Embodied Perception and the Economy of Action

Failure to see money on a tree: inattentional blindness for objects that guided behavior

How is it possible to drive home and have no awareness of the trip? We documented a new form of inattentional blindness in which people fail to become aware of obstacles that had guided their behavior. In our first study, we found that people talking on cell phones while walking waited longer to avoid an obstacle and were less likely to be aware that they had avoided an obstacle than other individual walkers. In our second study, cell phone talkers and texters were less likely to show awareness of money on a tree over the pathway they were traversing. Nonetheless, they managed to avoid walking into the money tree. Perceptual information may be processed in two distinct pathways - one guiding behavior and the other leading to awareness. We observed that people can appropriately use information to guide behavior without awareness.

Conditions under which arousal does and does not elevate height estimates

We present a series of experiments that explore the boundary conditions for how emotional arousal influences height estimates. Four experiments are presented, which investigated the influence of context, situation-relevance, intensity, and attribution of arousal on height estimates. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the environmental context to signal either danger (viewing a height from above) or safety (viewing a height from below). High arousal only increased height estimates made from above. In Experiment 2, two arousal inductions were used that contained either 1) height-relevant arousing images or 2) height-irrelevant arousing images. Regardless of theme, arousal increased height estimates compared to a neutral group. In Experiment 3, arousal intensity was manipulated by inserting an intermediate or long delay between the induction and height estimates. A brief, but not a long, delay from the arousal induction served to increase height estimates. In Experiment 4, an attribution manipulation was included, and those participants who were made aware of the source of their arousal reduced their height estimates compared to participants who received no attribution instructions. Thus, arousal that is attributed to its true source is discounted from feelings elicited by the height, thereby reducing height estimates. Overall, we suggest that misattributed, embodied arousal is used as a cue when estimating heights from above that can lead to overestimation.

Blocking mimicry makes true and false smiles look the same

Recent research suggests that facial mimicry underlies accurate interpretation of subtle facial expressions. In three experiments, we manipulated mimicry and tested its role in judgments of the genuineness of true and false smiles. Experiment 1 used facial EMG to show that a new mouthguard technique for blocking mimicry modifies both the amount and the time course of facial reactions. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants rated true and false smiles either while wearing mouthguards or when allowed to freely mimic the smiles with or without additional distraction, namely holding a squeeze ball or wearing a finger-cuff heart rate monitor. Results showed that blocking mimicry compromised the decoding of true and false smiles such that they were judged as equally genuine. Together the experiments highlight the role of facial mimicry in judging subtle meanings of facial expressions.

From Gestures to Gaming: Visible Embodiment of Remote Actions

Teleoperation is the act of controlling an object that exists in a space, real or virtual, physically disconnected from the user. During such situations, it is not uncommon to observe those controlling the remote object exhibiting movement consistent with the behaviour of the remote object. Though this behaviour has no obvious impact on one's control of the remote object, it appears tied to one's intentions, thus, possibly representing an embodied representation of ongoing cognitive processes. In the present investigation, we applied a natural behaviour approach to test this notion, (a) first by identifying the representational basis for the behaviour and (b) by identifying factors that influence the occurrence of the behaviour. Each study involved observing participant behaviour while they played a racing video game. Results revealed that the spontaneous behaviour demonstrated in a teleoperation setting is tied to one's remote actions, rather than local actions or some combination of remote and local actions (Experiment 1). In addition, increasing task demand led to an increase in the occurrence of the spontaneous behaviour (Experiment 2). A third experiment was conducted to rule out the possible confound of greater immersion that tends to accompany greater demand (Experiment 3). The implications of these results not only suggest that spontaneous behaviour observed during teleoperation reflects a form of visible embodiment, sensitive to task demand, but also further emphasizes the utility of natural behaviour approaches for furthering our understanding of the relationship between the body and cognitive processes.

