The "id" knows more than the "ego" admits: neuropsychoanalytic and primal consciousness perspectives on the interface between affective and cognitive neuroscience

Quo Vadis? The Future of Psychoanalysis

Although contemporary psychoanalysis is split into different schools and traditions, there is growing support for some of the main tenets of contemporary psychodynamic thinking from attachment theory, infant research, developmental psychopathology, new models of motivation, the neuroscience of emotions and emotional regulation, and the discovery of different implicit and explicit memory systems. These tenets, which psychodynamic clinicians of all stripes encounter in their daily work with clients, are the following: (1) that large footprints are left over from infancy and childhood which involved insensitive, intrusive, frightening, or shaming care; (2) the carryover of these relational experiences into adulthood are expressed as unconscious expectations and attributions we make of others (transference and countertransference; (3) defensive processes and emotional regulation and deregulatory patterns develop to cope with these unhealthy relations. Many findings from infant research, attachment theory, and new models of motivation and neuroscience have developed alongside the intersubjective and relational turn in psychoanalysis in the last sixty years. To different degrees this new developmental science has been incorporated into the relational field. This essay is a plea to incorporate this new science in the teaching of psychodynamic psychotherapy in order to create a dialogue among different relational and intersubjective traditions in psychoanalysis that could reduce the splintering and support efforts toward integration.

Feeling one's way in the world: Making a life

This paper argues for the psychoanalytic relevance of the works of James Gibson and Susanne Langer in explicating the early development of the human child and makes use of this combined formulation of development to think about psychoanalytic theory and practice. From the insights of James Gibson's ecological psychology we can appreciate the embodiment and embeddedness of the child's growing mind within both her physical and social environments. Making use of Susanne Langer's concept of feeling to redefine ecological psychology's perceptual counterpart to action allows us to understand the child's seamless transition into active participation in her culture, as she learns to project her animalian capacity to feel into intersubjectively defined forms of behavior and experience with others. The paper presents a lengthy exposition of Gibson's ecological psychology, before explaining Langer's thinking and launching into the combined insights of these scholars to explicate the nature of the child's mind as she feels her way in the world and makes a life for herself within it. This is the life she will be able to remake in the embeddedness of a psychoanalytic therapeutic relationship where she can learn to feel her way in the world in a new light.

The Neuropsychoanalytic Approach: Using Neuroscience as the Basic Science of Psychoanalysis

Neuroscience was the basic science behind Freud's psychoanalytic theory and technique. He worked as a neurologist for 20 years before being aware that a new approach to understand complex diseases, namely the hysterias, was needed. Solms coined the term neuropsychoanalysis to affirm that neuroscience still belongs in psychoanalysis. The neuropsychoanalytic field has continued Freud's original ideas as stated in 1895. Developments in psychoanalysis that have been created or revised by the neuropsychoanalysis movement include pain/relatedness/opioids, drive, structural model, dreams, cathexis, and dynamic unconscious. Neuroscience has contributed to the development of new psychoanalytic theory, such as Bazan's (2011) description of anxiety driven by unconscious intentions or “phantoms.” Results of adopting the “dual aspect monism” approach of idiographic psychoanalytic clinical observation combined with nomothetic investigation of related human phenomena include clarification and revision of theory, restoration of the scientific base of psychoanalysis, and improvement of clinical treatments. By imbricating psychoanalytic thinking with neuroscience, psychoanalysts are also positioned to make contributions to neuroscience research. Freud's original Project for a Scientific Psychology/Psychology for Neurologists can be carried forward in a way that moves psychoanalysis into the twenty-first century as a core contemporary science (Kandel, 1999). Neuroscience as the basic science of psychoanalysis both improves the field, and enhances its scientific and cultural status.

Reconsolidation: Turning consciousness into memory

The purpose of learning is not to maintain records but to generate predictions. Successful predictions remain implicit; only prediction errors ("surprises") attract consciousness. This is what Freud had in mind when he declared that "consciousness arises instead of a memory-trace." The aim of reconsolidation, and of psychotherapy, is to improve predictions about how to meet our needs in the world.

