Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test

Criterion Validity of Cognitive Reflection for Predicting Job Performance and Training Proficiency: A Meta-Analysis

This article presents a meta-analysis of the validity of cognitive reflection (CR) for predicting job performance and training proficiency. It also examines the incremental validity of CR over cognitive intelligence (CI) for predicting these two occupational criteria. CR proved to be an excellent predictor of job performance and training proficiency, and the magnitude of the true validity was very similar across the two criteria. Results also showed that the type of CR is not a moderator of CR validity. We also found that CR showed incremental variance over CI for the explanation of job performance, although the magnitude of the contribution is small. However, CR shows practically no incremental validity over CI validity in the explanation of training proficiency. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for the research and practice of personnel selection.

Misremembering Brexit: partisan bias and individual predictors of false memories for fake news stories among Brexit voters

Exposure to fake news stories can result in false memories for the events portrayed, and this effect can be enhanced if the stories conform to the reader's ideological position. We exposed 1299 UK residents to fabricated news stories about Brexit. 44% of participants reported a false memory for at least one fabricated story, with a higher rate of false memories for stories that reflected poorly on the opposing side. This effect of ideological congruency was somewhat greater among participants who were exposed to a threat to their social identity as a Leave or Remain supporter; however, this moderating effect was only statistically significant in exploratory analyses using a more conservative definition of false memory. Participants with higher cognitive ability and analytical reasoning scores were less susceptible to false memories. Individuals with better knowledge about Brexit showed better discrimination between true and false stories, while self-reported engagement with the Brexit debate was associated with an increased tendency to "remember" any story, regardless of its truth. These results implicate a combination of social and individual factors in the development of false memories from fake news, and suggest that exposure to social identity threats may enhance the polarising effects of fake news.

Turning up the heat: The impact of indoor temperature on selected cognitive processes and the validity of self-report

Indoor climate interventions are often motivated from a worker comfort and productivity perspective. However, the relationship between indoor climate and human performance remains unclear. We assess the effect of indoor climate factors on human performance, focusing on the impact of indoor temperature on decision processes. Specifically, we expect heat to negatively influence higher cognitive rational processes, forcing people to rely more on intuitive shortcuts. In a laboratory setting, participants (N=257) were exposed to a controlled physical environment with either a hot temperature (28° C) or a neutral temperature (22° C) over a two-hour period, in which a battery of validated tests were conducted. We find that heat exposure did not lead to a difference in decision quality. We did find evidence for a strong gender difference in self-report, such that only men expect that high temperature leads to a significant decline in performance, which does in fact not materialize. These results cast doubt on the validity of self-report as a proxy for performance under different indoor climate conditions.

Factors Influencing College Football Players' Beliefs About Incurring Football-Related Dementia

Background:

Football participation is associated with risks to acute and long-term health, including the possibility of incurring football-related dementia. Concerns have been raised regarding media coverage of these risks, which may have influenced athletes’ beliefs. However, little is known about football players’ views on football-related dementia. The risk-perception literature suggests that related risk perceptions and features of individual cognition, such as the ability to switch to reasoned, deliberative thinking, may influence individual perception of a long-term risk.

Purpose:

To evaluate factors influencing college football players’ belief that they are likely to incur football-related dementia in the future.

Study Design:

Cross-sectional study.

Methods:

Members of 4 National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Power 5 Football teams participated in this survey-based study, providing responses to demographic, athletic, and risk-posture questions, and completed the cognitive reflection test. Logistic regressions were used to evaluate relationships between beliefs about football-related dementia and factors including athletic and demographic characteristics, football risk posture, health-risk posture, and cognitive reflection test score.

Results:

About 10% of the 296 participating athletes thought football-related dementia was likely to occur in their future. Skill players had lower odds than linemen of believing that football-related dementia was likely (odds ratio [OR], 0.35; 95% CI, 0.14-0.89). For each additional suspected concussion in an athlete’s career, his odds of believing football-related dementia was likely increased by 24% (OR, 1.24; 95% CI, 1.07-1.45). Acute and chronic football-related risk perceptions, as well as non–football-related health-risk perceptions, were positively associated with athletes’ belief that football-related dementia was likely. Higher cognitive reflection test scores, a measure of ability to switch to slow, deliberative thinking, was positively associated with odds of believing football-related dementia was likely (OR, 1.57; 95% CI, 1.12-2.21).

