Modulation of the fusiform face area following minimal exposure to motivationally relevant faces: evidence of in-group enhancement (not out-group disregard)

fMRI Repetition Suppression During Generalized Social Categorization

Correctly identifying friends and foes is integral to successful group living. Here, we use repetition suppression to examine the neural circuitry underlying generalized group categorization-the process of categorizing in-group and out-group members across multiple social categories. Participants assigned to an arbitrary team (i.e., Eagles or Rattlers) underwent fMRI while categorizing political and arbitrary in-group and out-group members. We found that frontoparietal control network exhibited repetition suppression in response to "identical in-group" (Democrat-Democrat or Eagles-Eagles) and "different in-group" (Eagles-Democrat or Democrat-Eagles) trials relative to "out-group/in-group trials" (Republican-Democrat or Rattler-Eagles). Specifically, the repetition suppression contrast map included bilateral superior parietal lobule, bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and bilateral middle temporal gyrus. Participants who reported an increased tendency to join and value their social groups exhibited decreased repetition suppression in bilateral DLPFC. Comparison of our whole-brain repetition suppression map with an independently identified map of frontoparietal control network revealed 34.3% overlap. Social categorization requires recognizing both a target's group membership but also the target's orientation toward one's self. Fittingly, we find that generalized social categorization engages a network that acts as a functional bridge between dorsal attentional (exogenously-oriented) and default mode (internally-oriented) networks.

Interfacing With Faces: Perceptual Humanization and Dehumanization

This article links the visual perception of faces and social behavior. We argue that the ways in which people visually encode others’ faces—a rapid-fire perceptual categorization—can result in either humanizing or dehumanizing modes of perception. Our model suggests that these perceptual pathways channel subsequent social inferences and behavior. We focus on the construct of perceptual dehumanization, which involves a shift from configural to featural processing of human faces and, in turn, enables the infliction of harm, such as harsh punishments. We discuss visual attention as an antecedent of perceptual modes and consequent modes of social behavior and speculate about the functions of humanization and dehumanization in sustaining macro-level social structures.

Social Categories Alone Are Insufficient to Elicit an In-Group Advantage in Perceptions of Within-Person Variability

Within-person variability affects identity perception of other-race faces more than own-race faces; when participants sort images into piles representing different identities, they sort photographs of two other-race identities into more piles than two own-race identities. These results have been interpreted in terms of perceptual expertise, such that lack of experience with other-race faces leads to reduced ability to extract identity-relevant information across images. However, an alternative explanation is that sociocognitive factors (e.g., cognitive disregard for out-group faces) lead to differences in the number of perceived identities. Here, we examined whether social factors alone elicit an in-group advantage in perceptions of within-person variability. Caucasian participants sorted 40 photographs of two unfamiliar Caucasian identities (20 photographs/model) into piles based on the number of identities they believed were present. Half of the participants were told that the images were of students attending their university (in-group), whereas half were told that the images were of students attending a rival university (out-group). Participants sorted the photographs into a comparable number of identities for in- and out-group faces. This lack of an in-group advantage suggests that sociocognitive factors alone cannot account for differences in the number of perceived identities across faces from two categories.

