The person in the mirror: using the enfacement illusion to investigate the experiential structure of self-identification

The Role of Age on Multisensory Bodily Experience: An Experimental Study with a Virtual Reality Full-Body Illusion

A growing body of evidence demonstrated that it is feasible to induce ownership over an artificial body to alter bodily experience. However, several uncharted aspects about full-body illusion applications need to be tackled before a complete exploitation of these methods in clinical practice. This work is devoted to explore possible individual age-related differences in shaping changes in body representations induced with a full-body illusion. A total of 40 women were divided into two different age groups according to the median of the variable age. Participants estimated the width of three different body parts (i.e., shoulders, abdomen, and hips) before the entire illusion was induced (baseline), and after the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions. Results revealed that 26-to-55-year-old participants were more resistant to changes induced by the bodily illusion, whereas 19-to-25-year-old participants underestimated their bodies after both conditions. The findings were discussed in terms of the literature exploring age differences in responses to bodily illusion, which could suggest a Bayesian mechanism underlying these individual differences.

Heartfelt Self: Cardio-Visual Integration Affects Self-Face Recognition and Interoceptive Cortical Processing

The sense of body-ownership relies on the representation of both interoceptive and exteroceptive signals coming from one's body. However, it remains unknown how the integration of bodily signals coming from "outside" and "inside" the body is instantiated in the brain. Here, we used a modified version of the Enfacement Illusion to investigate whether the integration of visual and cardiac information can alter self-face recognition (Experiment 1) and neural responses to heartbeats (Experiment 2). We projected a pulsing shade, that was synchronous or asynchronous with the participant's heartbeat, onto a picture depicting the participant's face morphed with the face of an unfamiliar other. Results revealed that synchronous (vs. asynchronous) cardio-visual stimulation led to increased self-identification with the other's face (Experiment 1), while during stimulation, synchronicity modulated the amplitude of the Heartbeat Evoked Potential, an electrophysiological index of cortical interoceptive processing (Experiment 2). Importantly, the magnitude of the illusion-related effects was dependent on, and increased linearly, with the participants' Interoceptive Accuracy. These results provide the first direct neural evidence for the integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals in bodily self-awareness.

From multisensory integration in peripersonal space to bodily self-consciousness: from statistical regularities to statistical inference

Integrating information across sensory systems is a critical step toward building a cohesive representation of the environment and one's body, and as illustrated by numerous illusions, scaffolds subjective experience of the world and self. In the last years, classic principles of multisensory integration elucidated in the subcortex have been translated into the language of statistical inference understood by the neocortical mantle. Most importantly, a mechanistic systems-level description of multisensory computations via probabilistic population coding and divisive normalization is actively being put forward. In parallel, by describing and understanding bodily illusions, researchers have suggested multisensory integration of bodily inputs within the peripersonal space as a key mechanism in bodily self-consciousness. Importantly, certain aspects of bodily self-consciousness, although still very much a minority, have been recently casted under the light of modern computational understandings of multisensory integration. In doing so, we argue, the field of bodily self-consciousness may borrow mechanistic descriptions regarding the neural implementation of inference computations outlined by the multisensory field. This computational approach, leveraged on the understanding of multisensory processes generally, promises to advance scientific comprehension regarding one of the most mysterious questions puzzling humankind, that is, how our brain creates the experience of a self in interaction with the environment.

Just Before I Recognize Myself: The Role of Featural and Multisensory Cues Leading up to Explicit Mirror Self-Recognition

Leading up to explicit mirror self-recognition, infants rely on two crucial sources of information: the continuous integration of sensorimotor and multisensory signals, as when seeing one's movements reflected in the mirror, and the unique facial features associated with the self. While visual appearance and multisensory contingent cues may be two likely candidates of the processes that enable self-recognition, their respective contribution remains poorly understood. In this study, 18-month-old infants saw side-by-side pictures of themselves and a peer, which were systematically and simultaneously touched on the face with a hand. While watching the stimuli, the infant's own face was touched either in synchrony or out of synchrony and their preferential looking behavior was measured. Subsequently, the infants underwent the mirror-test task. We demonstrated that infants who were coded as nonrecognizers at the mirror test spent significantly more time looking at the picture of their own face compared to the other-face, irrespective of whether the multisensory input was synchronous or asynchronous. Our results suggest that right before the onset of mirror self-recognition, featural information about the self might be more relevant in the process of recognizing one's face, compared to multisensory cues.

