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Abstract
The target article "Thinking Through Other Minds" (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was both synthetic - building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; and prescriptive - showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and cultural ecologies of mind. In this reply to commentators, we address key issues, including: (1) refining the concept of culture to show how TTOM and the free-energy principle (FEP) can capture essential elements of human adaptation and functioning; (2) addressing cognition as an embodied, enactive, affective process involving cultural affordances; (3) clarifying the significance of the FEP formalism related to entropy minimization, Bayesian inference, Markov blankets, and enactivist views; (4) developing empirical tests and applications of the TTOM model; (5) incorporating cultural diversity and context at the level of intra-cultural variation, individual differences, and the transition to digital niches; and (6) considering some implications for psychiatry. The commentators' critiques and suggestions point to useful refinements and applications of the model. In ongoing collaborations, we are exploring how to augment the theory with affective valence, take into account individual differences and historicity, and apply the model to specific domains including epistemic bias.
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Smith R, Schwartenbeck P, Parr T, Friston KJ. An Active Inference Approach to Modeling Structure Learning: Concept Learning as an Example Case. Front Comput Neurosci 2020; 14:41. [PMID: 32508611 PMCID: PMC7250191 DOI: 10.3389/fncom.2020.00041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 36] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2019] [Accepted: 04/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Within computational neuroscience, the algorithmic and neural basis of structure learning remains poorly understood. Concept learning is one primary example, which requires both a type of internal model expansion process (adding novel hidden states that explain new observations), and a model reduction process (merging different states into one underlying cause and thus reducing model complexity via meta-learning). Although various algorithmic models of concept learning have been proposed within machine learning and cognitive science, many are limited to various degrees by an inability to generalize, the need for very large amounts of training data, and/or insufficiently established biological plausibility. Using concept learning as an example case, we introduce a novel approach for modeling structure learning-and specifically state-space expansion and reduction-within the active inference framework and its accompanying neural process theory. Our aim is to demonstrate its potential to facilitate a novel line of active inference research in this area. The approach we lay out is based on the idea that a generative model can be equipped with extra (hidden state or cause) "slots" that can be engaged when an agent learns about novel concepts. This can be combined with a Bayesian model reduction process, in which any concept learning-associated with these slots-can be reset in favor of a simpler model with higher model evidence. We use simulations to illustrate this model's ability to add new concepts to its state space (with relatively few observations) and increase the granularity of the concepts it currently possesses. We also simulate the predicted neural basis of these processes. We further show that it can accomplish a simple form of "one-shot" generalization to new stimuli. Although deliberately simple, these simulation results highlight ways in which active inference could offer useful resources in developing neurocomputational models of structure learning. They provide a template for how future active inference research could apply this approach to real-world structure learning problems and assess the added utility it may offer.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Philipp Schwartenbeck
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Parr T. Inferring What to Do (And What Not to). ENTROPY (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) 2020; 22:E536. [PMID: 33286308 PMCID: PMC7517030 DOI: 10.3390/e22050536] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/17/2020] [Revised: 05/04/2020] [Accepted: 05/07/2020] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
Abstract
In recent years, the "planning as inference" paradigm has become central to the study of behaviour. The advance offered by this is the formalisation of motivation as a prior belief about "how I am going to act". This paper provides an overview of the factors that contribute to this prior. These are rooted in optimal experimental design, information theory, and statistical decision making. We unpack how these factors imply a functional architecture for motivated behaviour. This raises an important question: how can we put this architecture to work in the service of understanding observed neurobiological structure? To answer this question, we draw from established techniques in experimental studies of behaviour. Typically, these examine the influence of perturbations of the nervous system-which include pathological insults or optogenetic manipulations-to see their influence on behaviour. Here, we argue that the message passing that emerges from inferring what to do can be similarly perturbed. If a given perturbation elicits the same behaviours as a focal brain lesion, this provides a functional interpretation of empirical findings and an anatomical grounding for theoretical results. We highlight examples of this approach that influence different sorts of goal-directed behaviour, active learning, and decision making. Finally, we summarise their implications for the neuroanatomy of inferring what to do (and what not to).
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK
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Communication between the Anterior Cingulate Cortex and Ventral Tegmental Area during a Cost-Benefit Reversal Task. Cell Rep 2020; 26:2353-2361.e3. [PMID: 30811986 DOI: 10.1016/j.celrep.2019.01.113] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2018] [Revised: 11/22/2018] [Accepted: 01/29/2019] [Indexed: 01/01/2023] Open
Abstract
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is implicated in value-based decision making, anticipation, and adaptation; however, how ACC activity modulates these behaviors is unclear. One possibility is via the ACC's connections with the ventral tegmental area (VTA), a dopaminergic region implicated in motivation and feedback processing. We tested this by monitoring ACC and VTA local field potentials in rats performing a cost-benefit reversal task that elicited both value-based and anticipatory choices. Partial directed coherence analyses revealed that elevated 4-Hz ACC-to-VTA signaling accompanied decisions that appeared to be anticipatory. ACC-to-VTA signaling also occurred post-reversal, consistent with it being involved in the initiation of non-default behavior. An analysis of 4-Hz signals in the other direction (VTA-to-ACC) revealed that it was elevated when the rats committed errors and that this signal was followed by behavioral adaptation. Together, these findings suggest that bidirectional communication between the ACC and VTA supports behavioral flexibility.
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Vasil J, Badcock PB, Constant A, Friston K, Ramstead MJD. A World Unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference. Front Psychol 2020; 11:417. [PMID: 32269536 PMCID: PMC7109408 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00417] [Citation(s) in RCA: 38] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/24/2019] [Accepted: 02/24/2020] [Indexed: 01/12/2023] Open
Abstract
Recent theoretical work in developmental psychology suggests that humans are predisposed to align their mental states with those of other individuals. One way this manifests is in cooperative communication; that is, intentional communication aimed at aligning individuals' mental states with respect to events in their shared environment. This idea has received strong empirical support. The purpose of this paper is to extend this account by proposing an integrative model of the biobehavioral dynamics of cooperative communication. Our formulation is based on active inference. Active inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and optimize an individual's internal model of the world. We propose that humans are characterized by an evolved adaptive prior belief that their mental states are aligned with, or similar to, those of conspecifics (i.e., that 'we are the same sort of creature, inhabiting the same sort of niche'). The use of cooperative communication emerges as the principal means to gather evidence for this belief, allowing for the development of a shared narrative that is used to disambiguate interactants' (hidden and inferred) mental states. Thus, by using cooperative communication, individuals effectively attune to a hermeneutic niche composed, in part, of others' mental states; and, reciprocally, attune the niche to their own ends via epistemic niche construction. This means that niche construction enables features of the niche to encode precise, reliable cues about the deontic or shared value of certain action policies (e.g., the utility of using communicative constructions to disambiguate mental states, given expectations about shared prior beliefs). In turn, the alignment of mental states (prior beliefs) enables the emergence of a novel, contextualizing scale of cultural dynamics that encompasses the actions and mental states of the ensemble of interactants and their shared environment. The dynamics of this contextualizing layer of cultural organization feedback, across scales, to constrain the variability of the prior expectations of the individuals who constitute it. Our theory additionally builds upon the active inference literature by introducing a new set of neurobiologically plausible computational hypotheses for cooperative communication. We conclude with directions for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jared Vasil
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States
| | - Paul B. Badcock
- Centre for Youth Mental Health, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
- Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
