Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in humans

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying deceptive hazard evaluation: An event-related potentials investigation

Deceptive behavior is common in human social interactions. Researchers have been trying to uncover the cognitive process and neural basis underlying deception due to its theoretical and practical significance. We used Event-related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the neural correlates of deception when the participants completed a hazard judgment task. Pictures conveying or not conveying hazard information were presented to the participants who were then requested to discriminate the hazard content (safe or hazardous) and make a response corresponding to the cues (truthful or deceptive). Behavioral and electrophysiological data were recorded during the entire experiment. Results showed that deceptive responses, compared to truthful responses, were associated with longer reaction time (RT), lower accuracy, increased N2 and reduced late positive potential (LPP), suggesting a cognitively more demanding process to respond deceptively. The decrement in LPP correlated negatively with the increment in RT for deceptive relative to truthful responses, regardless of hazard content. In addition, hazardous information evoked larger N1 and P300 than safe information, reflecting an early processing bias and a later evaluative categorization process based on motivational significance, respectively. Finally, the interaction between honesty (truthful/deceptive) and safety (safe/hazardous) on accuracy and LPP indicated that deceptive responses towards safe information required more effort than deceptive responses towards hazardous information. Overall, these results demonstrate the neurocognitive substrates underlying deception about hazard information.

The stimulated social brain: effects of transcranial direct current stimulation on social cognition

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is an increasingly popular noninvasive neuromodulatory tool in the fields of cognitive and clinical neuroscience and psychiatry. It is an inexpensive, painless, and safe brain-stimulation technique that has proven to be effective in modulating cognitive and sensory-perceptual functioning in healthy individuals and clinical populations. Importantly, recent findings have shown that tDCS may also be an effective and promising tool for probing the neural mechanisms of social cognition. In this review, we present the state-of-the-art of the field of tDCS research in social cognition. By doing so, we aim to gather knowledge of the potential of tDCS to modulate social functioning and social decision making in healthy humans, and to inspire future research investigations.

The honest truth about deception: Demographic, cognitive, and neural correlates of child repeated deceptive behavior

This study examined situational, psychological, and neurobiological factors associated with deceptive behavior in 8-year-old children. By assessing deception in low- and high-risk conditions, we differentiated between children displaying some dishonesty and children who deceived repeatedly, and we assessed the correlates of deception in 163 children. A large majority of the children were deceptive in the low-risk condition (n=121, 74.2%), but most children refrained from deception when at risk for getting caught (69 of 121). Using an aggregate score, children who continued deceiving could be discriminated from other children based on gender, lower age, lower IQ, less effortful control, and lower educated mothers. Compared with honest children and high-risk deceivers, low-risk deceivers differed on an aggregate score, suggesting that they were more likely to be girls and to come from higher income families. Compared with the other children, high-risk deceivers showed decreased activation in the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and right frontal pole during the low-risk condition, suggesting decreased engagement in conflict monitoring and error detection during opportunities for deception. In high-risk deceivers, high-risk deception was associated with increased bilateral ACC and right paracingulate gyrus activation compared with low-risk deception. High-risk deceivers may require a higher level of risk to engage the ACC to the same degree as low-risk deceivers or honest children. Our results suggest that deceptive behavior in children seems to be largely dependent on the estimated likelihood of getting caught. High-risk deceivers form a distinct group with different cognitive and neurobiological characteristics compared with honest children and low-risk deceivers.

Cognitive neuroscience of honesty and deception: A signaling framework

Understanding the neural basis of human honesty and deception has enormous potential scientific and practical value. However, past approaches, largely developed out of studies with forensic applications in mind, are increasingly recognized as having serious methodological and conceptual shortcomings. Here we propose to address these challenges by drawing on so-called signaling games widely used in game theory and ethology to study behavioral and evolutionary consequences of information transmission and distortion. In particular, by separating and capturing distinct adaptive problems facing signal senders and receivers, signaling games provide a framework to organize the complex set of cognitive processes associated with honest and deceptive behavior. Furthermore, this framework provides novel insights into feasibility and practical challenges of neuroimaging-based lie detection.

