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From fear of falling to choking under pressure: A predictive processing perspective of disrupted motor control under anxiety. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 148:105115. [PMID: 36906243 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2022] [Revised: 02/27/2023] [Accepted: 02/28/2023] [Indexed: 03/11/2023]
Abstract
Under the Predictive Processing Framework, perception is guided by internal models that map the probabilistic relationship between sensory states and their causes. Predictive processing has contributed to a new understanding of both emotional states and motor control but is yet to be fully applied to their interaction during the breakdown of motor movements under heightened anxiety or threat. We bring together literature on anxiety and motor control to propose that predictive processing provides a unifying principle for understanding motor breakdowns as a disruption to the neuromodulatory control mechanisms that regulate the interactions of top-down predictions and bottom-up sensory signals. We illustrate this account using examples from disrupted balance and gait in populations who are anxious/fearful of falling, as well as 'choking' in elite sport. This approach can explain both rigid and inflexible movement strategies, as well as highly variable and imprecise action and conscious movement processing, and may also unite the apparently opposing self-focus and distraction approaches to choking. We generate predictions to guide future work and propose practical recommendations.
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Rens N, Lancia GL, Eluchans M, Schwartenbeck P, Cunnington R, Pezzulo G. Evidence for entropy maximisation in human free choice behaviour. Cognition 2023; 232:105328. [PMID: 36463639 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/06/2021] [Revised: 11/10/2022] [Accepted: 11/12/2022] [Indexed: 12/05/2022]
Abstract
The freedom to choose between options is strongly linked to notions of free will. Accordingly, several studies have shown that individuals demonstrate a preference for choice, or the availability of multiple options, over and above utilitarian value. Yet we lack a decision-making framework that integrates preference for choice with traditional utility maximisation in free choice behaviour. Here we test the predictions of an inference-based model of decision-making in which an agent actively seeks states yielding entropy (availability of options) in addition to utility (economic reward). We designed a study in which participants freely navigated a virtual environment consisting of two consecutive choices leading to reward locations in separate rooms. Critically, the choice of one room always led to two final doors while, in the second room, only one door was permissible to choose. This design allowed us to separately determine the influence of utility and entropy on participants' choice behaviour and their self-evaluation of free will. We found that choice behaviour was better predicted by an inference-based model than by expected utility alone, and that both the availability of options and the value of the context positively influenced participants' perceived freedom of choice. Moreover, this consideration of options was apparent in the ongoing motion dynamics as individuals navigated the environment. In a second study, in which participants selected between rooms that gave access to three or four doors, we observed a similar pattern of results, with participants preferring the room that gave access to more options and feeling freer in it. These results suggest that free choice behaviour is well explained by an inference-based framework in which both utility and entropy are optimised and supports the idea that the feeling of having free will is tightly related to options availability.
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Katsumi Y, Theriault JE, Quigley KS, Barrett LF. Allostasis as a core feature of hierarchical gradients in the human brain. Netw Neurosci 2022; 6:1010-1031. [PMID: 38800458 PMCID: PMC11117115 DOI: 10.1162/netn_a_00240] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2021] [Accepted: 02/11/2022] [Indexed: 05/29/2024] Open
Abstract
This paper integrates emerging evidence from two broad streams of scientific literature into one common framework: (a) hierarchical gradients of functional connectivity that reflect the brain's large-scale structural architecture (e.g., a lamination gradient in the cerebral cortex); and (b) approaches to predictive processing and one of its specific instantiations called allostasis (i.e., the predictive regulation of energetic resources in the service of coordinating the body's internal systems). This synthesis begins to sketch a coherent, neurobiologically inspired framework suggesting that predictive energy regulation is at the core of human brain function, and by extension, psychological and behavioral phenomena, providing a shared vocabulary for theory building and knowledge accumulation.