- Orygen, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
| | - Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Maxwell J. D. Ramstead
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
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Parr T, Da Costa L, Friston K. Markov blankets, information geometry and stochastic thermodynamics. PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS. SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL, PHYSICAL, AND ENGINEERING SCIENCES 2020; 378:20190159. [PMID: 31865883 PMCID: PMC6939234 DOI: 10.1098/rsta.2019.0159] [Citation(s) in RCA: 54] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/11/2019] [Indexed: 05/21/2023]
Abstract
This paper considers the relationship between thermodynamics, information and inference. In particular, it explores the thermodynamic concomitants of belief updating, under a variational (free energy) principle for self-organization. In brief, any (weakly mixing) random dynamical system that possesses a Markov blanket-i.e. a separation of internal and external states-is equipped with an information geometry. This means that internal states parametrize a probability density over external states. Furthermore, at non-equilibrium steady-state, the flow of internal states can be construed as a gradient flow on a quantity known in statistics as Bayesian model evidence. In short, there is a natural Bayesian mechanics for any system that possesses a Markov blanket. Crucially, this means that there is an explicit link between the inference performed by internal states and their energetics-as characterized by their stochastic thermodynamics. This article is part of the theme issue 'Harmonizing energy-autonomous computing and intelligence'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK
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Smith R, Parr T, Friston KJ. Simulating Emotions: An Active Inference Model of Emotional State Inference and Emotion Concept Learning. Front Psychol 2019; 10:2844. [PMID: 31920873 PMCID: PMC6931387 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02844] [Citation(s) in RCA: 61] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/02/2019] [Accepted: 12/02/2019] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
The ability to conceptualize and understand one's own affective states and responses - or "Emotional awareness" (EA) - is reduced in multiple psychiatric populations; it is also positively correlated with a range of adaptive cognitive and emotional traits. While a growing body of work has investigated the neurocognitive basis of EA, the neurocomputational processes underlying this ability have received limited attention. Here, we present a formal Active Inference (AI) model of emotion conceptualization that can simulate the neurocomputational (Bayesian) processes associated with learning about emotion concepts and inferring the emotions one is feeling in a given moment. We validate the model and inherent constructs by showing (i) it can successfully acquire a repertoire of emotion concepts in its "childhood", as well as (ii) acquire new emotion concepts in synthetic "adulthood," and (iii) that these learning processes depend on early experiences, environmental stability, and habitual patterns of selective attention. These results offer a proof of principle that cognitive-emotional processes can be modeled formally, and highlight the potential for both theoretical and empirical extensions of this line of research on emotion and emotional disorders.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ryan Smith
- Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, United States
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Parr T, Friston KJ. Generalised free energy and active inference. BIOLOGICAL CYBERNETICS 2019; 113:495-513. [PMID: 31562544 PMCID: PMC6848054 DOI: 10.1007/s00422-019-00805-w] [Citation(s) in RCA: 70] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/04/2017] [Accepted: 09/13/2019] [Indexed: 05/30/2023]
Abstract
Active inference is an approach to understanding behaviour that rests upon the idea that the brain uses an internal generative model to predict incoming sensory data. The fit between this model and data may be improved in two ways. The brain could optimise probabilistic beliefs about the variables in the generative model (i.e. perceptual inference). Alternatively, by acting on the world, it could change the sensory data, such that they are more consistent with the model. This implies a common objective function (variational free energy) for action and perception that scores the fit between an internal model and the world. We compare two free energy functionals for active inference in the framework of Markov decision processes. One of these is a functional of beliefs (i.e. probability distributions) about states and policies, but a function of observations, while the second is a functional of beliefs about all three. In the former (expected free energy), prior beliefs about outcomes are not part of the generative model (because they are absorbed into the prior over policies). Conversely, in the second (generalised free energy), priors over outcomes become an explicit component of the generative model. When using the free energy function, which is blind to future observations, we equip the generative model with a prior over policies that ensure preferred (i.e. priors over) outcomes are realised. In other words, if we expect to encounter a particular kind of outcome, this lends plausibility to those policies for which this outcome is a consequence. In addition, this formulation ensures that selected policies minimise uncertainty about future outcomes by minimising the free energy expected in the future. When using the free energy functional-that effectively treats future observations as hidden states-we show that policies are inferred or selected that realise prior preferences by minimising the free energy of future expectations. Interestingly, the form of posterior beliefs about policies (and associated belief updating) turns out to be identical under both formulations, but the quantities used to compute them are not.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG UK
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG UK
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59
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Abstract
Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing Therapy (EMDR) is an effective treatment for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The Adaptive Information Processing Model (AIP) guides the development and practice of EMDR. The AIP postulates inadequately processed memory as the foundation of PTSD pathology. Predictive Processing postulates that the primary function of the brain is prediction that serves to anticipate the next moment of experience in order to resist the dissipative force of entropy thus facilitating continued survival. Memory is the primary substrate of prediction, and is optimized by an ongoing process of precision weighted prediction error minimization that refines prediction by updating the memories on which it is based. The Predictive Processing model of EMDR postulates that EMDR facilitates the predictive processing of traumatic memory by overcoming the bias against exploration and evidence accumulation. The EMDR protocol brings the traumatic memory into an active state of re-experiencing. Defensive responding and/or low sensory precision preclude evidence accumulation to test the predictions of the traumatic memory in the present. Sets of therapist guided eye movements repeatedly challenge the bias against evidence accumulation and compel sensory sampling of the benign present. Eye movements reset the theta rhythm organizing the flow of information through the brain, facilitating the deployment of both overt and covert attention, and the mnemonic search for associations. Sampling of sensation does not support the predictions of the traumatic memory resulting in prediction error that the brain then attempts to minimize. The net result is a restoration of the integrity of the rhythmic deployment of attention, a recalibration of sensory precision, and the updating (reconsolidation) of the traumatic memory. Thus one prediction of the model is a decrease in Attention Bias Variability, a core dysfunction in PTSD, following successful treatment with EMDR.
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60
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Mirza MB, Adams RA, Friston K, Parr T. Introducing a Bayesian model of selective attention based on active inference. Sci Rep 2019; 9:13915. [PMID: 31558746 PMCID: PMC6763492 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-50138-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2019] [Accepted: 08/28/2019] [Indexed: 11/26/2022] Open
Abstract
Information gathering comprises actions whose (sensory) consequences resolve uncertainty (i.e., are salient). In other words, actions that solicit salient information cause the greatest shift in beliefs (i.e., information gain) about the causes of our sensations. However, not all information is relevant to the task at hand: this is especially the case in complex, naturalistic scenes. This paper introduces a formal model of selective attention based on active inference and contextual epistemic foraging. We consider a visual search task with a special emphasis on goal-directed and task-relevant exploration. In this scheme, attention modulates the expected fidelity (precision) of the mapping between observations and hidden states in a state-dependent or context-sensitive manner. This ensures task-irrelevant observations have little expected information gain, and so the agent - driven to reduce expected surprise (i.e., uncertainty) - does not actively seek them out. Instead, it selectively samples task-relevant observations, which inform (task-relevant) hidden states. We further show, through simulations, that the atypical exploratory behaviours in conditions such as autism and anxiety may be due to a failure to appropriately modulate sensory precision in a context-specific way.
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Affiliation(s)
- M Berk Mirza
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK.
- Department of Neuroimaging, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK.
- The NIHR Maudsley Biomedical Research Centre (BRC) at South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London, London, UK.
