The free-energy self: a predictive coding account of self-recognition

From many to (n)one: Meditation and the plasticity of the predictive mind

How profoundly can humans change their own minds? In this paper we offer a unifying account of deconstructive meditation under the predictive processing view. We start from simple axioms. First, the brain makes predictions based on past experience, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Second, deconstructive meditation brings one closer to the here and now by disengaging anticipatory processes. We propose that practicing meditation therefore gradually reduces counterfactual temporally deep cognition, until all conceptual processing falls away, unveiling a state of pure awareness. Our account also places three main styles of meditation (focused attention, open monitoring, and non-dual) on a single continuum, where each technique relinquishes increasingly engrained habits of prediction, including the predicted self. This deconstruction can also permit certain insights by making the above processes available to introspection. Our framework is consistent with the state of empirical and (neuro)phenomenological evidence and illuminates the top-down plasticity of the predictive mind. Experimental rigor, neurophenomenology, and no-report paradigms are needed to further understanding of how meditation affects predictive processing and the self.

Development of the bodily self: Effects of visuomotor synchrony and visual appearance on virtual embodiment in children and adults

The sense of a bodily self is thought to depend on adaptive weighting and integration of bodily afferents and prior beliefs. Evidence from studies using paradigms such as the rubber hand illusion and full body illusion suggests changes in the integration of visuotactile bodily signals throughout childhood. Here, we extended this line of research by assessing how bottom-up visuomotor synchrony and expectancy, modulated by visual appearance of virtual avatars, contribute to embodiment in children. We compared responses to a first-person perspective virtual full body illusion from 8- to 12-year-old children and adults while manipulating synchrony of the avatar's movements (synchronous, 0.5-s delay, or 1-s delay compared with the participant's movements) and appearance of the avatar (human or skeleton). We measured embodiment with both subjective questionnaires and objective skin conductance responses to virtual threat. Results showed that children experienced ownership for the virtual avatar in a similar way as adults, which was reduced with increasing asynchrony, and for the skeleton avatar as compared with the human avatar. This modulation of ownership was not reflected in the skin conductance responses, which were equally high in all experimental conditions and only showed a modulation of repetition by age. In contrast, in children the subjective experience of agency was less affected by the dampening effects of visuomotor asynchrony or reduced human likeness and was overall higher. These findings suggest that children can easily embody a virtual avatar but that different aspects of embodiment develop at different rates, which could have important implications for applications of embodied virtual reality.

Self-Referential Processing Effects of Non-invasive Brain Stimulation: A Systematic Review

Systematic reviews of neuroimaging studies confirm stimulus-induced activity in response to verbal and non-verbal self-referential processing (SRP) in cortical midline structures, temporoparietal cortex and insula. Whether SRP can be causally modulated by way of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) has also been investigated in several studies. Here we summarize the NIBS literature including 27 studies of task-based SRP comparing response between verbal and non-verbal SRP tasks. The studies differed in design, experimental tasks and stimulation parameters. Results support the role of left inferior parietal lobule (left IPL) in verbal SRP and for the medial prefrontal cortex when valenced stimuli were used. Further, results support roles for the bilateral parietal lobe (IPL, posterior cingulate cortex), the sensorimotor areas (the primary sensory and motor cortex, the premotor cortex, and the extrastriate body area) and the insula in non-verbal SRP (bodily self-consciousness). We conclude that NIBS may differentially modulate verbal and non-verbal SRP by targeting the corresponding brain areas.

Whatever Next and Close to My Self-The Transparent Senses and the "Second Skin": Implications for the Case of Depersonalization

In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not only the temporal dimension (i.e., what is perceived now) but also the spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived here or next-to-my-body). In this paper, we propose to focus on perceptual experiences that happen “next,” i.e., close-to-my-body. This is because perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs has a key impact on the organism's survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences mediated by the skin and what we will call the “extended skin” or “second skin,” that is, immediate objects/materials that envelop closely to our skin, namely, clothes. We propose that the skin and tactile experiences are not a mere border separating the self and world. Rather, they simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. Hence, these proximal and pervasive tactile experiences can be viewed as a “transparent bridge” intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from their self, body, and the world.

Cognitive load dissociates explicit and implicit measures of body ownership and agency

It is often claimed that the human self consists of perceived body ownership and agency, which are commonly assessed through explicit ownership and agency judgments and implicit measures, like proprioceptive drift, skin conductance responses, and intentional binding effects. Bottom-up multisensory integration and top-down modulation were predicted to be important for ownership and agency. In previous studies, cognitive load was revealed to affect the sense of agency in a top-down fashion, but its effect on ownership has not been fully investigated, not even its possibly different effect on explicit and implicit measures. Here we used cognitive load (small vs. large sets in a working-memory task) to disentangle explicit and implicit measures of ownership and agency in a task inducing the virtual hand illusion (VHI; stronger perceived ownership and agency over a virtual hand if it moves in synchrony with one's real hand). Results showed similar patterns for ownership and agency - both ownership and agency were affected by cognitive load, and importantly in the explicit measures, higher load increased the effect of synchrony (i.e., the VHI), but in implicit measures, higher load reduced indications of both ownership and agency. Hence, the load manipulation was selective with regard to the explicit versus implicit nature of the measure but not with respect to the measure's content. This provides strong evidence that explicit and implicit measures of both ownership and agency rely on at least partly separable informational sources, while the difference between ownership and agency as such does not seem to play a major role.

The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life

The idea that our perceptions in the here and now are influenced by prior events and experiences has recently received substantial support and attention from the proponents of the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework in philosophy and computational neuroscience. In this paper we look at how perceptual experiences get off the ground from the outset, in utero. One basic yet overlooked aspect of current PP approaches is that human organisms first develop within another human body. Crucially, while not all humans will have the experience of being pregnant or carrying a baby, the experience of being carried and growing within another person's body is universal. Specifically, we focus on the development of minimal selfhood in utero as a process co-embodiment and co-homeostasis, and highlight their close relationship. We conclude with some implications on several critical questions fuelling current debates on the nature of conscious experiences, minimal self and social cognition.