I Am There … but Not Quite: An Unfaithful Mirror That Reduces Feelings of Ownership and Agency

The experience of seeing one's own face in a mirror is a common experience in daily life. Visual feedback from a mirror is linked to a sense of identity. We developed a procedure that allowed individuals to watch their own face, as in a normal mirror, or with specific distortions (lag) for active movement or passive touch. By distorting visual feedback while the face is being observed on a screen, we document an illusion of reduced embodiment. Participants made mouth movements, while their forehead was touched with a pen. Visual feedback was either synchronous (simultaneous) with reality, as in a mirror, or asynchronous (delayed). Asynchronous feedback was exclusive to touch or movement in different conditions and incorporated both in a third condition. Following stimulation, participants rated their perception of the face in the mirror, and perception of their own face, on questions that tapped into agency and ownership. Results showed that perceptions of both agency and ownership were affected by asynchrony. Effects related to agency, in particular, were moderated by individual differences in depersonalisation and auditory hallucination-proneness, variables with theoretical links to embodiment. The illusion presents a new way of investigating the extent to which body representations are malleable.

Affective Touch Enhances Self-Face Recognition During Multisensory Integration

Multisensory integration is a powerful mechanism for constructing body awareness and key for the sense of selfhood. Recent evidence has shown that the specialised C tactile modality that gives rise to feelings of pleasant, affective touch, can enhance the experience of body ownership during multisensory integration. Nevertheless, no study has examined whether affective touch can also modulate psychological identification with our face, the hallmark of our identity. The current study used the enfacement illusion paradigm to investigate the role of affective touch in the modulation of self-face recognition during multisensory integration. In the first experiment (N = 30), healthy participants were stroked on the cheek while they were looking at another face being stroked on the cheek in synchrony or asynchrony with affective (slow; CT-optimal) vs. neutral (fast; CT-suboptimal) touch. In the second experiment (N = 38) spatial incongruence of touch (cheek vs. forehead) was used as a control condition instead of temporal asynchrony. Overall, our data suggest that CT-optimal, affective touch enhances subjective (but not behavioural) self-face recognition during synchronous and spatially congruent integration of different sensations and possibly reduces deafference during asynchronous multisensory integration. We discuss the role of affective touch in shaping the more social aspects of our self.

Mirror self-face perception in individuals with schizophrenia: Feelings of strangeness associated with one's own image

Self-face recognition is crucial for sense of identity and for maintaining a coherent sense of self. Most of our daily life experiences with the image of our own face happen when we look at ourselves in the mirror. However, to date, mirror self-perception in schizophrenia has received little attention despite evidence that face recognition deficits and self abnormalities have been described in schizophrenia. Thus, this study aims to investigate mirror self-face perception in schizophrenia patients and its correlation with clinical symptoms. Twenty-four schizophrenia patients and twenty-five healthy controls were explicitly requested to describe their image in detail during 2min whilst looking at themselves in a mirror. Then, they were asked to report whether they experienced any self-face recognition difficulties. Results showed that schizophrenia patients reported more feelings of strangeness towards their face compared to healthy controls (U=209.5, p=0.048, r=0.28), but no statistically significant differences were found regarding misidentification (p=0.111) and failures in recognition (p=0.081). Symptoms such as hallucinations, somatic concerns and depression were also associated with self-face perception abnormalities (all p-values>0.05). Feelings of strangeness toward one's own face in schizophrenia might be part of a familiar face perception deficit or a more global self-disturbance, which is characterized by a loss of self-other boundaries and has been associated with abnormal body experiences and first rank symptoms. Regarding this last hypothesis, multisensorial integration might have an impact on the way patients perceive themselves since it has an important role in mirror self-perception.

