Body parts in property theory: an integrated framework

The role of property theory as a framework for analysis and regulation of body parts has become a debate of topical importance because of the emergence of biomedical technologies that utilise body parts, and also because the application of the concept of property, even with respect to historically and traditionally accepted forms of property, raises serious challenges to the property analyst. However, there is another reason for the topicality of property in relation to body parts: a proprietary approach confers on a claimant the advantage of continuing control that is tellingly lacking in non-property frameworks underpinned, for instance, by consent, negligence, privacy and unjust enrichment rules. In some circumstances, such as an unauthorised blood test performed on a blood sample obtained with consent, the continuing control provided by property law might be the only chance a claimant has to obtain a remedy. Economy of space, however, requires that only a prolegomenon on body parts and property theory is given below. Thus, the analysis begins by providing in outline a framework for comprehensive analysis of body parts within the realm of property theory; thereafter, the author engages with the normative question of whether body parts or rights exercisable over body parts could be admitted into the category of property.

The ownership that wasn't meant to be: Yearworth and property rights in human tissue

This paper is concerned with the English Court of Appeal's decision in Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust that six men had, for the purposes of their claims against the trust, ownership of the sperm they had produced. The case has been discussed by many commentators and most, if not all, of those who have discussed the case have claimed or assumed that the court held that the claimants had property rights in the sperm they had produced. In this paper, I advance an interpretation of the case that does not regard the court as deciding that the men had property rights (in the narrow sense of that term) in the sperm they had produced. On this view, the 'ownership' that the Court of Appeal purported to vest in each of the men was not a right in rem, a right 'binding the world'. If this is so, it is perhaps unsurprising that some scholars, evaluating the success of the court's reasoning as a justification for vesting the claimants with property rights, have found it to be unsatisfactory.

Intellectual property rights and detached human body parts

This paper responds to an invitation by the editors to consider whether the intellectual property (IP) regime suggests an appropriate model for protecting interests in detached human body parts. It begins by outlining the extent of existing IP protection for body parts in Europe, and the relevant strengths and weaknesses of the patent system in that regard. It then considers two further species of IP right of less obvious relevance. The first are the statutory rights of ownership conferred by domestic UK law in respect of employee inventions, and the second are the economic and moral rights recognised by European and international law in respect of authorial works. In the argument made, both of these species of IP right may suggest more appropriate models of sui generis protection for detached human body parts than patent rights because of their capacity better to accommodate the relevant public and private interests in respect of the same.

The current approach of the courts

The approach of the courts when considering proprietary ('ownership') interests in human bodily material has been pragmatic and piecemeal. The general principle was initially that such material is not legally 'property' that can be 'owned', but courts have recognised many exceptions. In determining disputes between individuals in particular cases, they have stated principles that are often inconsistent with those stated in other cases with different facts. Later judges have been constrained by these decisions, especially when made at appellate level. They can distinguish the facts of one case from another to achieve a different outcome, but they cannot state new principles to be applied more widely to promote consistency. This requires the will of Parliament and legislation to introduce new principles. Experience to date suggests that such legislation will need to be wide-ranging and complex, with different principles for different circumstances. There will not be one area of law that answers all the issues that arise.

Dignity and the use of body parts

This paper contends that the conventional ethical and legal ways of analysing the wrong involved in the misuse of human body parts are inadequate, and should be replaced with an analysis based on human dignity. It examines the various ways in which dignity has been understood, outlines many of the criticisms made of those ways (agreeing with many of the criticisms), and proposes a new way of seeing dignity which is exegetically consonant with the way in which dignity has been historically understood, and yet avoids the pitfalls which have led to dignity being dismissed by many as hopelessly amorphous or incurably theological. The account of dignity proposed is broadly Aristotelian. It defines dignity in terms of human thriving, and presupposes that it is possible, at least in principle, to determine empirically what makes humans thrive. It contends that humans are quintessentially relational animals, and that it is not possible (and certainly not ethically desirable) to define humans as atomistic entities. One important corollary of this is that when using dignity/thriving as a criterion for determining the ethical acceptability of a proposed action or inaction, one should ask not merely how the dignity interests of the patient (for instance) would be affected, but how the dignity interests of all stakeholders would be affected. The business of ethics is then the business of auditing all those interests, and determining the course of action which would maximise the amount of thriving in the world.