Prefrontal connections express individual differences in intrinsic resistance to trading off honesty values against economic benefits

Individuals differ profoundly when they decide whether to tell the truth or to be dishonest, particularly in situations where moral motives clash with economic motives, i.e., when truthfulness comes at a monetary cost. These differences should be expressed in the decision network, particularly in prefrontal cortex. However, the interactions between the core players of the decision network during honesty-related decisions involving trade-offs with economic costs remain poorly understood. To investigate brain connectivity patterns associated with individual differences in responding to economic costs of truthfulness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and measured brain activations, while participants made decisions concerning honesty. We found that in participants who valued honesty highly, dorsolateral and dorsomedial parts of prefrontal cortex were more tightly coupled with the inferior frontal cortex when economic costs were high compared to when they were low. Finer-grained analysis revealed that information flow from the inferior frontal cortex to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bidirectional information flow between the inferior frontal cortex and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex was associated with a reduced tendency to trade off honesty for economic benefits. Our findings provide a novel account of the neural circuitry that underlies honest decisions in the face of economic temptations.

Psychopathic Traits and Their Relationship with the Cognitive Costs and Compulsive Nature of Lying in Offenders

The cognitive view on deception holds that lying typically requires additional mental effort as compared to truth telling. Psychopathy, however, has been associated with swift and even compulsive lying, leading us to explore the ease and compulsive nature of lying in psychopathic offenders. We explored the costs of instructed lying versus truth telling through RTs and error rates in 52 violent male offenders, who were assessed with the Youth Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI). Our deception paradigm also included trials with the free choice to lie or tell the truth. By coupling monetary loss to slow and erroneous responding, we hypothesized that the frequency of lying despite likely negative consequences, would provide an index of compulsive lying. Offenders were slower and erred more often when lying than when telling the truth, and there was no robust association between psychopathy and the cognitive cost of lying. From an applied perspective, this suggests that psychopathy may not threaten the validity of computerized cognition-based lie detection. In the face of probable negative consequences, high grandiose-manipulative offenders chose to lie three times as often as low grandiose-manipulative offenders. Our new lying frequency index is a first attempt to create a much needed tool to empirically examine compulsive lying, and provides preliminary support for the compulsive nature of lying in grandiose-manipulative offenders. Alternative interpretation of the findings are discussed.

Catching a Deceiver in the Act: Processes Underlying Deception in an Interactive Interview Setting

Lying is known to evoke stress and cognitive load. Both form cues to deception and lead to an increase in sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity. But in reality, deceivers stick to the truth most the time and only lie occasionally. The present study therefore examined in an interactive suspect interview setting, whether deceivers still have clearly diverging cognitive and emotional processes from truth tellers when only having the intention to lie incidentally. We found that deceivers who lied constantly diverge from truth tellers in SNS activity, self-reported cognitive load and stress. Across all interviews, SNS activity correlated stronger with self-reports of cognitive load than stress, which supports the cognitive load approach. Furthermore, deceivers who told the truth and lied on only one crucial question, particularly diverged in self-reported stress from truth-tellers. In terms of SNS activity and self-reported cognitive load, no differences were found. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Interviewing Suspects with Avatars: Avatars Are More Effective When Perceived as Human

It has been consistently demonstrated that deceivers generally can be discriminated from truth tellers by monitoring an increase in their physiological response. But is this still the case when deceivers interact with a virtual avatar? The present research investigated whether the mere “belief” that the virtual avatar is computer or human operated forms a crucial factor for eliciting physiological cues to deception. Participants were interviewed about a transgression they had been seduced to commit, by a human-like virtual avatar. In a between-subject design, participants either deceived or told the truth about this transgression. During the interviews, we measured the physiological responses assessing participants' electrodermal activity (EDA). In line with our hypothesis, EDA differences between deceivers and truth tellers only were significant for participants who believed they interacted with a human operated (compared to a computer operated) avatar. These results have theoretical as well as practical implications which we will discuss.