Can Gaze-Contingent Mirror-Feedback from Unfamiliar Faces alter Self-Recognition?

This study focuses on learning of the self, by examining how human observers update internal representations of their own face. For this purpose, we present a novel gaze-contingent paradigm, in which an onscreen face mimics observers’ own eye-gaze behaviour (in the congruent condition), moves its eyes in different directions to that of the observers (incongruent condition), or remains static and unresponsive (neutral condition). Across three experiments, the mimicry of the onscreen face did not affect observers’ perceptual self-representations. However, this paradigm influenced observers’ reports of their own face. This effect was such that observers felt the onscreen face to be their own and that, if the onscreen gaze had moved on its own accord, observers expected their own eyes to move too. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.

The multisensory basis of the self: From body to identity to others [Formula: see text]

By grounding the self in the body, experimental psychology has taken the body as the starting point for a science of the self. One fundamental dimension of the bodily self is the sense of body ownership that refers to the special perceptual status of one's own body, the feeling that "my body" belongs to me. The primary aim of this review article is to highlight recent advances in the study of body ownership and our understanding of the underlying neurocognitive processes in three ways. I first consider how the sense of body ownership has been investigated and elucidated in the context of multisensory integration. Beyond exteroception, recent studies have considered how this exteroceptively driven sense of body ownership can be linked to the other side of embodiment, that of the unobservable, yet felt, interoceptive body, suggesting that these two sides of embodiment interact to provide a unifying bodily self. Lastly, the multisensorial understanding of the self has been shown to have implications for our understanding of social relationships, especially in the context of self-other boundaries. Taken together, these three research strands motivate a unified model of the self inspired by current predictive coding models.

Prosocial Consequences of Interpersonal Synchrony: A Meta-Analysis

Abstract. The capacity to establish interpersonal synchrony is fundamental to human beings because it constitutes the basis for social connection and understanding. Interpersonal synchrony refers to instances when the movements or sensations of two or more people overlap in time and form. Recently, the causal influence of interpersonal synchrony on prosociality has been established through experiments. The current meta-analysis is the first to synthesize these isolated and sometimes contradictory experiments. We meta-analyzed 60 published and unpublished experiments that compared an interpersonal synchrony condition with at least one control condition. The results reveal a medium effect of interpersonal synchrony on prosociality with regard to both attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, experimenter effects and intentionality moderate these effects. We discuss the strengths and limitations of our analysis, as well as its practical implications, and we suggest avenues for future research.

Interoception and Positive Symptoms in Schizophrenia

The present study focuses on the multifaceted concept of self-disturbance in schizophrenia, adding knowledge about a not yet investigated aspect, which is the interoceptive accuracy. Starting from the assumption that interoceptive accuracy requires an intact sense of self, which otherwise was proved to be altered in schizophrenia, the aim of the present study was to explore interoceptive accuracy in a group of schizophrenia patients, compared to healthy controls. Furthermore, the possible association between interoceptive accuracy and patients' positive and negative symptomatology was assessed. To pursue these goals, a group of 23 schizophrenia patients and a group of 23 healthy controls performed a heartbeat perception task. Patients' symptomatology was assessed by means of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Results demonstrated significantly lower interoceptive accuracy in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. This difference was not accounted for participants' age, BMI, anxiety levels, and heart rate. Furthermore, patients' illness severity, attention and pharmacological treatment did not influence their interoceptive accuracy levels. Interestingly, a strong positive relation between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptoms severity, especially Grandiosity, was found. The present results demonstrate for the first time that interoceptive accuracy is altered in schizophrenia. Furthermore, they prove a specific association between interoceptive accuracy and positive symptomatology, suggesting that the symptom Grandiosity might be protective against an altered basic sense of self in patients characterized by higher sensibility to their inner bodily sensations.

