Flying-fox species density--a spatial risk factor for Hendra virus infection in horses in eastern Australia

Hendra virus causes sporadic but typically fatal infection in horses and humans in eastern Australia. Fruit-bats of the genus Pteropus (commonly known as flying-foxes) are the natural host of the virus, and the putative source of infection in horses; infected horses are the source of human infection. Effective treatment is lacking in both horses and humans, and notwithstanding the recent availability of a vaccine for horses, exposure risk mitigation remains an important infection control strategy. This study sought to inform risk mitigation by identifying spatial and environmental risk factors for equine infection using multiple analytical approaches to investigate the relationship between plausible variables and reported Hendra virus infection in horses. Spatial autocorrelation (Global Moran's I) showed significant clustering of equine cases at a distance of 40 km, a distance consistent with the foraging 'footprint' of a flying-fox roost, suggesting the latter as a biologically plausible basis for the clustering. Getis-Ord Gi* analysis identified multiple equine infection hot spots along the eastern Australia coast from far north Queensland to central New South Wales, with the largest extending for nearly 300 km from southern Queensland to northern New South Wales. Geographically weighted regression (GWR) showed the density of P. alecto and P. conspicillatus to have the strongest positive correlation with equine case locations, suggesting these species are more likely a source of infection of Hendra virus for horses than P. poliocephalus or P. scapulatus. The density of horses, climate variables and vegetation variables were not found to be a significant risk factors, but the residuals from the GWR suggest that additional unidentified risk factors exist at the property level. Further investigations and comparisons between case and control properties are needed to identify these local risk factors.

Potential for introduction of bat-borne zoonotic viruses into the EU: a review

Bat-borne viruses can pose a serious threat to human health, with examples including Nipah virus (NiV) in Bangladesh and Malaysia, and Marburg virus (MARV) in Africa. To date, significant human outbreaks of such viruses have not been reported in the European Union (EU). However, EU countries have strong historical links with many of the countries where NiV and MARV are present and a corresponding high volume of commercial trade and human travel, which poses a potential risk of introduction of these viruses into the EU. In assessing the risks of introduction of these bat-borne zoonotic viruses to the EU, it is important to consider the location and range of bat species known to be susceptible to infection, together with the virus prevalence, seasonality of viral pulses, duration of infection and titre of virus in different bat tissues. In this paper, we review the current scientific knowledge of all these factors, in relation to the introduction of NiV and MARV into the EU.

Foodborne transmission of nipah virus in Syrian hamsters

Since 2001, outbreaks of Nipah virus have occurred almost every year in Bangladesh with high case-fatality rates. Epidemiological data suggest that in Bangladesh, Nipah virus is transmitted from the natural reservoir, fruit bats, to humans via consumption of date palm sap contaminated by bats, with subsequent human-to-human transmission. To experimentally investigate this epidemiological association between drinking of date palm sap and human cases of Nipah virus infection, we determined the viability of Nipah virus (strain Bangladesh/200401066) in artificial palm sap. At 22°C virus titers remained stable for at least 7 days, thus potentially allowing food-borne transmission. Next, we modeled food-borne Nipah virus infection by supplying Syrian hamsters with artificial palm sap containing Nipah virus. Drinking of 5×10⁸ TCID₅₀ of Nipah virus resulted in neurological disease in 5 out of 8 hamsters, indicating that food-borne transmission of Nipah virus can indeed occur. In comparison, intranasal (i.n.) inoculation with the same dose of Nipah virus resulted in lethal respiratory disease in all animals. In animals infected with Nipah virus via drinking, virus was detected in respiratory tissues rather than in the intestinal tract. Using fluorescently labeled Nipah virus particles, we showed that during drinking, a substantial amount of virus is deposited in the lungs, explaining the replication of Nipah virus in the respiratory tract of these hamsters. Besides the ability of Nipah virus to infect hamsters via the drinking route, Syrian hamsters infected via that route transmitted the virus through direct contact with naïve hamsters in 2 out of 24 transmission pairs. Although these findings do not directly prove that date palm sap contaminated with Nipah virus by bats is the origin of Nipah virus outbreaks in Bangladesh, they provide the first experimental support for this hypothesis. Understanding the Nipah virus transmission cycle is essential for preventing and mitigating future outbreaks.