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Herzog P, Kube T, Fassbinder E. How childhood maltreatment alters perception and cognition - the predictive processing account of borderline personality disorder. Psychol Med 2022; 52:2899-2916. [PMID: 35979924 PMCID: PMC9693729 DOI: 10.1017/s0033291722002458] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/16/2022] [Revised: 06/24/2022] [Accepted: 07/18/2022] [Indexed: 01/05/2023]
Abstract
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe mental disorder, comprised of heterogeneous psychological and neurobiological pathologies. Here, we propose a predictive processing (PP) account of BPD to integrate these seemingly unrelated pathologies. In particular, we argue that the experience of childhood maltreatment, which is highly prevalent in BPD, leaves a developmental legacy with two facets: first, a coarse-grained, alexithymic model of self and others - leading to a rigidity and inflexibility concerning beliefs about self and others. Second, this developmental legacy leads to a loss of confidence or precision afforded beliefs about the consequences of social behavior. This results in an over reliance on sensory evidence and social feedback, with concomitant lability, impulsivity and hypersensitivity. In terms of PP, people with BPD show a distorted belief updating in response to new information with two opposing manifestations: rapid changes in beliefs and a lack of belief updating despite disconfirmatory evidence. This account of distorted information processing has the potential to explain both the instability (of affect, self-image, and interpersonal relationships) and the rigidity (of beliefs about self and others) which is typical of BPD. At the neurobiological level, we propose that enhanced levels of dopamine are associated with the increased integration of negative social feedback, and we also discuss the hypothesis of an impaired inhibitory control of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of negative social information. Our account may provide a new understanding not only of the clinical aspects of BPD, but also a unifying theory of the corresponding neurobiological pathologies. We conclude by outlining some directions for future research on the behavioral, neurobiological, and computational underpinnings of this model, and point to some clinical implications of it.
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Oversampled and undersolved: Depressive rumination from an active inference perspective. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 142:104873. [PMID: 36116573 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104873] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/10/2022] [Revised: 09/12/2022] [Accepted: 09/12/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Rumination is a widely recognized cognitive deviation in depression. Despite the recognition, researchers have struggled to explain why patients cannot disengage from the process, although it depresses their mood and fails to lead to effective problem-solving. We rethink rumination as repetitive but unsuccessful problem-solving attempts. Appealing to an active inference account, we suggest that adaptive problem-solving is based on the generation, evaluation, and performance of candidate policies that increase an organism's knowledge of its environment. We argue that the problem-solving process is distorted during rumination. Specifically, rumination is understood as engaging in excessive yet unsuccessful oversampling of policy candidates that do not resolve uncertainty. Because candidates are sampled from policies that were selected in states resembling one's current state, "bad" starting points (e.g., depressed mood, physical inactivity) make the problem-solving process vulnerable for generating a ruminative "halting problem". This problem leads to high opportunity costs, learned helplessness and diminished overt behavior. Besides reviewing evidence for the conceptual paths of this model, we discuss its neurophysiological correlates and point towards clinical implications.
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Bottemanne H, Barberousse A, Fossati P. [Multidimensional and computational theory of mood]. Encephale 2022; 48:682-699. [PMID: 35987716 DOI: 10.1016/j.encep.2022.02.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2021] [Revised: 01/31/2022] [Accepted: 02/04/2022] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
What is mood? Despite its crucial place in psychiatric nosography and cognitive science, it is still difficult to delimit its conceptual ground. The distinction between emotion and mood is ambiguous: mood is often presented as an affective state that is more prolonged and less intense than emotion, or as an affective polarity distinguishing high and low mood swinging around a baseline. However, these definitions do not match the clinical reality of mood disorders such as unipolar depression and bipolar disorder, and do not allow us to understand the effect of mood on behaviour, perception and cognition. In this paper, we propose a multidimensional and computational theory of mood inspired by contemporary hypotheses in theoretical neuroscience and philosophy of emotion. After suggesting an operational distinction between emotion and mood, we show how a succession of emotions can cumulatively generate congruent mood over time, making mood an emerging state from emotion. We then present how mood determines mental and behavioral states when interacting with the environment, constituting a dispositional state of emotion, perception, belief, and action. Using this theoretical framework, we propose a computational representation of the emerging and dispositional dimensions of mood by formalizing mood as a layer of third-order Bayesian beliefs encoding the precision of emotion, and regulated by prediction errors associated with interoceptive predictions. Finally, we show how this theoretical framework sheds light on the processes involved in mood disorders, the emergence of mood congruent beliefs, or the mechanisms of antidepressant treatments in clinical psychiatry.