| | - Rick A Adams
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, 17 Queen Square, University College London, London, UK
- Division of Psychiatry, 149 Tottenham Court Road, University College London, London, UK
- Max Planck-UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, 10-12 Russell Square, London, WC1B 5EH, UK
- Department of Computer Science, University College London, Malet Place, London, WC1E 7JE, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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Parr T, Corcoran AW, Friston KJ, Hohwy J. Perceptual awareness and active inference. Neurosci Conscious 2019; 2019:niz012. [PMID: 31528360 PMCID: PMC6734140 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niz012] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/01/2019] [Revised: 05/24/2019] [Accepted: 07/28/2019] [Indexed: 12/16/2022] Open
Abstract
Perceptual awareness depends upon the way in which we engage with our sensorium. This notion is central to active inference, a theoretical framework that treats perception and action as inferential processes. This variational perspective on cognition formalizes the notion of perception as hypothesis testing and treats actions as experiments that are designed (in part) to gather evidence for or against alternative hypotheses. The common treatment of perception and action affords a useful interpretation of certain perceptual phenomena whose active component is often not acknowledged. In this article, we start by considering Troxler fading - the dissipation of a peripheral percept during maintenance of fixation, and its recovery during free (saccadic) exploration. This offers an important example of the failure to maintain a percept without actively interrogating a visual scene. We argue that this may be understood in terms of the accumulation of uncertainty about a hypothesized stimulus when free exploration is disrupted by experimental instructions or pathology. Once we take this view, we can generalize the idea of using bodily (oculomotor) action to resolve uncertainty to include the use of mental (attentional) actions for the same purpose. This affords a useful way to think about binocular rivalry paradigms, in which perceptual changes need not be associated with an overt movement.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London, UK
| | - Andrew W Corcoran
- Cognition & Philosophy Laboratory, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London, UK
| | - Jakob Hohwy
- Cognition & Philosophy Laboratory, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
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Linson A, Friston K. Reframing PTSD for computational psychiatry with the active inference framework. Cogn Neuropsychiatry 2019; 24:347-368. [PMID: 31564212 PMCID: PMC6816477 DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2019.1665994] [Citation(s) in RCA: 24] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/19/2018] [Accepted: 09/04/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Introduction: Recent advances in research on stress and, respectively, on disorders of perception, learning, and behaviour speak to a promising synthesis of current insights from (i) neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and psychology of stress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (ii) computational psychiatry approaches to pathophysiology (e.g. of schizophrenia and autism). Methods: Specifically, we apply this synthesis to PTSD. The framework of active inference offers an embodied and embedded lens through which to understand neuronal mechanisms, structures, and processes of cognitive function and dysfunction. In turn, this offers an explanatory model of how healthy mental functioning can go awry due to psychopathological conditions that impair inference about our environment and our bodies. In this context, auditory phenomena-known to be especially relevant to studies of PTSD and schizophrenia-and traditional models of auditory function can be viewed from an evolutionary perspective based on active inference. Results: We assess and contextualise a range of evidence on audition, stress, psychosis, and PTSD, and bring some existing partial models of PTSD into multilevel alignment. Conclusions: The novel perspective on PTSD we present aims to serve as a basis for new experimental designs and therapeutic interventions that integrate fundamentally biological, cognitive, behavioural, and environmental factors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Linson
- Faculty of Natural Sciences & Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL, London, UK
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63
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Benrimoh D, Parr T, Adams RA, Friston K. Hallucinations both in and out of context: An active inference account. PLoS One 2019; 14:e0212379. [PMID: 31430277 PMCID: PMC6701798 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0212379] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/31/2019] [Accepted: 08/03/2019] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
Hallucinations, including auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH), occur in both the healthy population and in psychotic conditions such as schizophrenia (often developing after a prodromal period). In addition, hallucinations can be in-context (they can be consistent with the environment, such as when one hallucinates the end of a sentence that has been repeated many times), or out-of-context (such as the bizarre hallucinations associated with schizophrenia). In previous work, we introduced a model of hallucinations as false (positive) inferences based on a (Markov decision process) formulation of active inference. In this work, we extend this model to include content–to disclose the computational mechanisms behind in- and out-of-context hallucinations. In active inference, sensory information is used to disambiguate alternative hypotheses about the causes of sensations. Sensory information is balanced against prior beliefs, and when this balance is tipped in the favor of prior beliefs, hallucinations can occur. We show that in-context hallucinations arise when (simulated) subjects cannot use sensory information to correct prior beliefs about hearing a voice, but beliefs about content (i.e. the sequential order of a sentence) remain accurate. When hallucinating subjects also have inaccurate beliefs about state transitions, out-of-context hallucinations occur; i.e. their hallucinated speech content is disordered. Note that out-of-context hallucinations in this setting does not refer to inference about context, but rather to false perceptual inference that emerges when the confidence in–or precision of–sensory evidence is reduced. Furthermore, subjects with inaccurate beliefs about state transitions but an intact ability to use sensory information do not hallucinate and are reminiscent of prodromal patients. This work demonstrates the different computational mechanisms that may underlie the spectrum of hallucinatory experience–from the healthy population to psychotic states.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Benrimoh
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, England, United Kingdom
- McGill University, Department of Psychiatry, Montreal, Canada
- * E-mail:
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, England, United Kingdom
| | - Rick A. Adams
- Division of Psychiatry, University College London, London, England, United Kingdom
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, England, United Kingdom
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, England, United Kingdom
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Vincent P, Parr T, Benrimoh D, Friston KJ. With an eye on uncertainty: Modelling pupillary responses to environmental volatility. PLoS Comput Biol 2019; 15:e1007126. [PMID: 31276488 PMCID: PMC6636765 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007126] [Citation(s) in RCA: 19] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/07/2018] [Revised: 07/17/2019] [Accepted: 05/23/2019] [Indexed: 01/04/2023] Open
Abstract
Living creatures must accurately infer the nature of their environments. They do this despite being confronted by stochastic and context sensitive contingencies—and so must constantly update their beliefs regarding their uncertainty about what might come next. In this work, we examine how we deal with uncertainty that evolves over time. This prospective uncertainty (or imprecision) is referred to as volatility and has previously been linked to noradrenergic signals that originate in the locus coeruleus. Using pupillary dilatation as a measure of central noradrenergic signalling, we tested the hypothesis that changes in pupil diameter reflect inferences humans make about environmental volatility. To do so, we collected pupillometry data from participants presented with a stream of numbers. We generated these numbers from a process with varying degrees of volatility. By measuring pupillary dilatation in response to these stimuli—and simulating the inferences made by an ideal Bayesian observer of the same stimuli—we demonstrate that humans update their beliefs about environmental contingencies in a Bayes optimal way. We show this by comparing general linear (convolution) models that formalised competing hypotheses about the causes of pupillary changes. We found greater evidence for models that included Bayes optimal estimates of volatility than those without. We additionally explore the interaction between different causes of pupil dilation and suggest a quantitative approach to characterising a person’s prior beliefs about volatility. Humans are constantly confronted with surprising events. To navigate such a world, we must understand the chances of an unexpected event occurring at any given point in time. We do this by creating a model of the world around us, in which we allow for these unexpected events to occur by holding beliefs about how volatile our environment is. In this work we explore the way in which we update our beliefs, demonstrating that this updating relies on the number of unexpected events in relation to the expected number. We do this by examining the pupil diameter, since—in controlled environments—changes in pupil diameter reflect our response to unexpected observations. Finally, we show that our methodology is appropriate for assessing the individual participant’s prior expectations about the amount of uncertainty in their environment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Peter Vincent
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - David Benrimoh
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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Dynamic Causal Modelling of Active Vision. J Neurosci 2019; 39:6265-6275. [PMID: 31182633 PMCID: PMC6687902 DOI: 10.1523/jneurosci.2459-18.2019] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/24/2018] [Revised: 03/08/2019] [Accepted: 03/11/2019] [Indexed: 11/27/2022] Open
Abstract
In this paper, we draw from recent theoretical work on active perception, which suggests that the brain makes use of an internal (i.e., generative) model to make inferences about the causes of sensations. This view treats visual sensations as consequent on action (i.e., saccades) and implies that visual percepts must be actively constructed via a sequence of eye movements. Oculomotor control calls on a distributed set of brain sources that includes the dorsal and ventral frontoparietal (attention) networks. We argue that connections from the frontal eye fields to ventral parietal sources represent the mapping from “where”, fixation location to information derived from “what” representations in the ventral visual stream. During scene construction, this mapping must be learned, putatively through changes in the effective connectivity of these synapses. Here, we test the hypothesis that the coupling between the dorsal frontal cortex and the right temporoparietal cortex is modulated during saccadic interrogation of a simple visual scene. Using dynamic causal modeling for magnetoencephalography with (male and female) human participants, we assess the evidence for changes in effective connectivity by comparing models that allow for this modulation with models that do not. We find strong evidence for modulation of connections between the two attention networks; namely, a disinhibition of the ventral network by its dorsal counterpart. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This work draws from recent theoretical accounts of active vision and provides empirical evidence for changes in synaptic efficacy consistent with these computational models. In brief, we used magnetoencephalography in combination with eye-tracking to assess the neural correlates of a form of short-term memory during a dot cancellation task. Using dynamic causal modeling to quantify changes in effective connectivity, we found evidence that the coupling between the dorsal and ventral attention networks changed during the saccadic interrogation of a simple visual scene. Intuitively, this is consistent with the idea that these neuronal connections may encode beliefs about “what I would see if I looked there”, and that this mapping is optimized as new data are obtained with each fixation.
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Abstract
The processes underwriting the acquisition of culture remain unclear. How are shared habits, norms, and expectations learned and maintained with precision and reliability across large-scale sociocultural ensembles? Is there a unifying account of the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of culture? Notions such as "shared expectations," the "selective patterning of attention and behaviour," "cultural evolution," "cultural inheritance," and "implicit learning" are the main candidates to underpin a unifying account of cognition and the acquisition of culture; however, their interactions require greater specification and clarification. In this article, we integrate these candidates using the variational (free-energy) approach to human cognition and culture in theoretical neuroscience. We describe the construction by humans of social niches that afford epistemic resources called cultural affordances. We argue that human agents learn the shared habits, norms, and expectations of their culture through immersive participation in patterned cultural practices that selectively pattern attention and behaviour. We call this process "thinking through other minds" (TTOM) - in effect, the process of inferring other agents' expectations about the world and how to behave in social context. We argue that for humans, information from and about other people's expectations constitutes the primary domain of statistical regularities that humans leverage to predict and organize behaviour. The integrative model we offer has implications that can advance theories of cognition, enculturation, adaptation, and psychopathology. Crucially, this formal (variational) treatment seeks to resolve key debates in current cognitive science, such as the distinction between internalist and externalist accounts of theory of mind abilities and the more fundamental distinction between dynamical and representational accounts of enactivism.