The Embodied-Enactive-Interactive Brain: Bridging Neuroscience and Creative Arts Therapies

The recognition and incorporation of evidence-based neuroscientific concepts into creative arts therapeutic knowledge and practice seem valuable and advantageous for the purpose of integration and professional development. Moreover, exhilarating insights from the field of neuroscience coincide with the nature, conceptualization, goals, and methods of Creative Arts Therapies (CATs), enabling comprehensive understandings of the clinical landscape, from a translational perspective. This paper contextualizes and discusses dynamic brain functions that have been suggested to lie at the heart of intra- and inter-personal processes. Touching upon fundamental aspects of the self and self-other interaction, the state-of-the-art neuroscientific-informed views will shed light on mechanisms of the embodied, predictive and relational brain. The conceptual analysis introduces and interweaves the following contemporary perspectives of brain function: firstly, the grounding of mental activity in the lived, bodily experience will be delineated; secondly, the enactive account of internal models, or generative predictive representations, shaped by experience, will be defined and extensively deliberated; and thirdly, the interpersonal simulation and synchronization mechanisms that support empathy and mentalization will be thoroughly considered. Throughout the paper, the cross-talks between the brain and the body, within the brain through functionally connected neural networks and in the context of agent-environment dynamics, will be addressed. These communicative patterns will be elaborated on to unfold psychophysiological linkage, as well as psychopathological shifts, concluding with the neuroplastic change associated with the formulation of CATs. The manuscript suggests an integrative view of the brain-body-mind in contexts relevant to the therapeutic potential of the expressive creative arts and the main avenues by which neuroscience may ground, enlighten and enrich the clinical psychotherapeutic practice.

Integration of predictions and afferent signals in body ownership

We aimed at investigating the contribution of sensory predictions triggered by the sight of an object moving towards the body for the sense of body ownership. We used a recently developed psychophysical discrimination task to assess body ownership in the rubber hand illusion. In this task, the participants had to choose which of the two right rubber hands in view felt most like their own, and the ownership discriminations were fitted to psychometric curves. In the current study, we occluded the visual impressions of the object moving towards one of the rubber hands (during the first two-thirds of the path) and only revealed the final third of the object's movement trajectory when it touched the rubber hand (approach-occluded condition). Alternatively, we occluded only the final part so that the main part of the movement towards the model hand was visible (touch-occluded). We compared these two conditions to an illusion baseline condition where the object was visible during the entire trajectory and contact (no-occlusion). The touch-occluded condition produced equally strong hand ownership as the baseline condition with no occlusion, while ownership perception was significantly reduced when vision of the object approaching the rubber hand was occluded (approach-occluded). Our results show that tactile predictions generated from seeing an object moving towards the body are temporally exact, and they contribute to the rubber hand illusion by integrating with temporally congruent afferent sensory signals. This finding highlights the importance of multisensory predictions in peripersonal space, object permanence, and the interplay between bottom-up sensory signals and top-down predictions in body ownership.

Predictive Processing in Cognitive Robotics: A Review

Predictive processing has become an influential framework in cognitive sciences. This framework turns the traditional view of perception upside down, claiming that the main flow of information processing is realized in a top-down, hierarchical manner. Furthermore, it aims at unifying perception, cognition, and action as a single inferential process. However, in the related literature, the predictive processing framework and its associated schemes, such as predictive coding, active inference, perceptual inference, and free-energy principle, tend to be used interchangeably. In the field of cognitive robotics, there is no clear-cut distinction on which schemes have been implemented and under which assumptions. In this letter, working definitions are set with the main aim of analyzing the state of the art in cognitive robotics research working under the predictive processing framework as well as some related nonrobotic models. The analysis suggests that, first, research in both cognitive robotics implementations and nonrobotic models needs to be extended to the study of how multiple exteroceptive modalities can be integrated into prediction error minimization schemes. Second, a relevant distinction found here is that cognitive robotics implementations tend to emphasize the learning of a generative model, while in nonrobotics models, it is almost absent. Third, despite the relevance for active inference, few cognitive robotics implementations examine the issues around control and whether it should result from the substitution of inverse models with proprioceptive predictions. Finally, limited attention has been placed on precision weighting and the tracking of prediction error dynamics. These mechanisms should help to explore more complex behaviors and tasks in cognitive robotics research under the predictive processing framework.

Learned Overweight Internal Model Can Be Activated to Maintain Equilibrium When Tactile Cues Are Uncertain: Evidence From Cortical and Behavioral Approaches

Human adaptive behavior in sensorimotor control is aimed to increase the confidence in feedforward mechanisms when sensory afferents are uncertain. It is thought that these feedforward mechanisms rely on predictions from internal models. We investigate whether the brain uses an internal model of physical laws (gravitational and inertial forces) to help estimate body equilibrium when tactile inputs from the foot sole are depressed by carrying extra weight. As direct experimental evidence for such a model is limited, we used Judoka athletes thought to have built up internal models of external loads (i.e., opponent weight management) as compared with Non-Athlete participants and Dancers (highly skilled in balance control). Using electroencephalography, we first (experiment 1) tested the hypothesis that the influence of tactile inputs was amplified by descending cortical efferent signals. We compared the amplitude of P1N1 somatosensory cortical potential evoked by electrical stimulation of the foot sole in participants standing still with their eyes closed. We showed smaller P1N1 amplitudes in the Load compared to No Load conditions in both Non-Athletes and Dancers. This decrease neural response to tactile stimulation was associated with greater postural oscillations. By contrast in the Judoka's group, the neural early response to tactile stimulation was unregulated in the Load condition. This suggests that the brain can selectively increase the functional gain of sensory inputs, during challenging equilibrium tasks when tactile inputs were mechanically depressed by wearing a weighted vest. In Judokas, the activation of regions such as the right posterior inferior parietal cortex (PPC) as early as the P1N1 is likely the source of the neural responses being maintained similar in both Load and No Load conditions. An overweight internal model stored in the right PPC known to be involved in maintaining a coherent representation of one's body in space can optimize predictive mechanisms in situations with high balance constraints (Experiment 2). This hypothesis has been confirmed by showing that postural reaction evoked by a translation of the support surface on which participants were standing wearing extra-weight was improved in Judokas.

