Psychosis, Delusions and the "Jumping to Conclusions" Reasoning Bias: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis

Does CBT for Psychosis Have an Impact on Delusions by Improving Reasoning Biases and Negative Self-Schemas?

Abstract. Cognitive-behavioral therapy for psychosis (CBTp) builds on theoretical models that postulate reasoning biases and negative self-schemas to be involved in the formation and maintenance of delusions. However, it is unclear whether CBTp induces change in delusions by improving these proposed causal mechanisms. This study reports on a mediation analysis of a CBTp effectiveness trial in which delusions were a secondary outcome. Patients with psychosis were randomized to individualized CBTp (n = 36) or a waiting list condition (WL; n = 34). Reasoning biases (jumping to conclusions, theory of mind, attribution biases) and self-schemas (implicit and explicit self-esteem; self-schemas related to different domains) were assessed pre- and post-therapy/WL. The results reveal an intervention effect on two of four measures of delusions and on implicit self-esteem. Nevertheless, the intervention effect on delusions was not mediated by implicit self-esteem. Changes in explicit self-schemas and reasoning biases did also not mediate the intervention effects on delusions. More focused interventions may be required to produce change in reasoning and self-schemas that have the potential to carry over to delusions.

Towards a reliable repeated-measures beads task for assessing the jumping to conclusions bias

The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC), in which some people gather less information than others before making a decision, has been linked to delusions in psychosis. JTC is usually identified via the beads task, in which a sequence of beads (the "target" sequence) is used to measure the amount of evidence participants require before making a decision. Yet, despite its common use, the reliability of the task has never been properly investigated. We investigated its reliability, and tested an alternate version which used distractor sequences to obfuscate the target sequence. Healthy participants (N = 212) were randomised into two groups. One group completed ten trials using the target sequence, while the other completed ten trials of the target sequence and three distractor sequences. Our data indicated the standard task may not be reliable over repeated measures, but that by including distractor sequences, the task becomes more believable, repeatable, and reliable. Additionally, excluding first-trial data (a "silent" practice trial) also improves repeatability. These improvements to the task are relevant to single trial studies, and will be especially useful to repeated-measures longitudinal, experimental, and treatment studies. Such repeated-measures studies are important for investigating the causal link between JTC and delusions.

The moderating role of cognitive biases on the relationship between negative affective states and psychotic-like experiences in non-clinical adults

Negative emotions and cognitive biases are important factors underlying psychotic symptoms and psychotic-like experiences (PLEs); however, it is not clear whether these factors interact when they influence psychotic phenomena. The aim of our study was to investigate whether psychosis-related cognitive biases moderate the relationship between negative affective states, i.e. anxiety and depression, and psychotic-like experiences. The study sample contains 251 participants who have never been diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. Anxiety, depression, cognitive biases, and psychotic-like experiences were assessed with self-report questionnaires. A moderation analysis was performed to examine the relationship between the study variables. The analyses revealed that the link between anxiety and positive PLEs is moderated by External Attribution bias, whereas the relationship between depression and positive PLEs is moderated by Attention to Threat bias. Attributional bias was also found to moderate the association between depression and negative subclinical symptoms; Jumping to Conclusions bias served as a moderator in the link between anxiety and depression and negative PLEs. Further studies in clinical samples are required to verify the moderating role of individual cognitive biases on the relationship between negative emotional states and full-blown psychotic symptoms.

Data gathering ability contributes to visual organization and probabilistic reasoning

Individuals use data gathering methods to inform judgments and behaviors. Effective interaction with the environment depends on these having high accuracy and low noise, but when they become abnormal, aberrant thoughts and perceptions can occur. In this study, we examined if data gathering methods were consistent across tasks that relied on different cognitive abilities, specifically visual perception and probabilistic reasoning. Thirty-four non-clinical participants engaged in the Ebbinghaus Illusion and the Jumping to Conclusions tasks, while also completing questionnaires concerning aspects of delusion formation. A significant, positive correlation was observed between performance on the Ebbinghaus Illusion and the Jumping to Conclusions tasks. Both tasks were negatively correlated with the General Conspiracy Belief Scale. The results suggest an underlying mechanism for data gathering that is consistent across behavioral domains and exists on a continuum in the general population.

Self-reported Cognitive Biases Moderate the Associations Between Social Stress and Paranoid Ideation in a Virtual Reality Experimental Study

INTRODUCTION

Cognitive biases are associated with psychosis liability and paranoid ideation. This study investigated the moderating relationship between pre-existing self-reported cognitive biases and the occurrence of paranoid ideation in response to different levels of social stress in a virtual reality environment.

METHODS

This study included 170 participants with different levels of psychosis liability (55 recent onset psychosis, 20 ultrahigh risk for psychosis, 42 siblings of psychotic patients, and 53 controls). All participants were exposed to virtual environments with different levels of social stress. The level of experienced paranoia in the virtual environments was measured with the State Social Paranoia Scale. Cognitive biases were assessed with a self-report continuous measure. Also, cumulative number of cognitive biases was calculated using dichotomous measures of the separate biases, based on general population norm scores.

RESULTS

Higher belief inflexibility bias (Z = 2.83, P < .001), attention to threat bias (Z = 3.40, P < .001), external attribution bias (Z = 2.60, P < .001), and data-gathering bias (Z = 2.07, P < .05) were all positively associated with reported paranoid ideation in the social virtual environments. Level of paranoid response increased with number of cognitive biases present (B = 1.73, P < .001). The effect of environmental stressors on paranoid ideation was moderated by attention to threat bias (Z = 2.78, P < .01) and external attribution bias (Z = 2.75, P < .01), whereas data-gathering bias and belief inflexibility did not moderate the relationship.

CONCLUSION

There is an additive effect of separate cognitive biases on paranoid response to social stress. The effect of social environmental stressors on paranoid ideation is further enhanced by attention to threat bias and external attribution bias.

Differential relationship of jumping-to-conclusions and incorrigibility with delusion severity

Reasoning biases such as jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) and incorrigibility have been suggested to contribute to the generation and maintenance of delusions. However, it is still debated whether these biases represent stable traits of patients with delusions, or are related to state fluctuations of delusion severity. The present study aimed to elucidate this question by combining a cross-sectional with a longitudinal approach. JTC, incorrigibility and delusion severity were assessed in 79 patients with a history of delusions over a 6-month period. To allow for a differentiated look into effects of time vs. symptom changes, patients were divided into patients with (D+) and without (D-) current delusions at baseline. Significant improvement of delusions was noted in D+ at follow-up. JTC did not differ between the two patient groups either at baseline or over time. In contrast, incorrigibility was significantly higher in D+ than D- at baseline; this difference remained stable throughout the 6-month follow-up period. The two biases did not significantly co-vary over time. Our results suggest a dissociation between incorrigibility and JTC as regards their relation to current presence of delusions, and tentatively support theoretical accounts attributing different roles to the two biases in the generation (JTC) and maintenance (incorrigibility) of delusions.