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Deane G. Machines That Feel and Think: The Role of Affective Feelings and Mental Action in (Artificial) General Intelligence. ARTIFICIAL LIFE 2022; 28:289-309. [PMID: 35881678 DOI: 10.1162/artl_a_00368] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/15/2023]
Abstract
What role do affective feelings (feelings/emotions/moods) play in adaptive behaviour? What are the implications of this for understanding and developing artificial general intelligence? Leading theoretical models of brain function are beginning to shed light on these questions. While artificial agents have excelled within narrowly circumscribed and specialised domains, domain-general intelligence has remained an elusive goal in artificial intelligence research. By contrast, humans and nonhuman animals are characterised by a capacity for flexible behaviour and general intelligence. In this article I argue that computational models of mental phenomena in predictive processing theories of the brain are starting to reveal the mechanisms underpinning domain-general intelligence in biological agents, and can inform the understanding and development of artificial general intelligence. I focus particularly on approaches to computational phenomenology in the active inference framework. Specifically, I argue that computational mechanisms of affective feelings in active inference-affective self-modelling-are revealing of how biological agents are able to achieve flexible behavioural repertoires and general intelligence. I argue that (i) affective self-modelling functions to "tune" organisms to the most tractable goals in the environmental context; and (ii) affective and agentic self-modelling is central to the capacity to perform mental actions in goal-directed imagination and creative cognition. I use this account as a basis to argue that general intelligence of the level and kind found in biological agents will likely require machines to be implemented with analogues of affective self-modelling.
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Everything is connected: Inference and attractors in delusions. Schizophr Res 2022; 245:5-22. [PMID: 34384664 PMCID: PMC9241990 DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2021.07.032] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2021] [Revised: 07/21/2021] [Accepted: 07/23/2021] [Indexed: 02/06/2023]
Abstract
Delusions are, by popular definition, false beliefs that are held with certainty and resistant to contradictory evidence. They seem at odds with the notion that the brain at least approximates Bayesian inference. This is especially the case in schizophrenia, a disorder thought to relate to decreased - rather than increased - certainty in the brain's model of the world. We use an active inference Markov decision process model (a Bayes-optimal decision-making agent) to perform a simple task involving social and non-social inferences. We show that even moderate changes in some model parameters - decreasing confidence in sensory input and increasing confidence in states implied by its own (especially habitual) actions - can lead to delusions as defined above. Incorporating affect in the model increases delusions, specifically in the social domain. The model also reproduces some classic psychological effects, including choice-induced preference change, and an optimism bias in inferences about oneself. A key observation is that no change in a single parameter is both necessary and sufficient for delusions; rather, delusions arise due to conditional dependencies that create 'basins of attraction' which trap Bayesian beliefs. Simulating the effects of antidopaminergic antipsychotics - by reducing the model's confidence in its actions - demonstrates that the model can escape from these attractors, through this synthetic pharmacotherapy.