Conclusion:

Some athletes view football as generally riskier, while others view football as generally lessri sky. These risk postures are informed by athletes’ concussion history, primary playing position, and ability to switch from fast, reactive thinking to slow, deliberative thinking. Ensuring that athletes are appropriately informed of the risks of participation is an ethical obligation of universities; sports medicine clinicians are appropriate facilitators of conversations about athletes’ health risks.

The Development of Cognitive Reflection in China

Cognitive reflection is the tendency to override an intuitive response so as to engage in the reflection necessary to derive a correct response. Here, we examine the emergence of cognitive reflection in a culture that values nonanalytic thinking styles, Chinese culture. We administered a child-friendly version of the cognitive reflection test, the CRT-D, to 130 adults and 111 school-age children in China and compared performance on the CRT-D to several measures of rational thinking (belief bias syllogisms, base rate sensitivity, denominator neglect, and other-side thinking) and normative thinking dispositions (actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition). The CRT-D was a significant predictor of rational thinking and normative thinking dispositions in both children and adults, as previously found in American samples. Adults' performance on the CRT-D correlated with their performance on the original CRT, and children's performance on the CRT-D predicted rational thinking and normative thinking dispositions even after adjusting for age. These results demonstrate that cognitive reflection, rational thinking, and normative thinking dispositions converge even in a culture that emphasizes holistic, nonanalytic reasoning.

Dunning-Kruger Effect: Intuitive Errors Predict Overconfidence on the Cognitive Reflection Test

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally, intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally, FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when judging their performance.

Pre-screening workers to overcome bias amplification in online labour markets

Groups have access to more diverse information and typically outperform individuals on problem solving tasks. Crowdsolving utilises this principle to generate novel and/or superior solutions to intellective tasks by pooling the inputs from a distributed online crowd. However, it is unclear whether this particular instance of "wisdom of the crowd" can overcome the influence of potent cognitive biases that habitually lead individuals to commit reasoning errors. We empirically test the prevalence of cognitive bias on a popular crowdsourcing platform, examining susceptibility to bias of online panels at the individual and aggregate levels. We then investigate the use of the Cognitive Reflection Test, notable for its predictive validity for both susceptibility to cognitive biases in test settings and real-life reasoning, as a screening tool to improve collective performance. We find that systematic biases in crowdsourced answers are not as prevalent as anticipated, but when they occur, biases are amplified with increasing group size, as predicted by the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The results further suggest that pre-screening individuals with the Cognitive Reflection Test can substantially enhance collective judgement and improve crowdsolving performance.

Detecting fake news on Facebook: The role of emotional intelligence

The proliferation of fake news on social media is now a matter of considerable public and governmental concern. In 2016, the UK EU referendum and the US Presidential election were both marked by social media misinformation campaigns, which have subsequently reduced trust in democratic processes. More recently, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the acceptance of fake news has been shown to pose a threat to public health. Research on how to combat the false acceptance of fake news is still in its infancy. However, recent studies have started to focus on the psychological factors which might make some individuals less likely to fall for fake news. Here, we adopt that approach to assess whether individuals who show high levels of 'emotional intelligence' (EQ) are less likely to fall for fake news items. That is, are individuals who are better able to disregard the emotionally charged content of such items, better equipped to assess the veracity of the information. Using a sample of UK participants, an established measure of EQ and a novel fake news detection task, we report a significant positive relationship between individual differences in emotional intelligence and fake news detection ability. We also report a similar effect for higher levels of educational attainment, and we report some exploratory qualitative fake news judgement data. Our findings are discussed in terms of their applicability to practical short term (i.e. current Facebook user data) and medium term (i.e. emotional intelligence training) interventions which could enhance fake news detection.