Tracking the truth: the effect of face familiarity on eye fixations during deception

In forensic investigations, suspects sometimes conceal recognition of a familiar person to protect co-conspirators or hide knowledge of a victim. The current experiment sought to determine whether eye fixations could be used to identify memory of known persons when lying about recognition of faces. Participants' eye movements were monitored whilst they lied and told the truth about recognition of faces that varied in familiarity (newly learned, famous celebrities, personally known). Memory detection by eye movements during recognition of personally familiar and famous celebrity faces was negligibly affected by lying, thereby demonstrating that detection of memory during lies is influenced by the prior learning of the face. By contrast, eye movements did not reveal lies robustly for newly learned faces. These findings support the use of eye movements as markers of memory during concealed recognition but also suggest caution when familiarity is only a consequence of one brief exposure.

Executive control- and reward-related neural processes associated with the opportunity to engage in voluntary dishonest moral decision making

Research has begun to examine the neurocognitive processes underlying voluntary moral decision making, which involves engaging in honest or dishonest behavior in a setting in which the individual is free to make his or her own moral decisions. Employing event-related potentials, we measured executive control-related and reward-related neural processes during an incentivized coin-guessing task in which participants had the opportunity to voluntarily engage in dishonest behavior, by overreporting their wins to maximize earnings. We report four primary findings: First, the opportunity to deceive recruited executive control processes involving conflict monitoring and conflict resolution, as evidenced by a higher N2 and a smaller P3. Second, processing the outcome of the coin flips engaged reward-related processes, as evidenced by a larger medial feedback negativity (MFN) for incorrect (loss) than for correct (win) guesses, reflecting a reward prediction error signal. Third, elevated executive control-related neural activity reflecting conflict resolution (i.e., an attenuated executive control P3) predicted a greater likelihood of engaging in overall deceptive behavior. Finally, whereas elevated reward-related neural activity (the reward P3) was associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in overall deceptive behavior, an elevated reward prediction error signal (MFN difference score) predicted increased trial-by-trial moral behavioral adjustment (i.e., a greater likelihood to overreport wins following a previous honest loss than following a previous honest win trial). Collectively, these findings suggest that both executive control- and reward-related neural processes are implicated in moral decision making.

When is Deceptive Message Production More Effortful than Truth-Telling? A Baker's Dozen of Moderators

Deception is thought to be more effortful than telling the truth. Empirical evidence from many quarters supports this general proposition. However, there are many factors that qualify and even reverse this pattern. Guided by a communication perspective, I present a baker’s dozen of moderators that may alter the degree of cognitive difficulty associated with producing deceptive messages. Among sender-related factors are memory processes, motivation, incentives, and consequences. Lying increases activation of a network of brain regions related to executive memory, suppression of unwanted behaviors, and task switching that is not observed with truth-telling. High motivation coupled with strong incentives or the risk of adverse consequences also prompts more cognitive exertion–for truth-tellers and deceivers alike–to appear credible, with associated effects on performance and message production effort, depending on the magnitude of effort, communicator skill, and experience. Factors related to message and communication context include discourse genre, type of prevarication, expected response length, communication medium, preparation, and recency of target event/issue. These factors can attenuate the degree of cognitive taxation on senders so that truth-telling and deceiving are similarly effortful. Factors related to the interpersonal relationship among interlocutors include whether sender and receiver are cooperative or adversarial and how well-acquainted they are with one another. A final consideration is whether the unit of analysis is the utterance, turn at talk, episode, entire interaction, or series of interactions. Taking these factors into account should produce a more nuanced answer to the question of when deception is more difficult than truth-telling.

