Systematic review: Effects, design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health care

ACC/AHA Special Report: Clinical Practice Guideline Implementation Strategies: A Summary of Systematic Reviews by the NHLBI Implementation Science Work Group: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on Clinical Practice Guidelines

BACKGROUND

In 2008, the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute convened an Implementation Science Work Group to assess evidence-based strategies for effectively implementing clinical practice guidelines. This was part of a larger effort to update existing clinical practice guidelines on cholesterol, blood pressure, and overweight/obesity.

OBJECTIVES

Review evidence from the published implementation science literature and identify effective or promising strategies to enhance the adoption and implementation of clinical practice guidelines.

METHODS

This systematic review was conducted on 4 critical questions, each focusing on the adoption and effectiveness of 4 intervention strategies: (1) reminders, (2) educational outreach visits, (3) audit and feedback, and (4) provider incentives. A scoping review of the Rx for Change database of systematic reviews was used to identify promising guideline implementation interventions aimed at providers. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were developed a priori for each question, and the published literature was initially searched up to 2012, and then updated with a supplemental search to 2015. Two independent reviewers screened the returned citations to identify relevant reviews and rated the quality of each included review.

RESULTS

Audit and feedback and educational outreach visits were generally effective in improving both process of care (15 of 21 reviews and 12 of 13 reviews, respectively) and clinical outcomes (7 of 12 reviews and 3 of 5 reviews, respectively). Provider incentives showed mixed effectiveness for improving both process of care (3 of 4 reviews) and clinical outcomes (3 reviews equally distributed between generally effective, mixed, and generally ineffective). Reminders showed mixed effectiveness for improving process of care outcomes (27 reviews with 11 mixed and 3 generally ineffective results) and were generally ineffective for clinical outcomes (18 reviews with 6 mixed and 9 generally ineffective results). Educational outreach visits (2 of 2 reviews), reminders (3 of 4 reviews), and provider incentives (1 of 1 review) were generally effective for cost reduction. Educational outreach visits (1 of 1 review) and provider incentives (1 of 1 review) were also generally effective for cost-effectiveness outcomes. Barriers to clinician adoption or adherence to guidelines included time constraints (8 reviews/overviews); limited staffing resources (2 overviews); timing (5 reviews/overviews); clinician skepticism (5 reviews/overviews); clinician knowledge of guidelines (4 reviews/overviews); and higher age of the clinician (1 overview). Facilitating factors included guideline characteristics such as format, resources, and end-user involvement (6 reviews/overviews); involving stakeholders (5 reviews/overviews); leadership support (5 reviews/overviews); scope of implementation (5 reviews/overviews); organizational culture such as multidisciplinary teams and low-baseline adherence (9 reviews/overviews); and electronic guidelines systems (3 reviews).

CONCLUSION

The strategies of audit and feedback and educational outreach visits were generally effective in improving both process of care and clinical outcomes. Reminders and provider incentives showed mixed effectiveness, or were generally ineffective. No general conclusion could be reached about cost effectiveness, because of limitations in the evidence. Important gaps exist in the evidence on effectiveness of implementation interventions, especially regarding clinical outcomes, cost effectiveness and contextual issues affecting successful implementation.

Value-based payment in implementing evidence-based care: the Mental Health Integration Program in Washington state

OBJECTIVES

To assess the role of value-based payment (VBP) in improving fidelity and patient outcomes in community implementation of an evidence-based mental health intervention, the Collaborative Care Model (CCM).

STUDY DESIGN

Retrospective study based on a natural experiment.

METHODS

We used the clinical tracking data of 1806 adult patients enrolled in a large implementation of the CCM in community health clinics in Washington state. VBP was initiated in year 2 of the program, creating a natural experiment. We compared implementation fidelity (measured by 3 process-of-care elements of the CCM) between patient-months exposed to VBP and patient-months not exposed to VBP. A series of regressions were estimated to check robustness of findings. We estimated a Cox proportional hazard model to assess the effect of VBP on time to achieving clinically significant improvement in depression (measured based on changes in depression symptom scores over time).

RESULTS

Estimated marginal effects of VBP on fidelity ranged from 9% to 30% of the level of fidelity had there been no exposure to VBP (P <.05 for every fidelity measure). Improvement in fidelity in response to VBP was greater among providers with a larger patient panel and among providers with a lower level of fidelity at baseline. Exposure to VBP was associated with an adjusted hazard ratio of 1.45 (95% confidence interval, 1.04-2.03) for achieving clinically significant improvement in depression.

CONCLUSIONS

VBP improved fidelity to key elements of the CCM, both directly incentivized and not explicitly incentivized by the VBP, and improved patient depression outcomes.

Governance Must Dive Into Organizations to Make a Real Difference Comment on "Governance, Government, and the Search for New Provider Models"

In their 2016 article, Saltman and Duran provide a thoughtful examination of the governance challenges involved in different care delivery models adopted in primary care and hospitals in two European countries. This commentary examines the limited potential of structural changes to achieve real reform and considers that, unless governance arrangements actually succeed in penetrating organizations, they are unlikely to improve care. It proposes three sets of levers influenced by governance that have potential to influence what happens at the point of care: harnessing the autonomy and expertise of professionals at a collective level to work towards better safety and quality; creating enabling contexts for cross-fertilization of clinical and organizational expertise, notably through teamwork; and patient and public engagement to achieve greater agreement on improvement priorities and overcome provider/manager tensions. Good governance provides guidance at a distance but also goes deep enough to influence clinical habits.

Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006-2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.

Incentives and disincentives for treating of depression and anxiety in Ontario Family Health Teams: protocol for a grounded theory study

INTRODUCTION

There is strong consensus that prevention and management of common mental disorders (CMDs) should occur in primary care and evidence suggests that treatment of CMDs in these settings can be effective. New interprofessional team-based models of primary care have emerged that are intended to address problems of quality and access to mental health services, yet many people continue to struggle to access care for CMDs in these settings. Insufficient attention directed towards the incentives and disincentives that influence care for CMDs in primary care, and especially in interprofessional team-based settings, may have resulted in missed opportunities to improve care quality and control healthcare costs. Our research is driven by the hypothesis that a stronger understanding of the full range of incentives and disincentives at play and their relationships with performance and other contextual factors will help stakeholders identify the critical levers of change needed to enhance prevention and management of CMDs in interprofessional primary care contexts. Participant recruitment began in May 2016.