The role of cognitive and metacognitive factors in non-clinical paranoia and negative affect

OBJECTIVES

It is increasingly accepted that paranoia lies on a continuum of severity that can be observed in the general population. Several psychological factors have been implicated in the development of more distressing persecutory ideas including negative affect (i.e., anxiety and depression), beliefs about oneself and other people (i.e., schemas), and metacognitive beliefs. This study aimed to explore the combined role of cognition and metacognition in paranoia. Specifically, unhelpful metacognitive beliefs and schematic beliefs were tested as potential moderators of the relationship between non-clinical paranoid ideation and negative affect.

METHODS

Measures from 227 people who took part in a cross-sectional online survey were analysed using structural equation modelling. A series of models grounded in cognitive and metacognitive theory were tested sequentially.

RESULTS

The results demonstrated that unhelpful metacognitive beliefs had a positive moderating effect on the relationship between paranoia and negative affect. Negative beliefs about oneself and other people did not moderate negative affect but positive beliefs about other people had a negative moderating effect. In a final model, negative schematic beliefs predicted paranoid ideation whilst metacognitive beliefs predicted and moderated affect.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings suggest that consideration of metacognitive beliefs, as well as schemas, may be important in understanding non-clinical paranoia.

PRACTITIONER POINTS

Metacognitive beliefs may be an important determinant of negative affect in the context of non-clinical paranoia. The consideration of both cognitive and metacognitive factors may be helpful when working with people with distressing paranoid ideas.

Neuropsychological functioning and jumping to conclusions in recent onset psychosis patients

BACKGROUND

The reasoning bias of jumping to conclusions (JTC) consists of a tendency to make assumptions having little information.

OBJECTIVE

The aim of this study was to estimate the differences in neuropsychological functioning between recent onset psychotic patients who jump to conclusions and those who do not jump to conclusions.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

One hundred and twenty-two patients with a recent onset of a psychotic disorder were assessed with three JTC tasks and a neuropsychological battery exploring verbal learning, memory, attention, psychomotor speed, visuoperceptual abilities, working memory, problem solving, executive functioning.

RESULTS

A total of 29.7% (n=36) of the individuals jumped to conclusions in Task 1, 14.0% (n=17) in Task 2, and 15.7% (n=19) in Task 3. People who jump to conclusions in three tasks scored significantly worse in many neuropsychological domain deficits, including attention (p<0.001-0.020), psychomotor speed (p<0.001), working memory (p<0.001-0.040), and executive functioning (p<0.001-0.042).

DISCUSSION

The present study demonstrates that JTC is present even in early stages of the illness, and that there is a relationship between JTC and neuropsychological functioning.

An internet-based intervention for people with psychosis (EviBaS): study protocol for a randomized controlled trial

BACKGROUND

Evidence shows that internet-based self-help interventions are effective in reducing symptoms for a wide range of mental disorders. To date, online interventions treating psychotic disorders have been scarce, even though psychosis is among the most burdensome disorders worldwide. Furthermore, the implementation of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) for psychosis in routine health care is challenging. Internet-based interventions could narrow this treatment gap. Thus, a comprehensive CBT-based online self-help intervention for people with psychosis has been developed. The aim of this study is the evaluation of the feasibility and efficacy of the intervention compared with a waiting list control group.

METHODS

The intervention includes modules on delusion, voice hearing, social competence, mindfulness, and seven other domains. Participants are guided through the program by a personal moderator. Usage can be amended by an optional smartphone app. In this randomized controlled trial, participants are allocated to a waiting list or an intervention of eight weeks. Change in positive psychotic symptoms of both groups will be compared (primary outcome) and predictors of treatment effects will be assessed.

DISCUSSION

To our knowledge, this project is one of the first large-scale investigations of an internet-based intervention for people with psychosis. It may thus be a further step to broaden treatment options for people suffering from this disorder.

TRIAL REGISTRATION

NCT02974400 (clinicaltrials.gov), date of registration: November 28th 2016.

The Relationship Between Clinical and Personal Recovery in Patients With Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis

Patients describe experiencing personal recovery despite ongoing symptoms of psychosis. The aim of the current research was to perform a meta-analysis investigating the relationship between clinical and personal recovery in patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders. A comprehensive OvidSP database search was performed to identify relevant studies. Correlation coefficients of the relationship between clinical and personal recovery were retrieved from primary studies. Meta-analyses were performed, calculating mean weighted effect sizes for the association between clinical and personal recovery, hope, and empowerment. Additionally, associations between positive, negative, affective symptoms, general functioning, and personal recovery were investigated. The results show that heterogeneity across studies was substantial. Random effect meta-analysis of the relationship between symptom severity and personal recovery revealed a mean weighted correlation coefficient of r = -.21 (95% CI = -0.27 to -0.14, P < .001). We found the following mean weighted effect size for positive symptoms r = -.20 (95% CI = -0.27 to -0.12, P < .001), negative symptoms r = -.24 (95% CI = -0.33 to -0.15, P < .001), affective symptoms r = -.34 (95% CI = -0.44 to -0.24, P < .001) and functioning r = .21 (95% CI = -0.09 to 0.32, P < .001). The results indicate a significant small to medium association between clinical and personal recovery. Psychotic symptoms show a smaller correlation than affective symptoms with personal recovery. These findings suggest that clinical and personal recovery should both be considered in treatment and outcome monitoring of patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

The role of expressive suppression in hallucinatory-like and delusion-like experiences. Findings in a non-clinical sample

INTRODUCTION

Previous works concerning emotion regulation in psychosis highlighted the relationship between expressive suppression and negative psychotic symptoms, as well as between expressive suppression and auditory hallucinations. However, a direct association between suppression and delusions has not been observed. In the study we examined whether expressive suppression is associated with psychotic-like experiences and whether it may influence delusion-like experiences by changing the impact of cognitive biases on delusional beliefs.

METHODS

Two hundred and twenty-one healthy individuals never diagnosed with psychiatric disorders completed self-report questionnaires measuring: delusion-like experiences, hallucinatory-like experiences, cognitive biases and expressive suppression. Regression and moderation analyses were performed.