The Contribution of the Cerebellum in the Hierarchial Development of the Self

What distinguishes human beings from other living organisms is that a human perceives himself as a "self". The self is developed hierarchially in a multi-layered process, which is based on the evolutionary maturation of the nervous system and patterns according to the rules and demands of the external world. Many researchers have attempted to explain the different aspects of the self, as well as the related neural substrates. In this paper, we first review the previously proposed ideas regarding the neurobiology of the self. We then suggest a new hypothesis regarding the hierarchial self, which proposes that the self is developed at three stages: subjective, objective, and reflective selves. In the second part, we attempt to answer the question "Why do we need a self?" We therefore explain that different parts of the self developed in an effort to identify stability in space, stability against constantly changing objects, and stability against changing cognitions. Finally, we discuss the role of the cerebellum as the neural substrate for the self.

Emotion Elicitation: A Comparison of Pictures and Films

Pictures and film clips are widely used and accepted stimuli to elicit emotions. Based on theoretical arguments it is often assumed that the emotional effects of films exceed those of pictures, but to date this assumption has not been investigated directly. The aim of the present study was to compare pictures and films in terms of their capacity to induce emotions verified by means of explicit measures. Stimuli were (a) single pictures presented for 6 s, (b) a set of three consecutive pictures with emotionally congruent contents presented for 2 s each, (c) short film clips with a duration of 6 s. A total of 144 participants rated their emotion and arousal states following stimulus presentation. Repeated-measures ANOVAs revealed that the film clips and 3-picture version were as effective as the classical 1-picture method to elicit positive emotions, however, modulation toward positive valence was little. Modulation toward negative valence was more effective in general. Film clips were less effective than pictorial stimuli in producing the corresponding emotion states (all p < 0.001) and were less arousing (all p ≤ 0.02). Possible reasons for these unexpected results are discussed.

The cross-mammalian neurophenomenology of primal emotional affects: From animal feelings to human therapeutics

The neural correlates of human emotions are easy to harvest. In contrast, the neural constitution of emotional feelings in humans has resisted systematic scientific analysis. This review summarizes how preclinical affective neuroscience initiatives are making progress in decoding the neural nature of such feelings in animal brains. This has been achieved by studying the rewarding and punishing effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS) of subcortical emotional networks (labeled SEEING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY systems) that evoke distinct emotion action patterns, as well as rewarding and punishing effects in animals. The implications of this knowledge for development of new psychiatric interventions, especially depression, are discussed. Three new antidepressive therapeutics arising from this work are briefly noted: 1) DBS of the medial forebrain bundle (MFB) in humans, 2) reduction of psychological pain that may arise from excessive PANIC arousal, and 3) facilitation of social joy through the study of social play in rats The overall argument is that we may more readily develop new psychiatric interventions through preclinical models if we take animal emotional feelings seriously, as opposed to just behavioral changes, as targets for development of new treatments.

Affective preclinical modeling of psychiatric disorders: taking imbalanced primal emotional feelings of animals seriously in our search for novel antidepressants

Preclinical animal models of psychiatric disorders are of critical importance for advances in development of new psychiatric medicine. Regrettably, behavior-only models have yielded no novel targeted treatments during the past half-century of vigorous deployment. This may reflect the general neglect of experiential aspects of animal emotions, since affective mental states of animals supposedly cannot be empirically monitored. This supposition is wrong—to the extent that the rewarding and punishing aspects of emotion circuit arousals reflect positive and negative affective states. During the past decade, the use of such affective neuroscience-based animal modeling has yielded three novel antidepressants (i) via the alleviation of psychic pain with low doses of buprenorphine; (ii) via the amplification of enthusiasm by direct stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle); and (iii) via the facilitation of the capacity for social joy with play facilitators such as rapastinel (GLYX13). All have progressed to successful human testing. For optimal progress, it may be useful for preclinical investigators to focus on the evolved affective foundations of psychiatrically relevant brain emotional disorders for optimal animal modeling.

