the combination of narcissism and social rejection is a powerful predictor of aggressive behavior.

“Mrs. His Name”: Women's Preferences For Married Names

Psychologists have long acknowledged the link between names and identity, but little research has studied women's choices about their married names. This study examines the descriptive characteristics of women who plan different choices and women's reasoning behind their choices in a sample of undergraduate women. Women who wish to keep or hyphenate their names have more feminist attitudes, score higher on instrumentality/agency, and are more likely to be immigrants and/or women of color. Content coding of open-ended responses on reasons for name choices showed those who want their husbands' names for themselves and their children most often cited tradition, a denial that names were linked with identity, and union within marriage. Women who want to keep or hyphenate their names mentioned the link between names and identity, professional reasons, and also union within marriage. The two groups often used similar language to explain different choices.

Mapping Gender

Recent theoretical and empirical work on gender-related attributes suggests a multifactorial approach, with masculine and feminine characteristics composed of many different areas: instrumentality/expressiveness in personality, occupations and leisure interests, physical/material attributes, stylistic and symbolic behaviors, social relationships, feminist attitudes, and self-rated masculinity/femininity. This article tests the multifactorial approach by measuring variables in every area by questionnaire and videotape in a sample of undergraduates. Bivariate correlations and factor analysis reveal a robust factor linking occupations and leisure interests for both men and women. Women's gender-related attributes show little coherence outside this factor. Men display a “male dominance” factor connecting low expressiveness, sports interest, male friends, sitting with knees wide apart, and conservative attitudes toward feminism. The results support a multifactorial approach but also uphold a link for men between masculine attributes and more traditional attitudes toward gender roles.

What is a Feminist?

This article outlines the evaluation and stereotype of feminists, based on responses to closed-ended semantic differential traits as well as open-ended, projective responses to a hypothetical male or female feminist. Consistent across both methodologies, undergraduate respondents (Study 1: N=210; Study 2: N=135) viewed feminists as politically liberal, assertive/career oriented, and more likely to be heterosexual than lesbian. Most evaluations were neutral to slightly positive, with a few negative areas. However, feminists were seen in less positive terms than the typical woman and were described as much more assertive and politically liberal. Gender, race, birth cohort, gender of target, and feminist-attitude differences are presented. Despite the neutral to slightly positive evaluation, most respondents did not personally identify as feminists, possibly because they misperceive others' attitudes toward feminists as more negative than they actually are.

Attitudes Toward Women, 1970–1995

The social climate for women has changed considerably since the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS; Spence & Helmreich, 1972a) was developed in the early 1970s, but the pattern of change in AWS scores throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is unclear. Published reports of data from 71 samples of American undergraduates responding to the AWS were located and analyzed for differences across time (1970–1995) and region (South and non-South). Women's AWS scores were strongly correlated with year of scale administration ( r = .78, p < .001), and men's scores showed a similar trend toward more liberal/feminist attitudes ( r = .60, p < .001). Scores show a steady trend toward more liberal/feminist attitudes, with no appreciable reversal or slowdown during the 1980s. Gender differences steadily increased from 1970 to 1985 and decreased from 1986 to 1995. Southern samples were marginally more conservative/traditional. The results are discussed in terms of generational differences, the effects of maternal employment on attitudes, and the individual's experience of cultural change.