METHODS AND ANALYSIS

An explanatory qualitative design, based on a constructivist grounded theory methodology, will be used. Our study will be conducted in the Canadian province of Ontario, a province that features a widely implemented interprofessional team-based model of primary care. Semistructured interviews will be conducted with a diverse range of healthcare professionals and stakeholders that can help us understand how various incentives and disincentives influence the provision of evidence-based collaborative care for CMDs. A final sample size of 100 is anticipated. The protocol was peer reviewed by experts who were nominated by the funding organisation.

ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION

The model we generate will shed light on the incentives and disincentives that are and should be in place to support high-quality CMD care and help stimulate more targeted, coordinated stakeholder responses to improving primary mental healthcare quality.

Financial Incentives to Encourage Value-Based Health Care

This article reviews the literature on the use of financial incentives to improve the provision of value-based health care. Eighty studies of 44 schemes from 10 countries were reviewed. The proportion of positive and statistically significant outcomes was close to .5. Stronger study designs were associated with a lower proportion of positive effects. There were no differences between studies conducted in the United States compared with other countries; between schemes that targeted hospitals or primary care; or between schemes combining pay for performance with rewards for reducing costs, relative to pay for performance schemes alone. Paying for performance improvement is less likely to be effective. Allowing payments to be used for specific purposes, such as quality improvement, had a higher likelihood of a positive effect, compared with using funding for physician income. Finally, the size of incentive payments relative to revenue was not associated with the proportion of positive outcomes.

The effectiveness of a pay for performance program on diabetes care in Taiwan: A nationwide population-based longitudinal study

Over the past two decades, studies have widely examined the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs by conducting biochemical tests and assessing complications; however, the reported effectiveness of such programs among participants selected through purposeful sampling is controversial. Therefore, the objective of the current study was to analyze the effectiveness of a P4P program on patients' prognoses, including hospitalization for chronic diabetic complications, and all-cause mortality during specific follow-up years by using a nationwide population-based database in Taiwan. Based on 125,315 newly diagnosed type 2 diabetes patient cohort during 2002-2006, two control sets were designed by propensity-score-matching strategy according to participation of P4P program and followed up to 2012. The results indicated that full participants demonstrated the lowest risks of developing complications and all-cause mortality compared with nonparticipants. These findings confirm the long-term effect of P4P programs on full participants and reveal that this effect is not due to confounding variables. The results indicate the importance of performance management and adherence to interventions for patients with chronic diseases in a long-term observation. Comprehensive and continuous care is suggested to improve patient prognosis and quality of care.

Impact of oncologist payment method on health care outcomes, costs, quality: a rapid review

BACKGROUND

The incidence of cancer and the cost of its treatment continue to rise. The effect of these dual forces is a major burden on the system of health care financing. One cost containment approach involves changing the way physicians are paid. Payers are testing reimbursement methods such as capitation and prospective payment while also evaluating how the changes impact health outcomes, resource utilization, and quality of care. The purpose of this study is to identify evidence related to physician payment methods' impacts, with a focus on cancer control.

METHODS

We conducted a rapid review. This involved defining eligibility criteria, identifying a search strategy, performing study selection according to the eligibility criteria, and abstracting data from included studies. This process was accompanied by a gray literature search for special topics.

RESULTS

The incentives in fee-for-service payment systems generally lead to health care services being applied inconsistently because providers practice independently with few systems in place for developing treatment protocols and practice reviews. This inconsistency is pronounced in cancer care because much of the total per patient spending occurs in the last month of life. Some insurers are predicting that this variation can be reduced through the use of prospective or bundled payments combined with decision support systems. Workload, recruitment, and retention are all affected by changes to physician payment models; effects seem to be magnified in the specialist context as their several extra years of training lower their overall supply.

CONCLUSIONS

Experimentation with physician payment methods has tended to neglect cancer care providers. Policymakers designing cancer-focused physician reimbursement pilot programs should incorporate quality measurement since very ill patients may receive too little treatment when payment models do not cover oncologists' total costs, e.g., fee-for-service systems whose prices do not account for the possible presence of other diseases.

The effectiveness of payment for performance in health care: A meta-analysis and exploration of variation in outcomes

BACKGROUND

Pay for performance (P4P) incentive schemes are increasingly used world-wide to improve health system performance but results of evaluations vary considerably. A systematic analysis of this variation in the effects of P4P schemes is needed.

METHODS

Evaluations of P4P schemes from any country were identified by searching for and updating systematic reviews of P4P schemes in health care in four bibliographic databases. Outcomes using different measures of effect were converted into standardized effect sizes (standardized mean difference, SMD) and each study was categorized as to whether or not it found a positive effect. Subgroup analysis, meta-regression and multilevel logistic regression were used to investigate factors explaining heterogeneity. Random-effects models were used because they take into account heterogeneity likely to be due to differences between studies rather than just chance. Sensitivity analysis was used to test the effect of different assumptions.

FINDINGS

96 primary studies were identified; 37 were included in the meta-analysis and meta-regression and all 96 in the logistic regression. The proportion of observed variation in study results that can be explained by true heterogeneity (I²) was 99.9%. Estimates of effect of P4P schemes were lower in evaluations using randomized controlled trials (SMD=0.08; 95% CI: 0.01-0.15) compared to no controls (0.15; 95% CI: 0.09-0.21), and lower for those measuring outcomes (e.g., smoking cessation) (SMD=0.0; 95% CI: -0.01 to 0.01) compared to process measures (e.g., giving cessation advice) (0.18; 95% CI: 0.06-0.31). Adjusting for other design features and the evaluation method, the odds of showing a positive effect was three times higher for schemes with larger incentives (>5% of salary/usual budget) (OR=3.38; 95% CI: 1.07-10.64). There were non-statistically significant increases in the odds of success if the incentive is paid to individuals (as opposed to groups) (OR=2.0; 95% CI: 0.62-6.56) and if there is a lower perceived risk of not earning the incentive (OR=2.9; 95% CI: 0.78-10.83). Schemes evaluated using less rigorous designs were 24 times more likely to have positive estimates of effect than those using randomized controlled trials (OR=24; 95% CI: 6.3-92.8).