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Putica A, Felmingham KL, Garrido MI, O'Donnell ML, Van Dam NT. A predictive coding account of value-based learning in PTSD: Implications for precision treatments. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 138:104704. [PMID: 35609683 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104704] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/26/2021] [Revised: 04/05/2022] [Accepted: 05/17/2022] [Indexed: 10/18/2022]
Abstract
While there are a number of recommended first-line interventions for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), treatment efficacy has been less than ideal. Generally, PTSD treatment models explain symptom manifestation via associative learning, treating the individual as a passive organism - acted upon - rather than self as agent. At their core, predictive coding (PC) models introduce the fundamental role of self-conceptualisation and hierarchical processing of one's sensory context in safety learning. This theoretical article outlines how predictive coding models of emotion offer a parsimonious framework to explain PTSD treatment response within a value-based decision-making framework. Our model integrates the predictive coding elements of the perceived: self, world and self-in the world and how they impact upon one or more discrete stages of value-based decision-making: (1) mental representation; (2) emotional valuation; (3) action selection and (4) outcome valuation. We discuss treatment and research implications stemming from our hypotheses.
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Gandolfi D, Puglisi FM, Boiani GM, Pagnoni G, Friston KJ, D'Angelo EU, Mapelli J. Emergence of associative learning in a neuromorphic inference network. J Neural Eng 2022; 19. [PMID: 35508120 DOI: 10.1088/1741-2552/ac6ca7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/20/2021] [Accepted: 05/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/12/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE In the theoretical framework of predictive coding and active inference, the brain can be viewed as instantiating a rich generative model of the world that predicts incoming sensory data while continuously updating its parameters via minimization of prediction errors. While this theory has been successfully applied to cognitive processes - by modelling the activity of functional neural networks at a mesoscopic scale - the validity of the approach when modelling neurons as an ensemble of inferring agents, in a biologically plausible architecture, remained to be explored. APPROACH We modelled a simplified cerebellar circuit with individual neurons acting as Bayesian agents to simulate the classical delayed eyeblink conditioning protocol. Neurons and synapses adjusted their activity to minimize their prediction error, which was used as the network cost function. This cerebellar network was then implemented in hardware by replicating digital neuronal elements via a low-power microcontroller. MAIN RESULTS Persistent changes of synaptic strength - that mirrored neurophysiological observations - emerged via local (neurocentric) prediction error minimization, leading to the expression of associative learning. The same paradigm was effectively emulated in low-power hardware showing remarkably efficient performance compared to conventional neuromorphic architectures. SIGNIFICANCE These findings show that: i) an ensemble of free energy minimizing neurons - organized in a biological plausible architecture - can recapitulate functional self-organization observed in nature, such as associative plasticity, and ii) a neuromorphic network of inference units can learn unsupervised tasks without embedding predefined learning rules in the circuit, thus providing a potential avenue to a novel form of brain-inspired artificial intelligence.
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Champion T, Da Costa L, Bowman H, Grześ M. Branching Time Active Inference: The theory and its generality. Neural Netw 2022; 151:295-316. [PMID: 35468491 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2022.03.036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/23/2021] [Revised: 03/25/2022] [Accepted: 03/28/2022] [Indexed: 12/01/2022]
Abstract
Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al. (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies.
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Smith R, Friston KJ, Whyte CJ. A step-by-step tutorial on active inference and its application to empirical data. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022; 107:102632. [PMID: 35340847 PMCID: PMC8956124 DOI: 10.1016/j.jmp.2021.102632] [Citation(s) in RCA: 37] [Impact Index Per Article: 18.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/26/2023]
Abstract
The active inference framework, and in particular its recent formulation as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), has gained increasing popularity in recent years as a useful approach for modeling neurocognitive processes. This framework is highly general and flexible in its ability to be customized to model any cognitive process, as well as simulate predicted neuronal responses based on its accompanying neural process theory. It also affords both simulation experiments for proof of principle and behavioral modeling for empirical studies. However, there are limited resources that explain how to build and run these models in practice, which limits their widespread use. Most introductions assume a technical background in programming, mathematics, and machine learning. In this paper we offer a step-by-step tutorial on how to build POMDPs, run simulations using standard MATLAB routines, and fit these models to empirical data. We assume a minimal background in programming and mathematics, thoroughly explain all equations, and provide exemplar scripts that can be customized for both theoretical and empirical studies. Our goal is to provide the reader with the requisite background knowledge and practical tools to apply active inference to their own research. We also provide optional technical sections and multiple appendices, which offer the interested reader additional technical details. This tutorial should provide the reader with all the tools necessary to use these models and to follow emerging advances in active inference research.