The Origins of Religious Disbelief: A Dual Inheritance Approach

Widespread religious disbelief represents a key testing ground for theories of religion. We evaluated the predictions of three prominent theoretical approaches—secularization, cognitive byproduct, and dual inheritance—in a nationally representative (United States, N = 1,417) data set with preregistered analyses and found considerable support for the dual inheritance perspective. Of key predictors of religious disbelief, witnessing fewer credible cultural cues of religious commitment was the most potent, β = .28, followed distantly by reflective cognitive style, β = .13, and less advanced mentalizing, β = .05. Low cultural exposure predicted about 90% higher odds of atheism than did peak cognitive reflection, and cognitive reflection only predicted disbelief among those relatively low in cultural exposure to religion. This highlights the utility of considering both evolved intuitions and transmitted culture and emphasizes the dual roles of content- and context-biased social learning in the cultural transmission of disbelief (preprint https://psyarxiv.com/e29rt/ ).

From bias to sound intuiting: Boosting correct intuitive reasoning

Although human thinking is often biased by erroneous intuitions, recent de-bias studies suggest that people's performance can be boosted by short training interventions, where the correct answers to reasoning problems are explained. However, the nature of this training effect remains unclear. Does training help participants correct erroneous intuitions through deliberation? Or does it help them develop correct intuitions? We addressed this issue in three studies, by focusing on the well-known Bat-and-Ball problem. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants first gave an initial intuitive response, under time pressure and cognitive load, and then gave a final response after deliberation. Studies 1 and 2 showed that not only did training boost performance, it did so as early as the intuitive stage. After training, most participants solved the problems correctly from the outset and no longer needed to correct an initial incorrect answer through deliberation. Study 3 indicated that this sound intuiting sustained over at least two months. The findings confirm that a short training can boost sound reasoning at an intuitive stage. We discuss key theoretical and applied implications.

A diffusion model analysis of belief bias: Different cognitive mechanisms explain how cognitive abilities and thinking styles contribute to conflict resolution in reasoning

Recent results have challenged the widespread assumption of dual process models of belief bias that sound reasoning relies on slow, careful reflection, whereas biased reasoning is based on fast intuition. Instead, parallel process models of reasoning suggest that rule- and belief-based problem features are processed in parallel and that reasoning problems that elicit a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features may also elicit more than one Type 1 response. This has important implications for individual-differences research on reasoning, because rule-based responses by certain individuals may reflect that these individuals were either more likely to give a rule-based default response or that they successfully inhibited and overrode a belief-based default response. In two studies, we used the diffusion model to describe decision making in a transitive reasoning task. In Study 1, 41 participants were asked to evaluate conclusions based on their validity. In Study 2, 133 participants evaluated conclusions based on their validity or believability. We tested which diffusion model parameters reflected conflict resolution and related those model parameters to individual differences in cognitive abilities and thinking styles. Individual differences in need for cognition predicted successful conflict resolution under logic instruction, which suggests that a disposition to engage in reflective thinking facilitates the inhibition and override of Type 1 responses. Intelligence, however, was negatively related to successful conflict resolution under belief instruction, which suggests that individuals with high cognitive abilities quickly generated a higher-level logical response that interfered with their ability to evaluate lower-level intrinsic problem features. Taken together, this double dissociation indicates that cognitive abilities and thinking styles affect the processing of conflict information through different mechanisms and at different stages: Greater cognitive abilities facilitate the efficient creation of decoupled problem representations, whereas a greater disposition to engage in critical thinking facilitates the detection and override of Type 1 responses.

Cognitive Predictors of Precautionary Behavior During the COVID-19 Pandemic

The attempts to mitigate the unprecedented health, economic, and social disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are largely dependent on establishing compliance to behavioral guidelines and rules that reduce the risk of infection. Here, by conducting an online survey that tested participants' knowledge about the disease and measured demographic, attitudinal, and cognitive variables, we identify predictors of self-reported social distancing and hygiene behavior. To investigate the cognitive processes underlying health-prevention behavior in the pandemic, we co-opted the dual-process model of thinking to measure participants' propensities for automatic and intuitive thinking vs. controlled and reflective thinking. Self-reports of 17 precautionary behaviors, including regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing a face mask, served as a dependent measure. The results of hierarchical regressions showed that age, risk-taking propensity, and concern about the pandemic predicted adoption of precautionary behavior. Variance in cognitive processes also predicted precautionary behavior: participants with higher scores for controlled thinking (measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test) reported less adherence to specific guidelines, as did respondents with a poor understanding of the infection and transmission mechanism of the COVID-19 virus. The predictive power of this model was comparable to an approach (Theory of Planned Behavior) based on attitudes to health behavior. Given these results, we propose the inclusion of measures of cognitive reflection and mental model variables in predictive models of compliance, and future studies of precautionary behavior to establish how cognitive variables are linked with people's information processing and social norms.