INTERPRETATION

Estimates of the effectiveness of incentive schemes on health outcomes are probably inflated due to poorly designed evaluations and a focus on process measures rather than health outcomes. Larger incentives and reducing the perceived risk of non-payment may increase the effect of these schemes on provider behavior.

A conceptual schema for government purchasing arrangements for Australian alcohol and other drug treatment

AIM

The aim of this study was to establish a conceptual schema for government purchasing of alcohol and other drug treatment in Australia which could encompass the diversity and variety in purchasing arrangements, and facilitate better decision-maker by purchasers. There is a limited evidence base on purchasing arrangements in alcohol and drug treatment despite the clear impact of purchasing arrangements on both treatment processes and treatment outcomes.

METHODS

The relevant health and social welfare literature on purchasing arrangements was reviewed; data were collected from Australian purchasers and providers of treatment giving detailed descriptions of the array of purchasing arrangements. Combined analysis of the literature and the Australian purchasing data resulted in a draft schema which was then reviewed by an expert committee and subsequently finalised.

RESULTS

The conceptual schema presented here was purpose-built for alcohol and other drug treatment, with its overlap between health and social welfare services. It has three dimensions: 1. The ways in which providers are chosen; 2. The ways in which services are paid for; and 3. How price is managed. Distinguishing between the methods for choosing providers (such as competitive or individually negotiated processes) from the way in which organisations are paid for their provision of treatment (such as via a block grant or payment for activity) provides conceptual clarity and enables closer analysis of each mechanism.

CONCLUSIONS

Governments can improve health and wellbeing by making informed decisions about the way they purchase and fund alcohol and other drug treatment. Research comparing different purchasing arrangements can provide a vital evidence-base to inform funders; however a first step is to accurately and consistently categorise current approaches against a typology or conceptual schema.

Does Pay-For-Performance Program Increase Providers Adherence to Guidelines for Managing Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C Virus Infection in Taiwan?

Background

Many people are concerned about that the quality of preventive care for patients with hepatitis B virus (HBV) and hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection is suboptimal. Taiwan, a hyperendemic area of chronic HBV and HCV infection, implemented a nationwide pay-for-performance (P4P) program in 2010, which aimed to improve the preventive care provided to HBV and HCV patients by increasing physicians’ adherence to guidelines through financial incentives. The objective of this study was to evaluate the early effects of the P4P program on utilization of preventive services by HBV and HCV patients.

Methods

Using a quasi-experimental design with propensity score matching method, we matched the HBV and HCV patients enrolled in the P4P program with non-enrollees in 2010, resulting in 21,643 patients in each group. Generalized estimating equations was applied to examine the difference-in-difference effects of P4P program enrollment on the utilization of three guideline-recommended preventive services (regular outpatient follow-up visits, abdominal ultrasonography (US) examinations, and aspartate aminotransferase and alanine aminotransferase (AST/ALT) tests by HBV and HCV patients.

Results

The P4P program enrollees were significantly more likely to attend twice-annual follow-up visits, to receive recommended US examinations and AST/ALT tests, than non-enrollees.

Conclusions

The results of our preliminary assessment indicate that financial incentives offered by the P4P program was associated with a modest improvement in adherence to guidelines for better chronic HBV and HBC management.

Modelling Nonlinearities and Reference Dependence in General Practitioners' Income Preferences

This paper tests for the existence of nonlinearity and reference dependence in income preferences for general practitioners. Confirming the theory of reference dependent utility within the context of a discrete choice experiment, we find that losses loom larger than gains in income for Norwegian general practitioners, i.e. they value losses from their current income level around three times higher than the equivalent gains. Our results are validated by comparison with equivalent contingent valuation values for marginal willingness to pay and marginal willingness to accept compensation for changes in job characteristics. Physicians' income preferences determine the effectiveness of 'pay for performance' and other incentive schemes. Our results may explain the relative ineffectiveness of financial incentive schemes that rely on increasing physicians' incomes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Creating the Business Case for Achieving Health Equity

Health care organizations have increasingly acknowledged the presence of health care disparities across race/ethnicity and socioeconomic status, but significantly fewer have made health equity for diverse patients a true priority. Lack of financial incentives is a major barrier to achieving health equity. To create a business case for equity, governmental and private payors can: 1) Require health care organizations to report clinical performance data stratified by race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. 2) Incentivize preventive care and primary care. Implement more aggressive shared savings plans, update physician relative value unit fee schedules, and encourage partnerships across clinical and non-clinical sectors. 3) Incentivize the reduction of health disparities with equity accountability measures in payment programs. 4) Align equity accountability measures across public and private payors. 5) Assist safety-net organizations. Provide adequate Medicaid reimbursement, risk-adjust clinical performance scores for sociodemographic characteristics of patients, provide support for quality improvement efforts, and calibrate cuts to Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments to the pace of health insurance expansion. 6) Conduct demonstration projects to test payment and delivery system reform interventions to reduce disparities. Commitment to social justice is essential to achieve health equity, but insufficient without a strong business case that makes interventions financially feasible.

Current State of Value-Based Purchasing Programs

The US healthcare system is rapidly moving toward rewarding value. Recent legislation, such as the Affordable Care Act and the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act, solidified the role of value-based payment in Medicare. Many private insurers are following Medicare's lead. Much of the policy attention has been on programs such as accountable care organizations and bundled payments; yet, value-based purchasing (VBP) or pay-for-performance, defined as providers being paid fee-for-service with payment adjustments up or down based on value metrics, remains a core element of value payment in Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. This review article summarizes the current state of VBP programs and provides analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for the future. Multiple inpatient and outpatient VBP programs have been implemented and evaluated; the impact of those programs has been marginal. Opportunities to enhance the performance of VBP programs include improving the quality measurement science, strengthening both the size and design of incentives, reducing health disparities, establishing broad outcome measurement, choosing appropriate comparison targets, and determining the optimal role of VBP relative to alternative payment models. VBP programs will play a significant role in healthcare delivery for years to come, and they serve as an opportunity for providers to build the infrastructure needed for value-oriented care.

Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives

Financial incentives for quality improvement in hospital care [known as pay for performance (P4P)] can be directed to either the hospital level or redistributed to the department level. Theoretically, performance payments distributed to lower organisational levels are more effective in increasing performance than payments directed to the hospital level, but the empirical evidence for this expectation is scarce. This paper compares the performance of hospital departments at hospitals that do and do not redistribute performance payments to the department level. We study a Danish P4P scheme to provide patients with case managers. Applying difference in differences analysis, we estimate a 5 percentage points higher performance at hospital departments that are subject to a direct financial incentive. Our results suggest that payers can improve the effectiveness of P4P payments by distributing payments to the department level rather than the hospital level.

Long-Term and Interactive Effects of Pay-For-Performance Interventions among Diabetic Nephropathy Patients at the Early Chronic Kidney Disease Stage

Chronic kidney disease (CKD) is a major health problem worldwide because of the aging population and lifestyle changes. One of the important etiologies of CKD is diabetes mellitus (DM). The long-term effects of pay-for-performance (P4P) on disease progression have not been thoroughly examined.This study is a retrospective population-based patient cohort design to examine the continuous effects of diabetes and CKD P4P interventions. This study used the health insurance claims database to conduct a longitudinal analysis. A total of 32,084 early CKD patients with diabetes were extracted from the outpatient claims database from January 2011 to December 2012, and the follow-up period was extended to August 2014. A 4-group matching design, including both diabetes and early CKD P4P interventions, with only diabetes P4P intervention, with only early CKD P4P intervention, and without any P4P interventions, was performed according to their descending intensity. The primary outcome of this study was all-cause mortality and the causes of death. The statistical methods included a Chi-squared test, ANOVA, and multi-variable Cox regression models.A dose-response relationship between the intervention groups and all-cause mortality was observed as follows: comparing to both diabetes and early CKD P4P interventions (reference), hazard ratio (HR) was 1.22 (95% confidence interval [CI], 1.00-1.50) for patients with only a diabetes P4P intervention; HR was 2.00 (95% CI, 1.66-2.42) for patients with only an early CKD P4P intervention; and HR was 2.42 (95% CI, 2.02-2.91) for patients without any P4P interventions. The leading cause of death of the total diabetic nephropathy patient cohort was infectious diseases (34.32%) followed by cardiovascular diseases (17.12%), acute renal failure (1.50%), and malignant neoplasm of liver (1.40%).Because the earlier interventions have lasting long-term effects on the patient's prognosis regardless of disease course, an integrated early intervention plan is suggested in future care plan designs. The mechanisms regarding the effects of P4P intervention, such as health education on diet control, continuity of care, and practice guidelines and adherence, are the primary components of disease management programs.

Cost Variation in Diabetes Care across Dutch Care Groups?

OBJECTIVE

The introduction of bundled payment for diabetes care in the Netherlands led to the origination of care groups. This study explored to what extent variation in health care costs per patient can be attributed to the performance of care groups. Furthermore, the commonly applied simple mean aggregation was compared with the more advanced generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) to benchmark health care costs per patient between care groups.

DATA SOURCE

Dutch 2009 nationwide insurance claims data of diabetes type 2 patients (104,544 patients, 50 care groups).

STUDY DESIGN

Both a simple mean aggregation and a GLMM approach was applied to rank care groups, using two different health care costs variables: total treatment health care costs and diabetes-specific specialist care costs per diabetes patient.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Care groups varied slightly in the first and mainly in the second indicator. Care group variation was not explained by composition. Although the ranking methods were correlated, some care groups' rank positions differed, with consequences on the top-10 and the low-10 positions.

CONCLUSIONS

Differences between care groups exist when an appropriate indicator and a sophisticated aggregation technique is used. Currently applied benchmarking may have unfair consequences for some care groups.

Impact of pay for performance on behavior of primary care physicians and patient outcomes

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Pay-for-performance is a financial incentive which links physicians' income to the quality of their services. Although pay-for-performance is suggested to be an effective payment method in many pilot countries (ie the UK) and enjoys a wide application in primary health care, researches on it are yet to reach an agreement. Thus, a systematic review was conducted on the evidence of impact of pay-for-performance on behavior of primary care physicians and patient outcomes aiming to provide a comprehensive and objective evaluation of pay-for-performance for decision-makers.

METHODS

Studies were identified by searching PubMed, EMbase, and The Cochrane Library. Electronic search was conducted in the fourth week of January 2013. As the included studies had significant clinical heterogeneity, a descriptive analysis was conducted. Quality Index was adopted for quality assessment of evidences.

RESULTS

Database searches yielded 651 candidate articles, of which 44 studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria. An overall positive effect was found on the management of disease, which varied in accordance with the baseline medical quality and the practice size. Meanwhile, it could bring about new problems regarding the inequity, patients' dissatisfaction and increasing medical cost.

CONCLUSIONS

Decision-makers should consider the baseline conditions of medical quality and the practice size before new medical policies are enacted. Furthermore, most studies are retrospective and observational with high level of heterogeneity though, the descriptive analysis is still of significance.

Benefits of Incentives for Breastfeeding and Smoking cessation in pregnancy (BIBS): a mixed-methods study to inform trial design

BACKGROUND

Smoking in pregnancy and/or not breastfeeding have considerable negative health outcomes for mother and baby.

AIM

To understand incentive mechanisms of action for smoking cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding, develop a taxonomy and identify promising, acceptable and feasible interventions to inform trial design.

DESIGN

Evidence syntheses, primary qualitative survey, and discrete choice experiment (DCE) research using multidisciplinary, mixed methods. Two mother-and-baby groups in disadvantaged areas collaborated throughout.

SETTING

UK.

PARTICIPANTS

The qualitative study included 88 pregnant women/recent mothers/partners, 53 service providers, 24 experts/decision-makers and 63 conference attendees. The surveys included 1144 members of the general public and 497 health professionals. The DCE study included 320 women with a history of smoking.

METHODS

(1) Evidence syntheses: incentive effectiveness (including meta-analysis and effect size estimates), delivery processes, barriers to and facilitators of smoking cessation in pregnancy and/or breastfeeding, scoping review of incentives for lifestyle behaviours; (2) qualitative research: grounded theory to understand incentive mechanisms of action and a framework approach for trial design; (3) survey: multivariable ordered logit models; (4) DCE: conditional logit regression and the log-likelihood ratio test.