Cognitive control, attention, and the other race effect in memory

People are better at remembering faces from their own race than other races–a phenomenon with significant societal implications. This Other Race Effect (ORE) in memory could arise from different attentional allocation to, and cognitive control over, same- and other-race faces during encoding. Deeper or more differentiated processing of same-race faces could yield more robust representations of same- vs. other-race faces that could support better recognition memory. Conversely, to the extent that other-race faces may be characterized by lower perceptual expertise, attention and cognitive control may be more important for successful encoding of robust, distinct representations of these stimuli. We tested a mechanistic model in which successful encoding of same- and other-race faces, indexed by subsequent memory performance, is differentially predicted by (a) engagement of frontoparietal networks subserving top-down attention and cognitive control, and (b) interactions between frontoparietal networks and fusiform cortex face processing. European American (EA) and African American (AA) participants underwent fMRI while intentionally encoding EA and AA faces, and ~24 hrs later performed an “old/new” recognition memory task. Univariate analyses revealed greater engagement of frontoparietal top-down attention and cognitive control networks during encoding for same- vs. other-race faces, stemming particularly from a failure to engage the cognitive control network during processing of other-race faces that were subsequently forgotten. Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses further revealed that OREs were characterized by greater functional interaction between medial intraparietal sulcus, a component of the top-down attention network, and fusiform cortex during same- than other-race face encoding. Together, these results suggest that group-based face memory biases at least partially stem from differential allocation of cognitive control and top-down attention during encoding, such that same-race memory benefits from elevated top-down attentional engagement with face processing regions; conversely, reduced recruitment of cognitive control circuitry appears more predictive of memory failure when encoding out-group faces.

Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and cerebellar contribution to in-group attitudes: a transcranial magnetic stimulation study

We tend to express more positive judgments and behaviors toward individuals belonging to our own group compared to other (out-) groups. In this study, we assessed the role of the cerebellum and of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) - two regions critically implicated in social cognition processes - in mediating implicit valenced attitudes toward in-group and out-group individuals. To this aim, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in combination with a standard attitude priming task, in which Caucasian participants had to categorize the valence of a series of adjectives primed by either an in-group or an out-group face. In two behavioral experiments, we found an in-group bias (i.e. faster categorization of positive adjectives when preceded by in-group faces) but no evidence of an out-group bias. Interestingly, TMS over both the dmPFC and over the (right) cerebellum significantly interfered with the modulation exerted by group membership on adjective valence classification, abolishing the in-group bias observed at baseline. Overall, our data suggest that both the dmPFC and the cerebellum play a causal role in mediating implicit social attitudes.

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder

It is argued that during ongoing visual perception, the brain is generating top-down predictions to facilitate, guide and constrain the processing of incoming sensory input. Here we demonstrate that these predictions are drawn from a diverse range of cognitive processes, in order to generate the richest and most informative prediction signals. This is consistent with a central role for cognitive penetrability in visual perception. We review behavioural and mechanistic evidence that indicate a wide spectrum of domains-including object recognition, contextual associations, cognitive biases and affective state-that can directly influence visual perception. We combine these insights from the healthy brain with novel observations from neuropsychiatric disorders involving visual hallucinations, which highlight the consequences of imbalance between top-down signals and incoming sensory information. Together, these lines of evidence converge to indicate that predictive penetration, be it cognitive, social or emotional, should be considered a fundamental framework that supports visual perception.

Mother still knows best: Maternal influence uniquely modulates adolescent reward sensitivity during risk taking

Adolescent decision-making is highly sensitive to input from the social environment. In particular, adult and maternal presence influence adolescents to make safer decisions when encountered with risky scenarios. However, it is currently unknown whether maternal presence confers a greater advantage than mere adult presence in buffering adolescent risk taking. In the current study, 23 adolescents completed a risk-taking task during an fMRI scan in the presence of their mother and an unknown adult. Results reveal that maternal presence elicits greater activation in reward-related neural circuits when making safe decisions but decreased activation following risky choices. Moreover, adolescents evidenced a more immature neural phenotype when making risky choices in the presence of an adult compared to mother, as evidenced by positive functional coupling between the ventral striatum and medial prefrontal cortex. Our results underscore the importance of maternal stimuli in bolstering adolescent decision-making in risky scenarios.

Swiss identity smells like chocolate: Social identity shapes olfactory judgments

There is extensive evidence that social identities can shape people’s attitudes and behavior, but what about sensory judgments? We examined the possibility that social identity concerns may also shape the judgment of non-social properties—namely, olfactory judgment. In two experiments, we presented Swiss and non-Swiss participants with the odor of chocolate, for which Switzerland is world-famous, and a control odor (popcorn). Swiss participants primed with Swiss identity reported the odor of chocolate (but not popcorn) as more intense than non-Swiss participants (Experiments 1 and 2) and than Swiss participants primed with individual identity or not primed (Experiment 2). The self-reported intensity of chocolate smell tended to increase as identity accessibility increased—but only among Swiss participants (Experiment 1). These results suggest that identity priming can counter-act classic sensory habituation effects, allowing identity-relevant smells to maintain their intensity after repeated presentations. This suggests that social identity dynamically influences sensory judgment. We discuss the potential implications for models of social identity and chemosensory perception.