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Constant A, Ramstead MJD, Veissière SPL, Friston K. Regimes of Expectations: An Active Inference Model of Social Conformity and Human Decision Making. Front Psychol 2019; 10:679. [PMID: 30988668 PMCID: PMC6452780 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00679] [Citation(s) in RCA: 56] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/12/2018] [Accepted: 03/11/2019] [Indexed: 01/06/2023] Open
Abstract
How do humans come to acquire shared expectations about how they ought to behave in distinct normalized social settings? This paper offers a normative framework to answer this question. We introduce the computational construct of 'deontic value' - based on active inference and Markov decision processes - to formalize conceptions of social conformity and human decision-making. Deontic value is an attribute of choices, behaviors, or action sequences that inherit directly from deontic cues in our econiche (e.g., red traffic lights); namely, cues that denote an obligatory social rule. Crucially, the prosocial aspect of deontic value rests upon a particular form of circular causality: deontic cues exist in the environment in virtue of the environment being modified by repeated actions, while action itself is contingent upon the deontic value of environmental cues. We argue that this construction of deontic cues enables the epistemic (i.e., information-seeking) and pragmatic (i.e., goal- seeking) values of any behavior to be 'cached' or 'outsourced' to the environment, where the environment effectively 'learns' about the behavior of its denizens. We describe the process whereby this particular aspect of value enables learning of habitual behavior over neurodevelopmental and transgenerational timescales.
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Affiliation(s)
- Axel Constant
- Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
| | - Maxwell J. D. Ramstead
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
| | - Samuel P. L. Veissière
- Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
- Department of Anthropology, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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68
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Parr T, Markovic D, Kiebel SJ, Friston KJ. Neuronal message passing using Mean-field, Bethe, and Marginal approximations. Sci Rep 2019; 9:1889. [PMID: 30760782 PMCID: PMC6374414 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-018-38246-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 55] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/11/2018] [Accepted: 12/19/2018] [Indexed: 01/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Neuronal computations rely upon local interactions across synapses. For a neuronal network to perform inference, it must integrate information from locally computed messages that are propagated among elements of that network. We review the form of two popular (Bayesian) message passing schemes and consider their plausibility as descriptions of inference in biological networks. These are variational message passing and belief propagation - each of which is derived from a free energy functional that relies upon different approximations (mean-field and Bethe respectively). We begin with an overview of these schemes and illustrate the form of the messages required to perform inference using Hidden Markov Models as generative models. Throughout, we use factor graphs to show the form of the generative models and of the messages they entail. We consider how these messages might manifest neuronally and simulate the inferences they perform. While variational message passing offers a simple and neuronally plausible architecture, it falls short of the inferential performance of belief propagation. In contrast, belief propagation allows exact computation of marginal posteriors at the expense of the architectural simplicity of variational message passing. As a compromise between these two extremes, we offer a third approach - marginal message passing - that features a simple architecture, while approximating the performance of belief propagation. Finally, we link formal considerations to accounts of neurological and psychiatric syndromes in terms of aberrant message passing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, WC1N 3BG, UK.
| | - Dimitrije Markovic
- Chair of Neuroimaging, Psychology Department, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany
| | - Stefan J Kiebel
- Chair of Neuroimaging, Psychology Department, Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden, Germany
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, WC1N 3BG, UK
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69
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Predictive Processes and the Peculiar Case of Music. Trends Cogn Sci 2019; 23:63-77. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.10.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 185] [Impact Index Per Article: 37.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2018] [Revised: 10/23/2018] [Accepted: 10/24/2018] [Indexed: 12/18/2022]
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70
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A Multi-scale View of the Emergent Complexity of Life: A Free-Energy Proposal. EVOLUTION, DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLEXITY 2019. [DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-00075-2_7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/07/2023]
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71
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Benrimoh D, Parr T, Vincent P, Adams RA, Friston K. Active Inference and Auditory Hallucinations. COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHIATRY (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.) 2018; 2:183-204. [PMID: 30627670 PMCID: PMC6317754 DOI: 10.1162/cpsy_a_00022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/02/2018] [Accepted: 10/03/2018] [Indexed: 01/27/2023]
Abstract
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) are often distressing symptoms of several neuropsychiatric conditions, including schizophrenia. Using a Markov decision process formulation of active inference, we develop a novel model of AVH as false (positive) inference. Active inference treats perception as a process of hypothesis testing, in which sensory data are used to disambiguate between alternative hypotheses about the world. Crucially, this depends upon a delicate balance between prior beliefs about unobserved (hidden) variables and the sensations they cause. A false inference that a voice is present, even in the absence of auditory sensations, suggests that prior beliefs dominate perceptual inference. Here we consider the computational mechanisms that could cause this imbalance in perception. Through simulation, we show that the content of (and confidence in) prior beliefs depends on beliefs about policies (here sequences of listening and talking) and on beliefs about the reliability of sensory data. We demonstrate several ways in which hallucinatory percepts could occur when an agent expects to hear a voice in the presence of imprecise sensory data. This model expresses, in formal terms, alternative computational mechanisms that underwrite AVH and, speculatively, can be mapped onto neurobiological changes associated with schizophrenia. The interaction of action and perception is important in modeling AVH, given that speech is a fundamentally enactive and interactive process-and that hallucinators often actively engage with their voices.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Peter Vincent
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Rick A. Adams
- Division of Psychiatry, University College London, London, UK,Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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72
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Benrimoh D, Parr T, Vincent P, Adams RA, Friston K. Active Inference and Auditory Hallucinations. COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHIATRY (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.) 2018. [PMID: 30627670 DOI: 10.1162/cpsy˙a˙00022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/12/2023]
Abstract
Auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) are often distressing symptoms of several neuropsychiatric conditions, including schizophrenia. Using a Markov decision process formulation of active inference, we develop a novel model of AVH as false (positive) inference. Active inference treats perception as a process of hypothesis testing, in which sensory data are used to disambiguate between alternative hypotheses about the world. Crucially, this depends upon a delicate balance between prior beliefs about unobserved (hidden) variables and the sensations they cause. A false inference that a voice is present, even in the absence of auditory sensations, suggests that prior beliefs dominate perceptual inference. Here we consider the computational mechanisms that could cause this imbalance in perception. Through simulation, we show that the content of (and confidence in) prior beliefs depends on beliefs about policies (here sequences of listening and talking) and on beliefs about the reliability of sensory data. We demonstrate several ways in which hallucinatory percepts could occur when an agent expects to hear a voice in the presence of imprecise sensory data. This model expresses, in formal terms, alternative computational mechanisms that underwrite AVH and, speculatively, can be mapped onto neurobiological changes associated with schizophrenia. The interaction of action and perception is important in modeling AVH, given that speech is a fundamentally enactive and interactive process-and that hallucinators often actively engage with their voices.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Benrimoh
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Peter Vincent
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Rick A Adams
- Division of Psychiatry, University College London, London, UK
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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73
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Parr T, Friston KJ. The Anatomy of Inference: Generative Models and Brain Structure. Front Comput Neurosci 2018; 12:90. [PMID: 30483088 PMCID: PMC6243103 DOI: 10.3389/fncom.2018.00090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 81] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2018] [Accepted: 10/25/2018] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
To infer the causes of its sensations, the brain must call on a generative (predictive) model. This necessitates passing local messages between populations of neurons to update beliefs about hidden variables in the world beyond its sensory samples. It also entails inferences about how we will act. Active inference is a principled framework that frames perception and action as approximate Bayesian inference. This has been successful in accounting for a wide range of physiological and behavioral phenomena. Recently, a process theory has emerged that attempts to relate inferences to their neurobiological substrates. In this paper, we review and develop the anatomical aspects of this process theory. We argue that the form of the generative models required for inference constrains the way in which brain regions connect to one another. Specifically, neuronal populations representing beliefs about a variable must receive input from populations representing the Markov blanket of that variable. We illustrate this idea in four different domains: perception, planning, attention, and movement. In doing so, we attempt to show how appealing to generative models enables us to account for anatomical brain architectures. Ultimately, committing to an anatomical theory of inference ensures we can form empirical hypotheses that can be tested using neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and electrophysiological experiments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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74
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Abstract
This paper characterizes impulsive behavior using a patch-leaving paradigm and active inference-a framework for describing Bayes optimal behavior. This paradigm comprises different environments (patches) with limited resources that decline over time at different rates. The challenge is to decide when to leave the current patch for another to maximize reward. We chose this task because it offers an operational characterization of impulsive behavior, namely, maximizing proximal reward at the expense of future gain. We use a Markov decision process formulation of active inference to simulate behavioral and electrophysiological responses under different models and prior beliefs. Our main finding is that there are at least three distinct causes of impulsive behavior, which we demonstrate by manipulating three different components of the Markov decision process model. These components comprise (i) the depth of planning, (ii) the capacity to maintain and process information, and (iii) the perceived value of immediate (relative to delayed) rewards. We show how these manipulations change beliefs and subsequent choices through variational message passing. Furthermore, we appeal to the process theories associated with this message passing to simulate neuronal correlates. In future work, we will use this scheme to identify the prior beliefs that underlie different sorts of impulsive behavior-and ask whether different causes of impulsivity can be inferred from the electrophysiological correlates of choice behavior.