Angular declination and the dynamic perception of egocentric distance

The extraction of the distance between an object and an observer is fast when angular declination is informative, as it is with targets placed on the ground. To what extent does angular declination drive performance when viewing time is limited? Participants judged target distances in a real-world environment with viewing durations ranging from 36-220 ms. An important role for angular declination was supported by experiments showing that the cue provides information about egocentric distance even on the very first glimpse, and that it supports a sensitive response to distance in the absence of other useful cues. Performance was better at 220-ms viewing durations than for briefer glimpses, suggesting that the perception of distance is dynamic even within the time frame of a typical eye fixation. Critically, performance in limited viewing trials was better when preceded by a 15-s preview of the room without a designated target. The results indicate that the perception of distance is powerfully shaped by memory from prior visual experience with the scene. A theoretical framework for the dynamic perception of distance is presented.

Spatial demonstratives and perceptual space: describing and remembering object location

Spatial demonstratives - terms including this and that - are among the most common words across all languages. Yet, there are considerable differences between languages in how demonstratives carve up space and the object characteristics they can refer to, challenging the idea that the mapping between spatial demonstratives and the vision and action systems is universal. In seven experiments we show direct parallels between spatial demonstrative usage in English and (non-linguistic) memory for object location, indicating close connections between the language of space and non-linguistic spatial representation. Spatial demonstrative choice in English and immediate memory for object location are affected by a range of parameters - distance, ownership, visibility and familiarity - that are lexicalized in the demonstrative systems of some other languages. The results support a common set of constraints on language used to talk about space and on (non-linguistic) spatial representation itself. Differences in demonstrative systems across languages may emerge from basic distinctions in the representation and memory for object location. In turn, these distinctions offer a building block from which non-spatial uses of demonstratives can develop.

Angular scale expansion theory and the misperception of egocentric distance in locomotor space

Perception is crucial for the control of action, but perception need not be scaled accurately to produce accurate actions. This paper reviews evidence for an elegant new theory of locomotor space perception that is based on the dense coding of angular declination so that action control may be guided by richer feedback. The theory accounts for why so much direct-estimation data suggests that egocentric distance is underestimated despite the fact that action measures have been interpreted as indicating accurate perception. Actions are calibrated to the perceived scale of space and thus action measures are typically unable to distinguish systematic (e.g., linearly scaled) misperception from accurate perception. Whereas subjective reports of the scaling of linear extent are difficult to evaluate in absolute terms, study of the scaling of perceived angles (which exist in a known scale, delimited by vertical and horizontal) provides new evidence regarding the perceptual scaling of locomotor space.

Action-Specific Effects in Aviation: What Determines Judged Runway Size?

Several recent studies have shown that the performance of a skill that involves acting on a goal object can influence one's judgment of the size of that object. The present study investigated this effect in an aviation context. Novice pilots were asked to perform a series of visual approach and landing manoeuvres in a flight simulator. After each landing, participants next performed a task in which runway size was judged for different simulated altitudes. Gaze behaviour and control stick kinematics were also analyzed. There were significant relationships between judged runway size and multiple action-related variables including touchdown velocity, time fixating the runway, and the magnitude and frequency of control inputs. These findings suggest that relationship between the perception of a target object and action is not solely determined by performance success or failure but rather involves a relationship between multiple variables that reflect the actor's ability.

"Top-down" effects where none should be found: the El Greco fallacy in perception research

A tidal wave of recent research purports to have discovered that higher-level states such as moods, action capabilities, and categorical knowledge can literally and directly affect how things look. Are these truly effects on perception, or might some instead reflect influences on judgment, memory, or response bias? Here, we exploited an infamous art-historical reasoning error (the so-called "El Greco fallacy") to demonstrate that multiple alleged top-down effects (including effects of morality on lightness perception and effects of action capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be effects on perception. We suggest that this error may also contaminate several other varieties of top-down effects and that this discovery has implications for debates over the continuity (or lack thereof) of perception and cognition.