RESULTS

Out of 1469 smoking cessation and 5408 breastfeeding multicomponent studies identified, 23 smoking cessation and 19 breastfeeding studies were included in the review. Vouchers contingent on biochemically proven smoking cessation in pregnancy were effective, with a relative risk of 2.58 (95% confidence interval 1.63 to 4.07) compared with non-contingent incentives for participation (four studies, 344 participants). Effects continued until 3 months post partum. Inconclusive effects were found for breastfeeding incentives compared with no/smaller incentives (13 studies) but provider commitment contracts for breastfeeding show promise. Intervention intensity is a possible confounder. The acceptability of seven promising incentives was mixed. Women (for vouchers) and those with a lower level of education (except for breastfeeding incentives) were more likely to disagree. Those aged ≤ 44 years and ethnic minority groups were more likely to agree. Agreement was greatest for a free breast pump and least for vouchers for breastfeeding. Universal incentives were preferred to those targeting low-income women. Initial daily text/telephone support, a quitting pal, vouchers for > £20.00 per month and values up to £80.00 increase the likelihood of smoking cessation. Doctors disagreed with provider incentives. A 'ladder' logic model emerged through data synthesis and had face validity with service users. It combined an incentive typology and behaviour change taxonomy. Autonomy and well-being matter. Personal difficulties, emotions, socialising and attitudes of others are challenges to climbing a metaphorical 'ladder' towards smoking cessation and breastfeeding. Incentive interventions provide opportunity 'rungs' to help, including regular skilled flexible support, a pal, setting goals, monitoring and outcome verification. Individually tailored and non-judgemental continuity of care can bolster women's capabilities to succeed. Rigid, prescriptive interventions placing the onus on women to behave 'healthily' risk them feeling pressurised and failing. To avoid 'losing face', women may disengage.

LIMITATIONS

Included studies were heterogeneous and of variable quality, limiting the assessment of incentive effectiveness. No cost-effectiveness data were reported. In surveys, selection bias and confounding are possible. The validity and utility of the ladder logic model requires evaluation with more diverse samples of the target population.

CONCLUSIONS

Incentives provided with other tailored components show promise but reach is a concern. Formal evaluation is recommended. Collaborative service-user involvement is important.

STUDY REGISTRATION

This study is registered as PROSPERO CRD42012001980.

FUNDING

The National Institute for Health Research Health Technology Assessment programme.

Would German physicians opt for pay-for-performance programs? A willingness-to-accept experiment in a large general practitioners' sample

BACKGROUND

Implementing pay-for-performance (P4P) programs is a non-trivial task. As evaluation studies showed, P4P programs often failed to improve performance quality. A crucial element for the successful implementation of P4P is to gain acceptance with health care providers.

OBJECTIVES

The aim of our study was to determine, if (and at what bonus rate) German general practitioners (GPs) would participate in a P4P program. We further examined differences between respondents who would participate in a P4P program (participants) versus respondents who would not participate (non-participants).

METHODS

A mail survey was conducted among 2493 general practitioners (GPs) in Lower Saxony (with a response rate of 36.2%). The questionnaire addressed attitudes toward P4P and included a willingness to accept experiment concerning P4P implementation.

RESULTS

The participation rate increased from 28% (at a bonus of 2.5%) to 50% (at a bonus of 20%). Participants showed better performance in target achievement and expected higher gains from P4P than non-participants. Major attitude differences were found in assessing feasibility of P4P, incentivizing performance and unintended consequences. The crucial factor for (not) accepting P4P might be the sense of (un)fairness of P4P.

CONCLUSION

To convince GPs to participate in P4P, better evidence for the effectiveness of P4P is required. To address the concerns of GPs, future endeavors should be directed to tailoring P4P programs. Finally, program implementation must be well communicated and thoroughly discussed with health care providers.

Effectiveness of a programme to reduce the burden of catheter-related bloodstream infections in a tertiary hospital

The objective of this study was to assess the effectiveness of a catheter-related bloodstream infection (CR BSI) reduction programme and healthcare workers' compliance with recommendations. A 3-year surveillance programme of CR BSIs in all hospital settings was implemented. As part of the programme, there was a direct observation of insertion and maintenance of central venous catheters (CVCs) to determine performance. A total of 38 education courses were held over the study period and feedback reports with the results of surveillance and recommendations were delivered to healthcare workers every 6 months. A total of 6722 short-term CVCs were inserted in 4982 patients for 58 763 catheter-days. Improvements of compliance with hand hygiene was verified at the insertion (87·1–100%, P < 0·001) and maintenance (51·1–72·1%, P = 0·029) of CVCs; and the use of chlorhexidine for skin disinfection was implemented at insertion (35·7–65·4%, P < 0·001) and maintenance (33·3–45·9%, P < 0·197) of CVCs. There were 266 CR BSI incidents recorded with an annual incidence density of 5·75/1000 catheter-days in the first year, 4·38 in the second year [rate ratio (RR) 0·76, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0·57–1·01] and 3·46 in the third year (RR 0·60, 95% CI 0·44–0·81). The education programme clearly improved compliance with recommendations for CVC handling, and was effective in reducing the burden of CR BSIs.

No hospital left behind? Education policy lessons for value-based payment in healthcare

Value-based payment systems have been widely implemented in healthcare in an effort to improve the quality of care. However, these programs have not broadly improved quality, and some evidence suggests that they may increase inequities in care. No Child Left Behind is a parallel effort in education to address uneven achievement and inequalities. Yet, by penalizing the lowest performers, No Child Left Behind's approach to accountability has led to a number of unintended consequences. This article draws lessons from education policy, arguing that financial incentives should be designed to support the lowest performers to improve quality.

Achieving change in primary care--effectiveness of strategies for improving implementation of complex interventions: systematic review of reviews

OBJECTIVE

To identify, summarise and synthesise available literature on the effectiveness of implementation strategies for optimising implementation of complex interventions in primary care.

DESIGN

Systematic review of reviews.

DATA SOURCES

MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Cochrane Library and PsychINFO were searched, from first publication until December 2013; the bibliographies of relevant articles were screened for additional reports.

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SELECTING STUDIES

Eligible reviews had to (1) examine effectiveness of single or multifaceted implementation strategies, (2) measure health professional practice or process outcomes and (3) include studies from predominantly primary care in developed countries. Two reviewers independently screened titles/abstracts and full-text articles of potentially eligible reviews for inclusion.