RESULTS

Regression analyses revealed that the overall level of suppression predicts hallucinatory-like experiences, but not delusion-like experiences. Suppression of anxiety and suppression of sadness were significant predictors of hallucinatory-like experiences, whereas suppression of anxiety predicted delusion-like experiences. A moderation analysis indicated that both the overall level of suppression and suppression of sadness moderate the relationship between belief inflexibility and delusion-like experiences in such a way that belief inflexibility increases delusion-like experiences only among individuals reporting a low level of suppression.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings confirmed that expressive suppression has a direct impact on hallucinatory-like experiences and suggest that the use of suppression may influence delusion-like experiences by moderating the impact of belief inflexibility on delusional thinking.

Video-based mobile health interventions for people with schizophrenia: Bringing the "pocket therapist" to life

OBJECTIVE

To examine whether video-based mobile health (mHealth) interventions are feasible, acceptable, understandable, and engaging to people with schizophrenia.

METHOD

This study used a mixed-methods design. Ten individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders were recruited for a month-long trial in which they used FOCUS-Audio/Video (FOCUS-AV), a smartphone system that offers video and written intervention options. Participants completed posttrial measures and engaged in semistructured interviews.

FINDINGS

One participant dropped out. The remaining 9 participants used intervention videos successfully. Participants responded to 67% of system-delivered prompts to engage FOCUS-AV, and 52% of FOCUS-AV use was initiated by the users. On average, participants used interventions 6 days a week, 4 times daily. Participants used video functions an average of 28 times. They chose video over written interventions on 67% of the times they used on-demand functions but opted for written content 78% of the times they responded to prescheduled prompts. Clinician videos were rated as more personal, engaging, and helpful than written interventions. Video and written interventions were rated as equally usable and understandable. Written interventions were rated as more favorable in letting users proceed at their own pace. Similarly to what is seen in live therapy, the communication style and demeanor of clinicians depicted in intervention videos reportedly affected participants' experience with treatment.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

Video-based mHealth may be a feasible, usable, acceptable, and highly engaging method for flexible delivery of interventions to people with schizophrenia using mobile technology. Producing intervention videos is more time-, labor-, and cost-intensive than generating written content, but participant feedback suggests that there may be added value in this approach. Additional research will determine whether video-based mHealth interventions lead to better, faster, or more sustainable clinical gains. (PsycINFO Database Record

The role of self-disturbances and cognitive biases in the relationship between traumatic life events and psychosis proneness in a non-clinical sample

BACKGROUND

Traumatic life events have been established as an environmental risk factor for psychosis. However, the exact mechanisms by which traumatic life events increase risk for psychosis are unknown. In the present study we tested an integrative model of traumatic life events being related to psychosis proneness via self-disturbances and cognitive biases.

METHODS

The sample consisted of 653 healthy people. Traumatic life events, self-disturbances, cognitive biases and psychosis proneness were assessed with self-report questionnaires. The direct and an indirect model of the relationship between traumatic life events and psychosis proneness were compared using path analyses with structural equation modelling in a cross-sectional study.

RESULTS

There was a significant direct effect of traumatic life events on psychosis proneness. However, path analysis suggested better fit of the indirect model including paths from trauma to psychosis proneness via cognitive biases and self-disturbances. There were significant paths from traumatic life events to cognitive biases and self-disorders. Self-disorders significantly predicted cognitive biases. Finally, cognitive biases and self-disorders significantly predicted psychosis proneness. Exclusion of any paths, apart from direct path in the model, significantly reduced model fitness.

DISCUSSION

The results revealed that a direct relationship between trauma and psychosis proneness became insignificant when taking into account the influence of self-disorders and cognitive biases. This suggests that the interactions between disrupted self-experience, impaired information processing and traumatic life events are of importance in psychosis proneness. This model should be further tested in a longitudinal study on a clinical sample.

The role of effective connectivity between the task-positive and task-negative network for evidence gathering [Evidence gathering and connectivity]

Reports linking a 'jumping-to-conclusions' bias to delusions have led to growing interest in the neurobiological correlates of probabilistic reasoning. Several brain areas have been implicated in probabilistic reasoning; however, findings are difficult to integrate into a coherent account. The present study aimed to provide additional evidence by investigating, for the first time, effective connectivity among brain areas involved in different stages of evidence gathering. We investigated evidence gathering in 25 healthy individuals using fMRI and a new paradigm (Box Task) designed such as to minimize the effects of cognitive effort and reward processing. Decisions to collect more evidence ('draws') were contrasted to decisions to reach a final choice ('conclusions') with respect to BOLD activity. Psychophysiological interaction analysis was used to investigate effective connectivity. Conclusion events were associated with extensive brain activations in widely distributed brain areas associated with the task-positive network. In contrast, draw events were characterized by higher activation in areas assumed to be part of the task-negative network. Effective connectivity between the two networks decreased during draws and increased during conclusion events. Our findings indicate that probabilistic reasoning may depend on the balance between the task-positive and task-negative network, and that shifts in connectivity between the two may be crucial for evidence gathering. Thus, abnormal connectivity between the two systems may significantly contribute to the jumping-to-conclusions bias.

Are Psychotic Experiences Related to Poorer Reflective Reasoning?

Background: Cognitive biases play an important role in the formation and maintenance of delusions. These biases are indicators of a weak reflective mind, or reduced engaging in reflective and deliberate reasoning. In three experiments, we tested whether a bias to accept non-sense statements as profound, treat metaphorical statements as literal, and suppress intuitive responses is related to psychotic-like experiences.

Methods: We tested deliberate reasoning and psychotic-like experiences in the general population and in patients with a former psychotic episode. Deliberate reasoning was assessed with the bullshit receptivity scale, the ontological confabulation scale and the cognitive reflection test (CRT). We also measured algorithmic performance with the Berlin numeracy test and the wordsum test. Psychotic-like experiences were measured with the Community Assessment of Psychic Experience (CAPE-42) scale.

Results: Psychotic-like experiences were positively correlated with a larger receptivity toward bullshit, more ontological confabulations, and also a lower score on the CRT but not with algorithmic task performance. In the patient group higher psychotic-like experiences significantly correlated with higher bullshit receptivity.

Conclusion: Reduced deliberate reasoning may contribute to the formation of delusions, and be a general thinking bias largely independent of a person's general intelligence. Acceptance of bullshit may be facilitated the more positive symptoms a patient has, contributing to the maintenance of the delusions.