Social Groups Prioritize Selective Attention to Faces: How Social Identity Shapes Distractor Interference

Human faces automatically attract visual attention and this process appears to be guided by social group memberships. In two experiments, we examined how social groups guide selective attention toward in-group and out-group faces. Black and White participants detected a target letter among letter strings superimposed on faces (Experiment 1). White participants were less accurate on trials with racial out-group (Black) compared to in-group (White) distractor faces. Likewise, Black participants were less accurate on trials with racial out-group (White) compared to in-group (Black) distractor faces. However, this pattern of out-group bias was only evident under high perceptual load—when the task was visually difficult. To examine the malleability of this pattern of racial bias, a separate sample of participants were assigned to mixed-race minimal groups (Experiment 2). Participants assigned to groups were less accurate on trials with their minimal in-group members compared to minimal out-group distractor faces, regardless of race. Again, this pattern of out-group bias was only evident under high perceptual load. Taken together, these results suggest that social identity guides selective attention toward motivationally relevant social groups—shifting from out-group bias in the domain of race to in-group bias in the domain of minimal groups—when perceptual resources are scarce.

The mere presence of an outgroup member disrupts the brain's feedback-monitoring system

Much of human learning happens in the social world. A person's social identity-the groups to which they belong, the people with whom they identify-is a powerful cue that can affect our goal-directed behaviors, often implicitly. In the present experiment, we explored the underlying neural mechanisms driving these processes, testing hypotheses derived from social identity theory. In a within-subjects design, participants underwent a minimal group manipulation where they were randomly assigned to an arbitrary ingroup. In two blocks of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a task for money while being observed by an ingroup member and outgroup member separately. Results revealed that being observed by an ingroup or outgroup member led to divergent patterns of neural activity associated with feedback monitoring, namely the feedback-related negativity (FRN). Receiving feedback in the presence of an ingroup member produced a typical FRN signal, but the FRN was dampened while receiving feedback in the presence of an outgroup member. Further, this differentiated neural pattern was exaggerated in people who reported greater intergroup bias. Together, the mere presence of a person can alter how the brain adaptively monitors feedback, impairing the reinforcement learning signal when the person observing is an outgroup member.

Racial stereotypes impair flexibility of emotional learning

Flexibility of associative learning can be revealed by establishing and then reversing cue-outcome discriminations. Here, we used functional MRI to examine whether neurobehavioral correlates of reversal-learning are impaired in White and Asian volunteers when initial learning involves fear-conditioning to a racial out-group. For one group, the picture of a Black male was initially paired with shock (threat) and a White male was unpaired (safe). For another group, the White male was a threat and the Black male was safe. These associations reversed midway through the task. Both groups initially discriminated threat from safety, as expressed through skin conductance responses (SCR) and activity in the insula, thalamus, midbrain and striatum. After reversal, the group initially conditioned to a Black male exhibited impaired reversal of SCRs to the new threat stimulus (White male), and impaired reversals in the striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, midbrain and thalamus. In contrast, the group initially conditioned to a White male showed successful reversal of SCRs and successful reversal in these brain regions toward the new threat. These findings provide new evidence that an aversive experience with a racial out-group member impairs the ability to flexibly and appropriately adjust fear expression towards a new threat in the environment.