Explicit Instructions Increase Cognitive Costs of Deception in Predictable Social Context

Convincing participants to deceive remains one of the biggest and most important challenges of laboratory-based deception research. The simplest and most prevalent method involves explicitly instructing participants to lie or tell the truth before presenting each task item. The usual finding of such experiments is increased cognitive load associated with deceptive responses, explained by necessity to inhibit default and automatic honest responses. However, explicit instructions are usually coupled with the absence of social context in the experimental task. Context plays a key role in social cognition by activating prior knowledge, which facilitates behaviors consistent with the latter. We hypothesized that in the presence of social context, both honest and deceptive responses can be produced on the basis of prior knowledge, without reliance on truth and without additional cognitive load during deceptive responses. In order to test the hypothesis, we have developed Speed-Dating Task (SDT), which is based on a real-life social event. In SDT, participants respond both honestly and deceptively to questions in order to appear similar to each of the dates. The dates are predictable and represent well-known categories (i.e., atheist or conservative). In one condition participants rely on explicit instructions preceding each question (external cue). In the second condition no explicit instructions are present, so the participants need to adapt based on prior knowledge about the category the dates belong to (internal cue). With internal cues, reaction times (RTs) are similar for both honest and deceptive responses. However, in the presence of external cues (EC), RTs are longer for deceptive than honest responses, suggesting that deceptive responses are associated with increased cognitive load. Compared to internal cues, deception costs were higher when EC were present. However, the effect was limited to the first part of the experiment, only partially confirming our initial hypothesis. The results suggest that the presence of social context in deception tasks might have a significant influence on cognitive processes associated with deception.

When deception becomes easy: the effects of task switching and goal neglect on the truth proportion effect

Lying is typically more cognitively demanding than truth telling. Yet, recent cognitive models of lying propose that lying can be just as easy as truth telling, depending on contextual factors. In line with this idea, research has shown that the cognitive cost of deception decreases when people frequently respond deceptively, while it increases when people rarely respond deceptively (i.e., the truth proportion effect). In the present study, we investigated two possible underlying mechanisms of the truth proportion effect. In Experiment 1 (N = 121), we controlled for the impact of switch costs by keeping the number of switches between deceptive and truthful responses constant. We found that people who often responded deceptively made fewer errors when responding deceptively than people who only occasionally responded deceptively, replicating the truth proportion effect. Thus, while the truth proportion effect in earlier studies may be partially driven by the cost of switching between truthful and deceptive responses, we still found evidence for the truth proportion effect while controlling for switch costs. In Experiment 2 (N = 68), we assessed whether the truth proportion effect is influenced by goal neglect. According to this view, the truth proportion effect should be reduced if participants are cued to maintain the task goals, while it should be larger when participants are allowed to neglect the task goals. In line with this hypothesis, we found a smaller truth proportion effect when participants were cued with the task goals compared to when they were not cued. This study shows that the truth proportion effect is influenced by goal neglect, implying that frequent deceptive responding strengthens the goal of responding deceptively. Our findings imply that the accuracy of lie detection tests could be increased by using a majority of truth-items (i.e., induce the truth proportion effect), and that the truth proportion effect should be maximized by (1) increasing the number of truth-lie task switches and (2) inducing goal neglect.

Specific marker of feigned memory impairment: The activation of left superior frontal gyrus

Faking memory impairment means normal people complain lots of memory problems without organic damage in forensic assessments. Using alternative forced-choice paradigm, containing digital or autobiographical information, previous neuroimaging studies have indicated that faking memory impairment could cause the activation in the prefrontal and parietal regions, and might involve a fronto-parietal-subcortical circuit. However, it is still unclear whether different memory types have influence on faking or not. Since different memory types, such as long-term memory (LTM) and short-term memory (STM), were found supported by different brain areas, we hypothesized that feigned STM or LTM impairment had distinct neural activation mapping. Besides that, some common neural correlates may act as the general characteristic of feigned memory impairment. To verify this hypothesis, the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) combined with an alternative word forced-choice paradigm were used in this study. A total of 10 right-handed participants, in this study, had to perform both STW and LTM tasks respectively under answering correctly, answering randomly and feigned memory impairment conditions. Our results indicated that the activation of the left superior frontal gyrus and the left medial frontal gyrus was associated with feigned LTM impairment, whereas the left superior frontal gyrus, the left precuneus and the right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were highly activated while feigning STM impairment. Furthermore, an overlapping was found in the left superior frontal gyrus, and it suggested that the activity of the left superior frontal gyrus might be acting as a specific marker of feigned memory impairment.