Self-Reported Cognitive Biases Are Equally Present in Patients Diagnosed With Psychotic Versus Nonpsychotic Disorders

We investigated the relation between subjective cognitive biases measured with the Dutch Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases (DACOBS-NL) and (1) the presence of a psychotic versus nonpsychotic psychiatric disorder, (2) the current dose of antipsychotic medication and current psychotic symptoms, and (3) the Personality Inventory for the DSM-5 (PID-5) Psychoticism personality trait. Results showed that DACOBS-NL subjective cognitive biases (1) were equally present in patients diagnosed with nonpsychotic disorders compared with patients with a psychotic disorder, (2) could not be explained by the current dose of antipsychotic medication, nor by current psychotic symptoms, and (3) significantly correlated with all PID-5 Personality domains. Moreover, in predicting membership of the psychotic versus nonpsychotic psychiatric disorder group, the addition of the PID-5 domains in step 2 rendered the contribution of the DACOBS-NL subjective cognitive biases in step 1 nonsignificant. Further research is needed to clarify the interplay between cognitive biases and aberrant salience in the prediction of psychotic disorders.

Data-Gathering, Belief Flexibility, and Reasoning Across the Psychosis Continuum

BACKGROUND

There is evidence for a group of nonclinical individuals with full-blown, persistent psychotic experiences (PEs) but no need-for-care: they are of particular importance in identifying risk and protective factors for clinical psychosis. The aim of this study was to investigate whether reasoning biases are related to PEs or need-for-care.

METHOD

Two groups with persistent PEs (clinical; n = 74; nonclinical; n = 92) and a control group without PEs (n = 83) were compared on jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) and belief flexibility. A randomly selected subset of interviews (n = 104) was analyzed to examine differences in experiential and rational reasoning.

RESULTS

As predicted JTC was more common in the clinical than the other 2 groups. Unexpectedly no group differences were observed between clinical and nonclinical groups on measures of belief flexibility. However, the clinical group was less likely to employ rational reasoning, while the nonclinical group was more likely to use experiential reasoning plus a combination of both types of reasoning processes, compared to the other 2 groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Reasoning biases differ in groups with PEs with and without need-for-care. JTC is associated with need-for-care rather than with PEs. The ability to invoke rational reasoning processes, together with an absence of JTC, may protect against pathological outcomes of persistent PEs. However, marked use of experiential reasoning is associated with the occurrence of PEs in both clinical and nonclinical groups. Implications for theory development, intervention and further research are discussed.

Self-disturbances, cognitive biases and insecure attachment as mechanisms of the relationship between traumatic life events and psychotic-like experiences in non-clinical adults - A path analysis

Although traumatic life events have been linked to psychotic-like experiences, the mechanisms of the relationship remain unclear. We investigated whether insecure (anxious and avoidant) attachment styles, cognitive biases and self-disturbances serve as significant mediators in the relationship between traumatic life events and psychotic-like experiences in non-clinical sample. Six-hundred and ninety healthy participants (522 females) who have not ever been diagnosed with psychiatric disorders took part in the study. Participants completed self-report scales that measure traumatic life events, psychotic-like experiences, cognitive biases, attachment styles and self-disturbances. Our model was tested with path analysis. Our integrated model fit to the data with excellent goodness-of-fit indices. The direct effect was significantly reduced after the mediators were included. Significant pathways from traumatic life events to psychotic-like experiences were found through self-disturbances and cognitive biases. Traumatic life events were associated with anxious attachment through cognitive biases. Self-disturbances, cognitive biases and anxious attachment had a direct effect on psychotic-like experiences. The results of our study tentatively suggest that traumatic life events are related with psychotic-like experiences through cognitive biases and self-disturbances. Further studies in clinical samples are required to verify our model.

The interplay between trait anxiety, cognitive biases and attentional control in healthy individuals with psychotic-like experiences

Although both anxiety and cognitive biases contribute to psychosis, it is still unclear whether these factors interact in their influence on psychotic symptoms. The aim of the study was to examine the interactions between trait anxiety, cognitive biases and delusion-like experiences (PLEs) in a non-clinical sample; the moderational role of attentional control on this relationship was also considered in the study. Two subgroups of participants, 92 individuals (M=24.76; SD=6.33) with heightened (HA) trait anxiety and 78 individuals (M=23.09; SD=5.66) with lowered (LA) trait anxiety took part in the study. Anxiety, cognitive biases and attentional control were measured using self-report questionnaires. Regression analyses and moderation analyses were performed. External attribution bias predicted psychotic-like experiences in both groups, whereas attention to threat bias and belief inflexibility predicted PLEs within LA group. Further moderation analyses revealed that in LA group attention to threat bias increases PLEs only among individuals with a high and moderate ability to focus attention. The results indicated that trait anxiety is an important factor influencing the relationship between cognitive biases and PLEs, and that the ability to voluntarily focus attention is a significant moderator of the linkage between attention to threat bias and delusion-like experiences among low-anxious healthy individuals.

Two case studies from a virtual reality intervention for delusions: feasibility and preliminary evidence

The use of virtual reality (VR) interventions for psychosis is on the rise. As information-processing biases such as overconfidence in memory are likely to be involved in the formation and maintenance of delusions, VR could also be used to correct cognitive distortions and in turn ameliorate delusions. The present study illustrates two case studies in which a VR intervention was employed to reduce delusions by means of correcting experiences. Participants navigated four virtual environments via a head-mounted display (HMD) and computer and were asked to recollect previously seen faces and objects and to rate their response confidence. The scenarios were created to elicit false memories. Immediately after each response, they received feedback to correct possible overconfidence in false memories. We present two case studies to illustrate individual differences. Both participants benefited from the intervention: delusions were reduced from pre- to post-assessment (after 3 weeks) as measured with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale and Psychotic Symptom Scale. This was corroborated by results on the Paranoia Checklist and the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences collected immediately after the session. Immediate effects also showed a reduction in delusion conviction rate. The present study provides preliminary evidence that delusions may be ameliorated by a VR paradigm designed to correct memory overconfidence. Cybersickness emerged as a problem in one of the patients.

SlowMo, a digital therapy targeting reasoning in paranoia, versus treatment as usual in the treatment of people who fear harm from others: study protocol for a randomised controlled trial

Background

Paranoia is one of the most common symptoms of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and is associated with significant distress and disruption to the person’s life. Developing more effective and accessible psychological interventions for paranoia is a clinical priority. Our research team has approached this challenge in two main ways: firstly, by adopting an interventionist causal approach to increase effectiveness and secondly, by incorporating user-centred inclusive design methods to enhance accessibility and usability. Our resultant new digital intervention, SlowMo, intensively targets a reasoning style associated with paranoia, fast thinking, characterised by jumping to conclusions and belief inflexibility. It consists of an easy-to-use, enjoyable and memorable digital interface. An interactive web-based app facilitates delivery of face-to-face meetings which is then synchronised with an innovative mobile app for use in daily life.