Sensory motor mechanisms unify psychology: the embodiment of culture

Sensorimotor mechanisms can unify explanations at cognitive, social, and cultural levels. As an example, we review how anticipated motor effort is used by individuals and groups to judge distance: the greater the anticipated effort the greater the perceived distance. Anticipated motor effort can also be used to understand cultural differences. People with interdependent self- construals interact almost exclusively with in-group members, and hence there is little opportunity to tune their sensorimotor systems for interaction with out-group members. The result is that interactions with out-group members are expected to be difficult and out-group members are perceived as literally more distant. In two experiments we show (a) interdependent Americans, compared to independent Americans, see American confederates (in-group) as closer; (b) interdependent Arabs, compared to independent Arabs, perceive Arab confederates (in- group) as closer, whereas interdependent Americans perceive Arab confederates (out-group) as farther. These results demonstrate how the same embodied mechanism can seamlessly contribute to explanations at the cognitive, social, and cultural levels.

The value of emotion: how does episodic prospection modulate delay discounting?

Background

Humans often show impatience when making intertemporal choice for monetary rewards, preferring small rewards delivered immediately to larger rewards delivered after a delay, which reflects a fundamental psychological principle: delay discounting. However, we propose that episodic prospection humans can vividly envisage exerts a strong and broad influence on individuals' delay discounting. Specifically, episodic prospection may affect individuals' intertemporal choice by the negative or positive emotion of prospection.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The present study explored how episodic prospection modulated delay discounting by emotion. Study 1 showed that participants were more inclined to choose the delayed but larger rewards when they imaged positive future events than when they did not image events; Study 2 showed that participants were more inclined to choose the immediate but smaller rewards when they imaged negative future events than when they did not image events; In contrast, study 3 showed that choice preferences of participants when they imaged neutral future events were the same as when they did not image events.

Conclusions/Significance

By manipulating the emotion valence of episodic prospection, our findings suggested that positive emotion made individuals tend to choose delayed rewards, while negative emotion made individuals tend to choose immediate rewards. Only imaging events with neutral emotion did not affect individuals' choice preference. Thus, the valence of imaged future events' emotion might play an important role in individuals' intertemporal choice. It is possible that the valence of emotion may affect the changed direction (promote or inhibit) of individuals' delay discounting, while the ability to image future events affects the changed degree of individuals' delay discounting.

The economy of social resources and its influence on spatial perceptions

Survival for any organism, including people, is a matter of resource management. To ensure survival, people necessarily budget their resources. Spatial perceptions contribute to resource budgeting by scaling the environment to an individual’s available resources. Effective budgeting requires setting a balance of income and expenditures around some baseline value. For social resources, this baseline assumes that the individuals are embedded in their social network. A review of the literature supports the proposal that our visual perceptions vary based on the implicit budgeting of physical and social resources, where social resources, as they fluctuate relative to a baseline, can directly alter our visual perceptions.

The accuracy of 'haptically' measured geographical slant perception

In two recent issues of Acta, the widely accepted view of Proffitt (2006), that 'haptic' measures of perceived geographical slant are generally accurate, and dissociated from explicit overestimates, came under intense scrutiny (Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, and Stigliani, 2010; 2011). Durgin and colleagues' challenge to this account centred on the claim that Proffitt's haptic' measure of geographical slant, the palm-board, may be accidently accurate due to restricted movements available at the wrist. Two experiments reported here compare the accuracy of Proffitt's palm-board with an alternative measure of geographical slant perception, the Palm-Controlled Inclinometer (PCI), which allows participants to use wrist, elbow and shoulder movements to match slant with their hand. Participants (N=320) made slant judgements using both measures, across five hills and five staircases with 32 participants for each stimulus angle (4.5°-31°). Results for the palm-board replicated those of Proffitt and co-workers, overestimation at shallow angles (≤14°), contrasted with underestimation at steeper angles (≥23°), whereas estimates made using the PCI had a greater degree of accuracy for steeper slopes. A follow-up experiment tested the accuracy of the palm-board and PCI for surfaces in near space to repeat the design of Durgin et al. (2010, experiment 1). Participants (N=20) used the palm-board and PCI to judge the angle of slanted blocks (25°, 30°). As with traversable slopes, PCI judgements did not differ from the actual angle of the blocks whereas the palm-board measure underestimated. 'Haptic' measures of geographical slant perception can be accurate for relatively steep slopes, in both near and far space.