In Bangladesh, outbreaks of Nipah virus occur almost every year, resulting in respiratory and neurological disease with high case-fatality rates. Based on epidemiological data Nipah virus is thought to be transmitted from fruit bats to humans via drinking of date palm sap contaminated by bats that drink from the sap stream or collection vessel during collection. Additionally, human-to-human transmission has been shown to occur. Here, we experimentally modeled the proposed transmission cycle of Nipah virus in Bangladesh in Syrian hamsters. Hamsters that drank artificial palm sap containing high doses of Nipah virus became infected with the virus and developed neurological signs of disease. Virus replication occurred mainly in the respiratory rather than the intestinal tract. Most importantly, hamsters infected with Nipah virus through drinking of contaminated palm sap could transmit the virus to uninfected cage mates. As treatments for Nipah virus are currently unavailable and medical interventions are difficult to implement in rural outbreak areas, our best hope to prevent or intervene in future outbreaks of Nipah virus lies in the potential to block transmission from bats to humans and from human to human. Understanding how Nipah virus is transmitted is essential to achieve this.

Duration of Maternal Antibodies against Canine Distemper Virus and Hendra Virus in Pteropid Bats

Old World frugivorous bats have been identified as natural hosts for emerging zoonotic viruses of significant public health concern, including henipaviruses (Nipah and Hendra virus), Ebola virus, and Marburg virus. Epidemiological studies of these viruses in bats often utilize serology to describe viral dynamics, with particular attention paid to juveniles, whose birth increases the overall susceptibility of the population to a viral outbreak once maternal immunity wanes. However, little is understood about bat immunology, including the duration of maternal antibodies in neonates. Understanding duration of maternally derived immunity is critical for characterizing viral dynamics in bat populations, which may help assess the risk of spillover to humans. We conducted two separate studies of pregnant Pteropus bat species and their offspring to measure the half-life and duration of antibodies to 1) canine distemper virus antigen in vaccinated captive Pteropus hypomelanus; and 2) Hendra virus in wild-caught, naturally infected Pteropus alecto. Both of these pteropid bat species are known reservoirs for henipaviruses. We found that in both species, antibodies were transferred from dam to pup. In P. hypomelanus pups, titers against CDV waned over a mean period of 228.6 days (95% CI: 185.4-271.8) and had a mean terminal phase half-life of 96.0 days (CI 95%: 30.7-299.7). In P. alecto pups, antibodies waned over 255.13 days (95% CI: 221.0-289.3) and had a mean terminal phase half-life of 52.24 days (CI 95%: 33.76-80.83). Each species showed a duration of transferred maternal immunity of between 7.5 and 8.5 months, which was longer than has been previously estimated. These data will allow for more accurate interpretation of age-related Henipavirus serological data collected from wild pteropid bats.

Epidemiology of henipavirus disease in humans

All seven recognized human cases of Hendra virus (HeV) infection have occurred in Queensland, Australia. Recognized human infections have all resulted from a HeV infected horse that was unusually efficient in transmitting the virus and a person with a high exposure to infectious secretions. In the large outbreak in Malaysia where Nipah virus (NiV) was first identified, most human infections resulted from close contact with NiV infected pigs. Outbreak investigations in Bangladesh have identified drinking raw date palm sap as the most common pathway of NiV transmission from Pteropus bats to people, but person-to-person transmission of NiV has been repeatedly identified in Bangladesh and India. Although henipaviruses are not easily transmitted to people, these newly recognized, high mortality agents warrant continued scientific attention.

Mapping risk of Nipah virus transmission across Asia and across Bangladesh

Nipah virus is a highly pathogenic but poorly known paramyxovirus from South and Southeast Asia. In spite of the risks that it poses to human health, the geography and ecology of its occurrence remain little understood-the virus is basically known from Bangladesh and peninsular Malaysia, and little in between. In this contribution, I use documented occurrences of the virus to develop ecological niche-based maps summarizing its likely broader occurrence-although rangewide maps could not be developed that had significant predictive abilities, reflecting minimal sample sizes available, maps within Bangladesh were quite successful in identifying areas in which the virus is predictably present and likely transmitted.