Being asked to tell an unpleasant truth about another person activates anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex

"Truth" has been used as a baseline condition in several functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of deception. However, like deception, telling the truth is an inherently social construct, which requires consideration of another person's mental state, a phenomenon known as Theory of Mind. Using a novel ecological paradigm, we examined blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses during social and simple truth telling. Participants (n = 27) were randomly divided into two competing teams. Post-competition, each participant was scanned while evaluating performances from in-group and out-group members. Participants were asked to be honest and were told that their evaluations would be made public. We found increased BOLD responses in the medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral anterior insula and precuneus when participants were asked to tell social truths compared to simple truths about another person. At the behavioral level, participants were slower at responding to social compared to simple questions about another person. These findings suggest that telling the truth is a nuanced cognitive operation that is dependent on the degree of mentalizing. Importantly, we show that the cortical regions engaged by truth telling show a distinct pattern when the task requires social reasoning.

From junior to senior Pinocchio: A cross-sectional lifespan investigation of deception

We present the first study to map deception across the entire lifespan. Specifically, we investigated age-related difference in lying proficiency and lying frequency. A large community sample (n = 1005) aged between 6 and 77 were surveyed on their lying frequency, and performed a reaction-time (RT) based deception task to assess their lying proficiency. Consistent with the inverted U-shaped pattern of age-related changes in inhibitory control that we observed in a stop signal task, we found that lying proficiency improved during childhood (in accuracy, not RTs), excelled in young adulthood (in accuracy and RTs), and worsened throughout adulthood (in accuracy and RTs). Likewise, lying frequency increased in childhood, peaked in adolescence, and decreased during adulthood. In sum, we observed important age-related difference in deception that generally fit with the U-shaped pattern of age-related changes observed in inhibitory control. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed from a cognitive view of deception.

Historical Techniques of Lie Detection

Since time immemorial, lying has been a part of everyday life. For this reason, it has become a subject of interest in several disciplines, including psychology. The purpose of this article is to provide a general overview of the literature and thinking to date about the evolution of lie detection techniques. The first part explores ancient methods recorded circa 1000 B.C. (e.g., God’s judgment in Europe). The second part describes technical methods based on sciences such as phrenology, polygraph and graphology. This is followed by an outline of more modern-day approaches such as FACS (Facial Action Coding System), functional MRI, and Brain Fingerprinting. Finally, after the familiarization with the historical development of techniques for lie detection, we discuss the scope for new initiatives not only in the area of designing new methods, but also for the research into lie detection itself, such as its motives and regulatory issues related to deception.

Self-serving dishonest decisions can show facilitated cognitive dynamics

We use a novel task to test two competing hypotheses concerning the cognitive processes involved in dishonesty. Many existing accounts of deception imply that in order to act dishonestly one has to use cognitive control to overcome a bias toward the truth, which results in more time and effort. A recent hypothesis suggests that lying in order to serve self-interest may be a rapid, even automatic tendency taking less time than refraining from lying. In the current study, we track the action dynamics of potentially dishonest decisions to investigate the underlying cognitive processes. Participants are asked to privately predict the outcome of a virtual coin flip, report their accuracy and receive bonus credit for accurate predictions. The movements of the computer cursor toward the target answer are recorded and used to characterize the dynamics of decisions. Our results suggest that when a self-serving condition holds, decisions that have a high probability of being dishonest take less time and experience less hesitation.

Deceptive Intentions: Can Cues to Deception Be Measured before a Lie Is Even Stated?