Multisensory body representation in autoimmune diseases

Body representation has been linked to the processing and integration of multisensory signals. An outstanding example of the pivotal role played by multisensory mechanisms in body representation is the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI). In this paradigm, multisensory stimulation induces a sense of ownership over a fake limb. Previous work has shown high interindividual differences in the susceptibility to the RHI. The origin of this variability remains largely unknown. Given the tight and bidirectional communication between the brain and the immune system, we predicted that the origin of this variability could be traced, in part, to the immune system’s functioning, which is altered by several clinical conditions, including Coeliac Disease (CD). Consistent with this prediction, we found that the Rubber Hand Illusion is stronger in CD patients as compared to healthy controls. We propose a biochemical mechanism accounting for the dependency of multisensory body representation upon the Immune system. Our finding has direct implications for a range of neurological, psychiatric and immunological conditions where alterations of multisensory integration, body representation and dysfunction of the immune system co-exist.

Judged and Remembered Trustworthiness of Faces Is Enhanced by Experiencing Multisensory Synchrony and Asynchrony in the Right Order

This work builds on the enfacement effect. This effect occurs when experiencing a rhythmic stimulation on one’s cheek while seeing someone else’s face being touched in a synchronous way. This typically leads to cognitive and social-cognitive effects similar to self-other merging. In two studies, we demonstrate that this multisensory stimulation can change the evaluation of the other’s face. In the first study, participants judged the stranger’s face and similar faces as being more trustworthy after synchrony, but not after asynchrony. Synchrony interacted with the order of the stroking; hence trustworthiness only changed when the synchronous stimulation occurred before the asynchronous one. In the second study, a synchronous stimulation caused participants to remember the stranger’s face as more trustworthy, but again only when the synchronous stimulation came before the asynchronous one. The results of both studies show that order of stroking creates a context in which multisensory synchrony can affect the trustworthiness of faces.

The influence of embodiment on multisensory integration using the mirror box illusion

We examined the relationship between subcomponents of embodiment and multisensory integration using a mirror box illusion. The participants' left hand was positioned against the mirror, while their right hidden hand was positioned 12″, 6″, or 0″ from the mirror - creating a conflict between visual and proprioceptive estimates of limb position in some conditions. After synchronous tapping, asynchronous tapping, or no movement of both hands, participants gave position estimates for the hidden limb and filled out a brief embodiment questionnaire. We found a relationship between different subcomponents of embodiment and illusory displacement towards the visual estimate. Illusory visual displacement was positively correlated with feelings of deafference in the asynchronous and no movement conditions, whereas it was positive correlated with ratings of visual capture and limb ownership in the synchronous and no movement conditions. These results provide evidence for dissociable contributions of different aspects of embodiment to multisensory integration.

The Enfacement Illusion Is Not Affected by Negative Facial Expressions

Enfacement is an illusion wherein synchronous visual and tactile inputs update the mental representation of one’s own face to assimilate another person’s face. Emotional facial expressions, serving as communicative signals, may influence enfacement by increasing the observer’s motivation to understand the mental state of the expresser. Fearful expressions, in particular, might increase enfacement because they are valuable for adaptive behavior and more strongly represented in somatosensory cortex than other emotions. In the present study, a face was seen being touched at the same time as the participant’s own face. This face was either neutral, fearful, or angry. Anger was chosen as an emotional control condition for fear because it is similarly negative but induces less somatosensory resonance, and requires additional knowledge (i.e., contextual information and social contingencies) to effectively guide behavior. We hypothesized that seeing a fearful face (but not an angry one) would increase enfacement because of greater somatosensory resonance. Surprisingly, neither fearful nor angry expressions modulated the degree of enfacement relative to neutral expressions. Synchronous interpersonal visuo-tactile stimulation led to assimilation of the other’s face, but this assimilation was not modulated by facial expression processing. This finding suggests that dynamic, multisensory processes of self-face identification operate independently of facial expression processing.