Transmission routes for nipah virus from Malaysia and Bangladesh

Human infections with Nipah virus in Malaysia and Bangladesh are associated with markedly different patterns of transmission and pathogenicity. To compare the 2 strains, we conducted an in vivo study in which 2 groups of ferrets were oronasally exposed to either the Malaysia or Bangladesh strain of Nipah virus. Viral shedding and tissue tropism were compared between the 2 groups. Over the course of infection, significantly higher levels of viral RNA were recovered from oral secretions of ferrets infected with the Bangladesh strain. Higher levels of oral shedding of the Bangladesh strain of Nipah virus might be a key factor in onward transmission in outbreaks among humans.

Re-emergence Nipah - a review

There was an outbreak of new emergence viral encephalitis caused by Nipah virus among humans in some areas of Bangladesh during 2001 - till to date. The disease affected mainly the young, had increased suspicion to spread from bat to man through eating of the same fruits. The risk of human-to-human transmission is thought to be low though many of the affected individuals belonged to the same family. The disease presented mainly as acute encephalitis with usually a short incubation period of less than two weeks, with the main symptoms of fever, headache, and giddiness followed by coma. Distinctive clinical signs include areflexia, hypotonia, hypertension, tachycardia and segmental myoclonus. Serology was helpful in confirming the diagnosis. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) showed distinctive changes of multiple, discrete or confluent small high signal lesions, best seen with fluid-attenuated inversion recovery (FLAIR) sequences. Mortality was as high as 32-92% and death was probably due to severe brainstem involvement. Relapse encephalitis was seen in those who recovered from acute encephalitis, and late-onset encephalitis was seen in those with initial non-encephalitic or asymptomatic diseases. Both these manifested as focal encephalitis arising from recurrent infection.

Pteropid bats are confirmed as the reservoir hosts of henipaviruses: a comprehensive experimental study of virus transmission

Bats of the genus Pteropus have been identified as the reservoir hosts for the henipaviruses Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah virus (NiV). The aim of these studies was to assess likely mechanisms for henipaviruses transmission from bats. In a series of experiments, Pteropus bats from Malaysia and Australia were inoculated with NiV and HeV, respectively, by natural routes of infection. Despite an intensive sampling strategy, no NiV was recovered from the Malaysian bats and HeV was reisolated from only one Australian bat; no disease was seen. These experiments suggest that opportunities for henipavirus transmission may be limited; therefore, the probability of a spillover event is low. For spillover to occur, a range of conditions and events must coincide. An alternate assessment framework is required if we are to fully understand how this reservoir host maintains and transmits not only these but all viruses with which it has been associated.

Hendra virus: what do we know?

Hendra virus infection is an emerging infectious disease that is not well understood. Most cases of Hendra virus infection have occurred in Queensland, with one case in a horse in NSW. Hendra virus infection has a high mortality rate in horses and humans and as cases could occur anywhere in Australia it is important to be ready for prompt action should an outbreak occur in NSW. This paper: reviews the current knowledge on Hendra virus infection including methods for preventing the disease; explains the animal health and human health response for an outbreak within NSW; and discusses possible future avenues for post-exposure prophylaxis and prevention by vaccination.

Use of infrared camera to understand bats' access to date palm sap: implications for preventing Nipah virus transmission

Pteropus bats are commonly infected with Nipah virus, but show no signs of illness. Human Nipah outbreaks in Bangladesh coincide with the date palm sap harvesting season. In epidemiologic studies, drinking raw date palm sap is a risk factor for human Nipah infection. We conducted a study to evaluate bats' access to date palm sap. We mounted infrared cameras that silently captured images upon detection of motion on date palm trees from 5:00 pm to 6:00 am. Additionally, we placed two locally used preventative techniques, bamboo skirts and lime (CaCO₃) smeared on date palm trees to assess their effectiveness in preventing bats access to sap. Out of 20 camera-nights of observations, 14 identified 132 visits of bats around the tree, 91 to the shaved surface of the tree where the sap flow originates, 4 at the stream of sap moving toward the collection pot, and no bats at the tap or on the collection pots; the remaining 6 camera-nights recorded no visits. Of the preventative techniques, the bamboo skirt placed for four camera-nights prevented bats access to sap. This study confirmed that bats commonly visited date palm trees and physically contacted the sap collected for human consumption. This is further evidence that date palm sap is an important link between Nipah virus in bats and Nipah virus in humans. Efforts that prevent bat access to the shaved surface and the sap stream of the tree could reduce Nipah spillovers to the human population.