Pandemic buying: Testing a psychological model of over-purchasing and panic buying using data from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic

The over-purchasing and hoarding of necessities is a common response to crises, especially in developed economies where there is normally an expectation of plentiful supply. This behaviour was observed internationally during the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the absence of actual scarcity, this behaviour can be described as 'panic buying' and can lead to temporary shortages. However, there have been few psychological studies of this phenomenon. Here we propose a psychological model of over-purchasing informed by animal foraging theory and make predictions about variables that predict over-purchasing by either exacerbating or mitigating the anticipation of future scarcity. These variables include additional scarcity cues (e.g. loss of income), distress (e.g. depression), psychological factors that draw attention to these cues (e.g. neuroticism) or to reassuring messages (eg. analytical reasoning) or which facilitate over-purchasing (e.g. income). We tested our model in parallel nationally representative internet surveys of the adult general population conducted in the United Kingdom (UK: N = 2025) and the Republic of Ireland (RoI: N = 1041) 52 and 31 days after the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 were detected in the UK and RoI, respectively. About three quarters of participants reported minimal over-purchasing. There was more over-purchasing in RoI vs UK and in urban vs rural areas. When over-purchasing occurred, in both countries it was observed across a wide range of product categories and was accounted for by a single latent factor. It was positively predicted by household income, the presence of children at home, psychological distress (depression, death anxiety), threat sensitivity (right wing authoritarianism) and mistrust of others (paranoia). Analytic reasoning ability had an inhibitory effect. Predictor variables accounted for 36% and 34% of the variance in over-purchasing in the UK and RoI respectively. With some caveats, the data supported our model and points to strategies to mitigate over-purchasing in future crises.

Conditional cooperation in group contests

In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants' contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This environment allows us to identify new determinants of conditional cooperation. We observe conditional cooperation in successful groups and in groups where members contribute more than rivals (even if they lose), but it vanishes in those groups that lose the contest due to low group performance. A random-effect linear panel regression analysis with an extensive set of controls confirms the findings.

Eye-tracking IQ: Cognitive capacity and strategy use on a ratio-bias task

This study tested the relationship between strategy use (assessed by eye-gaze patterns), cognitive ability (CA), and reasoning performance on a ratio-bias task. For the ratio-bias problems, participants (N = 125) chose which of two ratios was larger; each ratio was represented both as a fraction and as a picture. Problems were solved in two blocks: once under a deadline (Time1) and once in free time (Time2). Consistent with the assumption of dual process theories that CA is needed to overturn a pre-potent, initial response (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), CA was positively associated with correct performance at Time2, as well as the increase in performance from Time1 to Time2. However, strategy use predicted performance independently of CA at Time2, and accounted for the relationship between CA and improvement between Time1 and Time2: reasoners who attended to the fractions rather than to the misleading pictures performed better, regardless of CA. CA also predicted performance at Time1. Together, these findings suggest that the robust relationship between CA and reasoning (Stanovich, 1999) may arise because 1) high capacity reasoners are more likely to "intuit" the initial answer and 2) because CA is correlated with good strategy use, which, in turn, predicts performance.

Beliefs About Gambling Mediate the Effect of Cognitive Style on Gambling Problems

Problem gambling is often accompanied by a range of irrational cognitions that promote excessive gambling. The cognitive basis for these beliefs has been largely overlooked in the gambling literature. Dual process theory suggests there are two parallel cognitive processing systems, an intuitive and an analytic system, and that there are potential individual differences in preference for one or the other cognitive style. The current study explored whether people's cognitive styles are an important factor in the development of specific beliefs about gambling that in-turn contribute to gambling problems. The sample consisted of 1168 regular gamblers (539 female, ranging from 18 to 78 years of age; M = 35.47, SD = 10.78) recruited via Mechanical Turk. Participants completed a survey assessing cognitive style, problem gambling severity, and measures of protective and erroneous beliefs. In a path model, greater analytical thinking and lower intuitive thinking was associated with fewer erroneous gambling beliefs, which in turn were related to fewer gambling problems. A second model showed that protective beliefs also mediated the relationship between cognitive style and gambling, demonstrating that greater analytical thinking and lower intuitive thinking was associated with protective beliefs that similarly reduced problem gambling severity. Results suggest that a person's cognitive style influences peoples gambling by contributing to the endorsement of irrational or unsafe beliefs about gambling. Encouraging people to think more analytically may be useful in reducing erroneous beliefs about gambling that promote problematic gambling behaviour.