Methods/Design

We aim to test the clinical efficacy of SlowMo over 24 weeks to determine the mechanisms through which it reduces paranoia, and to identify participant characteristics that moderate its effectiveness. In a parallel-group randomised controlled trial, with 1:1 allocation, 360 participants with distressing persecutory beliefs will be independently randomised to receive either the SlowMo intervention added to treatment as usual (TAU) or TAU, using randomly varying permuted blocks, stratified by paranoia severity and site. Research workers will be blind to therapy allocation. The primary outcome is paranoia severity over 24 weeks; our hypothesised mechanism of change is reasoning; moderators include negative symptoms and working memory; and secondary outcomes include wellbeing, quality of life, and service use. The accessibility, usability and acceptability of the digital platform will be assessed.

Discussion

SlowMo has been developed as the first blended digital therapy to target fears of harm from others through an inclusive design approach. In addition to testing its efficacy, this trial will add to our understanding of psychological mechanisms in paranoia. The study will examine the usability and adherence of a novel digital therapy, including an app for self-management, in a large sample of people affected by severe mental health difficulties.

Trial registration

ISRCTN registry, ID: ISRCTN32448671. Registered prospectively on 30 January 2017. Date assigned 2 February 2017.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s13063-017-2242-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

A structural equation model of the relationship between insomnia, negative affect, and paranoid thinking

Background

A growing body of evidence points to relationships between insomnia, negative affect, and paranoid thinking. However, studies are needed to examine (i) whether negative affect mediates the relation between insomnia and paranoid thinking, (ii) whether different types of insomnia exert different effects on paranoia, and (iii) to compare the impact of objective and self-reported sleeping difficulties.

Method

Structural equation modelling was therefore used to test competing models of the relationships between self-reported insomnia, negative affect, and paranoia. n = 348 participants completed measures of insomnia, negative affect and paranoia. A subset of these participants (n = 91) went on to monitor their sleep objectively (using a portable sleep monitor made by Zeo) for seven consecutive nights. Associations between objectively recorded sleep, negative affect, and paranoia were explored using linear regression.

Results

The findings supported a fully mediated model where self-reported delayed sleep onset, but not self-reported problems with sleep maintenance or objective measures of sleep, was directly associated with negative affect that, in turn, was associated with paranoia. There was no evidence of a direct association between delayed sleep onset or sleep maintenance problems and paranoia.

Conclusions

Taken together, the findings point to an association between perceived (but not objective) difficulties initially falling asleep (but not maintaining sleep) and paranoid thinking; a relationship that is fully mediated by negative affect. Future research should seek to disentangle the causal relationships between sleep, negative affect, and paranoia (e.g., by examining the effect of an intervention using prospective designs that incorporate experience sampling). Indeed, interventions might profitably target (i) perceived sleep quality, (ii) sleep onset, and / or (iii) emotion regulation as a route to reducing negative affect and, thus, paranoid thinking.

Systematic review and meta-analysis of factors that help or hinder treatment decision-making capacity in psychosis

BackgroundThe evidence on factors that may influence treatment decisional capacity ('capacity') in psychosis has yet to be comprehensively synthesised, which limits the development of effective strategies to improve or support it.AimsTo determine the direction, magnitude and reliability of the relationship between capacity in psychosis and a range of clinical, demographic and treatment-related factors, thus providing a thorough synthesis of current knowledge.MethodWe conducted a systematic review, meta-analytical and narrative synthesis of factors that help or hinder treatment decision-making capacity in psychosis, assessing the direction, magnitude, significance and reliability of reported associations.ResultsWe identified 23 relevant studies (n = l823). Psychotic symptoms had small, moderate and strong associations with appreciation, understanding and reasoning respectively. Both verbal cognitive functioning and duration of education had small to moderate correlations with understanding and reasoning. Better capacity was also associated with better insight, better metacognitive ability, higher anxiety and lower perceived coercion. No linear relationship with depression was observed. Interventions linked to improved capacity over time were in-patient care, information simplification, shared decision-making and metacognitive training.ConclusionsAlthough much is known about the role of symptoms and other clinical variables, effective and acceptable psychological interventions to support capacity in this group are lacking.

Threatening events theme of cognitive biases mediates the relationship between fear of social situations and delusion-like experiences among healthy adults

Social anxiety (SA) is frequently observed among patients diagnosed with psychosis as well as among individuals with delusion-like experiences (DLEs). A heightened level of SA has been recognized to precede the development of psychotic symptoms; however, the detailed mechanisms that link SA to delusional ideation remain unrecognized. Since social anxiety is associated with the presence of cognitive biases and biased cognitive processes have been found to play a role in the development and maintenance of delusions, we hypothesized that cognitive biases may mediate in the relationship between social anxiety and DLEs. A total sample of 202 healthy individuals with mean age 35.59 (SD = 17.15) was assessed for the presence of delusion-like experiences, social anxiety, as well as the threatening events theme and anomalous perception theme of cognitive biases. The threatening events theme was found to fully mediate the linkage between fear of social situations and DLEs (β = 0.12, p < 0.05). The threatening events theme was also found to be a partial mediator in the association between social avoidance and DLEs (β = 0.20, p < 0.05), and between the overall level of social anxiety and DLEs (β = 0.18, p < 0.05). Our findings suggest that social anxiety may influence DLEs by providing the threatening events theme of cognitive biases.

Analytic cognitive style predicts paranormal explanations of anomalous experiences but not the experiences themselves: Implications for cognitive theories of delusions

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

It has been proposed that delusional beliefs are attempts to explain anomalous experiences. Why, then, do anomalous experiences induce delusions in some people but not in others? One possibility is that people with delusions have reasoning biases that result in them failing to reject implausible candidate explanations for anomalous experiences. We examine this hypothesis by studying paranormal interpretations of anomalous experiences.

METHODS

We examined whether analytic cognitive style (i.e. the willingness or disposition to critically evaluate outputs from intuitive processing and engage in effortful analytic processing) predicted anomalous experiences and paranormal explanations for these experiences after controlling for demographic variables and cognitive ability.

RESULTS

Analytic cognitive style predicted paranormal explanations for anomalous experiences, but not the anomalous experiences themselves.

LIMITATIONS

We did not study clinical delusions. Our attempts to control for cognitive ability may have been inadequate. Our sample was predominantly students.