A predictive processing framework of tool use

In this paper I introduce the theory of predictive processing as a unifying conceptual framework to account for the human ability to use and innovate tools. I explain the basic concepts of predictive processing and illustrate how this framework accounts for the development of tool use in young infants and for findings in the neuropsychological and neuroscientific literature. Then, I argue that the predictive processing model needs to be complemented with a functional-evolutionary perspective, according to which the developmental and neurocognitive mechanisms should be understood in relation to the adaptive function that tools subserve. I discuss cross-cultural and comparative studies on tool use to illustrate how tools could facilitate a process of cumulative cultural and technological evolution. Furthermore, I illustrate how central premises of the predictive processing framework, such as the notion of Bayesian inference as a general principle and the role of prediction-error-updating, speak to central debates in evolutionary psychology, such as the massive modularity hypothesis and the trade-off between exploitation and innovation. Throughout the paper I make several concrete suggestions for future studies that could be used to put the predictive processing model of tool use to the test.

Being Short, Sweet, and Sour: Congruent Visuo-Olfactory Stimulation Enhances Illusory Embodiment

Bodily self-identification has shown to be easily altered through spatiotemporally congruent multimodal signals. While such manipulations are mostly studied through visuo-tactile or visuo-motor stimulation, here we investigated whether congruent visuo-olfactory cues might enhance illusory self-identification with an arbitrary object. Using virtual reality, healthy individuals saw a grapefruit from its supposed first-person perspective that was touched in synchrony with their own body. The touch attempted to replicate what was seen as softly squeezing the grapefruit. Crucially, when we additionally presented the smell of a grapefruit in synchrony with the squeezing, they self-identified stronger with the fruit than when they smelled strawberry.

Interpersonal Motor Interactions Shape Multisensory Representations of the Peripersonal Space

This perspective review focuses on the proposal that predictive multisensory integration occurring in one's peripersonal space (PPS) supports individuals' ability to efficiently interact with others, and that integrating sensorimotor signals from the interacting partners leads to the emergence of a shared representation of the PPS. To support this proposal, we first introduce the features of body and PPS representations that are relevant for interpersonal motor interactions. Then, we highlight the role of action planning and execution on the dynamic expansion of the PPS. We continue by presenting evidence of PPS modulations after tool use and review studies suggesting that PPS expansions may be accounted for by Bayesian sensory filtering through predictive coding. In the central section, we describe how this conceptual framework can be used to explain the mechanisms through which the PPS may be modulated by the actions of our interaction partner, in order to facilitate interpersonal coordination. Last, we discuss how this proposal may support recent evidence concerning PPS rigidity in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and its possible relationship with ASD individuals' difficulties during interpersonal coordination. Future studies will need to clarify the mechanisms and neural underpinning of these dynamic, interpersonal modulations of the PPS.

Sensorimotor Representation Learning for an “Active Self” in Robots: A Model Survey

Safe human-robot interactions require robots to be able to learn how to behave appropriately in spaces populated by people and thus to cope with the challenges posed by our dynamic and unstructured environment, rather than being provided a rigid set of rules for operations. In humans, these capabilities are thought to be related to our ability to perceive our body in space, sensing the location of our limbs during movement, being aware of other objects and agents, and controlling our body parts to interact with them intentionally. Toward the next generation of robots with bio-inspired capacities, in this paper, we first review the developmental processes of underlying mechanisms of these abilities: The sensory representations of body schema, peripersonal space, and the active self in humans. Second, we provide a survey of robotics models of these sensory representations and robotics models of the self; and we compare these models with the human counterparts. Finally, we analyze what is missing from these robotics models and propose a theoretical computational framework, which aims to allow the emergence of the sense of self in artificial agents by developing sensory representations through self-exploration.

What COVID-19 tells us about the self: The deep intersubjective and cultural layers of our brain

The COVID-19 crisis is affecting our sense of self and touches upon our existential fears. This extends to the self-other relationship, as there is both being infected and infecting the other. What does this pandemic crisis tell us about our self and relatedness, its cultural differences, and how these are rooted in the brain's relation to the world? First, we discuss the psychological and neuronal features of self and self-other relation and how they are rooted in a deeper layer of the brain's neural activity complementing its cognitive surface layer. Second, we demonstrate cultural differences of Eastern and Western concepts of the self (i.e., independency and interdependency) and how these reflect the manifestation of the brain's neuro-social and neuro-ecological alignment. Finally, we highlight the intersubjective and cultural nature of the self and its surface in the COVID-19 crisis. Discussing various lines of empirical data showing the brain's intimate alignment to both social and ecological environmental contexts, our results support the assumption of the brain's deep layer features by laying bare a continuum of different degrees of neuro-social and neuro-ecological alignment. This entails a two-stage model of self with neuro-social-ecological and psychological levels that extends the previously suggested basis model of self-specificity. We conclude that the current pandemic shows the importance of the deeper intersubjective and cultural layers of both the self and brain; their neglect can be life-threatening for the self and others and, paradoxically, might reduce, rather than enlarge, the self's sense of freedom and independence.