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75
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Hong CCH, Fallon JH, Friston KJ, Harris JC. Rapid Eye Movements in Sleep Furnish a Unique Probe Into Consciousness. Front Psychol 2018; 9:2087. [PMID: 30429814 PMCID: PMC6220670 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02087] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/22/2018] [Accepted: 10/10/2018] [Indexed: 01/07/2023] Open
Abstract
The neural correlates of rapid eye movements (REMs) in sleep are extraordinarily robust; including REM-locked multisensory-motor integration and accompanying activation in the retrosplenial cortex, the supplementary eye field and areas encompassing cholinergic basal nucleus (Hong et al., 2009). The phenomenology of REMs speaks to the notion that perceptual experience in both sleep and wakefulness is a constructive process - in which we generate predictions of sensory inputs and then test those predictions through actively sampling the sensorium with eye movements. On this view, REMs during sleep may index an internalized active sampling or 'scanning' of self-generated visual constructs that are released from the constraints of visual input. If this view is correct, it renders REMs an ideal probe to study consciousness as "an exclusively internal affair" (Metzinger, 2009). In other words, REMs offer a probe of active inference - in the sense of predictive coding - when the brain is isolated from the sensorium in virtue of the natural blockade of sensory afferents during REM sleep. Crucially, REMs are temporally precise events that enable powerful inferences based on time series analyses. As a natural, task-free probe, (REMs) could be used in non-compliant subjects, including infants and animals. In short, REMs constitute a promising probe to study the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of consciousness and perhaps the psychopathology of schizophrenia and autism, which have been considered in terms of aberrant predictive coding.
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Affiliation(s)
- Charles C.-H. Hong
- Patuxent Institution, Correctional Mental Health Center — Jessup, Jessup, MD, United States
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, The Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, MD, United States
| | - James H. Fallon
- Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, United States
- Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, United States
| | - Karl J. Friston
- The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - James C. Harris
- Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, The Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, MD, United States
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76
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Parr T, Friston KJ. Attention or salience? Curr Opin Psychol 2018; 29:1-5. [PMID: 30359960 DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.10.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 66] [Impact Index Per Article: 11.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/23/2018] [Revised: 10/03/2018] [Accepted: 10/09/2018] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
While attention is widely recognised as central to perception, the term is often used to mean very different things. Prominent theories of attention - notably the premotor theory - relate it to planned or executed eye movements. This contrasts with the notion of attention as a gain control process that weights the information carried by different sensory channels. We draw upon recent advances in theoretical neurobiology to argue for a distinction between attentional gain mechanisms and salience attribution. The former depends upon estimating the precision of sensory data, while the latter is a consequence of the need to actively engage with the sensorium. Having established this distinction, we consider the intimate relationship between attention and salience.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, UK.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, UK
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77
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Prosser A, Friston KJ, Bakker N, Parr T. A Bayesian Account of Psychopathy: A Model of Lacks Remorse and Self-Aggrandizing. COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHIATRY (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.) 2018; 2:92-140. [PMID: 30381799 PMCID: PMC6184370 DOI: 10.1162/cpsy_a_00016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/02/2017] [Accepted: 04/27/2018] [Indexed: 12/28/2022]
Abstract
This article proposes a formal model that integrates cognitive and psychodynamic psychotherapeutic models of psychopathy to show how two major psychopathic traits called lacks remorse and self-aggrandizing can be understood as a form of abnormal Bayesian inference about the self. This model draws on the predictive coding (i.e., active inference) framework, a neurobiologically plausible explanatory framework for message passing in the brain that is formalized in terms of hierarchical Bayesian inference. In summary, this model proposes that these two cardinal psychopathic traits reflect entrenched maladaptive Bayesian inferences about the self, which defend against the experience of deep-seated, self-related negative emotions, specifically shame and worthlessness. Support for the model in extant research on the neurobiology of psychopathy and quantitative simulations are provided. Finally, we offer a preliminary overview of a novel treatment for psychopathy that rests on our Bayesian formulation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aaron Prosser
- Michael G. DeGroote School of Medicine, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
| | - Nathan Bakker
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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78
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Parr T, Benrimoh DA, Vincent P, Friston KJ. Precision and False Perceptual Inference. Front Integr Neurosci 2018; 12:39. [PMID: 30294264 PMCID: PMC6158318 DOI: 10.3389/fnint.2018.00039] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2018] [Accepted: 08/30/2018] [Indexed: 12/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Accurate perceptual inference fundamentally depends upon accurate beliefs about the reliability of sensory data. In this paper, we describe a Bayes optimal and biologically plausible scheme that refines these beliefs through a gradient descent on variational free energy. To illustrate this, we simulate belief updating during visual foraging and show that changes in estimated sensory precision (i.e., confidence in visual data) are highly sensitive to prior beliefs about the contents of a visual scene. In brief, confident prior beliefs induce an increase in estimated precision when consistent with sensory evidence, but a decrease when they conflict. Prior beliefs held with low confidence are rapidly updated to posterior beliefs, determined by sensory data. These induce much smaller changes in beliefs about sensory precision. We argue that pathologies of scene construction may be due to abnormal priors, and show that these can induce a reduction in estimated sensory precision. Having previously associated this precision with cholinergic signaling, we note that several neurodegenerative conditions are associated with visual disturbances and cholinergic deficits; notably, the synucleinopathies. On relating the message passing in our model to the functional anatomy of the ventral visual stream, we find that simulated neuronal loss in temporal lobe regions induces confident, inaccurate, empirical prior beliefs at lower levels in the visual hierarchy. This provides a plausible, if speculative, computational mechanism for the loss of cholinergic signaling and the visual disturbances associated with temporal lobe Lewy body pathology. This may be seen as an illustration of the sorts of hypotheses that may be expressed within this computational framework.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Institute of Neurology, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - David A Benrimoh
- Institute of Neurology, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Peter Vincent
- Institute of Neurology, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J Friston
- Institute of Neurology, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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79
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Parr T, Friston KJ. The Discrete and Continuous Brain: From Decisions to Movement-And Back Again. Neural Comput 2018. [PMID: 29894658 DOI: 10.1162/neco˙a˙01102] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/12/2023]
Abstract
To act upon the world, creatures must change continuous variables such as muscle length or chemical concentration. In contrast, decision making is an inherently discrete process, involving the selection among alternative courses of action. In this article, we consider the interface between the discrete and continuous processes that translate our decisions into movement in a Newtonian world-and how movement informs our decisions. We do so by appealing to active inference, with a special focus on the oculomotor system. Within this exemplar system, we argue that the superior colliculus is well placed to act as a discrete-continuous interface. Interestingly, when the neuronal computations within the superior colliculus are formulated in terms of active inference, we find that many aspects of its neuroanatomy emerge from the computations it must perform in this role.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, U.K.
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80
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Kaplan R, Friston KJ. Planning and navigation as active inference. BIOLOGICAL CYBERNETICS 2018; 112:323-343. [PMID: 29572721 PMCID: PMC6060791 DOI: 10.1007/s00422-018-0753-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 85] [Impact Index Per Article: 14.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/17/2017] [Accepted: 03/07/2018] [Indexed: 05/05/2023]
Abstract
This paper introduces an active inference formulation of planning and navigation. It illustrates how the exploitation-exploration dilemma is dissolved by acting to minimise uncertainty (i.e. expected surprise or free energy). We use simulations of a maze problem to illustrate how agents can solve quite complicated problems using context sensitive prior preferences to form subgoals. Our focus is on how epistemic behaviour-driven by novelty and the imperative to reduce uncertainty about the world-contextualises pragmatic or goal-directed behaviour. Using simulations, we illustrate the underlying process theory with synthetic behavioural and electrophysiological responses during exploration of a maze and subsequent navigation to a target location. An interesting phenomenon that emerged from the simulations was a putative distinction between 'place cells'-that fire when a subgoal is reached-and 'path cells'-that fire until a subgoal is reached.
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Affiliation(s)
- Raphael Kaplan
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London (UCL), 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London (UCL), 12 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, UK.