Relating spatial perspective taking to the perception of other's affordances: providing a foundation for predicting the future behavior of others

Understanding what another agent can see relates functionally to the understanding of what they can do. We propose that spatial perspective taking and perceiving other's affordances, while two separate spatial processes, together share the common social function of predicting the behavior of others. Perceiving the action capabilities of others allows for a common understanding of how agents may act together. The ability to take another's perspective focuses an understanding of action goals so that more precise understanding of intentions may result. This review presents an analysis of these complementary abilities, both in terms of the frames of reference and the proposed sensorimotor mechanisms involved. Together, we argue for the importance of reconsidering the role of basic spatial processes to explain more complex behaviors.

Psychological influences on distance estimation in a virtual reality environment

Studies of embodied perception have revealed that social, psychological, and physiological factors influence space perception. While many of these influences were observed with real or highly realistic stimuli, the present work showed that even the orientation of abstract geometric objects in a non-realistic virtual environment could influence distance perception. Observers wore a head mounted display and watched virtual cones moving within an invisible cube for 5 s with their head movement recorded. Subsequently, the observers estimated the distance to the cones or evaluated their friendliness. The cones either faced the observer, a target behind the cones, or were oriented randomly. The average viewing distance to the cones varied between 1.2 and 2.0 m. At a viewing distance of 1.6 m, the observers perceived the cones facing them as closer than the cones facing a target in the opposite direction, or those oriented randomly. Furthermore, irrespective of the viewing distance, observers moved their head away from the cones more strongly and evaluated the cones as less friendly when the cones faced the observers. Similar distance estimation results were obtained with a 3-dimensional projection onto a large screen, although the effective viewing distances were farther away. These results suggest that factors other than physical distance influenced distance perception even with non-realistic geometric objects in a virtual environment. Furthermore, the distance perception modulation was accompanied by changes in subjective impression and avoidance movement. We propose that cones facing an observer are perceived as socially discomforting or threatening, and potentially violate an observer's personal space, which might influence the perceived distance of cones.

Relieving the Burdens of Secrecy

Recent work demonstrates that harboring secrets influences perceptual judgments and actions. Individuals carrying secrets make judgments consistent with the experience of being weighed down, such as judging a hill as steeper and judging distances to be farther. In the present article, two studies examined whether revealing a secret would relieve the burden of secrecy. Relative to a control condition, thinking about a secret led to the judgments of increased hill slant, whereas revealing a secret eliminated that effect (Study 1). Additionally, relative to a control condition, thinking about a secret led to judgments of increased distance, and again, revealing a secret eliminated that effect (Study 2). Sharing secrets with others might relieve the perceived physical burden from secrecy.

The weight of a guilty conscience: subjective body weight as an embodiment of guilt

Guilt is an important social and moral emotion. In addition to feeling unpleasant, guilt is metaphorically described as a "weight on one's conscience." Evidence from the field of embodied cognition suggests that abstract metaphors may be grounded in bodily experiences, but no prior research has examined the embodiment of guilt. Across four studies we examine whether i) unethical acts increase subjective experiences of weight, ii) feelings of guilt explain this effect, and iii) whether there are consequences of the weight of guilt. Studies 1-3 demonstrated that unethical acts led to more subjective body weight compared to control conditions. Studies 2 and 3 indicated that heightened feelings of guilt mediated the effect, whereas other negative emotions did not. Study 4 demonstrated a perceptual consequence. Specifically, an induction of guilt affected the perceived effort necessary to complete tasks that were physical in nature, compared to minimally physical tasks.