Association between long-range temporal correlations in intrinsic EEG activity and subjective sense of identity

The long-range temporal correlation (LRTC) in resting-state intrinsic brain activity is known to be associated with temporal behavioral patterns, including decision making based on internal criteria such as self-knowledge. However, the association between the neuronal LRTC and the subjective sense of identity remains to be explored; in other words, whether our subjective sense of consistent self across time relates to the temporal consistency of neural activity. The present study examined the relationship between the LRTC of resting-state scalp electroencephalography (EEG) and a subjective sense of identity measured by the Erikson Psychosocial Stage Inventory (EPSI). Consistent with our prediction based on previous studies of neuronal-behavioral relationships, the frontocentral alpha LRTC correlated negatively with identity confusion. Moreover, from the descriptive analyses, centroparietal beta LRTC showed negative correlations with identity confusion, and frontal theta LRTC showed positive relationships with identity synthesis. These results suggest that more temporal consistency (reversely, less random noise) in intrinsic brain activity is associated with less confused and better-synthesized identity. Our data provide further evidence that the LRTC of intrinsic brain activity might serve as a noise suppression mechanism at the psychological level.

Virtual Body Ownership Illusions for Mental Health: A Narrative Review

Over the last 20 years, virtual reality (VR) has been widely used to promote mental health in populations presenting different clinical conditions. Mental health does not refer only to the absence of psychiatric disorders but to the absence of a wide range of clinical conditions that influence people’s general and social well-being such as chronic pain, neurological disorders that lead to motor o perceptual impairments, psychological disorders that alter behaviour and social cognition, or physical conditions like eating disorders or present in amputees. It is known that an accurate perception of oneself and of the surrounding environment are both key elements to enjoy mental health and well-being, and that both can be distorted in patients suffering from the clinical conditions mentioned above. In the past few years, multiple studies have shown the effectiveness of VR to modulate such perceptual distortions of oneself and of the surrounding environment through virtual body ownership illusions. This narrative review aims to review clinical studies that have explored the manipulation of embodied virtual bodies in VR for improving mental health, and to discuss the current state of the art and the challenges for future research in the context of clinical care.

Mentalization and embodied selfhood in Borderline Personality Disorder

Aberrations of self-experience are considered a core feature of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). While prominent etiologic accounts of BPD, such as the mentalization based approach, appeal to the developmental constitution of self in early infant-caregiver environments, they often rely on a conception of self that is not explicitly articulated. Moreover, self-experience in BPD is often theorized at the level of narrative identity, thus minimizing the role of embodied experience. In this article, we present the hypothesis that disordered self and interpersonal functioning in BPD result, in part, from impairments in "embodied mentalization," that manifest foundationally as alterations in minimal embodied selfhood, i.e. the first-person experience of being an individuated embodied subject. This account of BPD, which engages early intersubjective experiences has the potential to integrate phenomenological, developmental, and symptomatic findings in BPD, and is consistent with contemporary theories of brain function.

An Algorithmic Metaphysics of Self-Patterns

The paper draws on an algorithmic criterion to demonstrate that the self (as initially described in Shaun Gallagher’s a pattern theory of self) is a composite, scattered, and patterned object. It also addresses the question of extendedness of the self-pattern. Based on the criteria drawn from algorithmic complexity, I argue that although the self-pattern possesses a genuinely extended aspect (and in this sense, the self-pattern is minimally extended) the self-pattern and its environment do not constitute a genuine composite object.

Prosthesis embodiment and attenuation of prosthetic touch in upper limb amputees - A proof-of-concept study

Sensory attenuation of self-touch, that is, the perceptual reduction of self-generated tactile stimuli, is considered a neurocognitive basis for self-other distinction. However, whether this effect can also be found in upper limb amputees using a prosthesis is unknown. Thirteen participants were asked to touch their foot sole with a) their intact hand (self-touch), b) their prosthesis (prosthesis-touch), or c) let it be touched by another person (other-touch). Intensity of touch was assessed with a questionnaire. In addition, prosthesis embodiment was assessed in nine participants. Self-touch as well as prosthesis-touch was characterized by significant perceptual attenuation compared to other-touch, while self- and prosthesis-touch did not differ. The more embodied the prosthesis was, the more similar was its elicited touch perception to actual self-touch. These findings - although preliminary - suggest that perceptually embodied prostheses can be represented as an actual limb by the users' sensorimotor system.

Metric biases in body representation extend to objects

We typically misestimate the dimensions of our body e.g., we perceive our fingers as shorter, and our torso as more elongated, than they actually are. It stands to reason that those metric biases may also extend to objects that we interact with, to facilitate attunement with the environment. To explore this hypothesis, we compared the metric representations of seven objects and the subjects' own hand using the Line Length Judgment task, in six experiments involving 152 healthy subjects. We evaluated the size estimation errors made for each target (hand or previously observed objects) by asking subjects to compare the vertical or horizontal dimension of a specific target against the length of a vertical or horizontal line. As expected, we showed that the hand is misperceived in its dimensions. Interestingly, we found that metric biases are also present for daily-life objects, such as a mobile phone and a coffee mug, and are not affected by familiarity with the objects. In contrast, objects that are less likely to be manipulated, either because they are potentially harmful or disgusting, were differently represented. Furthermore, the propensity to interact with an object, rated by an independent sample of subjects, best predicted the pattern of metric biases associated with that object. Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis that biases affecting the hand representation extend to objects that elicit action-oriented behavior, highlighting the importance of studying the body as integrated and active in the environment.