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81
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Parr T, Friston KJ. Uncertainty, epistemics and active inference. J R Soc Interface 2018; 14:rsif.2017.0376. [PMID: 29167370 PMCID: PMC5721148 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2017.0376] [Citation(s) in RCA: 122] [Impact Index Per Article: 20.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2017] [Accepted: 10/27/2017] [Indexed: 11/28/2022] Open
Abstract
Biological systems—like ourselves—are constantly faced with uncertainty. Despite noisy sensory data, and volatile environments, creatures appear to actively maintain their integrity. To account for this remarkable ability to make optimal decisions in the face of a capricious world, we propose a generative model that represents the beliefs an agent might possess about their own uncertainty. By simulating a noisy and volatile environment, we demonstrate how uncertainty influences optimal epistemic (visual) foraging. In our simulations, saccades were deployed less frequently to regions with a lower sensory precision, while a greater volatility led to a shorter inhibition of return. These simulations illustrate a principled explanation for some cardinal aspects of visual foraging—and allow us to propose a correspondence between the representation of uncertainty and ascending neuromodulatory systems, complementing that suggested by Yu & Dayan (Yu & Dayan 2005 Neuron46, 681–692. (doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.04.026)).
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK
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82
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Connolly P. Expected Free Energy Formalizes Conflict Underlying Defense in Freudian Psychoanalysis. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1264. [PMID: 30072943 PMCID: PMC6060308 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 16] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2017] [Accepted: 06/29/2018] [Indexed: 12/02/2022] Open
Abstract
Freud's core interest in the psyche was the dynamic unconscious: that part of the psyche which is unconscious due to conflict (Freud, 1923/1961). Over the course of his career, Freud variously described conflict as an opposition to the discharge of activation (Freud, 1950), opposition to psychic activity due to the release of unpleasure (Freud, 1990/1991), opposition between the primary principle and the reality principle (Freud, 1911/1963), structural conflict between id, ego, and superego (Freud, 1923/1961), and ambivalence (Freud, 1912/1963). Besides this difficulty of the shifting description of conflict, an underlying question remained the specific shared terrain in which emotions, thoughts, intentions or wishes could come into conflict with one another (the neuronal homolog of conflict), and most especially how they may exist as quantities in opposition within that terrain. Friston's free-energy principle (FEP henceforth) connected to the work of Friston (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2010) has provided the potential for a powerful unifying theory in psychology, neuroscience, and related fields that has been shown to have tremendous consilience with psychoanalytic concepts (Hopkins, 2012). Hopkins (2016), drawing on a formulation by Hobson et al. (2014), suggests that conflict may be potentially quantifiable as free energy from a FEP perspective. More recently, work by Friston et al. (2017a) has framed the selection of action as a gradient descent of expected free energy under different policies of action. From this perspective, the article describes how conflict could potentially be formalized as a situation where opposing action policies have similar expected free energy, for example between actions driven by competing basic prototype emotion systems as described by Panksepp (1998). This conflict state may be avoided in the future through updating the relative precision of a particular set of prior beliefs about outcomes: this has the result of tending to favor one of the policies of action over others in future instances, a situation analogous to defense. Through acting as a constraint on the further development of the person, the defensive operation can become entrenched, and resistant to alteration. The implications that this formalization has for psychoanalysis is explored.
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Affiliation(s)
- Patrick Connolly
- Department of Counselling and Psychology, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, Hong Kong, Hong Kong
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83
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Abstract
How do we navigate a deeply structured world? Why are you reading this sentence first - and did you actually look at the fifth word? This review offers some answers by appealing to active inference based on deep temporal models. It builds on previous formulations of active inference to simulate behavioural and electrophysiological responses under hierarchical generative models of state transitions. Inverting these models corresponds to sequential inference, such that the state at any hierarchical level entails a sequence of transitions in the level below. The deep temporal aspect of these models means that evidence is accumulated over nested time scales, enabling inferences about narratives (i.e., temporal scenes). We illustrate this behaviour with Bayesian belief updating - and neuronal process theories - to simulate the epistemic foraging seen in reading. These simulations reproduce perisaccadic delay period activity and local field potentials seen empirically. Finally, we exploit the deep structure of these models to simulate responses to local (e.g., font type) and global (e.g., semantic) violations; reproducing mismatch negativity and P300 responses respectively.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom.
| | - Richard Rosch
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom.
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom.
| | - Cathy Price
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, United Kingdom.
| | - Howard Bowman
- Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience and Cognitive Systems and the School of Computing, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NF, United Kingdom; School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, United Kingdom.
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84
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Parr T, Friston KJ. The Discrete and Continuous Brain: From Decisions to Movement-And Back Again. Neural Comput 2018; 30:2319-2347. [PMID: 29894658 PMCID: PMC6115199 DOI: 10.1162/neco_a_01102] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022]
Abstract
To act upon the world, creatures must change continuous variables such as muscle length or chemical concentration. In contrast, decision making is an inherently discrete process, involving the selection among alternative courses of action. In this article, we consider the interface between the discrete and continuous processes that translate our decisions into movement in a Newtonian world—and how movement informs our decisions. We do so by appealing to active inference, with a special focus on the oculomotor system. Within this exemplar system, we argue that the superior colliculus is well placed to act as a discrete-continuous interface. Interestingly, when the neuronal computations within the superior colliculus are formulated in terms of active inference, we find that many aspects of its neuroanatomy emerge from the computations it must perform in this role.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, U.K.
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85
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Cittern D, Nolte T, Friston K, Edalat A. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivators of attachment under active inference. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0193955. [PMID: 29621266 PMCID: PMC5886414 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0193955] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/09/2017] [Accepted: 02/21/2018] [Indexed: 02/05/2023] Open
Abstract
This paper addresses the formation of infant attachment types within the context of active inference: a holistic account of action, perception and learning in the brain. We show how the organised forms of attachment (secure, avoidant and ambivalent) might arise in (Bayesian) infants. Specifically, we show that these distinct forms of attachment emerge from a minimisation of free energy-over interoceptive states relating to internal stress levels-when seeking proximity to caregivers who have a varying impact on these interoceptive states. In line with empirical findings in disrupted patterns of affective communication, we then demonstrate how exteroceptive cues (in the form of caregiver-mediated AMBIANCE affective communication errors, ACE) can result in disorganised forms of attachment in infants of caregivers who consistently increase stress when the infant seeks proximity, but can have an organising (towards ambivalence) effect in infants of inconsistent caregivers. In particular, we differentiate disorganised attachment from avoidance in terms of the high epistemic value of proximity seeking behaviours (resulting from the caregiver's misleading exteroceptive cues) that preclude the emergence of coherent and organised behavioural policies. Our work, the first to formulate infant attachment in terms of active inference, makes a new testable prediction with regards to the types of affective communication errors that engender ambivalent attachment.
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Affiliation(s)
- David Cittern
- Department of Computing, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Tobias Nolte
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Anna Freud Centre, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Abbas Edalat
- Department of Computing, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom
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86
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Franklin NT, Frank MJ. Compositional clustering in task structure learning. PLoS Comput Biol 2018; 14:e1006116. [PMID: 29672581 PMCID: PMC5929577 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006116] [Citation(s) in RCA: 23] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2017] [Revised: 05/01/2018] [Accepted: 04/03/2018] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans are remarkably adept at generalizing knowledge between experiences in a way that can be difficult for computers. Often, this entails generalizing constituent pieces of experiences that do not fully overlap, but nonetheless share useful similarities with, previously acquired knowledge. However, it is often unclear how knowledge gained in one context should generalize to another. Previous computational models and data suggest that rather than learning about each individual context, humans build latent abstract structures and learn to link these structures to arbitrary contexts, facilitating generalization. In these models, task structures that are more popular across contexts are more likely to be revisited in new contexts. However, these models can only re-use policies as a whole and are unable to transfer knowledge about the transition structure of the environment even if only the goal has changed (or vice-versa). This contrasts with ecological settings, where some aspects of task structure, such as the transition function, will be shared between context separately from other aspects, such as the reward function. Here, we develop a novel non-parametric Bayesian agent that forms independent latent clusters for transition and reward functions, affording separable transfer of their constituent parts across contexts. We show that the relative performance of this agent compared to an agent that jointly clusters reward and transition functions depends environmental task statistics: the mutual information between transition and reward functions and the stochasticity of the observations. We formalize our analysis through an information theoretic account of the priors, and propose a meta learning agent that dynamically arbitrates between strategies across task domains to optimize a statistical tradeoff.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nicholas T. Franklin
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic & Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
| | - Michael J. Frank
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic & Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
- Brown Institute for Brain Science, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
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87
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Pezzulo G, Rigoli F, Friston KJ. Hierarchical Active Inference: A Theory of Motivated Control. Trends Cogn Sci 2018; 22:294-306. [PMID: 29475638 PMCID: PMC5870049 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.009] [Citation(s) in RCA: 135] [Impact Index Per Article: 22.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/27/2017] [Revised: 01/23/2018] [Accepted: 01/30/2018] [Indexed: 12/17/2022]
Abstract
Motivated control refers to the coordination of behaviour to achieve affectively valenced outcomes or goals. The study of motivated control traditionally assumes a distinction between control and motivational processes, which map to distinct (dorsolateral versus ventromedial) brain systems. However, the respective roles and interactions between these processes remain controversial. We offer a novel perspective that casts control and motivational processes as complementary aspects - goal propagation and prioritization, respectively - of active inference and hierarchical goal processing under deep generative models. We propose that the control hierarchy propagates prior preferences or goals, but their precision is informed by the motivational context, inferred at different levels of the motivational hierarchy. The ensuing integration of control and motivational processes underwrites action and policy selection and, ultimately, motivated behaviour, by enabling deep inference to prioritize goals in a context-sensitive way.