DATA SYNTHESIS

Extracted data were synthesised using a narrative approach.

RESULTS

91 reviews were included. The most commonly evaluated strategies were those targeted at the level of individual professionals, rather than those targeting organisations or context. These strategies (eg, audit and feedback, educational meetings, educational outreach, reminders) on their own demonstrated a small to modest improvement (2-9%) in professional practice or behaviour with considerable variability in the observed effects. The effects of multifaceted strategies targeted at professionals were mixed and not necessarily more effective than single strategies alone. There was relatively little review evidence on implementation strategies at the levels of organisation and wider context. Evidence on cost-effectiveness was limited and data on costs of different strategies were scarce and/or of low quality.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a substantial literature on implementation strategies aimed at changing professional practices or behaviour. It remains unclear which implementation strategies are more likely to be effective than others and under what conditions. Future research should focus on identifying and assessing the effectiveness of strategies targeted at the wider context and organisational levels and examining the costs and cost-effectiveness of implementation strategies.

PROSPERO REGISTRATION NUMBER

CRD42014009410.

Collaborative drug therapy management and comprehensive medication management-2015

The American College of Clinical Pharmacy (ACCP) previously published position statements on collaborative drug therapy management (CDTM) in 1997 and 2003. Since 2003, significant federal and state legislation addressing CDTM has evolved and expanded throughout the United States. CDTM is well suited to facilitate the delivery of comprehensive medication management (CMM) by clinical pharmacists. CMM, defined by ACCP as a core component of the standards of practice for clinical pharmacists, is designed to optimize medication-related outcomes in collaborative practice environments. New models of care delivery emphasize patient-centered, team-based care and increasingly link payment to the achievement of positive economic, clinical, and humanistic outcomes. Hence clinical pharmacists practicing under CDTM agreements or through other privileging processes are well positioned to provide CMM. The economic value of clinical pharmacists in team-based settings is well documented. However, patient access to CMM remains limited due to lack of payer recognition of the value of clinical pharmacists in collaborative care settings and current health care payment policy. Therefore, the clinical pharmacy discipline must continue to establish and expand its use of CDTM agreements and other collaborative privileging mechanisms to provide CMM. Continued growth in the provision of CMM by appropriately qualified clinical pharmacists in collaborative practice settings will enhance recognition of their positive impact on medication-related outcomes.

Higher Incentive Payments in Medicare Advantage's Pay-for-Performance Program Did Not Improve Quality But Did Increase Plan Offerings

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the effects of the size of financial bonuses on quality of care and the number of plan offerings in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration.

DATA SOURCES

Publicly available data from CMS from 2009 to 2014 on Medicare Advantage plan quality ratings, the counties in the service area of each plan, and the benchmarks used to construct plan payments.

STUDY DESIGN

The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration began in 2012. Under the Demonstration, all Medicare Advantage plans were eligible to receive bonus payments based on plan-level quality scores (star ratings). In some counties, plans were eligible to receive bonus payments that were twice as large as in other counties. We used this variation in incentives to evaluate the effects of bonus size on star ratings and the number of plan offerings in the Demonstration using a differences-in-differences identification strategy. We used matching to create a comparison group of counties that did not receive double bonuses but had similar levels of the preintervention outcomes.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Results from the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the receipt of double bonuses was not associated with an increase in star ratings. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with a statistically insignificant increase of +0.034 (approximately 1 percent) in the average star rating (p > .10, 95 percent CI: -0.015, 0.083). In contrast, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an increase in the number of plans offered. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an overall increase of +0.814 plans (approximately 5.8 percent) (p < .05, 95 percent CI: 0.078, 1.549). We estimate that the double bonuses increased payments by $3.43 billion over the first 3 years of the Demonstration.

CONCLUSIONS

At great expense to Medicare, double bonuses in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration were not associated with improved quality but were associated with more plan offerings.

How Financial and Reputational Incentives Can Be Used to Improve Medical Care

OBJECTIVES

Narrative review of the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) and public reporting (PR) on health care outcomes, including spillover effects and impact on disparities.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The impact of P4P and PR is dependent on the underlying payment system (fee-for-service, salary, capitation) into which these schemes are introduced. Both have the potential to improve care, but they can also have substantial unintended consequences. Evidence from the behavioral economics literature suggests that individual physicians will vary in how they respond to incentives. We also discuss issues to be considered when including patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) or patient-reported experience measures into P4P and PR schemes.

CONCLUSION

We provide guidance to payers and policy makers on the design of P4P and PR programs so as to maximize their benefits and minimize their unintended consequences. These include involving clinicians in the design of the program, taking into account the payment system into which new incentives are introduced, designing the structure of reward programs to maximize the likelihood of intended outcomes and minimize the likelihood of unintended consequences, designing schemes that minimize the risk of increasing disparities, providing stability of incentives over some years, and including outcomes that are relevant to patients' priorities. In addition, because of the limitations of PR and P4P as effective interventions in their own right, it is important that they are combined with other policies and interventions intended to improve quality to maximize their likely impact.

Perspectives on financial incentives to health service providers for increasing breast feeding and smoking quit rates during pregnancy: a mixed methods study

OBJECTIVE

To explore the acceptability, mechanisms and consequences of provider incentives for smoking cessation and breast feeding as part of the Benefits of Incentives for Breastfeeding and Smoking cessation in pregnancy (BIBS) study.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional survey and qualitative interviews.

SETTING

Scotland and North West England.

PARTICIPANTS

Early years professionals: 497 survey respondents included 156 doctors; 197 health visitors/maternity staff; 144 other health staff. Qualitative interviews or focus groups were conducted with 68 pregnant/postnatal women/family members; 32 service providers; 22 experts/decision-makers; 63 conference attendees.

METHODS

Early years professionals were surveyed via email about the acceptability of payments to local health services for reaching smoking cessation in pregnancy and breastfeeding targets. Agreement was measured on a 5-point scale using multivariable ordered logit models. A framework approach was used to analyse free-text survey responses and qualitative data.