Epidemiology, surveillance and control of Nipah virus infections in Malaysia

The outbreak of Nipah virus, affecting pigs and pig-farm workers, was first noted in September 1998 in the north-western part of peninsular Malaysia. By March 1999, the outbreak had spread to other pig-farming areas of the country, inclusive of the neighbouring country, Singapore. A total of 283 human cases of viral encephalitis with 109 deaths were recorded in Malaysia from 29 September 1998 to December 1999. During the outbreak period, a number of surveillances under three broad groups; Surveillance in Human Health Sector, Surveillance in Animal Health Sector, and Surveillance for the Reservoir Hosts, were carried out to determine the prevalence, risk of virus infections and transmission in human and swine populations as well as the source and reservoir hosts of Nipah virus. Surveillance data showed that the virus spread rapidly among pigs within infected farms and transmission was attributed to direct contact with infective excretions and secretions. The spread of the virus among pig farms within and between states of peninsular Malaysia was due to movement of pigs. The transmission of the virus to humans was through close contact with infected pigs. Human to human transmission was considered a rare event though the Nipah virus could be isolated from saliva, urine, nasal and pharyngeal secretions of patients. Field investigations identified fruitbats of the Pteropid species as the natural reservoir hosts of the viruses. The outbreak was effectively brought under control following the discovery of the virus and institution of correct control measures through a combined effort of multi-ministerial and multidisciplinary teams working in close co-operation and collaboration with other international agencies.

Date palm sap collection: exploring opportunities to prevent Nipah transmission

Nipah virus (NiV) infection is a seasonal disease in Bangladesh that coincides with the date palm sap collection season. Raw date palm sap is a delicacy to drink in Bengali culture. If fruit bats that are infected with NiV gain access to the sap for drinking, they might occasionally contaminate the sap through saliva and urine. In February 2007, we conducted a qualitative study in six villages, interviewing 27 date palm sap collectors (gachhis) within the geographical area where NiV outbreaks have occurred since 2001. Gachhis reported that bats pose a challenge to successful collection of quality sap, because bats drink and defecate into the sap which markedly reduces its value. They know some methods to prevent access by bats and other pests but do not use them consistently, because of lack of time and resources. Further studies to explore the effectiveness of these methods and to motivate gachhis to invest their time and money to use them could reduce the risk of human Nipah infection in Bangladesh.

Bats without borders: long-distance movements and implications for disease risk management

Fruit bats of the genus Pteropus (commonly known as flying-foxes) are the natural hosts of several recently emerged zoonotic viruses of animal and human health significance in Australia and Asia, including Hendra and Nipah viruses. Satellite telemetry was used on nine flying-foxes of three species (Pteropus alecto n=5, P. vampyrus n=2, and P. neohibernicus n=2) to determine the scale and pattern of their long-distance movements and their potential to transfer these viruses between countries in the region. The animals were captured and released from six different locations in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste. Their movements were recorded for a median of 120 (range, 47-342) days with a median total distance travelled of 393 (range, 76-3011) km per individual. Pteropus alecto individuals were observed to move between Australia and Papua New Guinea (Western Province) on four occasions, between Papua New Guinea (Western Province) and Indonesia (Papua) on ten occasions, and to traverse Torres Strait on two occasions. Pteropus vampyrus was observed to move between Timor-Leste and Indonesia (West Timor) on one occasion. These findings expand upon the current literature on the potential for transfer of zoonotic viruses by flying-foxes between countries and have implications for disease risk management and for the conservation management of flying-fox populations in Australia, New Guinea, and the Lesser Sunda Islands.