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Affiliation(s)
- Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome, Italy.
| | - Francesco Rigoli
- City, University of London, London, UK; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, London, UK
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88
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Linson A, Clark A, Ramamoorthy S, Friston K. The Active Inference Approach to Ecological Perception: General Information Dynamics for Natural and Artificial Embodied Cognition. Front Robot AI 2018; 5:21. [PMID: 33500908 PMCID: PMC7805975 DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 39] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/16/2017] [Accepted: 02/16/2018] [Indexed: 01/01/2023] Open
Abstract
The emerging neurocomputational vision of humans as embodied, ecologically embedded, social agents—who shape and are shaped by their environment—offers a golden opportunity to revisit and revise ideas about the physical and information-theoretic underpinnings of life, mind, and consciousness itself. In particular, the active inference framework (AIF) makes it possible to bridge connections from computational neuroscience and robotics/AI to ecological psychology and phenomenology, revealing common underpinnings and overcoming key limitations. AIF opposes the mechanistic to the reductive, while staying fully grounded in a naturalistic and information-theoretic foundation, using the principle of free energy minimization. The latter provides a theoretical basis for a unified treatment of particles, organisms, and interactive machines, spanning from the inorganic to organic, non-life to life, and natural to artificial agents. We provide a brief introduction to AIF, then explore its implications for evolutionary theory, ecological psychology, embodied phenomenology, and robotics/AI research. We conclude the paper by considering implications for machine consciousness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam Linson
- Department of Computing Science and Mathematics, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom.,Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom.,Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
| | - Andy Clark
- School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom.,Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
| | - Subramanian Ramamoorthy
- School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom.,Edinburgh Centre for Robotics, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
| | - Karl Friston
- The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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89
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Parr T, Friston KJ. Active inference and the anatomy of oculomotion. Neuropsychologia 2018; 111:334-343. [PMID: 29407941 PMCID: PMC5884328 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.01.041] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2017] [Revised: 01/07/2018] [Accepted: 01/29/2018] [Indexed: 02/01/2023]
Abstract
Given that eye movement control can be framed as an inferential process, how are the requisite forces generated to produce anticipated or desired fixation? Starting from a generative model based on simple Newtonian equations of motion, we derive a variational solution to this problem and illustrate the plausibility of its implementation in the oculomotor brainstem. We show, through simulation, that the Bayesian filtering equations that implement 'planning as inference' can generate both saccadic and smooth pursuit eye movements. Crucially, the associated message passing maps well onto the known connectivity and neuroanatomy of the brainstem - and the changes in these messages over time are strikingly similar to single unit recordings of neurons in the corresponding nuclei. Furthermore, we show that simulated lesions to axonal pathways reproduce eye movement patterns of neurological patients with damage to these tracts.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK.
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90
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Abstract
Computational theories of brain function have become very influential in neuroscience. They have facilitated the growth of formal approaches to disease, particularly in psychiatric research. In this paper, we provide a narrative review of the body of computational research addressing neuropsychological syndromes, and focus on those that employ Bayesian frameworks. Bayesian approaches to understanding brain function formulate perception and action as inferential processes. These inferences combine ‘prior’ beliefs with a generative (predictive) model to explain the causes of sensations. Under this view, neuropsychological deficits can be thought of as false inferences that arise due to aberrant prior beliefs (that are poor fits to the real world). This draws upon the notion of a Bayes optimal pathology – optimal inference with suboptimal priors – and provides a means for computational phenotyping. In principle, any given neuropsychological disorder could be characterized by the set of prior beliefs that would make a patient’s behavior appear Bayes optimal. We start with an overview of some key theoretical constructs and use these to motivate a form of computational neuropsychology that relates anatomical structures in the brain to the computations they perform. Throughout, we draw upon computational accounts of neuropsychological syndromes. These are selected to emphasize the key features of a Bayesian approach, and the possible types of pathological prior that may be present. They range from visual neglect through hallucinations to autism. Through these illustrative examples, we review the use of Bayesian approaches to understand the link between biology and computation that is at the heart of neuropsychology.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Geraint Rees
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.,Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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91
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Parr T, Friston KJ. The Computational Anatomy of Visual Neglect. Cereb Cortex 2018; 28:777-790. [PMID: 29190328 PMCID: PMC6005118 DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhx316] [Citation(s) in RCA: 33] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/18/2017] [Revised: 10/27/2017] [Accepted: 10/31/2017] [Indexed: 11/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Visual neglect is a debilitating neuropsychological phenomenon that has many clinical implications and-in cognitive neuroscience-offers an important lesion deficit model. In this article, we describe a computational model of visual neglect based upon active inference. Our objective is to establish a computational and neurophysiological process theory that can be used to disambiguate among the various causes of this important syndrome; namely, a computational neuropsychology of visual neglect. We introduce a Bayes optimal model based upon Markov decision processes that reproduces the visual searches induced by the line cancellation task (used to characterize visual neglect at the bedside). We then consider 3 distinct ways in which the model could be lesioned to reproduce neuropsychological (visual search) deficits. Crucially, these 3 levels of pathology map nicely onto the neuroanatomy of saccadic eye movements and the systems implicated in visual neglect.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
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92
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Mirza MB, Adams RA, Mathys C, Friston KJ. Human visual exploration reduces uncertainty about the sensed world. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0190429. [PMID: 29304087 PMCID: PMC5755757 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0190429] [Citation(s) in RCA: 49] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/24/2017] [Accepted: 12/14/2017] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution. First, we asked whether there is any evidence for 'epistemic foraging'; i.e. exploration that resolves uncertainty about a scene. In brief, we used Bayesian model comparison to compare Markov decision process (MDP) models of scan-paths that did-and did not-contain the epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for action selection. In the course of this model comparison, we discovered that it was necessary to include non-epistemic (heuristic) policies to explain observed behaviour (e.g., a reading-like strategy that involved scanning from left to right). Despite this use of heuristic policies, model comparison showed that there is substantial evidence for epistemic foraging in the visual exploration of even simple scenes. Second, we compared MDP models that did-and did not-allow for changes in prior expectations over successive blocks of the visual search paradigm. We found that implicit prior beliefs about the speed and accuracy of visual searches changed systematically with experience. Finally, we characterised intersubject variability in terms of subject-specific prior beliefs. Specifically, we used canonical correlation analysis to see if there were any mixtures of prior expectations that could predict between-subject differences in performance; thereby establishing a quantitative link between different behavioural phenotypes and Bayesian belief updating. We demonstrated that better scene categorisation performance is consistently associated with lower reliance on heuristics; i.e., a greater use of a generative model of the scene to direct its exploration.