Neural basis of disgust perception in racial prejudice

Worldwide racial prejudice is originated from in-group/out-group discrimination. This prejudice can bias face perception at the very beginning of social interaction. However, little is known about the neurocognitive mechanism underlying the influence of racial prejudice on facial emotion perception. Here, we examined the neural basis of disgust perception in racial prejudice using a passive viewing task and functional magnetic resonance imaging. We found that compared with the disgusted faces of in-groups, the disgusted faces of out-groups result in increased amygdala and insular engagement, positive coupling of the insula with amygdala-based emotional system, and negative coupling of the insula with anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)-based regulatory system. Furthermore, machine-learning algorithms revealed that the level of implicit racial prejudice could be predicted by functional couplings of the insula with both the amygdala and the ACC, which suggests that the insula is largely involved in racially biased disgust perception through two distinct neural circuits. In addition, individual difference in disgust sensitivity was found to be predictive of implicit racial prejudice. Taken together, our results suggest a crucial role of insula-centered circuits for disgust perception in racial prejudice.

The Neuroscience of Intergroup Relations: An Integrative Review

We review emerging research on the psychological and biological factors that underlie social group formation, cooperation, and conflict in humans. Our aim is to integrate the intergroup neuroscience literature with classic theories of group processes and intergroup relations in an effort to move beyond merely describing the effects of specific social out-groups on the brain and behavior. Instead, we emphasize the underlying psychological processes that govern intergroup interactions more generally: forming and updating our representations of "us" and "them" via social identification and functional relations between groups. This approach highlights the dynamic nature of social identity and the context-dependent nature of intergroup relations. We argue that this theoretical integration can help reconcile seemingly discrepant findings in the literature, provide organizational principles for understanding the core elements of intergroup dynamics, and highlight several exciting directions for future research at the interface of intergroup relations and neuroscience.

Neural correlates of biased social fear learning and interaction in an intergroup context

Associations linking a fearful experience to a member of a social group other than one's own (out-group) are more resistant to change than corresponding associations to a member of one's own (in-group) (Olsson et al., 2005; Kubota et al., 2012), providing a possible link to discriminative behavior. Using a fear conditioning paradigm, we investigated the neural activity underlying aversive learning biases towards in-group (White) and out-group (Black) members, and their predictive value for discriminatory interactive behavior towards novel virtual members of the racial out-group (n = 20). Our results indicate that activity in brain regions previously linked to conditioned fear and perception of individuals belonging to the racial out-groups, or otherwise stigmatized groups, jointly contribute to the expression of race-based biases in learning and behavior. In particular, we found that the amygdala and anterior insula (AI) played key roles in differentiating between in-group and out-group faces both when the faces were paired with an aversive event (acquisition) and when no more shocks were administered (extinction). In addition, functional connectivity between the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus increased during perception of conditioned out-group faces. Moreover, we showed that brain activity in the fear-learning-bias network was related to participants' discriminatory interactions with novel out-group members on a later day. Our findings are the first to identify the neural mechanism of fear learning biases towards out-group members, and its relationship to interactive behavior. Our findings provide important clues towards understanding the mechanisms underlying biases between social groups.

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We examined the neural basis of learning to fear racial out-group vs. in-group faces.

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We investigated how biases in learning influenced subsequent virtual social interactive behavior.

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Activity in amygdala and AI differentially tracked fear learning of in-group and out-group faces.

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Learned fear of out vs. in-group faces increased connectivity between amygdala and fusiform gyrus.

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Increased activity in AI and amygdala predicted later anti-Black biases in social interactions.

Perceived communicative context and emotional content amplify visual word processing in the fusiform gyrus

The personal significance of a language statement depends on its communicative context. However, this is rarely taken into account in neuroscience studies. Here, we investigate how the implied source of single word statements alters their cortical processing. Participants' brain event-related potentials were recorded in response to identical word streams consisting of positive, negative, and neutral trait adjectives stated to either represent personal trait feedback from a human or to be randomly generated by a computer. Results showed a strong impact of perceived sender. Regardless of content, the notion of receiving feedback from a human enhanced all components, starting with the P2 and encompassing early posterior negativity (EPN), P3, and the late positive potential (LPP). Moreover, negative feedback by the "human sender" elicited a larger EPN, whereas positive feedback generally induced a larger LPP. Source estimations revealed differences between "senders" in visual areas, particularly the bilateral fusiform gyri. Likewise, emotional content enhanced activity in these areas. These results specify how even implied sender identity changes the processing of single words in seemingly realistic communicative settings, amplifying their processing in the visual brain. This suggests that the concept of motivated attention extends from stimulus significance to simultaneous appraisal of contextual relevance. Finally, consistent with distinct stages of emotional processing, at least in contexts perceived as social, humans are initially alerted to negative content, but later process what is perceived as positive feedback more intensely.