RESULTS

Health professional net agreement for provider incentives for smoking cessation targets was 52.9% (263/497); net disagreement was 28.6% (142/497). Health visitors/maternity staff were more likely than doctors to agree: OR 2.35 (95% CI 1.51 to 3.64; p<0.001). Net agreement for provider incentives for breastfeeding targets was 44.1% (219/497) and net disagreement was 38.6% (192/497). Agreement was more likely for women (compared with men): OR 1.81 (1.09 to 3.00; p=0.023) and health visitors/maternity staff (compared with doctors): OR 2.54 (95% CI 1.65 to 3.91; p<0.001). Key emergent themes were 'moral tensions around acceptability', 'need for incentives', 'goals', 'collective or divisive action' and 'monitoring and proof'. While provider incentives can focus action and resources, tensions around the impact on relationships raised concerns. Pressure, burden of proof, gaming, box-ticking bureaucracies and health inequalities were counterbalances to potential benefits.

CONCLUSIONS

Provider incentives are favoured by non-medical staff. Solutions which increase trust and collaboration towards shared goals, without negatively impacting on relationships or increasing bureaucracy are required.

The Theory of Value-Based Payment Incentives and Their Application to Health Care

Objectives

To present the implications of agency theory in microeconomics, augmented by behavioral economics, for different methods of value‐based payment in health care; and to derive a set of future research questions and policy recommendations based on that conceptual analysis.

Data Sources

Original literature of agency theory, and secondarily behavioral economics, combined with applied research and empirical evidence on the application of those principles to value‐based payment.

Study Design

Conceptual analysis and targeted review of theoretical research and empirical literature relevant to value‐based payment in health care.

Principal Findings

Agency theory and secondarily behavioral economics have powerful implications for design of value‐based payment in health care. To achieve improved value—better patient experience, clinical quality, health outcomes, and lower costs of care—high‐powered incentives should directly target improved care processes, enhanced patient experience, and create achievable benchmarks for improved outcomes. Differing forms of value‐based payment (e.g., shared savings and risk, reference pricing, capitation, and bundled payment), coupled with adjunct incentives for quality and efficiency, can be tailored to different market conditions and organizational settings.

Conclusions

Payment contracts that are “incentive compatible”—which directly encourage better care and reduced cost, mitigate gaming, and selectively induce clinically efficient providers to participate—will focus differentially on evidence‐based care processes, will right‐size and structure incentives to avoid crowd‐out of providers’ intrinsic motivation, and will align patient incentives with value. Future research should address the details of putting these and related principles into practice; further, by deploying these insights in payment design, policy makers will improve health care value for patients and purchasers.

Implementing Value-Based Payment Reform: A Conceptual Framework and Case Examples

This article develops a conceptual framework for implementation of value-based payment (VBP) reform and then draws on that framework to systematically examine six distinct multi-stakeholder coalition VBP initiatives in three different regions of the United States. The VBP initiatives deploy the following payment models: reference pricing, "shadow" primary care capitation, bundled payment, pay for performance, shared savings within accountable care organizations, and global payment. The conceptual framework synthesizes prior models of VBP implementation. It describes how context, project objectives, payment and care delivery strategies, and the barriers and facilitators to translating strategy into implementation affect VBP implementation and value for patients. We next apply the framework to six case examples of implementation, and conclude by discussing the implications of the case examples and the conceptual framework for future practice and research.

Taking hospital treatments home: a mixed methods case study looking at the barriers and success factors for home dialysis treatment and the influence of a target on uptake rates

Background

Despite healthcare policies and evidence which promote home dialysis, uptake rates have been falling for over 10 years in England. A target introduced by commissioners in the West Midlands provided a unique opportunity to study how hospitals can increase home-based treatment for a group of patients with complex life-threatening conditions.

Methods

Quantitative changes in home treatment uptake rates in seven hospitals in the West Midlands were compared with the rest of England for 3 years pre and post the introduction of the target in 2010, using a logistic regression model. Qualitative interviews in four hospitals with 96 clinical and managerial staff and 93 dialysis patients explored the barriers and facilitators to increasing the uptake of home treatment and the impact of the target.

Results

Home treatment uptake rates increased significantly in the seven study hospitals compared with the 3 years prior to the introduction of the target and compared with the rest of England where rates remained static. The four main factors facilitating increased uptake were as follows: the commissioner’s target, linked to financial penalties; additional funding for specialist staff and equipment; committed, visible clinical champions and good systems for patient training and ongoing healthcare support at home. The three main barriers were as follows: lack of training for non-specialist staff, poorly developed patient education and considerable unrecognised and unmet emotional and psychological patient needs.

Conclusions

This study shows the impact of using targets with financial penalties to achieve change and how hospitals can increase significantly the uptake of home-based self-care for a group of patients with complex medical needs. It provides useful pointers to the main barriers and facilitators, which are likely to be relevant to other groups of patients who could be treated at home. It also highlights two neglected areas which need to improve if patients with life-threatening long-term conditions are to be encouraged to take up home treatment: individualised patient education which allows exploration of the impacts of treatment options and the provision of ongoing emotional support.

Is There a Relationship Between Value-Based Purchasing and Hospital Profitability? An Exploratory Study of Missouri Hospitals

Recent US legislation is attempting to transition inpatient Medicare payments to a value-based purchasing (VBP) program. The VBP program is a pay-for-performance (P4P) system that incentivizes hospitals to improve patient satisfaction, health outcomes, and adherence to clinical protocols while simultaneously holding down costs. Our study evaluates (1) the impact of financial performance on the VBP adjustments and (2) whether there is a correlation between the VBP adjustment and the financial performance of Missouri hospitals that opted into the program. While upward and downward adjustments to the inpatient base rate may be related to hospital financial performance, prior financial performance may also be related to the adjustments. Financial health may allow facilities to invest and position the hospital for favorable future P4P adjustments. The results of our analysis indicate the VBP adjustment to the inpatient base rate is very small (±0.18%), clustered around zero, and is not correlated with financial performance. We also find that financial performance and improvement in the years prior to the adjustment are not related to the VBP adjustment or its respective components. This suggests that CMS is avoiding penalizing less profitable facilities, but the adjustment is also so small and tightly clustered around zero that it is failing to provide an adequate incentive to hospitals. The costs of improving patient satisfaction, clinical process adherence, health care outcomes, and efficiency above that of peers coupled with the growing number of metrics being used to calculate the VBP adjustments call into question the financial incentives of the hospital VBP program.