Is that me or my twin? Lack of self-face recognition advantage in identical twins

Despite the increasing interest in twin studies and the stunning amount of research on face recognition, the ability of adult identical twins to discriminate their own faces from those of their co-twins has been scarcely investigated. One's own face is the most distinctive feature of the bodily self, and people typically show a clear advantage in recognizing their own face even more than other very familiar identities. Given the very high level of resemblance of their faces, monozygotic twins represent a unique model for exploring self-face processing. Herein we examined the ability of monozygotic twins to distinguish their own face from the face of their co-twin and of a highly familiar individual. Results show that twins equally recognize their own face and their twin's face. This lack of self-face advantage was negatively predicted by how much they felt physically similar to their co-twin and by their anxious or avoidant attachment style. We speculate that in monozygotic twins, the visual representation of the self-face overlaps with that of the co-twin. Thus, to distinguish the self from the co-twin, monozygotic twins have to rely much more than control participants on the multisensory integration processes upon which the sense of bodily self is based. Moreover, in keeping with the notion that attachment style influences perception of self and significant others, we propose that the observed self/co-twin confusion may depend upon insecure attachment.

Neural Mechanisms of Body Awareness in Infants

The ability to differentiate one's body from others is a fundamental aspect of social perception and has been shown to involve the integration of sense modalities attributable to the self. Though behavioral studies in infancy have investigated infants' discrimination of body-related multisensory stimuli, whether they attribute this information as belonging to the self is still unknown. In human adults, neuroimaging studies have demonstrated the recruitment of a specific set of brain regions in response to body-related multisensory integration. To test whether the infant brain integrates this information similarly to adults, in a first functional near-infrared spectroscopy study we investigated the role of visual–proprioceptive feedback when temporal cues are manipulated by showing 5-month-old infants an online video of their own face while the infant was performing movements. To explore the role of body-related contingency further, in a second study we investigated whether cortical activation in response to self-initiated movements and external tactile stimulation was similar to that found in the first study. Our results indicate that infants' specialized cortical activation in response to body-related contingencies is similar to brain activation seen in response to body awareness in adults.

Interpersonal multisensory stimulation reduces the overwhelming distracting power of self-gaze: psychophysical evidence for 'engazement'

One's own face and gaze are never seen directly but only in a mirror. Yet, these stimuli capture attention more powerfully than others' face and gaze, suggesting the self is special for brain and behavior. Synchronous touches felt on one's own and seen on the face of others induce the sensation of including others in one's own face (enfacement). We demonstrate that enfacement may also reduce the overwhelming distracting power of self-gaze. This effect, hereafter called ‘engazement', depends on the perceived physical attractiveness and inner beauty of the pair partner. Thus, we highlight for the first time the close link between enfacement and engazement by showing that changes of the self-face representation induced by facial visuo-tactile stimulation extend to gaze following, a separate process likely underpinned by different neural substrates. Moreover, although gaze following is a largely automatic, engazement is penetrable to the influence of social variables, such as positive interpersonal perception.

Enfacing others but only if they are nice to you

Experiencing tactile facial stimulation while seeing synchronous stimuli on the face of another individual induces “enfacement,” i.e., the subjective illusory experience of ownership of the other's face (explicit measure) and the attribution of the others' facial features to one's own face (implicit measure). Here we expanded previous knowledge by investigating if the tendency to include the other into one's own representation is influenced by positive or negative interpersonal attitudes derived either from consolidated socio-cultural stereotypes or from newly acquired, short-term individual interactions with a specific person. To this aim, we tested in Caucasian white participants the enfacement with a white and a black confederate, before and after an experimental procedure inducing a positive or negative perception of each of them. The results show that the subjective experience of enfacement with in- and out-group others before and after the manipulation is similar. The bias in attributing other's facial features to one's own face after synchronous stroking was, instead, dependent on whether the other person was positively perceived, independently of his/her ethnicity. Thus, we show that realistic positive face-to-face interactions are more effective than consolidated racial biases in influencing the strength of self-attribution of another persons' facial features in the context of multisensory illusions. Results suggest that positive interpersonal interactions might powerfully change the plasticity of self-other representations.