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Whyte CJ, Hohwy J, Smith R. An active inference model of conscious access: How cognitive action selection reconciles the results of report and no-report paradigms. CURRENT RESEARCH IN NEUROBIOLOGY 2022; 3:100036. [PMID: 36304590 PMCID: PMC9593308 DOI: 10.1016/j.crneur.2022.100036] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2022] [Revised: 03/08/2022] [Accepted: 03/18/2022] [Indexed: 10/31/2022] Open
Abstract
Cognitive theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory and higher-order theories, posit that frontoparietal circuits play a crucial role in conscious access. However, recent studies using no-report paradigms have posed a challenge to cognitive theories by demonstrating conscious accessibility in the apparent absence of prefrontal cortex (PFC) activation. To address this challenge, this paper presents a computational model of conscious access, based upon active inference, that treats working memory gating as a cognitive action. We simulate a visual masking task and show that late P3b-like event-related potentials (ERPs), and increased PFC activity, are induced by the working memory demands of self-report generation. When reporting demands are removed, these late ERPs vanish and PFC activity is reduced. These results therefore reproduce, and potentially explain, results from no-report paradigms. However, even without reporting demands, our model shows that simulated PFC activity on visible stimulus trials still crosses the threshold for reportability - maintaining the link between PFC and conscious access. Therefore, our simulations show that evidence provided by no-report paradigms does not necessarily contradict cognitive theories of consciousness.
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Isomura T. Active inference leads to Bayesian neurophysiology. Neurosci Res 2021; 175:38-45. [PMID: 34968557 DOI: 10.1016/j.neures.2021.12.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2021] [Revised: 12/13/2021] [Accepted: 12/14/2021] [Indexed: 01/20/2023]
Abstract
The neuronal substrates that implement the free-energy principle and ensuing active inference at the neuron and synapse level have not been fully elucidated. This Review considers possible neuronal substrates underlying the principle. First, the foundations of the free-energy principle are introduced, and then its ability to empirically explain various brain functions and psychological and biological phenomena in terms of Bayesian inference is described. Mathematically, the dynamics of neural activity and plasticity that minimise a cost function can be cast as performing Bayesian inference that minimises variational free energy. This equivalence licenses the adoption of the free-energy principle as a universal characterisation of neural networks. Further, the neural network structure itself represents a generative model under which an agent operates. A virtue of this perspective is that it enables the formal association of neural network properties with prior beliefs that regulate inference and learning. The possible neuronal substrates that implement prior beliefs and how to empirically examine the theory are discussed. This perspective renders brain activity explainable, leading to a deeper understanding of the neuronal mechanisms underlying basic psychology and psychiatric disorders in terms of an implicit generative model.
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Raja V, Valluri D, Baggs E, Chemero A, Anderson ML. The Markov blanket trick: On the scope of the free energy principle and active inference. Phys Life Rev 2021; 39:49-72. [PMID: 34563472 DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2021.09.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 20] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/09/2021] [Accepted: 09/10/2021] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
The free energy principle (FEP) has been presented as a unified brain theory, as a general principle for the self-organization of biological systems, and most recently as a principle for a theory of every thing. Additionally, active inference has been proposed as the process theory entailed by FEP that is able to model the full range of biological and cognitive events. In this paper, we challenge these two claims. We argue that FEP is not the general principle it is claimed to be, and that active inference is not the all-encompassing process theory it is purported to be either. The core aspects of our argumentation are that (i) FEP is just a way to generalize Bayesian inference to all domains by the use of a Markov blanket formalism, a generalization we call the Markov blanket trick; and that (ii) active inference presupposes successful perception and action instead of explaining them.