Slant perception for stairs and screens: effects of sex and fatigue in a laboratory environment

The apparent slope of a hill or staircase, termed geographical slant perception, is exaggerated in explicit awareness. Across two experiments this paper tests the use of a laboratory environment to study geographical slant perception. First, using a student-aged sample (N = 166), we examine the similarity of slant estimates in the field with those made in the laboratory using life-sized images of the built environment as stimuli. Results reveal no differences in slant estimates between the two test environments. Furthermore, three traditional measures of perceived geographical slant (verbal, visual, and haptic) appear sensitive to a difference in slant of only 3.4 degrees in both the field and laboratory environments. In a follow-up experiment we test the effect of fatigue on slant estimates in the laboratory. In line with previous research with outdoor stimuli, fatigued participants provided more exaggerated explicit reports of slant relative to those in a control group, and females gave more exaggerated slant estimates than males across both experiments. The current set of findings open the door to future studies of geographical slant perception that may be more suited to laboratory conditions.

Illusory ownership of a virtual child body causes overestimation of object sizes and implicit attitude changes

An illusory sensation of ownership over a surrogate limb or whole body can be induced through specific forms of multisensory stimulation, such as synchronous visuotactile tapping on the hidden real and visible rubber hand in the rubber hand illusion. Such methods have been used to induce ownership over a manikin and a virtual body that substitute the real body, as seen from first-person perspective, through a head-mounted display. However, the perceptual and behavioral consequences of such transformed body ownership have hardly been explored. In Exp. 1, immersive virtual reality was used to embody 30 adults as a 4-y-old child (condition C), and as an adult body scaled to the same height as the child (condition A), experienced from the first-person perspective, and with virtual and real body movements synchronized. The result was a strong body-ownership illusion equally for C and A. Moreover there was an overestimation of the sizes of objects compared with a nonembodied baseline, which was significantly greater for C compared with A. An implicit association test showed that C resulted in significantly faster reaction times for the classification of self with child-like compared with adult-like attributes. Exp. 2 with an additional 16 participants extinguished the ownership illusion by using visuomotor asynchrony, with all else equal. The size-estimation and implicit association test differences between C and A were also extinguished. We conclude that there are perceptual and probably behavioral correlates of body-ownership illusions that occur as a function of the type of body in which embodiment occurs.

Spiders appear to move faster than non-threatening objects regardless of one's ability to block them

We examined whether perception of a threatening object - a spider - was more accurate than of a non-threatening object. An accurate perception could promote better survival than a biased perception. However, if biases encourage faster responses and more appropriate behaviors, then under the right circumstances, perceptual biases could promote better survival. We found that spiders appeared to be moving faster than balls and ladybugs. Furthermore, the perceiver's ability to act on the object also influenced perceived speed: the object looked faster when it was more difficult to block. Both effects--the threat of the object and the perceiver's blocking abilities--acted independently from each other. The results suggest effects of multiple types of affordances on perception of speed.

Response bias cannot explain action-specific effects: evidence from compliant and non-compliant participants

According to the action-specific account of perception, the perceiver's ability to act influences perception of the target. For example, targets that are easier to acquire are reported to look closer, bigger, and slower. However, an alternative explanation for these effects is that they are due to response bias, rather than to changes in perception. To test the role of response bias, we employed two separate manipulations. We manipulated people's abilities to block a ball and measured the corresponding effects on estimated ball speed. We also created an explicit task demand by giving participants instructions that emphasized responding either slow or fast. Participants were grouped, based on whether they were compliant or non-compliant with the instructions. Regardless of their compliance, we found an action-specific effect of blocking ability on estimated speed. Given that non-compliant participants still showed the effect, the results provide strong evidence against a response-bias explanation of this action-specific effect. Paired with earlier research, we conclude that blocking ability influences perceived speed. Perception expresses the relationship between the environment and the perceiver, and this view is consistent with emerging neural and behavioral evidence for an interconnected perceptual-motor system.