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Affiliation(s)
- M. Berk Mirza
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Rick A. Adams
- Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Division of Psychiatry, University College London, London, United Kingdom
| | - Christoph Mathys
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
- Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati (SISSA), Trieste, Italy
- Translational Neuromodeling Unit (TNU), Institute for Biomedical Engineering, University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
- Max Planck UCL Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, London, United Kingdom
| | - Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom
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93
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Abstract
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the principles of active inference. We illustrate how different forms of short-term memory are expressed formally (mathematically) through appealing to beliefs about the causes of our sensations and about the actions we pursue. This is used to motivate an approach to active vision that depends upon inferences about the causes of 'what I have seen' and learning about 'what I would see if I were to look there'. The former could manifest as persistent 'delay-period' activity - of the sort associated with working memory, while the latter is better suited to changes in synaptic efficacy - of the sort that underlies short-term learning and adaptation. We review formulations of these ideas in terms of active inference, their role in directing visual exploration and the consequences - for active vision - of their failures. To illustrate the latter, we draw upon some of our recent work on the computational anatomy of visual neglect.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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94
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Goh JOS, Hung HY, Su YS. A conceptual consideration of the free energy principle in cognitive maps: How cognitive maps help reduce surprise. PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/bs.plm.2018.09.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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95
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Kirchhoff M, Parr T, Palacios E, Friston K, Kiverstein J. The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle. J R Soc Interface 2018; 15:20170792. [PMID: 29343629 PMCID: PMC5805980 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2017.0792] [Citation(s) in RCA: 148] [Impact Index Per Article: 24.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/21/2017] [Accepted: 12/14/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
This work addresses the autonomous organization of biological systems. It does so by considering the boundaries of biological systems, from individual cells to Home sapiens, in terms of the presence of Markov blankets under the active inference scheme-a corollary of the free energy principle. A Markov blanket defines the boundaries of a system in a statistical sense. Here we consider how a collective of Markov blankets can self-assemble into a global system that itself has a Markov blanket; thereby providing an illustration of how autonomous systems can be understood as having layers of nested and self-sustaining boundaries. This allows us to show that: (i) any living system is a Markov blanketed system and (ii) the boundaries of such systems need not be co-extensive with the biophysical boundaries of a living organism. In other words, autonomous systems are hierarchically composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets-all the way down to individual cells, all the way up to you and me, and all the way out to include elements of the local environment.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael Kirchhoff
- Department of Philosophy, University of Wollongong Faculty of Law Humanities and the Arts, Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK
| | | | - Karl Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology UCL, London, UK
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96
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Friston KJ, Parr T, de Vries B. The graphical brain: Belief propagation and active inference. Netw Neurosci 2017; 1:381-414. [PMID: 29417960 PMCID: PMC5798592 DOI: 10.1162/netn_a_00018] [Citation(s) in RCA: 190] [Impact Index Per Article: 27.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2017] [Accepted: 05/10/2017] [Indexed: 12/19/2022] Open
Abstract
This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference-and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models. Crucially, these models can entertain both discrete and continuous states, leading to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to elucidate the requisite message passing in terms of its form and scheduling. To accommodate mixed generative models (of discrete and continuous states), one also has to consider link nodes or factors that enable discrete and continuous representations to talk to each other. When mapping the implicit computational architecture onto neuronal connectivity, several interesting features emerge. For example, Bayesian model averaging and comparison, which link discrete and continuous states, may be implemented in thalamocortical loops. These and other considerations speak to a computational connectome that is inherently state dependent and self-organizing in ways that yield to a principled (variational) account. We conclude with simulations of reading that illustrate the implicit neuronal message passing, with a special focus on how discrete (semantic) representations inform, and are informed by, continuous (visual) sampling of the sensorium. AUTHOR SUMMARY This paper considers functional integration in the brain from a computational perspective. We ask what sort of neuronal message passing is mandated by active inference-and what implications this has for context-sensitive connectivity at microscopic and macroscopic levels. In particular, we formulate neuronal processing as belief propagation under deep generative models that can entertain both discrete and continuous states. This leads to distinct schemes for belief updating that play out on the same (neuronal) architecture. Technically, we use Forney (normal) factor graphs to characterize the requisite message passing, and link this formal characterization to canonical microcircuits and extrinsic connectivity in the brain.
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Affiliation(s)
- Karl J. Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, United Kingdom
| | - Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, United Kingdom
| | - Bert de Vries
- Eindhoven University of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
- GN Hearing, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
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97
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Parr T, Friston KJ. Working memory, attention, and salience in active inference. Sci Rep 2017; 7:14678. [PMID: 29116142 PMCID: PMC5676961 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-15249-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 109] [Impact Index Per Article: 15.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/15/2017] [Accepted: 10/24/2017] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
The psychological concepts of working memory and attention are widely used in the cognitive and neuroscientific literatures. Perhaps because of the interdisciplinary appeal of these concepts, the same terms are often used to mean very different things. Drawing on recent advances in theoretical neurobiology, this paper tries to highlight the correspondence between these established psychological constructs and the formal processes implicit in mathematical descriptions of brain function. Here, we consider attention and salience from the perspective offered by active inference. Using variational principles and simulations, we use active inference to demonstrate how attention and salience can be disambiguated in terms of message passing between populations of neurons in cortical and subcortical structures. In brief, we suggest that salience is something that is afforded to actions that realise epistemic affordance, while attention per se is afforded to precise sensory evidence - or beliefs about the causes of sensations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, London, UK.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, London, UK
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Parr T, Friston KJ. The active construction of the visual world. Neuropsychologia 2017; 104:92-101. [PMID: 28782543 PMCID: PMC5637165 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.08.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 65] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/31/2017] [Revised: 07/23/2017] [Accepted: 08/02/2017] [Indexed: 12/03/2022]
Abstract
What we see is fundamentally dependent on where we look. Despite this seemingly obvious statement, many accounts of the neurobiology underpinning visual perception fail to consider the active nature of how we sample our sensory world. This review offers an overview of the neurobiology of visual perception, which begins with the control of saccadic eye movements. Starting from here, we can follow the anatomy backwards, to try to understand the functional architecture of neuronal networks that support the interrogation of a visual scene. Many of the principles encountered in this exercise are equally applicable to other perceptual modalities. For example, the somatosensory system, like the visual system, requires the sampling of data through mobile receptive epithelia. Analysis of a somatosensory scene depends on what is palpated, in much the same way that visual analysis relies on what is foveated. The discussion here is structured around the anatomical systems involved in active vision and visual scene construction, but will use these systems to introduce some general theoretical considerations. We will additionally highlight points of contact between the biology and the pathophysiology that has been proposed to cause a clinical disorder of scene construction - spatial hemineglect.
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Affiliation(s)
- Thomas Parr
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, UK.
| | - Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, UK.
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Friston KJ, Lin M, Frith CD, Pezzulo G, Hobson JA, Ondobaka S. Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight. Neural Comput 2017; 29:2633-2683. [PMID: 28777724 DOI: 10.1162/neco_a_00999] [Citation(s) in RCA: 158] [Impact Index Per Article: 22.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
Abstract
This article offers a formal account of curiosity and insight in terms of active (Bayesian) inference. It deals with the dual problem of inferring states of the world and learning its statistical structure. In contrast to current trends in machine learning (e.g., deep learning), we focus on how people attain insight and understanding using just a handful of observations, which are solicited through curious behavior. We use simulations of abstract rule learning and approximate Bayesian inference to show that minimizing (expected) variational free energy leads to active sampling of novel contingencies. This epistemic behavior closes explanatory gaps in generative models of the world, thereby reducing uncertainty and satisfying curiosity. We then move from epistemic learning to model selection or structure learning to show how abductive processes emerge when agents test plausible hypotheses about symmetries (i.e., invariances or rules) in their generative models. The ensuing Bayesian model reduction evinces mechanisms associated with sleep and has all the hallmarks of "aha" moments. This formulation moves toward a computational account of consciousness in the pre-Cartesian sense of sharable knowledge (i.e., con: "together"; scire: "to know").
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Affiliation(s)
- Karl J Friston
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Marco Lin
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
| | - Christopher D Frith
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London WC1N 3BG, and Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Studies, University of London EC1E 7HU, U.K.
| | - Giovanni Pezzulo
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, 7-00185 Rome, Italy
| | - J Allan Hobson
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London WC1N 3BG, U.K., and Division of Sleep Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02215, U.S.A.
| | - Sasha Ondobaka
- Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London WC1N 3BG, U.K.
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Abstract
In recent decades, embodiment has become an influential concept in psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Embodiment denotes the study of the reciprocal (causal) relationships between mind and body, with the mind not only affecting the body but also vice versa. Embodied cognition comes to the fore in sensorimotor coupling, predictive coding, and nonverbal behavior. Additionally, the embodiment of the mind constitutes the basis of social interaction and communication, as evident in research on nonverbal synchrony and mimicry. These theoretical and empirical developments portend a range of implications for schizophrenia research and treatment. Sensorimotor dysfunctions are closely associated with affective and psychotic psychopathology, leading to altered timing in the processing of stimuli and to disordered appraisals of the environment. Problems of social cognition may be newly viewed as disordered embodied communication. The embodiment perspective suggests novel treatment strategies through psychotherapy and body-oriented interventions, and may ultimately provide biomarkers for diagnosis.
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Affiliation(s)
- Wolfgang Tschacher
- Universitätsklinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, Universität Bern, Bolligenstrasse 111, 3060 Bern, Schweiz
| | - Anne Giersch
- INSERM U1114, FMTS, Departement de Psychiatrie, CHRU de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France
| | - Karl Friston
- The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
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