CONCLUSIONS

Limited analytic cognitive style might contribute to the interpretation of anomalous experiences in terms of delusional beliefs.

A Bayesian perspective on delusions: Suggestions for modifying two reasoning tasks

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

There are a range of mechanistic explanations on the formation and maintenance of delusions. Within the Bayesian brain hypothesis, particularly within the framework of predictive coding models, delusions are seen as an aberrant inference process characterized by either a failure in sensory attenuation or an aberrant weighting of prior experience. Testing of these Bayesian decision theories requires measuring of both the patients' confidence in their beliefs and the confidence they assign new, incoming information. In the Bayesian framework we apply here, the former is referred to as the prior while the latter is usually called the data or likelihood.

METHODS AND RESULTS

This narrative review will commence by giving an introduction to the basic concept underlying the Bayesian decision theory approach to delusion. A consequence of crucial importance of this sketch is that it provides a measure for the persistence of a belief. Experimental tasks measuring these parameters are presented. Further, a modification of two standard reasoning tasks, the beads task and the evidence integration task, is proposed that permits testing the parameters from Bayesian decision theory.

LIMITATIONS

Patients differ from controls by the distress the delusions causes to them. The Bayesian Decision theory framework has no explicit parameter for distress.

CONCLUSIONS

A more detailed reporting of differences between patients with delusions is warranted.

The relationship between cognitive biases and psychological dimensions of delusions: The importance of jumping to conclusions

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Cognitive biases play a role in the development and maintenance of delusions. However, delusions are multidimensional (i.e., emotional and cognitive facets) and often co-occur with auditory hallucinations. Therefore, further refinement of the precise relationship between cognitive biases, delusions, and hallucinatory experiences is warranted.

METHODS

A total sample of 167 patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorders was split into two groups consisting of patients with active delusions (n = 127) and active hallucinations (n = 92). All patients were assessed for delusions and hallucinations using the semi-structured psychotic symptom rating scales (PSYRATS), which assesses the emotional (i.e., distress) and cognitive (i.e., conviction, preoccupation) dimensions of these symptoms. Cognitive biases were assessed with the Cognitive Biases Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQp) self-report questionnaire (assessing jumping to conclusions, intentionalising, catastrophising, emotional reasoning, and dichotomous thinking biases). Multiple stepwise regressions were performed to investigate the relationship between delusions and cognitive biases, while controlling for auditory hallucinations (and vice-versa).

RESULTS

The only cognitive bias to significantly predict delusions after controlling for the severity of auditory hallucinations was the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias (predicted both emotional and cognitive dimensions). Only the emotional dimension of auditory hallucinations was predicted by the intentionalising and dichotomous thinking biases, after delusional severity was controlled for.

LIMITATIONS

The cross-sectional design precludes causal inferences. Only positive psychotic symptoms were assessed and no wider psychopathology assessment was utilised (e.g., negative symptoms, anxiety, depression).

CONCLUSIONS

The jumping to conclusions bias is associated with both delusional conviction and emotional distress.

Negative affect and a fluctuating jumping to conclusions bias predict subsequent paranoia in daily life: An online experience sampling study

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Negative affect and a tendency to "jump to conclusions" (JTC) are associated with paranoia. So far, only negative affect has been examined as a precursor of subsequent paranoia in daily life using experience sampling (ESM). We addressed this research gap and used ESM to test whether JTC fluctuates in daily life, whether it predicts subsequent paranoia, and whether it mediates the effect of negative affect on paranoia.

METHODS

Thirty-five participants with schizophrenia spectrum disorders repeatedly self-reported negative affect, JTC, and paranoia via online questionnaires on two consecutive days. We measured JTC with a paradigm consisting of ambiguous written scenarios. Multilevel linear models were conducted.

RESULTS

Most participants showed JTC consistently on two days rather than only on one day. When time was used as a predictor of JTC, significant slope variance indicated that for a subgroup of participants JTC fluctuated over time. For 48% of participants, these fluctuations equaled changes of approximately ±1 point on the four-point JTC scale within one day. There was no mediation. However, negative affect and JTC both significantly predicted subsequent paranoia.

LIMITATIONS

The ESM assessment period was short and encompassed few assessments (8 in total).

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings indicate that JTC is both stable (regarding its mere occurrence) and fluctuating simultaneously (regarding its magnitude). Although JTC was not a mediator linking negative affect and paranoia, it did predict paranoia. Further ESM studies on JTC are needed to confirm our findings in longer assessment periods and with other JTC paradigms.

Unlocking design potential: Design with people diagnosed with schizophrenia

With the expansion of e-health systems to more diverse and heterogeneous contexts and user groups, it is increasingly important to include users in design. Designers recognize the benefits of user participation, but including users with lowered cognitive and social abilities can be difficult. This paper intends to answer how these users can participate in the design of e-health systems. We conducted a case study with stakeholder interviews and design workshops with users diagnosed with schizophrenia to identify and overcome the challenges for participation. From the stakeholder interviews, we identified challenges relating to social interaction, technical experience, cognitive ability, and loss of individuality. We designed workshops that addressed these challenges and identify five strategies for unlocking the design potential of the participants: (1) work together with concrete materials and examples; (2) maintain a positive focus; (3) accept all ideas; (4) maintain and require realism; and (5) use previous interaction. We conclude that, when supported appropriately, it is possible to involve people diagnosed with schizophrenia. We also highlight the difficulty for someone not self-experienced to understand contexts as challenging and sensitive as this, and thus the value of user participation.

Intranasal oxytocin does not modulate jumping to conclusions in schizophrenia: Potential interactions with caudate volume and baseline social functioning

BACKGROUND

Patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) tend to sample less information when making a decision, jumping to conclusions (JTC) without sufficient evidence. This "JTC bias" may be a trait marker of the disease and may not improve with antipsychotic treatment. We conducted a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial to test whether intranasal oxytocin could reduce JTC in stable, medicated patients with SCZ and healthy controls (HCs). We also explored whether striatal volume, clinical symptoms, and baseline social functioning (SF) was related to JTC performance.

METHODS

Forty-three male, medicated SCZ patients (Mean Age: 40.81±11.44) and sixteen HCs (Mean Age: 30.38±9.85) participated in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, cross-over study. Participants completed the Beads Task on two separate visits (minimum 20days apart). Participants were randomized to receive either intranasal oxytocin (50IU in solution) or intranasal placebo (saline). Twenty of the SCZ patients and all sixteen HCs also provided T1 MRIs (3-T).