Handles lost in non-reachable space

Recent evidence indicates that we experience manipulable objects as graspable, provided that they fall within our reaching space. Nevertheless, such evidence comes from studies using virtual objects that have poor ecological validity. Here, we used a spatial alignment effect paradigm and systematically examined this effect when a real handled object was presented at four different distances, namely near-reaching space, actual-reaching space, perceived-reaching space, and non-reaching space. Participants responded with either the right or the left hand as soon as the real object, a mug with the handle oriented toward the left or right, was presented. We found spatial compatibility effect only when the object was presented in the near-reaching and actual-reaching spaces. Results suggest that the activation of the potential actions to perform with objects is modulated by object accessibility. They also suggest that accessibility is exclusively linked to the actual rather than the estimated reaching ability of the perceiver. Results are discussed within the theoretical framework of embodied cognition.

Sugar and space? Not the case: Effects of low blood glucose on slant estimation are mediated by beliefs

There is a current debate concerning whether people's physiological or behavioral potential alters their perception of slanted surfaces. One way to directly test this is to physiologically change people's potential by lowering their blood sugar and comparing their estimates of slant to those with normal blood sugar. In the first investigation of this (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010), it was shown that people with low blood sugar gave higher estimates of slanted surfaces than people with normal blood sugar. The question that arises is whether these higher estimates are due to lower blood sugar, per se, or experimental demand created by other aspects of the experiment. Here evidence was collected from 120 observers showing that directly manipulating physiological potential, while controlling for experimental demand effects, does not alter the perception of slant. Indeed, when experimental demand went against behavioral potential, it produced judgmental biases opposite to those predicted by behavioral potential in the low blood sugar condition. It is suggested that low blood sugar only affects slant judgments by making participants more susceptible to judgmental biases.

Intentional weighting: a basic principle in cognitive control

Human perception and action are tailored to the situation at hand, and thus reflect the current intentions of the perceiver/actor. We suggest that this is achieved by an "intentional-weighting" mechanism. It operates on the cognitive representations of the features of perceived events and produced event--perceptions and actions that is. Intention- or goal-related feature dimensions are weighted more strongly, so that feature values defined on the respective dimension have a stronger impact on information processing, and stimulus and response selection in particular. This article discusses what intentional weighting is, how such a mechanism may work, and how it relates to available research on attention, action planning, and executive control.

Yes It Can

Understanding the division of labor between conscious processes and unconscious ones is central to our understanding of the human mind. This article proposes a simple “Yes It Can” (or YIC) principle: It argues that unconscious processes can perform the same fundamental, high-level functions that conscious processes can perform. The author presents considerations of evolutionary pressures and of the availability of mental resources that render YIC a reasonable hypothesis. Evidence is then reviewed from various subfields of the cognitive sciences, which shows that functions that were traditionally thought of as requiring consciousness can occur nonconsciously. On the basis of these data and arguments, it is proposed that an answer to the question “What is it that consciousness does?” would not be in the form of “Consciousness is necessary for F,” where F is a fundamental, high-level cognitive function. In Marr’s (1982) terms, the argument is that computationally conscious and unconscious processes are very similar. Yet differences in how these processes kick in and in the ways in which they play out (Marr’s algorithmic-representational level) are likely to have interesting implications for human cognition, motivation, and emotion.

Self-representation of children suffering from congenital heart disease and maternal competence

Child development may be subject to forms of motor, physical, cognitive and self-representation impairments when complex congenital heart disease (CHD) occurs. In some cases, inadequacy of both self-representation as well as the family system are displayed. It seems to be important to search the likely internal and external resources of the CHD child, and the possible connections among such resources, which may help him/her to manage his/her own risk condition. The research project inquires the possible resources related to the self-representation and self-esteem levels of the CHD child, and those related to maternal self-perception as competent mothers. A group of 25 children (mean age = 10.2; SD=1.8) suffering from specific forms of CHD, and a group made up of their relative mothers (mean age = 38.2; SD=5) were studied. The tools used were the Human Figure Drawing, to investigate child body-related self-representation; the TMA scale (Self-esteem Multidimensional Test), to investigate the child's self-esteem; and the Q-sort questionnaire, to assess how mothers perceived their maternal competence. Data concerning the likely correlations between the child's self-representation and the maternal role competence show [that] positive correlations between some indicators of maternal competence, specific aspects of CHD children's self-representation (mothers' emotional coping and children's self-image adequacy) and self-esteem (mothers' emotional scaffolding and children's self-esteem at an emotional level). By detecting the occurrence of specific correlations among resources of both child and mother, the study provides cardiologists with information that is useful for building a relationship with the families concerned, which would seem to enhance the quality of the process of the cure itself.