The structure of conscious bodily self-perception during full-body illusions

Previous research suggests that bodily self-identification, bodily self-localization, agency, and the sense of being present in space are critical aspects of conscious full-body self-perception. However, none of the existing studies have investigated the relationship of these aspects to each other, i.e., whether they can be identified to be distinguishable components of the structure of conscious full-body self-perception. Therefore, the objective of the present investigation is to elucidate the structure of conscious full-body self-perception. We performed two studies in which we stroked the back of healthy individuals for three minutes while they watched the back of a distant virtual body being synchronously stroked with a virtual stick. After visuo-tactile stimulation, participants assessed changes in their bodily self-perception with a custom made self-report questionnaire. In the first study, we investigated the structure of conscious full-body self-perception by analyzing the responses to the questionnaire by means of multidimensional scaling combined with cluster analysis. In the second study, we then extended the questionnaire and validated the stability of the structure of conscious full-body self-perception found in the first study within a larger sample of individuals by performing a principle components analysis of the questionnaire responses. The results of the two studies converge in suggesting that the structure of conscious full-body self-perception consists of the following three distinct components: bodily self-identification, space-related self-perception (spatial presence), and agency.

Visual capture and the experience of having two bodies - Evidence from two different virtual reality techniques

In neurology and psychiatry the detailed study of illusory own body perceptions has suggested close links between bodily processing and self-consciousness. One such illusory own body perception is heautoscopy where patients have the sensation of being reduplicated and to exist at two or even more locations. In previous experiments, using a video head-mounted display, self-location and self-identification were manipulated by applying conflicting visuo-tactile information. Yet the experienced singularity of the self was not affected, i.e., participants did not experience having multiple bodies or selves. In two experiments presented in this paper, we investigated self-location and self-identification while participants saw two virtual bodies (video-generated in study 1 and 3D computer generated in study 2) that were stroked either synchronously or asynchronously with their own body. In both experiments, we report that self-identification with two virtual bodies was stronger during synchronous stroking. Furthermore, in the video generated setup with synchronous stroking participants reported a greater feeling of having multiple bodies than in the control conditions. In study 1, but not in study 2, we report that self-location – measured by anterior posterior drift – was significantly shifted towards the two bodies in the synchronous condition only. Self-identification with two bodies, the sensation of having multiple bodies, and the changes in self-location show that the experienced singularity of the self can be studied experimentally. We discuss our data with respect to ownership for supernumerary hands and heautoscopy. We finally compare the effects of the video and 3D computer generated head-mounted display technology and discuss the possible benefits of using either technology to induce changes in illusory self-identification with a virtual body.

Body perception in newborns

Body ownership and awareness has recently become an active topic of research in adults using paradigms such as the "rubber hand illusion" and "enfacement" [1-11]. These studies show that visual, tactile, postural, and anatomical information all contribute to the sense of body ownership in adults [12]. While some hypothesize body perception from birth [13], others have speculated on the importance of postnatal experience [14, 15]. Through studying body perception in newborns, we can directly investigate the factors involved prior to significant postnatal experience. To address this issue, we measured the looking behavior of newborns presented with visual-tactile synchronous and asynchronous cues, under conditions in which the visual information was either an upright (body-related stimulus; experiment 1) or inverted (non-body-related stimulus; experiment 2) infant face. We found that newborns preferred to look at the synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition, but only when the visual stimulus was body related. These results are in line with findings from adults and demonstrate that human newborns detect intersensory synchrony when related to their own bodies, consistent with the basic processes underlying body perception being present at birth.