German students' current choice of profession in the field of psychotherapy: Reasons for or against engaging in psychoanalytic training

The psychoanalytic societies in Germany as in many other countries are concerned by a decline in the number of candidates for full psychoanalytic training. While this situation is partly attributable to changes both in society and in educational and healthcare systems, it is questionable whether psychoanalytic training institutions have yet found adequate responses to it. Under the banner of 'evidence-based treatment', behaviour therapy has come to be widely disseminated, with major implications for the teaching of different psychotherapy paradigms at universities. To investigate the determinants of this trend in the specific German situation, a large-scale, multi-method exploratory study supported by IPA's DPPT programme was undertaken, focusing on the reasons given by a population (N = 679) of German psychology, medical, and education students for embarking on training in psychoanalysis or behaviour therapy. The results suggest that behaviour therapy is more compatible with the prevailing scientific understanding and with current societal and cultural trends, owing in part to inadequacies or bias in university teaching of the various paradigms of psychotherapy. While most of the psychology students expressed a preference for behavioural training, the psychotherapy option proved less attractive for their counterparts in the fields of medicine and education. Semi-standardized qualitative interviews were used to gain a deeper understanding of the students' decisions for or against training in a specific paradigm, and led to the identification of seven decision-making prototypes. Possible reasons for the students' decisions are discussed, and concrete proposals and recommendations are presented.

Affective preclinical modeling of psychiatric disorders: taking imbalanced primal emotional feelings of animals seriously in our search for novel antidepressants

Preclinical animal models of psychiatric disorders are of critical importance for advances in development of new psychiatric medicine. Regrettably, behavior-only models have yielded no novel targeted treatments during the past half-century of vigorous deployment. This may reflect the general neglect of experiential aspects of animal emotions, since affective mental states of animals supposedly cannot be empirically monitored. This supposition is wrong-to the extent that the rewarding and punishing aspects of emotion circuit arousals reflect positive and negative affective states. During the past decade, the use of such affective neuroscience-based animal modeling has yielded three novel antidepressants (i) via the alleviation of psychic pain with low doses of buprenorphine; (ii) via the amplification of enthusiasm by direct stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle); and (iii) via the facilitation of the capacity for social joy with play facilitators such as rapastinel (GLYX13). All have progressed to successful human testing. For optimal progress, it may be useful for preclinical investigators to focus on the evolved affective foundations of psychiatrically relevant brain emotional disorders for optimal animal modeling.

The ontogenesis of narrative: from moving to meaning

Narrative, the creation of imaginative projects and experiences displayed in expressions of movement and voice, is how human cooperative understanding grows. Human understanding places the character and qualities of objects and events of interest within stories that portray intentions, feelings, and ambitions, and how one cares about them. Understanding the development of narrative is therefore essential for understanding the development of human intelligence, but its early origins are obscure. We identify the origins of narrative in the innate sensorimotor intelligence of a hypermobile human body and trace the ontogenesis of narrative form from its earliest expression in movement. Intelligent planning, with self-awareness, is evident in the gestures and motor expressions of the mid-gestation fetus. After birth, single intentions become serially organized into projects with increasingly ambitious distal goals and social meaning. The infant imitates others’ actions in shared tasks, learns conventional cultural practices, and adapts his own inventions, then names topics of interest. Through every stage, in simple intentions of fetal movement, in social imitations of the neonate, in early proto-conversations and collaborative play of infants and talk of children and adults, the narrative form of creative agency with it four-part structure of ‘introduction,’ ‘development,’ ‘climax,’ and ‘resolution’ is present. We conclude that shared rituals of culture and practical techniques develop from a fundamental psycho-motor structure with its basic, vital impulses for action and generative process of thought-in-action that express an integrated, imaginative, and sociable Self. This basic structure is evident before birth and invariant in form throughout life. Serial organization of single, non-verbal actions into complex projects of expressive and explorative sense-making become conventional meanings and explanations with propositional narrative power. Understanding the root of narrative in embodied meaning-making in this way is important for practical work in therapy and education, and for advancing philosophy and neuroscience.