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Interoception abnormalities in schizophrenia: A review of preliminary evidence and an integration with Bayesian accounts of psychosis. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 132:757-773. [PMID: 34823914 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.11.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2021] [Revised: 10/31/2021] [Accepted: 11/13/2021] [Indexed: 01/07/2023]
Abstract
Schizophrenia research has traditionally focused almost exclusively on how the brain interprets the outside world. However, our internal bodily milieu is also central to how we interpret the world and construct our reality: signals from within the body are critical for not only basic survival, but also a wide range of brain functions from basic perception, emotion, and motivation, to sense of self. In this article, we propose that interoception-the processing of bodily signals-may have implications for a wide range of clinical symptoms in schizophrenia and may thus provide key insights into illness mechanisms. We start with an overview of interoception pathways. Then we provide a review of direct and indirect findings in various interoceptive systems in schizophrenia and interpret these findings in the context of computational frameworks that model interoception as hierarchical Bayesian inference. Finally, we propose a conceptual model of how altered interoceptive inference may contribute to specific schizophrenia symptoms-negative symptoms in particular-and suggest directions for future research, including potential new avenues of treatment.
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Holmes E, Parr T, Griffiths TD, Friston KJ. Active inference, selective attention, and the cocktail party problem. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2021; 131:1288-1304. [PMID: 34687699 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.09.038] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/12/2021] [Revised: 08/27/2021] [Accepted: 09/17/2021] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a new generative model for an active inference account of preparatory and selective attention, in the context of a classic 'cocktail party' paradigm. In this setup, pairs of words are presented simultaneously to the left and right ears and an instructive spatial cue directs attention to the left or right. We use this generative model to test competing hypotheses about the way that human listeners direct preparatory and selective attention. We show that assigning low precision to words at attended-relative to unattended-locations can explain why a listener reports words from a competing sentence. Under this model, temporal changes in sensory precision were not needed to account for faster reaction times with longer cue-target intervals, but were necessary to explain ramping effects on event-related potentials (ERPs)-resembling the contingent negative variation (CNV)-during the preparatory interval. These simulations reveal that different processes are likely to underlie the improvement in reaction times and the ramping of ERPs that are associated with spatial cueing.
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An active inference account of protective behaviours during the COVID-19 pandemic. COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2021; 21:1117-1129. [PMID: 34652601 PMCID: PMC8518276 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-021-00947-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 08/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Newly emerging infectious diseases, such as the coronavirus (COVID-19), create new challenges for public healthcare systems. Before effective treatments, countering the spread of these infections depends on mitigating, protective behaviours such as social distancing, respecting lockdown, wearing masks, frequent handwashing, travel restrictions, and vaccine acceptance. Previous work has shown that the enacting protective behaviours depends on beliefs about individual vulnerability, threat severity, and one’s ability to engage in such protective actions. However, little is known about the genesis of these beliefs in response to an infectious disease epidemic, and the cognitive mechanisms that may link these beliefs to decision making. Active inference (AI) is a recent approach to behavioural modelling that integrates embodied perception, action, belief updating, and decision making. This approach provides a framework to understand the behaviour of agents in situations that require planning under uncertainty. It assumes that the brain infers the hidden states that cause sensations, predicts the perceptual feedback produced by adaptive actions, and chooses actions that minimize expected surprise in the future. In this paper, we present a computational account describing how individuals update their beliefs about the risks and thereby commit to protective behaviours. We show how perceived risks, beliefs about future states, sensory uncertainty, and outcomes under each policy can determine individual protective behaviours. We suggest that these mechanisms are crucial to assess how individuals cope with uncertainty during a pandemic, and we show the interest of these new perspectives for public health policies.