Individual differences in susceptibility to false memories for COVID-19 fake news

Exposure to 'fake news' can result in false memories, with possible consequences for downstream behaviour. Given the sharp rise in online misinformation during the coronavirus pandemic, it is important to understand the factors that influence the development of false memories. The present study measured susceptibility to false memories following exposure to fabricated news stories about the pandemic in a sample of 3746 participants. We investigated the effect of individual differences in (1) knowledge about COVID-19, (2) engagement with media or discussion about the coronavirus, (3) anxiety about COVID-19 and (4) analytical reasoning. Notably, objectively and subjectively assessed knowledge about COVID-19 were not significantly correlated. Objectively assessed knowledge was associated with fewer false memories but more true memories, suggesting a true discrimination between true and fake news. In contrast, participants who merely believed themselves to be very knowledgeable were more likely to report a memory for true stories, but showed no reduction in false memories. Similarly, individuals who reported high levels of media engagement or anxiety about COVID-19 reported an increase in true (but not false) memories. Finally, higher levels of analytical reasoning were associated with fewer memories for both true and fabricated stories, suggesting a stricter threshold for reporting a memory for any story. These data indicate that false memories can form in response to fake COVID-19 news and that susceptibility to this misinformation is affected by the individual's knowledge about and interaction with COVID-19 information, as well as their tendency to think critically.

P. Hanel P, J. Wolf L. The Very Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition: Developing a Six-Item Version

The need for cognition refers to people's tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking and has become influential across social and medical sciences. Using three samples from the United States and the United Kingdom (N = 1,596), we introduce a six-item short version of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS-18). First, we reduced the number of items from 18 to 6 based on the items' discrimination values, threshold levels, measurement precision (item information curve), item-total correlations, and factor loadings. Second, we confirmed the one-factor structure and established measurement invariance across countries and gender. Finally, we demonstrated that while the NCS-6 provides significant time savings, it comes at a minimal cost in terms of its construct validity with external variables such as openness, cognitive reflection test, and need for affect. Overall, our findings indicate that the NCS-6 is a parsimonious, reliable, and valid measure of need for cognition.

How scientific reasoning correlates with health-related beliefs and behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic?

We examined whether scientific reasoning is associated with health-related beliefs and behaviors over and above general analytic thinking ability in the general public (N = 783, aged 18-84). Health-related beliefs included: anti-vaccination attitudes, COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, and generic health-related epistemically suspect beliefs. Scientific reasoning correlated with generic pseudoscientific and health-related conspiracy beliefs and COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. Crucially, scientific reasoning was a stronger independent predictor of unfounded beliefs (including anti-vaccination attitudes) than general analytic thinking was; however, it had a more modest role in health-related behaviors.

Individual Differences in Miserly Thinking Predict Endorsement of Racial/Ethnic Stereotypes

The “cognitive miser” metaphor is a classic characterization of mental life wherein cognitive efficiency is favored over careful and reflective thinking. A presumed implication is that reliance on intuitive processing in the absence of reflective thinking should encourage stereotyping. However, research to date has not adequately tested whether proclivities to engage reflective thinking correspond with less stereotype endorsement, nor if their influence occurs independent of cognitive ability and epistemic motivation. In two studies, we conducted straightforward tests of this hypothesis by measuring individual differences in miserly or reflective thinking, cognitive ability, and epistemic motivation as unique predictors of stereotype endorsement. We utilized objective, performance-based measures of reflective thinking via the Cognitive Reflection Test. The results provide the first direct evidence for the cognitive miser hypothesis. Individual differences in miserly thinking predicted endorsements of racial/ethnic stereotypes independent of cognitive ability and epistemic motivation.

The risk elicitation puzzle revisited: Across-methods (in)consistency?