Top-down versus bottom-up perspectives on clinically significant memory reconsolidation

Lane et al. are right: Troublesome memories can be therapeutically recontextualized. Reconsolidation of negative/traumatic memories within the context of positive/prosocial affects can facilitate diverse psychotherapies. Although neural mechanisms remain poorly understood, we discuss how nonlinear dynamics of various positive affects, heavily controlled by primal subcortical networks, may be critical for optimal benefits.

The integrated memory model: A new framework for understanding the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy

In this response to commentaries on our target article, we highlight and clarify a variety of issues and respond to several comments, challenges, and misconceptions. Topics covered include the mechanisms of enduring change, the nature of memory, the conditions in which memories are updated, the role of emotional arousal in change, and current limitations in our understanding of the neural basis of change in psychotherapy. It is our hope that through research stimulated by this exchange the latter may be advanced.

Evolutionary aspects of self- and world consciousness in vertebrates

Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective, neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and neuropsychological data supporting the hypothesis that different levels of self and world representation in vertebrates rely upon (i) a “basal” subcortical system that includes brainstem, hypothalamus and central thalamic nuclei and that may underpin the primary (or anoetic) consciousness likely present in all vertebrates; and (ii) a forebrain system that include the medial and lateral structures of the cerebral hemispheres and may sustain the most sophisticated forms of consciousness [e.g., noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic, reflective knowledge]. We posit a mutual, bidirectional functional influence between these two major brain circuits. We conclude that basic aspects of consciousness like primary self and core self (based on anoetic and noetic consciousness) are present in many species of vertebrates and that, even self-consciousness (autonoetic consciousness) does not seem to be a prerogative of humans and of some non-human primates but may, to a certain extent, be present in some other mammals and birds

Internally and externally generated emotions in people with acquired brain injury: preservation of emotional experience after right hemisphere lesions

The study of emotional changes after brain injury has contributed enormously to the understanding of the neural basis of emotion. However, little attention has been placed on the methods used to elicit emotional responses in people with brain damage. Of particular interest are subjects with right hemisphere [RH] cortical lesions, who have been described as presenting impairment in emotional processing. In this article, an internal and external mood induction procedure [MIP] was used to trigger positive and negative emotions, in a sample of 10 participants with RH damage, and 15 healthy controls. Emotional experience was registered by using a self-report questionnaire. As observed in previous studies, internal and external MIPs were equally effective in eliciting the target emotion, but the internal procedure generated higher levels of intensity. Remarkably, participants with RH lesions were equally able to experience both positive and negative affect. The results are discussed in relation to the role of the RH in the capacity to experience negative emotions.

Toward the Constitution of Emotional Feelings: Synergistic Lessons From Izard’s Differential Emotions Theory and Affective Neuroscience

Cal Izard has provided psychology a robust vision of human emotional feelings. He has addressed the full spectrum of emotional-developmental-cognitive complexities entailed in clarifying seemingly impenetrable mysteries: How do we experience emotions and how do they guide cognitive development? Izard’s developmental studies of infant minds integrate the primal evolutionary affective foundations of our nature with the diverse paths of nurture, and are framed in ways that can promote human thriving. His multilayered vision of our emotional nature resonates well with modern cross-species affective neuroscience perspectives.