Can deceitful intentions be discriminated from truthful ones? Previous work consistently demonstrated that deceiving others is accompanied by nervousness/stress and cognitive load. Both are related to increased sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activity. We hypothesized that SNS activity already rises during intentions to lie and, consequently, cues to deception can be detected before stating an actual lie. In two experiments, controlling for prospective memory, we monitored SNS activity during lying, truth telling, and truth telling with the aim of lying at a later instance. Electrodermal activity (EDA) was used as an indicator of SNS. EDA was highest during lying, and compared to the truth condition, EDA was also raised during the intention to deceive. Moreover, the switch from truth telling toward lying in the intention condition evoked higher EDA than switching toward non-deception related tasks in the lie or truth condition. These results provide first empirical evidence that increased SNS activity related to deception can be monitored before a lie is stated. This implies that cues to deception are already present during the mere intention to lie.

The importance of sensory integration processes for action cascading

Dual tasking or action cascading is essential in everyday life and often investigated using tasks presenting stimuli in different sensory modalities. Findings obtained with multimodal tasks are often broadly generalized, but until today, it has remained unclear whether multimodal integration affects performance in action cascading or the underlying neurophysiology. To bridge this gap, we asked healthy young adults to complete a stop-change paradigm which presented different stimuli in either one or two modalities while recording behavioral and neurophysiological data. Bimodal stimulus presentation prolonged response times and affected bottom-up and top-down guided attentional processes as reflected by the P1 and N1, respectively. However, the most important effect was the modulation of response selection processes reflected by the P3 suggesting that a potentially different way of forming task goals operates during action cascading in bimodal vs. unimodal tasks. When two modalities are involved, separate task goals need to be formed while a conjoint task goal may be generated when all stimuli are presented in the same modality. On a systems level, these processes seem to be related to the modulation of activity in fronto-polar regions (BA10) as well as Broca's area (BA44).

The "good cop, bad cop" effect in the RT-based concealed information test: exploring the effect of emotional expressions displayed by a virtual investigator

Concealing the possession of relevant information represents a complex cognitive process, shaped by contextual demands and individual differences in cognitive and socio-emotional functioning. The Reaction Time-based Concealed Information Test (RT-CIT) is used to detect concealed knowledge based on the difference in RTs between denying recognition of critical (probes) and newly encountered (irrelevant) information. Several research questions were addressed in this scenario implemented after a mock crime. First, we were interested whether the introduction of a social stimulus (facial identity) simulating a virtual investigator would facilitate the process of deception detection. Next, we explored whether his emotional displays (friendly, hostile or neutral) would have a differential impact on speed of responses to probe versus irrelevant items. We also compared the impact of introducing similar stimuli in a working memory (WM) updating context without requirements to conceal information. Finally, we explored the association between deceptive behavior and individual differences in WM updating proficiency or in internalizing problems (state / trait anxiety and depression). Results indicated that the mere presence of a neutral virtual investigator slowed down participants' responses, but not the appended lie-specific time (difference between probes and irrelevants). Emotional expression was shown to differentially affect speed of responses to critical items, with positive displays from the virtual examiner enhancing lie-specific time, compared to negative facial expressions, which had an opposite impact. This valence-specific effect was not visible in the WM updating context. Higher levels of trait / state anxiety were related to faster responses to probes in the negative condition (hostile facial expression) of the RT-CIT. These preliminary findings further emphasize the need to take into account motivational and emotional factors when considering the transfer of deception detection techniques from the laboratory to real-life settings.