With the rise of experimental research in the social sciences, numerous methods to elicit and classify people's risk attitudes in the laboratory have evolved. However, evidence suggests that attitudes towards risk may vary considerably when measured with different methods. Based on a within-subject experimental design using four widespread risk preference elicitation tasks, we find that the different methods indeed give rise to considerably varying estimates of individual and aggregate level risk preferences. Conducting simulation exercises to obtain benchmarks for subjects' behavior, we find that the observed heterogeneity in risk preference estimates across methods is qualitatively similar to the heterogeneity arising from independent random draws from the choice distributions observed in the experiment. Our study, however, provides evidence that subjects are surprisingly well aware of the variation in the riskiness of their choices. We argue that this calls into question the common interpretation of variation in revealed risk preferences as being inconsistent.

A reflection on cognitive reflection – testing convergent/divergent validity of two measures of cognitive reflection

The aim of the study was to test convergent/discriminant validity of two measures of cognitive reflection, cognitive reflection test (CRT) and belief bias syllogisms (BBS) and to investigate whether their distinctive characteristic of luring participants into giving wrong intuitive responses explains their relationships with various abilities and disposition measures. Our results show that the same traits largely account for performance on both non-lure task, the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT), and CRT and explain their correlations with other variables. These results also imply that the predictive validity of CRT for wide range of outcomes does not stem from lures. Regarding the BBS, we found that its correlations with other measures were substantially diminished once we accounted for the effects of BNT. This also implies that the lures are not the reason for the correlation between BBS and these measure. We conclude that the lures are not the reason why cognitive reflection tasks correlate with different outcomes. Our results call into question an original definition of CRT as a measure of ability or disposition to resist reporting first response that comes to mind, as well as the validity of results of studies showing “incremental validity” of CRT over numeracy.

Motivated numeracy and active reasoning in a Western European sample

Recent work by Kahan et al. (2017) on the psychology of motivated numeracy in the context of intracultural disagreement suggests that people are less likely to employ their capabilities when the evidence runs contrary to their political ideology. This research has so far been carried out primarily in the USA regarding the liberal–conservative divide over gun control regulation. In this paper, we present the results of a modified replication that included an active reasoning intervention with Western European participants regarding both the hierarchy–egalitarianism and individualism–collectivism divides over immigration policy (n = 746; considerably less than the preregistration sample size). We reproduce the motivated numeracy effect, though we do not find evidence of increased polarization of high-numeracy participants.

Hunger Affects Social Decisions in a Multi-Round Public Goods Game but Not a Single-Shot Ultimatum Game

Objective

People have the intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation, but experimental tests of this have often produced null results. One possible explanation is that the experimental tasks used are not rich enough to capture the diverse pathways by which social cooperation can be sustained or break down in real life. We studied the effects of hunger on cooperation in two tasks of differential interaction richness.

Methods

We manipulated hunger by asking participants to eat, or refrain from eating, breakfast. Participants in experiment 1 (n = 106) played a one-shot Ultimatum Game. Participants in experiment 2 (n = 264) played twenty rounds of a Public Goods Game in the same groups of four, ten rounds with the possibility of punishing other group members, and ten without.

Results

In experiment 1, skipping breakfast had no significant effects on either amounts proposed or minimum acceptable offers. In experiment 2, there were multiple different significant effects of the manipulation. No-breakfast participants were more generous in the first round of the game without punishment, and in subsequent rounds, were more influenced by what other group members had done the round before. In the punishment game, no-breakfast participants were also less likely to punish their group-mates than breakfast participants. Consequently, the possibility of punishment was less effective in increasing group cooperation levels in no-breakfast groups.

Conclusion

Replicating earlier findings, we found a null effect of hunger on cooperation in a one-shot Ultimatum Game. However, in our richer Public Goods Game, the dynamics of cooperation differed with hunger, in subtle ways not simply classifiable as hungry participants being ‘more’ or ‘less’ cooperative overall.