Phylostratigraphic profiles in zebrafish uncover chordate origins of the vertebrate brain

An elaborated tripartite brain is considered one of the important innovations of vertebrates. Other extant chordate groups have a more basic brain organization. For instance, cephalochordates possess a relatively simple brain possibly homologous to the vertebrate forebrain and hindbrain, whereas tunicates display the tripartite organization, but without the specialized brain centers. The difference in anatomical complexity is even more pronounced if one compares chordates with other deuterostomes that have only a diffuse nerve net or alternatively a rather simple central nervous system. To gain a new perspective on the evolutionary roots of the complex vertebrate brain, we made here a phylostratigraphic analysis of gene expression patterns in the developing zebrafish (Danio rerio). The recovered adaptive landscape revealed three important periods in the evolutionary history of the zebrafish brain. The oldest period corresponds to preadaptive events in the first metazoans and the emergence of the nervous system at the metazoan-eumetazoan transition. The origin of chordates marks the next phase, where we found the overall strongest adaptive imprint in almost all analyzed brain regions. This finding supports the idea that the vertebrate brain evolved independently of the brains within the protostome lineage. Finally, at the origin of vertebrates we detected a pronounced signal coming from the dorsal telencephalon, in agreement with classical theories that consider this part of the cerebrum a genuine vertebrate innovation. Taken together, these results reveal a stepwise adaptive history of the vertebrate brain where most of its extant organization was already present in the chordate ancestor.

A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness

A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness revolves around the distinction between the subject of consciousness and objects of consciousness. In contrast to the mainstream of cognitive science, neuropsychoanalysis prioritizes the subject. The subject of consciousness is the indispensable page upon which consciousness of objects is inscribed. This has implications for our conception of the mental. The subjective being of consciousness is not registered in the classical exteroceptive modalities; it is not merely a cognitive representation, not only a memory trace. Rather, the exteroceptive modalities are registered in the subjective being. Cognitive representations are mental solids embedded within subjectivity, the tangible and visible (etc) properties of which are projected onto reality. It is important to recognize that mental solids (e.g., the body-as-object) are no more real than the subjective being they are inscribed in (the body-as-subject). Moreover, pure subjectivity is not without content or quality. This aspect of consciousness is conventionally described quantitatively as the level of consciousness, or wakefulness. But it feels like something to be awake. The primary modality of this aspect of consciousness is affect. Affect supplies the subjectivity that underpins all consciousness. Some implications of this approach are discussed here, in broad brush strokes.

Bodily selves in relation: embodied simulation as second-person perspective on intersubjectivity

This article addresses basic aspects of social cognition focusing on the pivotal role played by the lived body in the constitution of our experience of others. It is suggested that before studying intersubjectivity we should better qualify the notion of the self. A minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, defined in terms of its motor potentialities, is proposed. The discovery of mirror mechanisms for action, emotions and sensations led to the proposal of an embodied approach to intersubjectivity-embodied simulation (ES) theory. ES and the related notion of neural reuse provide a new empirically based perspective on intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeality. ES challenges the notion that folk psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. ES is discussed within a second-person perspective on mindreading.

The human nature of culture and education

Human cultures educate children with different strategies. Ancient hunter-gatherers 200,000 years ago, with bodies and brains like our own, in bands of a hundred well-known individuals or less, depended on spontaneous cooperative practice of knowledge and skills in a natural world. Before creating language, they appreciated beautiful objects and music. Anthropologists observe that similar living cultures accept that children learn in playful 'intent participation'. Large modern industrial states with millions of citizens competing in a global economy aim to instruct young people in scientific concepts and the rules of literacy and numeracy deemed important for employment with elaborate machines. Our psychobiological theories commonly assume that an infant starts with a body needing care and emotional regulation and a mind that assimilates concepts of objects by sensorimotor action and requires school instruction in rational principles after several years of cognitive development. Evidence from archeology and evolutionary anthropology indicates that Homo sapiens are born with an imaginative and convivial brain ready for the pleasure of shared invention and with a natural sense of beauty in handmade objects and music. In short, there are innate predispositions for culture for practicing meaningful habits and artful performances that are playfully inventive and seductive for companionship in traditions, and soon capable of grasping the clever purpose of shared tasks and tools. This knowledge of inventive human nature with esthetic and moral sensibilities has important implications for educational policy in our schools. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:173-192. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1276 CONFLICT OF INTEREST: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person “self-experience,” a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of “awareness” or “knowing consciousness” that permits “time-travel” in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one’s life and its possibilities within the “mind’s eye.”