Transmission of human infection with Nipah virus

Nipah virus (NiV) is a paramyxovirus whose reservoir host is fruit bats of the genus Pteropus. Occasionally the virus is introduced into human populations and causes severe illness characterized by encephalitis or respiratory disease. The first outbreak of NiV was recognized in Malaysia, but 8 outbreaks have been reported from Bangladesh since 2001. The primary pathways of transmission from bats to people in Bangladesh are through contamination of raw date palm sap by bats with subsequent consumption by humans and through infection of domestic animals (cattle, pigs, and goats), presumably from consumption of food contaminated with bat saliva or urine with subsequent transmission to people. Approximately one-half of recognized Nipah case patients in Bangladesh developed their disease following person-to-person transmission of the virus. Efforts to prevent transmission should focus on decreasing bat access to date palm sap and reducing family members' and friends' exposure to infected patients' saliva.

In-depth assessment of an outbreak of Nipah encephalitis with person-to-person transmission in Bangladesh: implications for prevention and control strategies

Continued Nipah encephalitis outbreaks in Bangladesh highlight the need for preventative and control measures to reduce transmission from bats to humans and human-to-human spread. Qualitative research was conducted at the end of an encephalitis outbreak in Faridpur, Bangladesh in May 2004 and continued through December 2004. Methods included in-depth interviews with caretakers of cases, case survivors, neighbors of cases, and health providers. Results show contrasts between local and biomedical views on causal explanations and appropriate care. Social norms demanded that family members maintain physical contact with sick patients, potentially increasing the risk of human-to-human transmission. Initial treatment strategies by community members involved home remedies, and public health officials encouraged patient hospitalization. Over time, communities linked the outbreak to supernatural powers and sought care with spiritual healers. Differing popular and medical views of illness caused conflict and rejection of biomedical recommendations. Future investigators should consider local perceptions of disease and treatment when developing outbreak strategies.

Lessons from the Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia

The Nipah virus outbreak in Malaysia (September 1998 to May 1999) resulted in 265 cases of acute encephalitis with 105 deaths, and near collapse of the billion-dollar pig-farming industry. Because it was initially attributed to Japanese encephalitis, early control measures were ineffective, and the outbreak spread to other parts of Malaysia and nearby Singapore. The isolation of the novel aetiological agent, the Nipah virus (NiV), from the cerebrospinal fluid of an outbreak victim was the turning point which led to outbreak control 2 months later. Together with the Hendra virus, NiV is now recognised as a new genus, Henipavirus (Hendra + Nipah), in the Paramyxoviridae family. Efforts of the local and international scientific community have since elucidated the epidemiology, clinico-pathophysiology and pathogenesis of this new disease. Humans contracted the infection from close contact with infected pigs, and formed the basis for pig-culling that eventually stopped the outbreak. NiV targeted medium-sized and small blood vessels resulting in endothelial multinucleated syncytia and fibrinoid necrosis. Autopsies revealed disseminated cerebral microinfarctions resulting from vasculitis-induced thrombosis and direct neuronal involvement. The discovery of NiV in the urine and saliva of Malaysian Island flying foxes (Pteropus hypomelanus and Petropus vampyrus) implicated these as natural reservoir hosts of NiV. It is probable that initial transmission of NiV from bats to pigs occurred in late 1997/early 1998 through contamination of pig swill by bat excretions, as a result of migration of these forest fruitbats to cultivated orchards and pig-farms, driven by fruiting failure of forest trees during the El Nino-related drought and anthropogenic fires in Indonesia in 1997-1998. This outbreak emphasizes the need for sharing information of any unusual illnesses in animals and humans, an open-minded approach and close collaboration and co-ordination between the medical profession, veterinarians and wildlife specialists in the investigation of such illnesses. Environmental mismanagement (such as deforestation and haze) has far-reaching effects, including encroachment of wildlife into human habitats and the introduction of zoonotic infections into domestic animals and humans.

Infection and disease in reservoir and spillover hosts: determinants of pathogen emergence

Infection and disease in reservoir and spillover hosts determine patterns of infectious agent availability and opportunities for infection, which then govern the process of transmission between susceptible species. In this chapter, using the zoonotic agents Hendra virus and Nipah virus as examples, the pathogenesis of infection in various species including the wildlife reservoirs and domestic spillover hosts is reviewed with an emphasis on the aspects of pathogenesis which contribute to the dissemination of infection. Through these discussions, the emergence of these zoonotic agents is explored.