The smart intuitor: Cognitive capacity predicts intuitive rather than deliberate thinking

Cognitive capacity is commonly assumed to predict performance in classic reasoning tasks because people higher in cognitive capacity are believed to be better at deliberately correcting biasing erroneous intuitions. However, recent findings suggest that there can also be a positive correlation between cognitive capacity and correct intuitive thinking. Here we present results from 2 studies that directly contrasted whether cognitive capacity is more predictive of having correct intuitions or successful deliberate correction of an incorrect intuition. We used a two-response paradigm in which people were required to give a fast intuitive response under time pressure and cognitive load and afterwards were given the time to deliberate. We used a direction-of change analysis to check whether correct responses were generated intuitively or whether they resulted from deliberate correction (i.e., an initial incorrect-to-correct final response change). Results showed that although cognitive capacity was associated with the correction tendency (overall r = 0.22) it primarily predicted correct intuitive responding (overall r = 0.44). These findings force us to rethink the nature of sound reasoning and the role of cognitive capacity in reasoning. Rather than being good at deliberately correcting erroneous intuitions, smart reasoners simply seem to have more accurate intuitions.

How mathematics anxiety affects students' inflexible perseverance in mathematics problem-solving: Examining the mediating role of cognitive reflection

BACKGROUND

Too many students persevere in relying upon one (sometimes suboptimal) strategy for solving a wide range of problems, even when they know more efficient strategies. Although many studies have mentioned such phenomena, few studies have examined how emotional factors could affect this type of inflexible perseverance in strategy use.

AIMS

To examine whether mathematics anxiety could affect students' inflexible perseverance in strategy use and whether this effect could be mediated by cognitive reflection, which is the ability to engage in deliberate reasoning.

SAMPLE AND METHOD

In Study 1, 164 undergraduate students' (18-22 years) mathematics anxiety, cognitive reflection, and performance in overcoming inflexible perseverance were measured by a questionnaire battery. Structural equation models were used to examine the correlations between these variables. In Study 2, 98 undergraduate freshmen (17-18 years) were assigned to two groups, where one group's mathematics anxiety was temporarily induced by task instructions, while the other group served as a control group. Cognitive reflection and inflexible perseverance of the two groups were compared.

RESULTS

Study 1 showed that mathematics anxiety was negatively correlated with students' performance on overcoming inflexible perseverance, while cognitive reflection mediated such an effect. Study 2 showed that compared to the control group, the experimental group showed lower cognitive reflection, which led to lower performance in overcoming inflexible perseverance.

CONCLUSIONS

Mathematics anxiety was showed to impair students' ability to engage in deliberate reasoning and was associated with inflexible use of strategies. Alleviating students' mathematics anxiety should be considered when promoting students' strategic flexibility.

Jumping to conclusions in the less-delusion-prone? Further evidence from a more reliable beads task

BACKGROUND

A single meta-analysis has found that healthy people with higher delusion-proneness tend to gather less information (i.e., make fewer draws to decision, or DTD) on the beads task, although the findings of contributing studies were mixed, and the pooled effect size was small. However, using a new and more reliable "distractor sequences" beads task, we recently found a positive relationship between delusion-proneness and DTD in a healthy sample. In the current study, we re-tested this relationship in a new sample, and tested the possibility that the relationship is driven by participant's ability to understand and use odds or likelihood information ("odds literacy").

METHODS

Healthy participants (N = 167) completed the distractor sequences beads task, the Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI) which measures delusion-proneness, a measure of odds literacy, and the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scale.

RESULTS

PDI and DTD were positively correlated, and comparing PDI quartiles on DTD confirmed a statistically significant trend of increasing DTD with PDI quartile. Odds literacy was positively rather than negatively associated with both DTD and PDI. Anxiety was positively correlated with PDI and DTD.

CONCLUSIONS

We replicated our earlier finding that DTD and delusion-proneness were positively related in a non-clinical sample, but found that increased odds-literacy did not drive lower PDI and DTD, and hence did not explain their covariance. It is possible however that anxiety and co-occurring risk aversion drive increased delusion-proneness and information-gathering, potentially accounting for the positive relationship between PDI and DTD.