Trauma, dream, and psychic change in psychoanalyses: a dialog between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences

To many psychoanalysts dreams are a central source of knowledge of the unconscious-the specific research object of psychoanalysis. The dialog with the neurosciences, devoted to the testing of hypotheses on human behavior and neurophysiology with objective methods, has added to psychoanalytic conceptualizations on emotion, memory, sleep and dreams, conflict and trauma. To psychoanalysts as well as neuroscientists, the neurological basis of psychic functioning, particularly concerning trauma, is of special interest. In this article, an attempt is made to bridge the gap between psychoanalytic findings and neuroscientific findings on trauma. We then attempt to merge both approaches in one experimental study devoted to the investigation of the neurophysiological changes (fMRI) associated with psychoanalytic treatment in chronically depressed patients. We also report on an attempt to quantify psychoanalysis-induced transformation in the manifest content of dreams. To do so, we used two independent methods. First, dreams reported during the cure of chronic depressed analysands were assessed by the treating psychoanalyst. Second, dreams reported in an experimental context were analyzed by an independent evaluator using a standardized method to quantify changes in dream content (Moser method). Single cases are presented. Preliminary results suggest that psychoanalysis-induced transformation can be assessed in an objective way.

Autism as a developmental disorder in intentional movement and affective engagement

We review evidence that autistic spectrum disorders have their origin in early prenatal failure of development in systems that program timing, serial coordination and prospective control of movements, and that regulate affective evaluations of experiences. There are effects in early infancy, before medical diagnosis, especially in motor sequencing, selective or exploratory attention, affective expression and intersubjective engagement with parents. These are followed by retardation of cognitive development and language learning in the second or third year, which lead to a diagnosis of ASD. The early signs relate to abnormalities that have been found in brain stem systems and cerebellum in the embryo or early fetal stage, before the cerebral neocortex is functional, and they have clear consequences in infancy when neocortical systems are intensively elaborated. We propose, with evidence of the disturbances of posture, locomotion and prospective motor control in children with autism, as well as of their facial expression of interest and affect, and attention to other persons' expressions, that examination of the psychobiology of motor affective disorders, rather than later developing cognitive or linguistic ones, may facilitate early diagnosis. Research in this area may also explain how intense interaction, imitation or "expressive art" therapies, which respond intimately with motor activities, are effective at later stages. Exceptional talents of some autistic people may be acquired compensations for basic problems with expectant self-regulations of movement, attention and emotion.

Cross-Species Neuroaffective Parsing of Primal Emotional Desires and Aversions in Mammals

The primal motivational systems of all mammals are constituted of the evolved affective brain networks that gauge key survival issues. However, since progress in functional neuroscience has historically lagged behind conceptual developments in psychological science, motivational processes have traditionally been anchored to behavioral rather than neural and affective issues. Attempts to retrofit neuroaffective issues onto established psychological-conceptual structures are problematic, especially when fundamental evidence for primal affective circuits, and their neural nature, comes largely from animal research. This article provides a synopsis of our growing understanding of primary-process emotional systems of mammalian brains and minds, which provides a new empirically based infrastructure for higher levels of human theorizing.

Toward a cross-species understanding of empathy

Although signs of empathy have now been well documented in non-human primates, only during the past few years have systematic observations suggested that a primal form of empathy exists in rodents. Thus, the study of empathy in animals has started in earnest. Here we review recent studies indicating that rodents are able to share states of fear, and highlight how affective neuroscience approaches to the study of primary-process emotional systems can help to delineate how primal empathy is constituted in mammalian brains. Cross-species evolutionary approaches to understanding the neural circuitry of emotional 'contagion' or 'resonance' between nearby animals, together with the underlying neurochemistries, may help to clarify the origins of human empathy.