Their pain gives us pleasure: How intergroup dynamics shape empathic failures and counter-empathic responses

Despite its early origins and adaptive functions, empathy is not inevitable; people routinely fail to empathize with others, especially members of different social or cultural groups. In five experiments, we systematically explore how social identity, functional relations between groups, competitive threat, and perceived entitativity contribute to intergroup empathy bias: the tendency not only to empathize less with out-group relative to in-group members, but also feel pleasure in response to their pain (and pain in response to their pleasure). When teams are set in direct competition, affective responses to competition-irrelevant events are characterized not only by less empathy toward out-group relative to in-group members, but also by increased counter-empathic responses: Schadenfreude and Glückschmerz (Experiment 1). Comparing responses to in-group and out-group targets against responses to unaffiliated targets in this competitive context suggests that intergroup empathy bias may be better characterized by out-group antipathy rather than extraordinary in-group empathy (Experiment 2). We find also that intergroup empathy bias is robust to changes in relative group standing-feedback indicating that the out-group has fallen behind (Experiment 3a) or is no longer a competitive threat (Experiment 3b) does not reduce the bias. However, reducing perceived in-group and out-group entitativity can significantly attenuate intergroup empathy bias (Experiment 4). This research establishes the boundary conditions of intergroup empathy bias and provides initial support for a more integrative framework of group-based empathy.

Labelling and discrimination: do homophobic epithets undermine fair distribution of resources?

This research investigated the behavioural consequences of homophobic epithets. After exposure to either a category or a homophobic label, heterosexual participants allocated fictitious resources to two different prevention programmes: one mainly relevant to heterosexuals (sterility prevention), the other to homosexuals (AIDS-HIV prevention). Responses on allocation matrices served to identify strategies that favoured the ingroup over the outgroup. Results indicated stronger ingroup-favouritism in the homophobic than in the category label condition. This study shows that discriminatory group labels have tangible effects on people's monetary behaviours in intergroup contexts, increasing their tendency to favour the ingroup when distributing resources.

The neuroscience of prejudice and stereotyping

Despite global increases in diversity, social prejudices continue to fuel intergroup conflict, disparities and discrimination. Moreover, as norms have become more egalitarian, prejudices seem to have 'gone underground', operating covertly and often unconsciously, such that they are difficult to detect and control. Neuroscientists have recently begun to probe the neural basis of prejudice and stereotyping in an effort to identify the processes through which these biases form, influence behaviour and are regulated. This research aims to elucidate basic mechanisms of the social brain while advancing our understanding of intergroup bias in social behaviour.

Knowledge is power: how conceptual knowledge transforms visual cognition

In this review, we synthesize the existing literature demonstrating the dynamic interplay between conceptual knowledge and visual perceptual processing. We consider two theoretical frameworks that demonstrate interactions between processes and brain areas traditionally considered perceptual or conceptual. Specifically, we discuss categorical perception, in which visual objects are represented according to category membership, and highlight studies showing that category knowledge can penetrate early stages of visual analysis. We next discuss the embodied account of conceptual knowledge, which holds that concepts are instantiated in the same neural regions required for specific types of perception and action, and discuss the limitations of this framework. We additionally consider studies showing that gaining abstract semantic knowledge about objects and faces leads to behavioral and electrophysiological changes that are indicative of more efficient stimulus processing. Finally, we consider the role that perceiver goals and motivation may play in shaping the interaction between conceptual and perceptual processing. We hope to demonstrate how pervasive such interactions between motivation, conceptual knowledge, and perceptual processing are in our understanding of the visual environment, and to demonstrate the need for future research aimed at understanding how such interactions arise in the brain.