Like the back of my hand: Visual ERPs reveal a specific change detection mechanism for the bodily self

The ability to identify our own body is considered a pivotal marker of self-awareness. Previous research demonstrated that subjects are more efficient in the recognition of images representing self rather than others' body effectors (self-advantage). Here, we verified whether, at an electrophysiological level, bodily-self recognition modulates change detection responses. In a first EEG experiment (discovery sample), event-related potentials (ERPs) were elicited by a pair of sequentially presented visual stimuli (vS1; vS2), representing either the self-hand or other people's hands. In a second EEG experiment (replicating sample), together with the previously described visual stimuli, also a familiar hand was presented. Participants were asked to decide whether vS2 was identical or different from vS1. Accuracy and response times were collected. In both experiments, results confirmed the presence of the self-advantage: participants responded faster and more accurately when the self-hand was presented. ERP results paralleled behavioral findings. Anytime the self-hand was presented, we observed significant change detection responses, with a larger N270 component for vS2 different rather than identical to vS1. Conversely, when the self-hand was not included, and even in response to the familiar hand in Experiment 2, we did not find any significant modulation of the change detection responses. Overall our findings, showing behavioral self-advantage and the selective modulation of N270 for the self-hand, support the existence of a specific mechanism devoted to bodily-self recognition, likely relying on the multimodal (visual and sensorimotor) dimension of the bodily-self representation. We propose that such a multimodal self-representation may activate the salience network, boosting change detection effects specifically for the self-hand.

Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation

Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and "enlightened" states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense feelings of alienation, fear, and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives from various traditions, "selfless" experiences are highly sought after, being associated with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric and euphoric experiences should be conceptualized. In this paper, we propose a unified account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building on our recent active inference research, we propose an account of the experiences of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go on to develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience by "tuning" agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control and contrast this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and possible dangers, of meditation.

Virtual reality in neurorehabilitation: a review of its effects on multiple cognitive domains

INTRODUCTION

Neurological diseases frequently cause adult-onset disability and have increased the demand for rehabilitative interventions. Neurorehabilitation has been progressively relying on computer-assisted programs and, more recently, on virtual reality (VR). Current reviews explore VR-based neurorehabilitation for assessing and treating the most common neurological pathologies. However, none of them explored specifically the impact of VR on multiple cognitive domains.

AREAS COVERED

The present work is a review of 6 years of literature (2015-2020) on VR in neurorehabilitation with the purpose of analyzing its effects on memory, attention, executive functions, language, and visuospatial ability.

EXPERT OPINION

Our review suggests that VR-based neurorehabilitation showed encouraging results for executive functions and visuospatial abilities particularly for both acute and neurodegenerative conditions. Conversely, memory, and attention outcomes are conflicting, and language did not show significant improvements following VR-based rehabilitation. Within five years, it is plausible that VR-based intervention would be provided in standalone and mobile-based platforms that won't need a PC to work, with reduced latency and improved user interaction.

Interoception and Its Role for Eating, Obesity, and Eating Disorders

Abstract. The importance of the sense of ourselves from within for understanding adaptive behavior and psychopathology has been increasingly recognized during the last decades. Interoception builds the foundation of our embodied self and dysfunctional interoception lies at the core of many psychosomatic disorders. Eating is fundamental for survival with consequences for health and well-being. It is deeply grounded in homoeostatic and allostatic psychophysiological needs and is driven by interoceptive signals of the body. This narrative review summarizes a selection of empirical findings and draws conclusions on the role of interoception in eating behavior, body weight, and eating disorders. Beyond disordered eating behavior, eating disorders are characterized by impairment of the sense of self, with dysfunctional interoception at its core. Predictive coding accounts are addressed to integrate conclusions and to underline the relevance of interventions to modify interoception.

Perception of Our Own Body Influences Self-Concept and Self-Incoherence Impairs Episodic Memory

How does our body affect the way we think about our personality? We addressed this question by eliciting the perceptual illusion that pairs of friends swapped bodies with each other. We found that during the illusion, the participants rated their own personality characteristics more similarly to the way they previously rated their friend's personality, and this flexible adjustment of self-concept to the "new" bodily self was related to the strength of illusory ownership of the friend's body. Moreover, a subsequent memory test showed that personality traits rated during the friend-body-swap illusion were generally remembered worse than traits rated during the control conditions; importantly, however, this impairment of episodic recognition memory was reduced for the participants who considerably adjusted their self-concept during the illusory body swapping. These findings demonstrate that our beliefs about own personality are dynamically shaped by the perception of our body and that coherence between the bodily and conceptual self-representations is important for the normal encoding of episodic memories.

Wilding the predictive brain

The Predictive Processing (PP) framework casts the brain as a probabilistic prediction engine that continually generates predictions of the causal structure of the world in order to construct for itself, from the top down, incoming sensory signals. Conceiving of the brain in this way has yielded incredible explanatory power, offering what many believe to be our first glimpse at a unified theory of the mind. In this paper, the picture of the mind brought into view by predictive processing theories is shown to be embodied, deeply affective and nicely poised for cognitive extension. We begin by giving an overview of the main themes of the framework, and situating this approach within embodied cognitive science. We show perception, action, homeostatic regulation and emotion to be underpinned by the very same predictive machinery. We conclude by showing how predictive minds will increasingly be understood as deeply interwoven with, and perhaps extended into, the surrounding social, cultural and technological landscape. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Psychology > Emotion and Motivation Philosophy > Action.

Fluidity of gender identity induced by illusory body-sex change

Gender identity is a collection of thoughts and feelings about one’s own gender, which may or may not correspond to the sex assigned at birth. How this sense is linked to the perception of one’s own masculine or feminine body remains unclear. Here, in a series of three behavioral experiments conducted on a large group of control volunteers (N = 140), we show that a perceptual illusion of having the opposite-sex body is associated with a shift toward a more balanced identification with both genders and less gender-stereotypical beliefs about own personality characteristics, as indicated by subjective reports and implicit behavioral measures. These findings demonstrate that the ongoing perception of one’s own body affects the sense of one’s own gender in a dynamic, robust, and automatic manner.