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Arthur T, Harris DJ. Predictive eye movements are adjusted in a Bayes-optimal fashion in response to unexpectedly changing environmental probabilities. Cortex 2021; 145:212-225. [PMID: 34749190 DOI: 10.1016/j.cortex.2021.09.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/02/2021] [Revised: 08/18/2021] [Accepted: 09/27/2021] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
This study examined the application of active inference to dynamic visuomotor control. Active inference proposes that actions are dynamically planned according to uncertainty about sensory information, prior expectations, and the environment, with motor adjustments serving to minimise future prediction errors. We investigated whether predictive gaze behaviours are indeed adjusted in this Bayes-optimal fashion during a virtual racquetball task. In this task, participants intercepted bouncing balls with varying levels of elasticity, under conditions of higher or lower environmental volatility. Participants' gaze patterns differed between stable and volatile conditions in a manner consistent with generative models of Bayes-optimal behaviour. Partially observable Markov models also revealed an increased rate of associative learning in response to unpredictable shifts in environmental probabilities, although there was no overall effect of volatility on this parameter. Findings extend active inference frameworks into complex and unconstrained visuomotor tasks and present important implications for a neurocomputational understanding of the visual guidance of action.
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Mannella F, Maggiore F, Baltieri M, Pezzulo G. Active inference through whiskers. Neural Netw 2021; 144:428-437. [PMID: 34563752 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.08.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/08/2021] [Revised: 08/29/2021] [Accepted: 08/31/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
Rodents use whisking to probe actively their environment and to locate objects in space, hence providing a paradigmatic biological example of active sensing. Numerous studies show that the control of whisking has anticipatory aspects. For example, rodents target their whisker protraction to the distance at which they expect objects, rather than just reacting fast to contacts with unexpected objects. Here we characterize the anticipatory control of whisking in rodents as an active inference process. In this perspective, the rodent is endowed with a prior belief that it will touch something at the end of the whisker protraction, and it continuously modulates its whisking amplitude to minimize (proprioceptive and somatosensory) prediction errors arising from an unexpected whisker-object contact, or from a lack of an expected contact. We will use the model to qualitatively reproduce key empirical findings about the ways rodents modulate their whisker amplitude during exploration and the scanning of (expected or unexpected) objects. Furthermore, we will discuss how the components of active inference model can in principle map to the neurobiological circuits of rodent whisking.
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Marković D, Stojić H, Schwöbel S, Kiebel SJ. An empirical evaluation of active inference in multi-armed bandits. Neural Netw 2021; 144:229-246. [PMID: 34507043 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.08.018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/27/2021] [Revised: 07/07/2021] [Accepted: 08/11/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
A key feature of sequential decision making under uncertainty is a need to balance between exploiting-choosing the best action according to the current knowledge, and exploring-obtaining information about values of other actions. The multi-armed bandit problem, a classical task that captures this trade-off, served as a vehicle in machine learning for developing bandit algorithms that proved to be useful in numerous industrial applications. The active inference framework, an approach to sequential decision making recently developed in neuroscience for understanding human and animal behaviour, is distinguished by its sophisticated strategy for resolving the exploration-exploitation trade-off. This makes active inference an exciting alternative to already established bandit algorithms. Here we derive an efficient and scalable approximate active inference algorithm and compare it to two state-of-the-art bandit algorithms: Bayesian upper confidence bound and optimistic Thompson sampling. This comparison is done on two types of bandit problems: a stationary and a dynamic switching bandit. Our empirical evaluation shows that the active inference algorithm does not produce efficient long-term behaviour in stationary bandits. However, in the more challenging switching bandit problem active inference performs substantially better than the two state-of-the-art bandit algorithms. The results open exciting venues for further research in theoretical and applied machine learning, as well as lend additional credibility to active inference as a general framework for studying human and animal behaviour.