Economic scarcity alters the perception of race

When the economy declines, racial minorities are hit the hardest. Although existing explanations for this effect focus on institutional causes, recent psychological findings suggest that scarcity may also alter perceptions of race in ways that exacerbate discrimination. We tested the hypothesis that economic resource scarcity causes decision makers to perceive African Americans as "Blacker" and that this visual distortion elicits disparities in the allocation of resources. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that scarcity altered perceptions of race, lowering subjects' psychophysical threshold for seeing a mixed-race face as "Black" as opposed to "White." In studies 3 and 4, scarcity led subjects to visualize African American faces as darker and more "stereotypically Black," compared with a control condition. When presented to naïve subjects, face representations produced under scarcity elicited smaller allocations than control-condition representations. Together, these findings introduce a novel perceptual account for the proliferation of racial disparities under economic scarcity.

Differences in anticipated interaction drive own group biases in face memory

According to much research, the Own Group Bias (OGB) in face memory occurs as a consequence of social categorization – ingroup members are more likely than outgroup members to be encoded as individuals and remembered well. The current work is an examination of the role of anticipated future interaction in the OGB. We conducted two studies showing that anticipated interaction influences group-based face memory. In Study 1, we provided correlational evidence that beliefs about the amount and importance of future interaction one will have with racial outgroup members is associated with the OGB, such that people expecting more interaction with outgroup members show a reduced OGB. In Study 2, we manipulated expectations about future interactions with lab-created groups and observed that high levels of anticipated future interaction with the outgroup eliminated the OGB. Thus, social group categorization drives face memory biases to the extent that group membership affords the expectation of interpersonal interaction.

Racial bias in neural empathic responses to pain

Recent studies have shown that perceiving the pain of others activates brain regions in the observer associated with both somatosensory and affective-motivational aspects of pain, principally involving regions of the anterior cingulate and anterior insula cortex. The degree of these empathic neural responses is modulated by racial bias, such that stronger neural activation is elicited by observing pain in people of the same racial group compared with people of another racial group. The aim of the present study was to examine whether a more general social group category, other than race, could similarly modulate neural empathic responses and perhaps account for the apparent racial bias reported in previous studies. Using a minimal group paradigm, we assigned participants to one of two mixed-race teams. We use the term race to refer to the Chinese or Caucasian appearance of faces and whether the ethnic group represented was the same or different from the appearance of the participant' own face. Using fMRI, we measured neural empathic responses as participants observed members of their own group or other group, and members of their own race or other race, receiving either painful or non-painful touch. Participants showed clear group biases, with no significant effect of race, on behavioral measures of implicit (affective priming) and explicit group identification. Neural responses to observed pain in the anterior cingulate cortex, insula cortex, and somatosensory areas showed significantly greater activation when observing pain in own-race compared with other-race individuals, with no significant effect of minimal groups. These results suggest that racial bias in neural empathic responses is not influenced by minimal forms of group categorization, despite the clear association participants showed with in-group more than out-group members. We suggest that race may be an automatic and unconscious mechanism that drives the initial neural responses to observed pain in others.

Neural correlates of the in-group memory advantage on the encoding and recognition of faces