Financial incentive schemes in primary care

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common in primary care, and this article reviews their impact. It is based primarily on existing systematic reviews. The evidence suggests that P4P schemes can change health professionals' behavior and improve recorded disease management of those clinical processes that are incentivized. P4P may narrow inequalities in performance comparing deprived with nondeprived areas. However, such schemes have unintended consequences. Whether P4P improves the patient experience, the outcomes of care or population health is less clear. These practical uncertainties mirror the ethical concerns of many clinicians that a reductionist approach to managing markers of chronic disease runs counter to the humanitarian values of family practice. The variation in P4P schemes between countries reflects different historical and organizational contexts. With so much uncertainty regarding the effects of P4P, policy makers are well advised to proceed carefully with the implementation of such schemes until and unless clearer evidence for their cost-benefit emerges.

Effect of Paying for Performance on Utilisation, Quality, and User Costs of Health Services in Tanzania: A Controlled Before and After Study

BACKGROUND

Despite widespread implementation across Africa, there is limited evidence of the effect of payment for performance (P4P) schemes in low income countries on the coverage of quality services and affordability, consistent with universal health coverage objectives. We examined the effect of a government P4P scheme on utilisation, quality, and user costs of health services in Tanzania.

METHODS

We evaluated the effects of a P4P scheme on utilisation of all maternal and child immunization services targeted by the scheme, and non-targeted general outpatient service use. We also evaluated effects on patient satisfaction with care and clinical content of antenatal care, and user costs. The evaluation was done in 150 facilities across all 7 intervention districts and 4 comparison districts with two rounds of data collection over 13-months in January 2012 and February 2013. We sampled 3000 households of women who had delivered in the 12 months prior to interview; 1500 patients attending health facilities for targeted and non-targeted services at each round of data collection. Difference-in-difference regression analysis was employed.

FINDINGS

We estimated a significant positive effect on two out of eight targeted indicators. There was an 8.2% (95% CI: 3.6% to 12.8%) increase in coverage of institutional deliveries among women in the intervention area, and a 10.3% (95% CI: 4.4% to 16.1%) increase in the provision of anti-malarials during pregnancy. Use of non-targeted services reduced at dispensaries by 57.5 visits per month among children under five (95% CI: -110.2 to -4.9) and by 90.8 visits per month for those aged over five (95% CI: -156.5 to -25.2). There was no evidence of an effect of P4P on patient experience of care for targeted services. There was a 0.05 (95% CI: 0.01 to 0.10) increase in the patient satisfaction score for non-targeted services. P4P was associated with a 5.0% reduction in those paying out of pocket for deliveries (95% CI: -9.3% to -0.7%) but there was no evidence of an effect on the average amount paid.

CONCLUSION

This study adds to the very limited evidence on the effects of P4P at scale and highlights the potential risks of such schemes in relation to non-targeted service use. Further consideration of the design of P4P schemes is required to enhance progress towards universal health coverage, and close monitoring of effects on non-targeted services and user costs should be encouraged.

Pharmaceutical policies: effects of financial incentives for prescribers

BACKGROUND

The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories. Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care. Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital settings (pharmaceutical budget caps or targets), financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes (pay for performance interventions) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions (pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies). This is the first update of the original version of this review.

OBJECTIVES

To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers' practices on drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes and costs (expenditures).

SEARCH METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) (searched 29/01/2015); MEDLINE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); EMBASE, Ovid SP (searched 29/01/2015); International Network for Rational Use of Drugs (INRUD) Bibliography (searched 29/01/2015); National Health Service (NHS) Economic Evaluation Database (searched 29/01/2015); EconLit - ProQuest (searched 02/02/2015); and Science Citation Index and Social Sciences Citation Index, Institute for Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Knowledge (citation search for included studies searched 10/02/2015). We screened the reference lists of relevant reports and contacted study authors and organisations to identify additional studies.

SELECTION CRITERIA

We included policies that intend to affect prescribing by means of financial incentives for prescribers. Included in this category are pharmaceutical budget caps or targets, pay for performance and drug reimbursement rate reductions and other financial policies, if they were specifically targeted at prescribing or drug utilisation. Policies in this review were defined as laws, rules, regulations and financial and administrative orders made or implemented by payers such as national or local governments, non-government organisations, private or social insurers and insurance-like organisations. One of the following outcomes had to be reported: drug use, healthcare utilisation, health outcomes or costs. The study had to be a randomised or non-randomised trial, an interrupted time series (ITS) analysis, a repeated measures study or a controlled before-after (CBA) study.

DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

At least two review authors independently assessed eligibility for inclusion of studies and risks of bias using Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) criteria and extracted data from the included studies. For CBA studies, we reported relative effects (e.g. adjusted relative change). The review team re-analysed all ITS results. When possible, the review team also re-analysed CBA data as ITS data.

MAIN RESULTS

Eighteen evaluations (six new studies) of pharmaceutical policies from six high-income countries met our inclusion criteria. Fourteen studies evaluated pharmaceutical budget policies in the UK (nine studies), two in Germany and Ireland and one each in Sweden and Taiwan. Three studies assessed pay for performance policies in the UK (two) and the Netherlands (one). One study from Taiwan assessed a reimbursement rate reduction policy. ITS analyses had some limitations. All CBA studies had serious limitations. No study from low-income or middle-income countries met the inclusion criteria.Pharmaceutical budgets may lead to a modest reduction in drug use (median relative change -2.8%; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain of the effects of the policy on drug costs or healthcare utilisation, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on health outcomes were not reported. Effects of pay for performance policies on drug use and health outcomes are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. Effects of this policy on drug costs and healthcare utilisation have not been measured. Effects of the reimbursement rate reduction policy on drug use and drug costs are uncertain, as the certainty of such evidence has been assessed as very low. No included study assessed the effects of this policy on healthcare utilisation or health outcomes. Administration costs of the policies were not reported in any of the included studies.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns, limited evidence of their effects can be found. Effects of policies, including pay for performance policies, in improving quality of care and health outcomes remain uncertain. Because pharmaceutical policies have uncertain effects, and because they might cause harm as well as benefit, proper evaluation of these policies is needed. Future studies should consider the impact of these policies on health outcomes, drug use and overall healthcare expenditures, as well as on drug expenditures.