Neural correlates of self-deception and impression-management

Self-deception and impression-management comprise two types of deceptive, but generally socially acceptable behaviours, which are common in everyday life as well as being present in a number of psychiatric disorders. We sought to establish and dissociate the 'normal' brain substrates of self-deception and impression-management. Twenty healthy participants underwent fMRI scanning at 3T whilst completing the 'Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding' test under two conditions: 'fake good', giving the most desirable impression possible and 'fake bad' giving an undesirable impression. Impression-management scores were more malleable to manipulation via 'faking' than self-deception scores. Response times to self-deception questions and 'fake bad' instructions were significantly longer than to impression-management questions and 'fake good' instructions respectively. Self-deception and impression-management manipulation and 'faking bad' were associated with activation of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC). Impression-management manipulation was additionally associated with activation of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left posterior middle temporal gyrus. 'Faking bad' was additionally associated with activation of right vlPFC, left temporo-parietal junction and right cerebellum. There were no supra-threshold activations associated with 'faking good'. Our neuroimaging data suggest that manipulating self-deception and impression-management and more specifically 'faking bad' engages a common network comprising mPFC and left vlPFC. Shorter response times and lack of dissociable neural activations suggests that 'faking good', particularly when it comes to impression-management, may be our most practiced 'default' mode.

The role of expectations, hype and ethics in neuroimaging and neuromodulation futures

The production of expectations or future-goals for the development of techniques which “read” and modulate brain function, represent an important practical tool for neuroscientists. These visions-of-the-future assist scientists by providing focus for both individual and cross-disciplinary research programs; they encourage the development of new industrial sectors, are used to justify the allocation of government resources and funding, and via the media can help capture the imagination and support of the public. However, such expectations need to be tempered by reality. Over-hyping brain imaging and modulation will lead to disappointment; disappointment that in turn can undermine its potential. Similarly, if neuroscientists focus their attention narrowly on the science without concomitant consideration of its future ethical, legal and social implications, then their expectations may remain unrealized. To develop these arguments herein we introduce the theoretical concept of expectations and the practical consequences of expectations. We contextualize these reflections by referring to brain imaging and modulation studies on deception, which encompass the measurement-suppression-augmentation range.

Manipulating item proportion and deception reveals crucial dissociation between behavioral, autonomic, and neural indices of concealed information

Developed as an alternative to traditional deception detection methods, the concealed information test (CIT) assesses recognition of critical (e.g., crime-relevant) "probes." Most often, recognition has been measured as enhanced skin conductance responses (SCRs) to probes compared to irrelevant foils (CIT effect). More recently, also differentially enlarged reaction times (RTs) and increased neural activity in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, the right middle frontal gyrus, and the right temporo-parietal junction have been observed. The aims of the current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study were to (1) investigate the boundary conditions of the CIT effects in all three measures and thereby (2) gain more insight into the relative contribution of two mechanisms underlying enhanced responding to concealed information (i.e., orienting versus response inhibition). Therefore, we manipulated the proportion of probe versus irrelevant items, and whether suspects were instructed to actively deny recognition of probe knowledge (i.e., deceive) during the test. Results revealed that whereas overt deception was not necessary for the SCR CIT effect, it was crucial for the RT and the fMRI-based CIT effects. The proportion manipulation enhanced the CIT effect in all three measures. The results indicate that different mental processes might underlie the response pattern in the CIT. While skin conductance responding to concealed information may best be explained by orienting theory, it seems that response inhibition drives RT and blood oxygen level dependent responding to concealed information.

If I imagine it, then it happened: the Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.

The motor cost of telling lies: electrocortical signatures and personality foundations of spontaneous deception

Although universal, lying is generally considered immoral behavior. Most neuroscience studies on lying sanction or instruct deceptive behaviors and thus might fail to acknowledge the significance of lie-related moral conflicts. By combining electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings with a novel paradigm in which participants decided freely whether to deceive another person, we have generated indices of the cognitive (reaction times and stimulus-locked event-related components) and moral (readiness potential and its correlations with deception-related personality traits) cost of spontaneous deception. Our data fail to support the consensus that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth telling, suggesting that spontaneous deception, as opposed to lying out of requirement, might not mandate additional cognitive workload. Interestingly, lying was associated with decreased motor readiness, an event-related potential (ERP) component that is linked to motor preparation of self-determined actions and modulated when we face moral dilemmas. Notably, this reduction was less extensive in manipulative participants and greater in those who cared highly about their impression management. Our study expands on previous findings on deception by associating a cortical marker of reduced preparation to act with individual differences in moral cognition.