Property in recyclable artificial implants

This article discusses property rights in recyclable artificial implants such as pacemakers. These implants can remain useful and valuable after the death of the first user, but it is not clear who owns the devices when they are removed. The article explains how property rights are transferred consensually and by the operation of law. It then applies these principles to the problem of recyclable implants and argues that the central question is whether the device in any given case accedes to its host human body. If it does not, then on removal the device is owned by the same person who owned it when it was first implanted: this may be the first user or their estate, or a hospital, or even a manufacturer. On the other hand, if the device does accede to the host body, then it ceases to exist as an independent object. The thing into which it has merged, a living human body, cannot be the subject of property rights. This means that any earlier rights in the implant are lost, and would not revive on removal. Instead, new property rights may attach to an explanted device.

Stepping back from the property line: a perspective from regulatory theory

There are multiple populations affected by issues associated with the excision and use of human tissue, each with different interests. There are also multiple subject matters for regulation; multiple regulatory goals that inform the system; and multiple strategies that may contribute to the attainment of those goals. This article outlines a range of regulatory mechanisms and suggests that a property regime is only one method of regulation in this area. Others may need to be considered to take account of the interests of all who may be affected,

Property or not property? The spectrum of approaches to regulating the use of human bodily material

This article presents the case for taking a property approach in regulating the use of human bodily material. It examines the current debates on the issue and outlines the various perspectives, ranging from the anti-property stance, through the spectrum of positions on modified and semi-proprietary approaches, through to the "full-blooded" property approach advocated by some commentators. It elucidates why those approaches that allow some proprietary aspects into regulation are to be preferred.

Relational bodies

This article argues that debates over the legal status of bodies reveal a much deeper dispute over the nature of the self. In these discussions lawyers and ethicists have much to learn from a more profound understanding of the biological nature of the body. Far from being a static entity, the body is constantly recreating itself. It contains parts that are organisms in their own right. Bodies are dependent upon other bodies and the external environment for survival. The complex biological picture reflects a philosophical truth that bodies are interdependent and "leaky". We should not, therefore, expect a single legal regime, such as property to capture the biological and ethical values that are at stake in relation to every part of the body. A more complex statutory regime is required to recognise the complexity of the interests in, and nature of, different body parts.

Making something into nothing: reforming the "no property" rule for human tissue

Advances in medical science have redefined the use and worth of once useless human tissue. The Australian common law has not kept pace with these advances, perpetuating the "no property" rule in human tissue. This has led to a plethora of legal problems surrounding who owns human tissue. This article examines the Australian common law position in relation to regenerative tissue. It then compares it with approaches in the United States and the United Kingdom. With a focus on absurd or unethical outcomes in these jurisdictions, it illustrates how such situations will occur in Australia. Finally, it proposes a framework of property rights that could be adopted at common law to prevent these problems without the commodification of human tissue occurring.

The evolution of dental group practices

Dentists and the dental profession are changing. One significant change in the deliver of dental care is the evolution of group practices to include networks of dental practices with central management by various service organizations that are owned or financed by private equity firms. This article discusses their evolution and potential advantages and disadvantages for dentists who join them. The article concludes with a prediction about the future heterogeneity of the dental care system.

The role of ownership in environmental performance: evidence from coalbed methane development

One way coalbed methane production differs from traditional oil and gas extraction is in the large quantities of produced water. This water must be disposed of for production to occur. Surface discharge has proven to be a low-cost alternative; regulations are in place to protect surface water quality. This paper investigates the effects of alternative ownership regimes on regulatory compliance. A unique dataset linking coalbed methane wells in Wyoming to water disposal permit violations is used to explore differences in environmental performance across severed and unified minerals. Empirical analysis of these data suggest that ownership does impact environmental compliance behavior. Most violations occur on split estate. Federal split estate wells have more severe violations, though not necessarily more of them. Federal unified wells performed best, with fewer and less serious violations. Wells on private land have more, though not necessarily more severe, violations. These results suggest some room for policy proposals accounting for alternative ownership regimes.