Perceptual correlates of successful body-prosthesis interaction in lower limb amputees: psychometric characterisation and development of the Prosthesis Embodiment Scale

Prostheses are used to at least partly restore the body after limb amputation. Making the user accepting the prosthetic device as part of his or her body, i.e., inducing prosthesis embodiment, has been identified as major aim of prosthetic treatment. However, up to now, there is no consensus about the psychometric nature of prosthesis embodiment in limb amputees. In the present study, 118 unilateral lower limb amputees using a prosthesis were asked to complete an online questionnaire targeting prosthesis embodiment. Principal axis factoring revealed the factor structure of prosthesis embodiment, i.e., Ownership/Integrity, Agency, and Anatomical Plausibility, which resembles the embodiment structure previously identified for normally-limbed participants. The majority of amputees achieved prosthesis embodiment as assessed with the final version of the newly developed Prosthesis Embodiment Scale. Internal consistency was excellent, and test–retest reliability was satisfying, while the instrument was also sensitive for new prosthetic equipment. Validation on the basis of relationships to prosthesis satisfaction and adjustment to prosthesis use was performed. The Prosthesis Embodiment Scale could be a valuable tool for the assessment of perceptual correlates of successful body–prosthesis interaction in rehabilitative and research contexts, the latter which might further benefit from the comparability of psychometrically evaluated data.

The Developing Bodily Self: How Posture Constrains Body Representation in Childhood

Adults' body representation is constrained by multisensory information and knowledge of the body such as its possible postures. This study (N = 180) tested for similar constraints in children. Using the rubber hand illusion with adults and 6- to 7-year olds, we measured proprioceptive drift (an index of hand localization) and ratings of felt hand ownership. The fake hand was either congruent or incongruent with the participant's own. Across ages, congruency of posture and visual-tactile congruency yielded greater drift toward the fake hand. Ownership ratings were higher with congruent visual-tactile information, but unaffected by posture. Posture constrains body representation similarly in children and adults, suggesting that children have sensitive, robust mechanisms for maintaining a sense of bodily self.

Stranger to my face: Top-down and bottom-up effects underlying prioritization of images of one's face

Recent studies suggest that we rapidly and effortlessly associate neutral information with the self, leading to subsequent prioritization of this information in perception. However, the exact underlying processes behind these effects are not fully known. Here, we focus specifically on top-down and bottom-up processes involved in self-prioritization, and report results from three experiments involving face detection, using a sequential match-non-match task. Across the three experiments we asked participants to associate an unfamiliar face with the self (Experiment 1), to associate one's face with a stranger's name (Experiment 2), and to establish both associations simultaneously (Experiment 3). We found that while participants showed evidence of bottom-up prioritization of their real faces, they did not show such an effect for self-associated strangers' faces. However, the participants showed a robust self-related top-down effect; when presented with a self-related cue, they were later faster at classifying both subsequent correct and incorrect targets. Together, our results suggest that self-prioritization is underpinned by distinct top-down and bottom-up processes. We discuss our findings in the context of the proposal that the self acts as an "integrative glue", and suggest an interpretation of our results within the framework of predictive coding.

Thinking, believing, and hallucinating self in schizophrenia

In this Personal View, we discuss the history and concept of self-disturbance in relation to the pathophysiology and subjective experience of schizophrenia in terms of three approaches: the perceptual anomalies approach of the early Heidelberg School of Psychiatry, the ipseity model, and the predictive coding framework. Despite the importance of these approaches, there has been a notable absence of efforts to compare them and consider how they might be integrated. This Personal View compares the three approaches and offers suggestions as to how they might work together, which represents a novel position. We view self-disturbances as transformations of self that form the inseparable background against which psychotic symptoms emerge. Integrating computational psychiatric approaches with those used by phenomenologists in the first two listed approaches, we argue that delusions and hallucinations are inferences produced under extraordinary conditions and are both statistically and experientially as real for patients as other mental events. Such inferences still approximate Bayes-optimality, given the personal, neurobiological, and environmental circumstances, and might be the only ones available to minimise prediction error. The added contribution we hope to make focuses on how the dialogue between neuroscience and phenomenology might improve clinical practice. We hope this Personal View will act as a timely primer and bridging point for the different approaches of computational psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology for interested clinicians.

The Prospective Sense of Agency is Rooted in Local and Global Properties of Intrinsic Functional Brain Networks

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to a constitutional aspect of the self describing the extent to which individuals feel in control over their actions and consequences thereof. Although the SoA has been associated with mental health and well-being, it is still unknown how interindividual variability in the SoA is embedded in the intrinsic brain organization. We hypothesized that the prospective component of an implicit SoA is associated with brain networks related to SoA and sensorimotor predictions on multiple spatial scales. We replicated previous findings by showing a significant prospective SoA as indicated by intentional binding effects. Then, using task-free fMRI and graph analysis, we analyzed associations between intentional binding effects and the intrinsic brain organization at regional, modular, and whole-brain scales. The results showed that intermodular connections of a frontoparietal module including the premotor cortex, supramarginal gyrus, and dorsal precuneus are associated with individual differences in prospective intentional binding. Notably, prospective intentional binding effects were also related to global brain modularity within a specific structural resolution range. These findings suggest that an implicit SoA generated through sensorimotor predictions relies on the intrinsic organization of the brain connectome on both local and global scales.

Thinking through prior bodies: autonomic uncertainty and interoceptive self-inference

The Bayesian brain hypothesis, as formalized by the free-energy principle, is ascendant in cognitive science. But, how does the Bayesian brain obtain prior beliefs? Veissière and colleagues argue that sociocultural interaction is one important source. We offer a complementary model in which “interoceptive self-inference” guides the estimation of expected uncertainty both in ourselves and in our social conspecifics.