Embodying an outgroup: the role of racial bias and the effect of multisensory processing in somatosensory remapping

We come to understand other people's physical and mental states by re-mapping their bodily states onto our sensorimotor system. This process, also called somatosensory resonance, is an essential ability for social cognition and is stronger when observing ingroup than outgroup members. Here we investigated, first, whether implicit racial bias constrains somatosensory resonance, and second, whether increasing the ingroup/outgroup perceived physical similarity results in an increase in the somatosensory resonance for outgroup members. We used the Visual Remapping of Touch effect as an index of individuals' ability in resonating with the others, and the Implicit Association Test to measure racial bias. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to detect near-threshold tactile stimuli delivered to their own face while viewing either an ingroup or an outgroup face receiving a similar stimulation. Our results showed that individuals' tactile accuracy when viewing an outgroup face being touched was negatively correlated to their implicit racial bias. In Experiment 2, participants received the interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) while observing an outgroup member. IMS has been found to increase the perceived physical similarity between the observer's and the observed body. We tested whether such increase in ingroup/outgroup perceived physical similarity increased the remapping ability for outgroup members. We found that after sharing IMS experience with an outgroup member, tactile accuracy when viewing touch on outgroup faces increased. Interestingly, participants with stronger implicit bias against the outgroup showed larger positive change in the remapping. We conclude that shared multisensory experiences might represent one key way to improve our ability to resonate with others by overcoming the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup categories.

Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily self-consciousness

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.

Plasticity in unimodal and multimodal brain areas reflects multisensory changes in self-face identification

Nothing provides as strong a sense of self as seeing one's face. Nevertheless, it remains unknown how the brain processes the sense of self during the multisensory experience of looking at one's face in a mirror. Synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation on one's own and another's face, an experience that is akin to looking in the mirror but seeing another's face, causes the illusory experience of ownership over the other person's face and changes in self-recognition. Here, we investigate the neural correlates of this enfacement illusion using fMRI. We examine activity in the human brain as participants experience tactile stimulation delivered to their face, while observing either temporally synchronous or asynchronous tactile stimulation delivered to another's face on either a specularly congruent or incongruent location. Activity in the multisensory right temporo-parietal junction, intraparietal sulcus, and the unimodal inferior occipital gyrus showed an interaction between the synchronicity and the congruency of the stimulation and varied with the self-reported strength of the illusory experience, which was recorded after each stimulation block. Our results highlight the important interplay between unimodal and multimodal information processing for self-face recognition, and elucidate the neurobiological basis for the plasticity required for identifying with our continuously changing visual appearance.

Balancing the "inner" and the "outer" self: interoceptive sensitivity modulates self-other boundaries

Distinguishing self from other is necessary for self-awareness and social interactions. This distinction is thought to depend on multisensory integration dominated by visual feedback. However, self-awareness also relies on the processing of interoceptive signals. We contrasted the exteroceptive and interoceptive models of the self to investigate the hitherto unexplored interaction between the perception of the self from the outside and from within. Multisensory stimulation between self and other was used to induce controlled changes in the representation of one's identity. Interoceptive sensitivity predicted the malleability of self-representations in response to multisensory integration across behavioral, physiological, and introspective responses, suggesting that interoception plays a key modulating role in the self-recognition system. In particular, only participants with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced changes in self-other boundaries in response to multisensory stimulation. These results support the view that interoceptive predictive coding models are used to monitor and assign the sources of sensory input either to the self or to others, as well as support the hypothesis of the insular cortex as a convergence zone in the processing and global representation of the material self given its involvement in both interoceptive feelings, multisensory integration, and self-processing.

Consciousness and the invention of Morel

A scientific study of consciousness should take into consideration both objective and subjective measures of conscious experiences. To this date, very few studies have tried to integrate third-person data, or data about the neurophysiological correlates of conscious states, with first-person data, or data about subjective experience. Inspired by Morel's invention (Casares, 1940), a literary machine capable of reproducing sensory-dependent external reality, this article suggests that combination of virtual reality techniques and brain reading technologies, that is, decoding of conscious states by brain activity alone, can offer this integration. It is also proposed that the multimodal, simulating, and integrative capacities of the dreaming brain render it an “endogenous” Morel's machine, which can potentially be used in studying consciousness, but not always in a reliable way. Both the literary machine and dreaming could contribute to a better understanding of conscious states.