Regulating the use of human bodily material

The articles in this special issue consider recent developments in the law regulating the use of human bodily material and the wider implications of those developments. For some time, the law has accepted that a person who has undertaken "work and skill" on excised bodily material may obtain at least a possessory right; but the person from whom the material came did not have such a right. Now, however, the law has recognised that people may have some legal rights regarding their own bodily material. What is the nature and source of those rights? Should they be expanded? If so, what legal principles are best to do that? The most frequent suggestion is the law of property but many other areas of law are also relevant: the law of contract; tort (bailment and consent); criminal law (e.g., forensic testing); gifts; custodianship and others. These regulatory options are outlined in this editorial and discussed by lawyers and other contributors in their articles in this special issue. There are also stimulating philosophical reflections on the nature of human bodily material.

Biobanking of blood and bone marrow: emerging challenges for custodians of public resources

The Australian Bone Marrow Donor Registry (ABMDR) is a publicly funded company that is part of an international network that facilitates unrelated bone marrow transplantation. This role means that the ABMDR has access to a large biospecimen repository therefore making it a highly valuable research resource. Recognising the potential value of these biospecimens for research purposes, the ABMDR is in the process of determining whether, and how, to share its biospecimens with other biobanks. While this would undoubtedly be of value to the scientific community, and ultimately to the wider community, it would also inevitably transform the role of an institution whose primary role is therapeutic, and would compromise the degree of control that a custodian has over donated material. This article describe the challenges confronting the ABMDR, and organisations like it, in balancing their duties to donors, patients, researchers and the general public. These problems have led inevitably to the use of "property" rights language in the discussion of these issues but notions of gift, ownership, trusteeship and transfer might also be considered.

"Thin" property and controversial subject matter: Yanner v. Eaton and property rights in human tissue and embryos

This article examines the definitions of "property" offered by the majority of the High Court of Australia in the case of Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351, which involved a statute giving the Crown "property" in fauna. It argues that the majority judges in that case endorsed a flexible or "thin" conception of property that is consistent with recognition of property in "things" such as excised human tissue and in vitro human embryos, despite the many differences between such "things" and ordinary chattels. A similar flexible conception of property was also an important factor in the United Kingdom case of Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust[2010] QB 1.

Body ownership and research

This article questions whether recognition of property rights in human tissue .would enhance protection of the interests of donors of tissue used for research purposes. Best practice already obliges researchers to comply with a range of legal and ethical obligations, with particular focus on informed consent and research transparency. A number of lawsuits relating to research use of human tissue emphasise the central importance of informed consent to donors. Informed consent of communities, as well as individuals, becomes essential when engaging in research with indigenous peoples. Increasingly genetic researchers are adopting participatory governance as a model for working with communities to develop culturally appropriate genetic studies that address health problems that are priorities for the communities involved. The transparency of the participatory governance model means that participants feel that their autonomy is respected and that their interests are being represented throughout the research process. The question of ownership of samples becomes irrelevant as control is codified through alternative mechanisms.

Property rights in human gametes in Australia

It has long been a basic tenet of the common law that there can be no property interest in human bodies or body parts. However, exceptions to the rule have been recognised from the mid-19th century and developed over time. In the early 21st century, there have been interesting developments in the common law of Australia and England, with Australian Supreme Court judges and the English Court of Appeal casting aside existing exceptions, and finding property rights in human body parts, including gametes, by relying instead on a "rational" and "logical" basis to identify property interests in human body parts.

Laboratory specimens and genetic privacy: evolution of legal theory

Although laboratory specimens are an important resource for biomedical research, controversy has arisen when research has been conducted without the knowledge or consent of the individuals who were the source of the specimens. This paper summarizes the most important litigation regarding the research use of laboratory specimens and traces the evolution of legal theory from property claims to claims related to genetic privacy interests.