RESULTS

Patients with SCZ took fewer draws to decision (DTD) than HCs (t(57)=2.78, p=0.007). Oxytocin did not significantly change DTD in patients (t(42)=-1.11, p=0.27), nor in HCs (t(15)=-0.62, p=0.55). Exploratory analyses found ventral caudate volumes were negatively correlated with DTD (r(18)=-0.50, p=0.03) in patients. Moreover, oxytocin was more likely to improve JTC in patients with lower baseline SF. However, these exploratory findings did not survive correction for multiple comparisons.

CONCLUSIONS

We replicate increased JTC in SCZ. However, acute intranasal oxytocin did not modify JTC. Future studies with larger samples should explore how brain morphology and SF are related to JTC performance in patients with SCZ.

Randomized control trial to assess the efficacy of metacognitive training compared with a psycho-educational group in people with a recent-onset psychosis

BACKGROUND

Aims were to assess the efficacy of metacognitive training (MCT) in people with a recent onset of psychosis in terms of symptoms as a primary outcome and metacognitive variables as a secondary outcome.

METHOD

A multicenter, randomized, controlled clinical trial was performed. A total of 126 patients were randomized to an MCT or a psycho-educational intervention with cognitive-behavioral elements. The sample was composed of people with a recent onset of psychosis, recruited from nine public centers in Spain. The treatment consisted of eight weekly sessions for both groups. Patients were assessed at three time-points: baseline, post-treatment, and at 6 months follow-up. The evaluator was blinded to the condition of the patient. Symptoms were assessed with the PANSS and metacognition was assessed with a battery of questionnaires of cognitive biases and social cognition.

RESULTS

Both MCT and psycho-educational groups had improved symptoms post-treatment and at follow-up, with greater improvements in the MCT group. The MCT group was superior to the psycho-educational group on the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) total (p = 0.026) and self-certainty (p = 0.035) and dependence self-subscale of irrational beliefs, comparing baseline and post-treatment. Moreover, comparing baseline and follow-up, the MCT group was better than the psycho-educational group in self-reflectiveness on the BCIS (p = 0.047), total BCIS (p = 0.045), and intolerance to frustration (p = 0.014). Jumping to Conclusions (JTC) improved more in the MCT group than the psycho-educational group (p = 0.021). Regarding the comparison within each group, Theory of Mind (ToM), Personalizing Bias, and other subscales of irrational beliefs improved in the MCT group but not the psycho-educational group (p < 0.001-0.032).

CONCLUSIONS

MCT could be an effective psychological intervention for people with recent onset of psychosis in order to improve cognitive insight, JTC, and tolerance to frustration. It seems that MCT could be useful to improve symptoms, ToM, and personalizing bias.

Dopamine, cognitive biases and assessment of certainty: A neurocognitive model of delusions

This paper examines the evidence that delusions can be explained within the framework of a neurocognitive model of how the brain assesses certainty. Here, 'certainty' refers to both low-level interpretations of one's environment and high-level (conscious) appraisals of one's beliefs and experiences. A model is proposed explaining how the brain systems responsible for assigning certainty might dysfunction, contributing to the cause and maintenance of delusional beliefs. It is suggested that delusions arise through a combination of perturbed striatal dopamine and aberrant salience as well as cognitive biases such as the tendency to jump to conclusions (JTC) and hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches. The role of emotion, stress, trauma and sociocultural factors in forming and modifying delusions is also considered. Understanding the mechanisms involved in forming and maintaining delusions has important clinical implications, as interventions that improve cognitive flexibility (e.g. cognitive remediation therapy and mindfulness training) could potentially attenuate neurocognitive processes.

Association of the Jumping to Conclusions and Evidence Integration Biases With Delusions in Psychosis: A Detailed Meta-analysis

We completed a meta-analysis to investigate the relationship between delusions in psychosis and 4 cognitive biases: "jumping to conclusions" (JTC), the "bias against disconfirmatory evidence" (BADE), the "bias against confirmatory evidence" (BACE), and "liberal acceptance" (LA). Building on recent meta-analyses we compared more narrowly defined groups. We identified 35 JTC, 8 BADE, 7 BACE, and 6 LA studies for inclusion. Groups with schizophrenia who were currently experiencing delusions demonstrated greater JTC, BADE, BACE, and LA than groups with schizophrenia who were not currently experiencing delusions, who in turn demonstrated no more JTC than healthy control groups. Hence JTC, BADE, BACE, and LA co-vary with delusions in cross-sectional samples of people with schizophrenia. Groups who were experiencing delusions due to other psychiatric illnesses also demonstrated greater JTC than healthy controls, and equivalent JTC to groups with schizophrenia currently experiencing delusions. Hence JTC is associated with delusions across a range of diagnoses. Groups with other, non-delusional psychiatric illnesses demonstrated less JTC, BADE, BACE, and LA than groups with schizophrenia currently experiencing delusions, less JTC than groups experiencing delusions due to other diagnoses, and no more JTC, BADE, BACE, or LA than healthy control groups. Hence JTC, BADE, BACE, and LA were not associated with psychiatric illnesses in general. Our results indicate all 4 biases are associated with delusions specifically rather than merely with a diagnosis of schizophrenia or with being psychiatrically ill, consistent with the possibility that they contribute to delusional severity.

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Delusions, the fixed false beliefs characteristic of psychotic illness, have long defied understanding despite their response to pharmacological treatments (e.g., D2 receptor antagonists). However, it can be challenging to discern what makes beliefs delusional compared with other unusual or erroneous beliefs. We suggest mapping the putative biology to clinical phenomenology with a cognitive psychology of belief, culminating in a teleological approach to beliefs and brain function supported by animal and computational models. We argue that organisms strive to minimize uncertainty about their future states by forming and maintaining a set of beliefs (about the organism and the world) that are robust, but flexible. If uncertainty is generated endogenously, beliefs begin to depart from consensual reality and can manifest into delusions. Central to this scheme is the notion that formal associative learning theory can provide an explanation for the development and persistence of delusions. Beliefs, in animals and humans, may be associations between representations (e.g., of cause and effect) that are formed by minimizing uncertainty via new learning and attentional allocation. Animal research has equipped us with a deep mechanistic basis of these processes, which is now being applied to delusions. This work offers the exciting possibility of completing revolutions of translation, from the bedside to the bench and back again. The more we learn about animal beliefs, the more we may be able to apply to human beliefs and their aberrations, enabling a deeper mechanistic understanding.