The neural basis of dishonest decisions that serve to harm or help the target

We conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to elucidate the neurocognitive mechanisms of harmful and helpful dishonest decisions. During scanning, the subjects read scenarios concerning events that could occur in real-life situations and were asked to decide whether to tell a lie as though they were experiencing those events. Half of the scenarios consisted of harmful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as bad lies, and the other half consisted of helpful stories in which the dishonest decisions could be regarded as good lies. In contrast to the control decision-making task, we found that the decision-making tasks that involved honesty or dishonesty recruited a network of brain regions that included the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In the harmful stories, the right temporoparietal junction and the right medial frontal cortex were activated when the subjects made dishonest decisions compared with honest decisions. No region discriminated between the honest and dishonest decisions made in the helpful stories. These preliminary findings suggest that the neural basis of dishonest decisions is modulated by whether the lying serves to harm or help the target.

Pants on fire: the electrophysiological signature of telling a lie

Even though electroencephalography has played a prominent role for lie detection via personally relevant information, the electrophysiological signature of active lying is still elusive. We addressed this signature with two experiments in which participants helped a virtual police officer to locate a knife. Crucially, before this response, they announced whether they would lie or tell the truth about the knife's location. This design allowed us to study the signature of lie-telling in the absence of rare and personally significant oddball stimuli that are typically used for lie detection via electrophysiological markers, especially the P300 component. Our results indicate that active lying attenuated P300 amplitudes as well as N200 amplitudes for such non-oddball stimuli. These results support accounts that stress the high cognitive demand of lie-telling, including the need to suppress the truthful response and to generate a lie.

I want to lie about not knowing you, but my precuneus refuses to cooperate

Previously identified neural correlates of deception, such as the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and parietal regions, have proven to be unreliable neural markers of deception, most likely because activity in these regions reflects executive processes that are not specific to deception. Herein, we report the first fMRI study that provides strong preliminary evidence that the neural activity associated with perception but not executive processes could offer a better marker of deception with regard to face familiarity. Using a face-recognition task, activity in the left precuneus during the perception of familiar faces accurately marked 11 of 13 subjects who lied about not knowing faces that were in fact familiar to them. This level of classification accuracy is much higher than the level predicted by chance and agrees with other findings by experts in lie detection.

Using fMRI to decode true thoughts independent of intention to conceal

Multi-variate pattern analysis (MVPA) applied to BOLD-fMRI has proven successful at decoding complicated fMRI signal patterns associated with a variety of cognitive processes. One cognitive process, not yet investigated, is the mental representation of "Yes/No" thoughts that precede the actual overt response to a binary "Yes/No" question. In this study, we focus on examining: (1) whether spatial patterns of the hemodynamic response carry sufficient information to allow reliable decoding of "Yes/No" thoughts; and (2) whether decoding of "Yes/No" thoughts is independent of the intention to respond honestly or dishonestly. To achieve this goal, we conducted two separate experiments. Experiment 1, collected on a 3T scanner, examined the whole brain to identify regions that carry sufficient information to permit significantly above-chance prediction of "Yes/No" thoughts at the group level. In Experiment 2, collected on a 7T scanner, we focused on the regions identified in Experiment 1 to examine the capability of achieving high decoding accuracy at the single subject level. A set of regions--namely right superior temporal gyrus, left supra-marginal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus--exhibited high decoding power. Decoding accuracy for these regions increased with trial averaging. When 18 trials were averaged, the median accuracies were 82.5%, 77.5%, and 79.5%, respectively. When trials were separated according to deceptive intentions (set via experimental cues), and classifiers were trained on honest trials, but tested on trials where subjects were asked to deceive, the median accuracies of these regions still reached 66%, 75%, and 78.5%. These results provide evidence that concealed "Yes/No" thoughts are encoded in the BOLD signal, retaining some level of independence from the subject's intentions to answer honestly or dishonestly. These findings also suggest the theoretical possibility for more efficient brain-computer interfaces where subjects only need to think their answers to communicate.