Direct Electrophysiological Correlates of Body Ownership in Human Cerebral Cortex

Over the past decade, numerous neuroimaging studies based on hemodynamic markers of brain activity have examined the feeling of body ownership using perceptual body-illusions in humans. However, the direct electrophysiological correlates of body ownership at the cortical level remain unexplored. To address this, we studied the rubber hand illusion in 5 patients (3 males and 2 females) implanted with intracranial electrodes measuring cortical surface potentials. Increased high-γ (70–200 Hz) activity, an index of neuronal firing rate, in premotor and intraparietal cortices reflected the feeling of ownership. In both areas, high-γ increases were intimately coupled with the subjective illusion onset and sustained both during and in-between touches. However, intraparietal activity was modulated by tactile stimulation to a higher degree than the premotor cortex through effective connectivity with the hand-somatosensory cortex, which suggests different functional roles. These findings constitute the first intracranial electrophysiological characterization of the rubber hand illusion and extend our understanding of the dynamic mechanisms of body ownership.

Using Facial Animation to Increase the Enfacement Illusion and Avatar Self-Identification

Through avatar embodiment in Virtual Reality (VR) we can achieve the illusion that an avatar is substituting our body: the avatar moves as we move and we see it from a first person perspective. However, self-identification, the process of identifying a representation as being oneself, poses new challenges because a key determinant is that we see and have agency in our own face. Providing control over the face is hard with current HMD technologies because face tracking is either cumbersome or error prone. However, limited animation is easily achieved based on speaking. We investigate the level of avatar enfacement, that is believing that a picture of a face is one's own face, with three levels of facial animation: (i) one in which the facial expressions of the avatars are static, (ii) one in which we implement lip-sync motion and (iii) one in which the avatar presents lip-sync plus additional facial animations, with blinks, designed by a professional animator. We measure self-identification using a face morphing tool that morphs from the face of the participant to the face of a gender matched avatar. We find that self-identification on avatars can be increased through pre-baked animations even when these are not photorealistic nor look like the participant.

Noise Helps Optimization Escape From Saddle Points in the Synaptic Plasticity

Numerous experimental studies suggest that noise is inherent in the human brain. However, the functional importance of noise remains unknown. n particular, from a computational perspective, such stochasticity is potentially harmful to brain function. In machine learning, a large number of saddle points are surrounded by high error plateaus and give the illusion of the existence of local minimum. As a result, being trapped in the saddle points can dramatically impair learning and adding noise will attack such saddle point problems in high-dimensional optimization, especially under the strict saddle condition. Motivated by these arguments, we propose one biologically plausible noise structure and demonstrate that noise can efficiently improve the optimization performance of spiking neural networks based on stochastic gradient descent. The strict saddle condition for synaptic plasticity is deduced, and under such conditions, noise can help optimization escape from saddle points on high dimensional domains. The theoretical results explain the stochasticity of synapses and guide us on how to make use of noise. In addition, we provide biological interpretations of proposed noise structures from two points: one based on the free energy principle in neuroscience and another based on observations of in vivo experiments. Our simulation results manifest that in the learning and test phase, the accuracy of synaptic sampling with noise is almost 20% higher than that without noise for synthesis dataset, and the gain in accuracy with/without noise is at least 10% for the MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset. Our study provides a new learning framework for the brain and sheds new light on deep noisy spiking neural networks.

Welcoming back my arm: affective touch increases body ownership following right-hemisphere stroke

Right-hemisphere stroke can impair the ability to recognize one’s contralesional body parts as belonging to one’s self. The study of this so-called ‘disturbed sense of limb ownership’ can provide unique insights into the neurocognitive mechanisms of body ownership. In this study, we address a hypothesis built upon experimental studies on body ownership in healthy volunteers. These studies have shown that affective (pleasant) touch, an interoceptive modality associated with unmyelinated, slow-conducting C-tactile afferents, has a unique role in the sense of body ownership. In this study, we systematically investigated whether affective touch stimulation could increase body ownership in patients with a disturbed sense of limb ownership following right-hemisphere stroke. An initial feasibility study in 16 adult patients with acute stroke enabled us to optimize and calibrate an affective touch protocol to be administered by the bedside. The main experiment, conducted with a different sample of 26 right hemisphere patients, assessed changes in limb ownership elicited following self- (patient) versus other- (experimenter) generated tactile stimulation, using a velocity known to optimally activate C-tactile fibres (i.e. 3 cm/s), and a second velocity that is suboptimal for C-tactile activation (i.e. 18 cm/s). We further examined the specificity and mechanism of observed changes in limb ownership in secondary analyses looking at (i) the influence of perceived intensity and pleasantness of touch, (ii) touch laterality and (iii) level of disturbed sense of limb ownership on ownership change and (iv) changes in unilateral neglect arising from touch. Findings indicated a significant increase in limb ownership following experimenter-administered, C-tactile-optimal touch. Voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping identified damage to the right insula and, more substantially, the right corpus callosum, associated with a failure to increase body ownership following experimenter-administered, affective touch. Our findings suggest that affective touch can increase the sense of body-part ownership following right-hemisphere stroke, potentially due to its unique role in the multisensory integration processes that underlie the sense of body ownership.

Predictive learning: its key role in early cognitive development

What is a fundamental ability for cognitive development? Although many researchers have been addressing this question, no shared understanding has been acquired yet. We propose that predictive learning of sensorimotor signals plays a key role in early cognitive development. The human brain is known to represent sensorimotor signals in a predictive manner, i.e. it attempts to minimize prediction error between incoming sensory signals and top–down prediction. We extend this view and suggest that two mechanisms for minimizing prediction error lead to the development of cognitive abilities during early infancy. The first mechanism is to update an immature predictor. The predictor must be trained through sensorimotor experiences because it does not inherently have prediction ability. The second mechanism is to execute an action anticipated by the predictor. Interacting with other individuals often increases prediction error, which can be minimized by executing one's own action corresponding to others’ action. Our experiments using robotic systems replicated developmental dynamics observed in infants. The capabilities of self–other cognition and goal-directed action were acquired based on the first mechanism, whereas imitation and prosocial behaviours emerged based on the second mechanism. Our theory further provides a potential mechanism for autism spectrum condition. Atypical tolerance for prediction error is hypothesized to be a cause of perceptual and social difficulties.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘From social brains to social robots: applying neurocognitive insights to human–robot interaction’.