Analytic cognitive style, not delusional ideation, predicts data gathering in a large beads task study

INTRODUCTION

It has been proposed that deluded and delusion-prone individuals gather less evidence before forming beliefs than those who are not deluded or delusion-prone. The primary source of evidence for this "jumping to conclusions" (JTC) bias is provided by research that utilises the "beads task" data-gathering paradigm. However, the cognitive mechanisms subserving data gathering in this task are poorly understood.

METHODS

In the largest published beads task study to date (n = 558), we examined data gathering in the context of influential dual-process theories of reasoning.

RESULTS

Analytic cognitive style (the willingness or disposition to critically evaluate outputs from intuitive processing and engage in effortful analytic processing) predicted data gathering in a non-clinical sample, but delusional ideation did not.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between data gathering and analytic cognitive style suggests that dual-process theories of reasoning can contribute to our understanding of the beads task. It is not clear why delusional ideation was not found to be associated with data gathering or analytic cognitive style.

Acceptance and Efficacy of Metacognitive Training (MCT) on Positive Symptoms and Delusions in Patients With Schizophrenia: A Meta-analysis Taking Into Account Important Moderators

Metacognitive training (MCT) is a new, widely used intervention for psychosis. The present meta-analysis examines the efficacy of MCT in schizophrenia. Fifteen studies comparing effects of MCT on positive symptoms, delusions or acceptance of MCT with a control group were included in this meta-analysis. These studies comprised a total of 408 patients in the MCT condition and 399 in the control condition. The moderating effects of masking of outcome assessment, randomization, incomplete outcome data, use of an active control intervention, and individual vs group MCT were investigated. Possible effects of sensitivity analyses and publication bias were also examined. The results show a significant overall effect of MCT for positive symptoms (g = -0.34, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.15]), delusions (g = -0.41, 95% CI [-0.74, -0.07]) and acceptance of the intervention (g = -0.84, 95% CI [-1.37, -0.31]). Using only studies being at low risk for bias regarding randomization, masking and incomplete outcome data reduced effect sizes for positive symptoms and delusions (g = -0.28, 95% CI [-0.50, -0.06] and g = -0.18, 95% CI [-0.43, 0.06]), respectively. This meta-analysis demonstrates that MCT exerts a small to moderate effect on delusions and positive symptoms and a large effect on acceptance of the intervention. The effect on delusions is reduced, but remains significant when potential biases are considered.

Autism As a Disorder of High Intelligence

A suite of recent studies has reported positive genetic correlations between autism risk and measures of mental ability. These findings indicate that alleles for autism overlap broadly with alleles for high intelligence, which appears paradoxical given that autism is characterized, overall, by below-average IQ. This paradox can be resolved under the hypothesis that autism etiology commonly involves enhanced, but imbalanced, components of intelligence. This hypothesis is supported by convergent evidence showing that autism and high IQ share a diverse set of convergent correlates, including large brain size, fast brain growth, increased sensory and visual-spatial abilities, enhanced synaptic functions, increased attentional focus, high socioeconomic status, more deliberative decision-making, profession and occupational interests in engineering and physical sciences, and high levels of positive assortative mating. These findings help to provide an evolutionary basis to understanding autism risk as underlain in part by dysregulation of intelligence, a core human-specific adaptation. In turn, integration of studies on intelligence with studies of autism should provide novel insights into the neurological and genetic causes of high mental abilities, with important implications for cognitive enhancement, artificial intelligence, the relationship of autism with schizophrenia, and the treatment of both autism and intellectual disability.

Early relationships and paranoia: Qualitative investigation of childhood experiences associated with the development of persecutory delusions

Research suggests a link between Persecutory Delusions (PDs) and early interpersonal difficulties. However, little research has explored the first-hand experience of navigating such adversities in those who later developed PDs. The current study reports on a qualitative investigation of the early interpersonal experiences and challenges faced by a sample of individuals who have recovered from PDs, using a semi-structured interview. A sample of seven individuals who have previously experienced PDs were recruited from two National Health Services (NHS) and an Early Intervention Psychosis service in England. Using an Interpretative Phenomenological Analytic (IPA) approach, the analysis identified three main themes (early experiences, impact of early experiences, coping with adversity). Early experiences captured early inconsistent and problematic relationships in childhood, and experiences of victimization. Exploring the impact of these early events revealed important roles for the participants' inconsistent sense of self, their negative perception of others, and their disturbed social functioning and substance use. Coping with adversity revealed distinct forms of avoidant and proactive coping. The findings are consistent with models of PDs that emphasise the impact of early interpersonal experiences, and offer support for attachment and cognitive factors.

The efficacy of a new translational treatment for persecutory delusions: study protocol for a randomised controlled trial (The Feeling Safe Study)

Background

Persecutory delusions (strong unfounded fears that others intend harm to the person) occur in more than 70 % of the patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. This major psychotic experience is a key clinical target, for which substantial improvement in treatment is needed. Our aim is to use advances in theoretical understanding to develop a much more efficacious treatment that leads to recovery in at least 50 % of people with persistent persecutory delusions. Our cognitive conceptualisation is that persecutory delusions are threat beliefs, developed in the context of genetic and environmental risk, maintained by a number of psychological processes including excessive worry, low self-confidence, intolerance of anxious affect and other internal anomalous experiences, reasoning biases, and safety-seeking strategies. The clinical implication is that safety has to be relearned, by entering the feared situations after reduction of the influence of the maintenance factors. We have been individually evaluating modules targeting causal factors. These will now be tested together as a full treatment, called The Feeling Safe Programme. The treatment is modular, personalised, and includes patient preference. We will test whether the new treatment leads to greater recovery in persistent persecutory delusions, psychological well-being, and activity levels compared to befriending (that is, controlling for therapist attention).

Methods/design

The Feeling Safe Study is a parallel group randomised controlled trial for 150 patients who have persecutory delusions despite previous treatment in mental health services. Patients will be randomised (1:1 ratio) to The Feeling Safe Programme or befriending (both provided in 20 sessions over 6 months). Standard care will continue as usual. Online randomisation will use a permuted blocks algorithm, with randomly varying block size, stratified by therapist. Assessments, by a rater blind to allocation, will be conducted at 0, 6 (post treatment), and 12 months. The primary outcome is the level of delusional conviction at 6 months. Secondary outcomes include levels of psychological well-being, suicidal ideation, and activity. All main analyses will be intention-to-treat. The trial is funded by the NHS National Institute for Health Research.

Discussion

The Feeling Safe study will provide a Phase II evaluation of a new targeted translational psychological treatment for persecutory delusions.

Trial registration

Current Controlled Trials ISRCTN18705064 (registered 11 November 2015).