Affective signals of threat increase perceived proximity

Do stimuli appear to be closer when they are more threatening? We tested people's perceptions of distance to stimuli that they felt were threatening relative to perceptions of stimuli they felt were disgusting or neutral. Two studies demonstrated that stimuli that emitted affective signals of threat (e.g., an aggressive male student) were seen as physically closer than stimuli that emitted affective signals of disgust (e.g., a repulsive male student) or no affective signal. Even after controlling for the direct effects of physiological arousal, object familiarity, and intensity of the negative emotional reaction, we found that threatening stimuli appeared to be physically closer than did disgusting ones (Study 2). These findings highlight the links among biased perception, action regulation, and successful navigation of the environment.

Anxiety and perceptual-motor performance: toward an integrated model of concepts, mechanisms, and processes

Under anxiety, people sometimes perform poorly. This concerns cognitive performance (e.g., taking an important exam) as well as perceptual-motor performance (e.g., picking up a cup from a table). There is still much debate about how anxiety affects perceptual-motor performance. In the current paper we review the experimental literature on anxiety and perceptual-motor performance, thereby focusing on how anxiety affects the perception, selection, and realization of action possibilities. Based on this review we discuss the merits of two opposing theoretical explanations and build on existing frameworks of anxiety and cognitive performance to develop an integrated model that explains the various ways in which anxiety may specifically affect perceptual-motor performance. This model distinguishes between positive and negative effects of anxiety and, moving beyond previous approaches, recognizes three operational levels (i.e., attentional, interpretational, and behavioral) at which anxiety may affect different aspects of goal-directed action. Finally, predictions are formulated and directions for future research suggested.

Scientific Utopia: II. Restructuring Incentives and Practices to Promote Truth Over Publishability

An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in the literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation. Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. For example, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishable reports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. The persistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive-getting it right-competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive-getting it published. This article develops strategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation that account for ordinary human motivations and biases.

Sizing Opportunity

An abundance of research has investigated the effects of motivational states on size estimates, with initially a strong focus on the functionality of size overestimations. We suggest and found, however, that goal-relevant objects can be over- and underestimated, depending on which size is goal congruent. Specifically, we found that people with a throwing goal estimated (verbally and via visual matching) the size of a basketball as smaller than people without a throwing goal; hoop size estimates showed the reverse effect (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 3, sex-primed men estimated a woman’s breasts as larger than neutral-primed men; women showed the reverse effect. Finally, Experiment 4 replicated this finding for people in impulsive but not reflective cognitive states, suggesting that biased size estimation is a spontaneous process that promotes readiness for goal pursuit. We conclude that bigger is not always better; people size the world as it best suits them.

Felt Understanding and Misunderstanding Affect the Perception of Pain, Slant, and Distance

We conducted two studies to examine whether the psychological states of felt understanding and misunderstanding would affect people’s basic perceptions such as pain, geographical slant, and distance. As predicted, an experimentally induced sense of felt understanding relative to misunderstanding increased pain tolerance marginally and reduced the perceived distance to the target locations significantly. In Study 2, we not only replicated Study 1’s findings on pain tolerance and distance perception but also found that participants in the understanding condition perceived the same hill to be significantly less steep than those in the misunderstanding condition. Our studies demonstrated that the experimentally induced feeling of misunderstanding tends to have the aversive effect on the perception of pain, geographical slant, and distance, whereas the experimentally induced feeling of understanding tends to alleviate pain, reduce the geographical slant, and the perceived distance to a target location.