Prerequisites for an Artificial Self

Traditionally investigated in philosophy, body ownership and agency-two main components of the minimal self-have recently gained attention from other disciplines, such as brain, cognitive and behavioral sciences, and even robotics and artificial intelligence. In robotics, intuitive human interaction in natural and dynamic environments becomes more and more important, and requires skills such as self-other distinction and an understanding of agency effects. In a previous review article, we investigated studies on mechanisms for the development of motor and cognitive skills in robots (Schillaci et al., 2016). In this review article, we argue that these mechanisms also build the foundation for an understanding of an artificial self. In particular, we look at developmental processes of the minimal self in biological systems, transfer principles of those to the development of an artificial self, and suggest metrics for agency and body ownership in an artificial self.

Toward Enhanced Teleoperation Through Embodiment

Telerobotics aims to transfer human manipulation skills and dexterity over an arbitrary distance and at an arbitrary scale to a remote workplace. A telerobotic system that is transparent enables a natural and intuitive interaction. We postulate that embodiment (with three sub-components: sense of ownership, agency, and self-location) of the robotic system leads to optimal perceptual transparency and increases task performance. However, this has not yet been investigated directly. We reason along four premises and present findings from the literature that substantiate each of them: (1) the brain can embody non-bodily objects (e.g., robotic hands), (2) embodiment can be elicited with mediated sensorimotor interaction, (3) embodiment is robust against inconsistencies between the robotic system and the operator's body, and (4) embodiment positively correlates to dexterous task performance. We use the predictive encoding theory as a framework to interpret and discuss the results reported in the literature. Numerous previous studies have shown that it is possible to induce embodiment over a wide range of virtual and real extracorporeal objects (including artificial limbs, avatars, and android robots) through mediated sensorimotor interaction. Also, embodiment can occur for non-human morphologies including for elongated arms and a tail. In accordance with the predictive encoding theory, none of the sensory modalities is critical in establishing ownership, and discrepancies in multisensory signals do not necessarily lead to loss of embodiment. However, large discrepancies in terms of multisensory synchrony or visual likeness can prohibit embodiment from occurring. The literature provides less extensive support for the link between embodiment and (dexterous) task performance. However, data gathered with prosthetic hands do indicate a positive correlation. We conclude that all four premises are supported by direct or indirect evidence in the literature, suggesting that embodiment of a remote manipulator may improve dexterous performance in telerobotics. This warrants further implementation testing of embodiment in telerobotics. We formulate a first set of guidelines to apply embodiment in telerobotics and identify some important research topics.

Defective Embodiment of Alien Hand Uncovers Altered Sensorimotor Integration in Schizophrenia

The observation that people with schizophrenia misattribute the source of their own actions has led to the hypothesis that they suffer from altered sensorimotor processes underlying sense of agency. Furthermore, rubber hand studies suggest an abnormal experience of embodiment in schizophrenia. However, this latter finding is based on a procedure that elicits ownership sensations for a fake hand by visuo-tactile stimulation, leaving the agency subcomponent of embodiment relatively untouched. By using a visuo-motor version of the embodiment illusion able to actively elicit also sense of agency for an alien hand, we tested whether the putative sensorimotor deficits are also involved in altering embodiment sensations in schizophrenia. Subjective (questionnaire) and perceptual (forearm bisection performance) indexes of the embodiment illusion were collected. Differently from controls, both the explicit agency component and the implicit body metrics update were not modulated by the extent of visuo-motor congruency in participants with schizophrenia. We conclude that motor prediction and/or temporal binding window impairments may alter the feeling of embodiment and body representation in schizophrenia.

Happy you, happy me: expressive changes on a stranger's voice recruit faster implicit processes than self-produced expressions

In social interactions, people have to pay attention both to the ‘what’ and ‘who’. In particular, expressive changes heard on speech signals have to be integrated with speaker identity, differentiating e.g. self- and other-produced signals. While previous research has shown that self-related visual information processing is facilitated compared to non-self stimuli, evidence in the auditory modality remains mixed. Here, we compared electroencephalography (EEG) responses to expressive changes in sequence of self- or other-produced speech sounds using a mismatch negativity (MMN) passive oddball paradigm. Critically, to control for speaker differences, we used programmable acoustic transformations to create voice deviants that differed from standards in exactly the same manner, making EEG responses to such deviations comparable between sequences. Our results indicate that expressive changes on a stranger’s voice are highly prioritized in auditory processing compared to identical changes on the self-voice. Other-voice deviants generate earlier MMN onset responses and involve stronger cortical activations in a left motor and somatosensory network suggestive of an increased recruitment of resources for less internally predictable, and therefore perhaps more socially relevant, signals.

Extending Bayesian Models of the Rubber Hand Illusion

Human body sense is surprisingly flexible - in the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), precisely administered visuo-tactile stimulation elicits a sense of ownership over a fake hand. The general consensus is that there are certain semantic top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated in this way: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model. However, empirical evidence shows that the sense of ownership may extend to objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms) and the hypothesis about the relevance of appearance lacks direct empirical support. Probabilistic multisensory integration approaches constitute a promising alternative. However, the recent Bayesian models of RHI limit too strictly the possible factors influencing likelihood and prior probability distributions. In this paper, I analyse how Bayesian models of RHI could be extended. The introduction of skin-based spatial information can account for the cross-compensation of sensory signals giving rise to RHI. Furthermore, addition of Bayesian Coupling Priors, depending on (1) internal learned models of relatedness (coupling strength) of sensory cues, (2) scope of temporal binding windows, and (3) extension of peripersonal space, would allow quantification of individual tendencies to integrate divergent visual and somatosensory signals. The extension of Bayesian models would yield an empirically testable proposition accounting comprehensively for a wide spectrum of RHI-related phenomena and rendering appearance-oriented internal body models explanatorily redundant.