People have a memory advantage for faces that belong to the same group, for example, that attend the same university or have the same personality type. Faces from such in-group members are assumed to receive more attention during memory encoding and are therefore recognized more accurately. Here we use event-related potentials related to memory encoding and retrieval to investigate the neural correlates of the in-group memory advantage. Using the minimal group procedure, subjects were classified based on a bogus personality test as belonging to one of two personality types. While the electroencephalogram was recorded, subjects studied and recognized faces supposedly belonging to the subject’s own and the other personality type. Subjects recognized in-group faces more accurately than out-group faces but the effect size was small. Using the individual behavioral in-group memory advantage in multivariate analyses of covariance, we determined neural correlates of the in-group advantage. During memory encoding (300 to 1000 ms after stimulus onset), subjects with a high in-group memory advantage elicited more positive amplitudes for subsequently remembered in-group than out-group faces, showing that in-group faces received more attention and elicited more neural activity during initial encoding. Early during memory retrieval (300 to 500 ms), frontal brain areas were more activated for remembered in-group faces indicating an early detection of group membership. Surprisingly, the parietal old/new effect (600 to 900 ms) thought to indicate recollection processes differed between in-group and out-group faces independent from the behavioral in-group memory advantage. This finding suggests that group membership affects memory retrieval independent of memory performance. Comparisons with a previous study on the other-race effect, another memory phenomenon influenced by social classification of faces, suggested that the in-group memory advantage is dominated by top-down processing whereas the other-race effect is also influenced by extensive perceptual experience.

Representations of individuals in ventral temporal cortex defined by faces and biographies

The fusiform gyrus responds more strongly to faces than to other categories of objects. This response could reflect either categorical detection of faces or recognition of particular facial identities. Recent fMRI studies have attempted to address the question of what information is encoded in these regions, but have reported mixed results. We tested whether the creation of richer identity representations via training on visual and social information, and the use of an adaptation design, would reveal more robust representations of these identities in ventral temporal cortex. Examining the patterns of activation across voxels in bilateral fusiform gyri, we identified unique patterns for particular identities. Attaching distinctive biographical information to identities did not increase the strength of these representations, but did produce a grouping effect: faces associated with the same amount of biographical information were represented more similarly to each other. These results are consistent with the possibility that identity exemplars are represented in posterior visual areas best known for their role in representing categorical information, and suggest that these areas may be sensitive to some forms of non-visual information, including from the social domain.

Face gender modulates women's brain activity during face encoding

Women typically remember more female than male faces, whereas men do not show a reliable own-gender bias. However, little is known about the neural correlates of this own-gender bias in face recognition memory. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we investigated whether face gender modulated brain activity in fusiform and inferior occipital gyri during incidental encoding of faces. Fifteen women and 14 men underwent fMRI while passively viewing female and male faces, followed by a surprise face recognition task. Women recognized more female than male faces and showed higher activity to female than male faces in individually defined regions of fusiform and inferior occipital gyri. In contrast, men's recognition memory and blood-oxygen-level-dependent response were not modulated by face gender. Importantly, higher activity in the left fusiform gyrus (FFG) to one gender was related to better memory performance for that gender. These findings suggest that the FFG is involved in the gender bias in memory for faces, which may be linked to differential experience with female and male faces.

Putting a face in its place: in- and out-group membership alters the N170 response

Two mechanisms have been proposed to account for the difficulty in recognizing faces of other racial groups (the other-race effect; ORE): perceptual expertise and social cognitive factors. Focusing on the social cognitive factors alone, we manipulated in-group and out-group memberships based on two social categories (nationality and university affiliation), and controlled for perceptual expertise by testing Caucasian participants with Caucasian faces only. Using event-related potentials (ERPs) and focusing on the N170, a brain electrical component sensitive to faces, we provide for the first time strong support for the social cognitive influence on face processing within 200 ms. After participants learned the social categories, the N170 latency differentiated between double in-group and double out-group faces, taking longer to process the latter. In comparison, without group memberships, there was no difference in N170 latency among the faces. These results are consistent with recent findings of behavioral and imaging research, providing further support for the social cognitive model and its potential for understanding ORE.

The influence of group membership on the neural correlates involved in empathy

Empathy involves affective, cognitive, and emotion regulative components. The affective component relies on the sharing of emotional states with others and is discussed here in relation to the human Mirror System. On the other hand, the cognitive component is related to understanding the mental states of others and draws upon literature surrounding Theory of Mind (ToM). The final component, emotion regulation, depends on executive function and is responsible for managing the degree to which explicit empathic responses are made. This mini-review provides information on how each of the three components is individually affected by group membership and how this leads to in-group bias.