The Influence of Core Self-Evaluations on Group Decision Making Processes: A Laboratory Experiment

The personal trait called Core Self-Evaluations (CSE) has been receiving increasing attention from behavioral strategy scholars due to its ability to predict job performance and to explain some facets of decision-making processes. However, despite previous studies hypothesizing that managers with high values of CSE are intuitive thinkers, beyond any doubt of their capacities and that they significantly lead to positive results for their organization, no one has empirically investigated these assumptions. This gap can be substantiated by the following research question: “How do high Core Self-Evaluations influence team decision-making processes?”. Answering it provides insights on how the evaluations that decision makers make about situations (and the consequent actions that are implemented) highly depend on decision makers’ inner traits and their effect on cognition. To fill this gap, 120 graduate students—divided into groups of four—took part in a simulation game and were asked to make decisions acting the role of General Manager of a small-sized manufacturing firm. Tests aimed at identifying the CSE and intuitive/reflecting thinking approach of participants were administered; moreover, the performance resulting from their decision-making processes and their estimation of reached results were collected. Results show that an average level of CSE is preferable to balance intuitive and reflective thinking, as well as avoiding overconfidence bias and reaching the best performance possible. This work suggests that there is a huge misattribution in considering a high level of CSE as being beneficial for decision-making processes and consequent performance.

The Intuition of Punishment: A Study of Fairness Preferences and Cognitive Ability

Can differences in cognitive reflection explain other-regarding behavior? To test this, I use the three-item Cognitive Reflection Task to classify individuals as intuitive or reflective and correlate this measure with choices in three games that each subject participates in. The main sample consists of 236 individuals who completed the dictator game, ultimatum game and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed that intuitive individuals acted more prosocially in all social dilemma tasks. These individuals were more likely to serve as a norm enforcer and third-party punish a selfish act in the dictator game. Reflective individuals were found more likely to act consistently in a self-interested manner across the three games.

"You're wrong!": The impact of accuracy feedback on the bat-and-ball problem

The popular bat-and-ball problem is a relatively simple math riddle on which people are easily biased by intuitive or heuristic thinking. In two studies we tested the impact of a simple but somewhat neglected manipulation - the impact of minimal accuracy feedback - on bat-and-ball performance. Participants solved a total of 15 standard and 15 control versions of the bat-and-ball problem in three consecutive blocks. Half of the participants received accuracy feedback in the intermediate block. Results of both studies indicated that the feedback had, on average, no significant effect on bat-and-ball accuracy over and above mere repeated presentation. We did observe a consistent improvement for a small number of individual participants. Explorative analyses indicated that this improved group showed a more pronounced conflict detection effect (i.e., latency increase) at the pretest and took more deliberation time after receiving the negative feedback compared to the unimproved group.

Using confidence and consensuality to predict time invested in problem solving and in real-life web searching

Understanding processes that lead people to invest a certain amount of time in challenging tasks is important for theory and practice. In particular, researchers often assume strong linear associations between confidence, consensuality (the degree to which an answer is independently given by multiple participants), and response time. The Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM; Ackerman, 2014) is a metacognitive model which explains the stopping rules people employ under uncertainty in terms of the confidence-time association. This model is unique in predicting a curvilinear rather than a linear confidence-time association. Using consensuality as an alternative to confidence for predicting response time offers theoretical and practical opportunities. In four experiments, including replications and variations, we examined confidence (where collected) and consensuality as predictors of the time people invest in three problem-solving tasks and in real-life web searching. The results using consensuality, like those for confidence, fitted the curvilinear time pattern predicted by the DCM, with one exception: at least 30% of the population must endorse a potential answer for consensuality to predict response time based on the stopping rules in the DCM. Beyond examining consensuality as a predictor, the study brings converging evidence supporting the DCM's curvilinear confidence-time association over alternative models. The methodology used for analyzing web searching offers new directions for metacognitive research in naturally-performed tasks.

How physical interaction with insight problems affects solution rates, hint use, and cognitive load

So-called insight problems are widely studied because they tap into the creative thinking that is crucial for solving real problems. However, insight problems are typically presented in static formats (on paper, computer) that allow no physical interaction with the problem elements, whereas such an interaction might in fact reduce the load on limited cognitive resources, such as working memory (WM) capacity, thereby facilitating solutions. To test this proposition, 124 young adults were allowed to interact physically with nine established insight problems, while another 124 people attempted to solve these problems using paper and pencil. Additionally, hints were provided for three problems that typically no-one solves. No general facilitating effect of physical interaction was found, with only one problem clearly benefitting from it. Furthermore, making use of hints was actually hindered by physical interaction. No difference in perceived task load and correlation with WM capacity was observed between the formats, and subjective ratings of insight were virtually unaffected by presentation format. Overall, physical interaction minimally affected insight problem-solving, which appears to rely strongly on internalized cognitive processing involving WM.