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Smith R, Mayeli A, Taylor S, Al Zoubi O, Naegele J, Khalsa SS. Gut inference: A computational modelling approach. Biol Psychol 2021; 164:108152. [PMID: 34311031 PMCID: PMC8429276 DOI: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108152] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2021] [Revised: 07/20/2021] [Accepted: 07/22/2021] [Indexed: 12/22/2022]
Abstract
Neurocomputational theories have hypothesized that Bayesian inference underlies interoception, which has become a topic of recent experimental work in heartbeat perception. To extend this approach beyond cardiac interoception, we describe the application of a Bayesian computational model to a recently developed gastrointestinal interoception task completed by 40 healthy individuals undergoing simultaneous electroencephalogram (EEG) and peripheral physiological recording. We first present results that support the validity of this modelling approach. Second, we provide a test of, and confirmatory evidence supporting, the neural process theory associated with a particular Bayesian framework (active inference) that predicts specific relationships between computational parameters and event-related potentials in EEG. We also offer some exploratory evidence suggesting that computational parameters may influence the regulation of peripheral physiological states. We conclude that this computational approach offers promise as a tool for studying individual differences in gastrointestinal interoception.
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Gumbsch C, Adam M, Elsner B, Butz MV. Emergent Goal-Anticipatory Gaze in Infants via Event-Predictive Learning and Inference. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e13016. [PMID: 34379329 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/01/2020] [Revised: 05/17/2021] [Accepted: 06/16/2021] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
Abstract
From about 7 months of age onward, infants start to reliably fixate the goal of an observed action, such as a grasp, before the action is complete. The available research has identified a variety of factors that influence such goal-anticipatory gaze shifts, including the experience with the shown action events and familiarity with the observed agents. However, the underlying cognitive processes are still heavily debated. We propose that our minds (i) tend to structure sensorimotor dynamics into probabilistic, generative event-predictive, and event boundary predictive models, and, meanwhile, (ii) choose actions with the objective to minimize predicted uncertainty. We implement this proposition by means of event-predictive learning and active inference. The implemented learning mechanism induces an inductive, event-predictive bias, thus developing schematic encodings of experienced events and event boundaries. The implemented active inference principle chooses actions by aiming at minimizing expected future uncertainty. We train our system on multiple object-manipulation events. As a result, the generation of goal-anticipatory gaze shifts emerges while learning about object manipulations: the model starts fixating the inferred goal already at the start of an observed event after having sampled some experience with possible events and when a familiar agent (i.e., a hand) is involved. Meanwhile, the model keeps reactively tracking an unfamiliar agent (i.e., a mechanical claw) that is performing the same movement. We qualitatively compare these modeling results to behavioral data of infants and conclude that event-predictive learning combined with active inference may be critical for eliciting goal-anticipatory gaze behavior in infants.
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Bidirectional interaction between visual and motor generative models using Predictive Coding and Active Inference. Neural Netw 2021; 143:638-656. [PMID: 34343777 DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2021.07.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2021] [Revised: 07/09/2021] [Accepted: 07/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/21/2022]
Abstract
In this work, we build upon the Active Inference (AIF) and Predictive Coding (PC) frameworks to propose a neural architecture comprising a generative model for sensory prediction, and a distinct generative model for motor trajectories. We highlight how sequences of sensory predictions can act as rails guiding learning, control and online adaptation of motor trajectories. We furthermore inquire the effects of bidirectional interactions between the motor and the visual modules. The architecture is tested on the control of a simulated robotic arm learning to reproduce handwritten letters.
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Van de Cruys S, Van Dessel P. Mental distress through the prism of predictive processing theory. Curr Opin Psychol 2021; 41:107-112. [PMID: 34388670 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.07.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/01/2020] [Revised: 06/10/2021] [Accepted: 07/12/2021] [Indexed: 10/20/2022]
Abstract
We review the predictive processing theory's take on goals and affect, to shed new light on mental distress and how it develops into psychopathology such as in affective and motivational disorders. This analysis recovers many of the classical factors known to be important in those disorders, like uncertainty and control, but integrates them in a mechanistic model of adaptive and maladaptive cognition and behavior. We derive implications for treatment that have so far remained underexposed in existing predictive processing accounts of mental disorder, specifically with regard to the model-dependent construction of value, the importance of model validation (evidence), and the introduction and learning of new, adaptive beliefs that relieve suffering.
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