An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence

The Social Context Network Model in Psychiatric and Neurological Diseases

The role of contextual modulations has been extensively studied in basic sensory and cognitive processes. However, little is known about their impact on social cognition, let alone their disruption in disorders compromising such a domain. In this chapter, we flesh out the social context network model (SCNM), a neuroscientific proposal devised to address the issue. In SCNM terms, social context effects rely on a fronto-temporo-insular network in charge of (a) updating context cues to make predictions, (b) consolidating context-target associative learning, and (c) coordinating internal and external milieus. First, we characterize various social cognition domains as context-dependent phenomena. Then, we review behavioral and neural evidence of social context impairments in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) and autism spectrum disorder (ASD), highlighting their relation with key SCNM hubs. Next, we show that other psychiatric and neurological conditions involve context-processing impairments following damage to the brain regions included in the model. Finally, we call for an ecological approach to social cognition assessment, moving beyond widespread abstract and decontextualized methods.

Evidence for Enhanced Interoceptive Accuracy in Professional Musicians

Interoception is defined as the perceptual activity involved in the processing of internal bodily signals. While the ability of internal perception is considered a relatively stable trait, recent data suggest that learning to integrate multisensory information can modulate it. Making music is a uniquely rich multisensory experience that has shown to alter motor, sensory, and multimodal representations in the brain of musicians. We hypothesize that musical training also heightens interoceptive accuracy comparable to other perceptual modalities. Thirteen professional singers, twelve string players, and thirteen matched non-musicians were examined using a well-established heartbeat discrimination paradigm complemented by self-reported dispositional traits. Results revealed that both groups of musicians displayed higher interoceptive accuracy than non-musicians, whereas no differences were found between singers and string-players. Regression analyses showed that accumulated musical practice explained about 49% variation in heartbeat perception accuracy in singers but not in string-players. Psychometric data yielded a number of psychologically plausible inter-correlations in musicians related to performance anxiety. However, dispositional traits were not a confounding factor on heartbeat discrimination accuracy. Together, these data provide first evidence indicating that professional musicians show enhanced interoceptive accuracy compared to non-musicians. We argue that musical training largely accounted for this effect.

Redefining the Role of Limbic Areas in Cortical Processing

There is increasing evidence that the brain actively constructs action and perception using past experience. In this paper, we propose that the direction of information flow along gradients of laminar differentiation provides important insight on the role of limbic cortices in cortical processing. Cortical limbic areas, with a simple laminar structure (e.g., no or rudimentary layer IV), send 'feedback' projections to lower level better laminated areas. We propose that this 'feedback' functions as predictions that drive processing throughout the cerebral cortex. This hypothesis has the potential to provide a unifying framework for an increasing number of proposals that use predictive coding to explain a myriad of neural processes and disorders, and has important implications for hypotheses about consciousness.

Active Inference, homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control

We review a theory of homeostatic regulation and adaptive behavioural control within the Active Inference framework. Our aim is to connect two research streams that are usually considered independently; namely, Active Inference and associative learning theories of animal behaviour. The former uses a probabilistic (Bayesian) formulation of perception and action, while the latter calls on multiple (Pavlovian, habitual, goal-directed) processes for homeostatic and behavioural control. We offer a synthesis these classical processes and cast them as successive hierarchical contextualisations of sensorimotor constructs, using the generative models that underpin Active Inference. This dissolves any apparent mechanistic distinction between the optimization processes that mediate classical control or learning. Furthermore, we generalize the scope of Active Inference by emphasizing interoceptive inference and homeostatic regulation. The ensuing homeostatic (or allostatic) perspective provides an intuitive explanation for how priors act as drives or goals to enslave action, and emphasises the embodied nature of inference.

The Dopaminergic Midbrain Encodes the Expected Certainty about Desired Outcomes

Dopamine plays a key role in learning; however, its exact function in decision making and choice remains unclear. Recently, we proposed a generic model based on active (Bayesian) inference wherein dopamine encodes the precision of beliefs about optimal policies. Put simply, dopamine discharges reflect the confidence that a chosen policy will lead to desired outcomes. We designed a novel task to test this hypothesis, where subjects played a "limited offer" game in a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Subjects had to decide how long to wait for a high offer before accepting a low offer, with the risk of losing everything if they waited too long. Bayesian model comparison showed that behavior strongly supported active inference, based on surprise minimization, over classical utility maximization schemes. Furthermore, midbrain activity, encompassing dopamine projection neurons, was accurately predicted by trial-by-trial variations in model-based estimates of precision. Our findings demonstrate that human subjects infer both optimal policies and the precision of those inferences, and thus support the notion that humans perform hierarchical probabilistic Bayesian inference. In other words, subjects have to infer both what they should do as well as how confident they are in their choices, where confidence may be encoded by dopaminergic firing.

Investigating the phenomenological matrix of mindfulness-related practices from a neurocognitive perspective

There has been a great increase in literature concerned with the effects of a variety of mental training regimes that generally fall within what might be called contemplative practices, and a majority of these studies have focused on mindfulness. Mindfulness meditation practices can be conceptualized as a set of attention-based, regulatory, and self-inquiry training regimes cultivated for various ends, including wellbeing and psychological health. This article examines the construct of mindfulness in psychological research and reviews recent, nonclinical work in this area. Instead of proposing a single definition of mindfulness, we interpret it as a continuum of practices involving states and processes that can be mapped into a multidimensional phenomenological matrix which itself can be expressed in a neurocognitive framework. This phenomenological matrix of mindfulness is presented as a heuristic to guide formulation of next-generation research hypotheses from both cognitive/behavioral and neuroscientific perspectives. In relation to this framework, we review selected findings on mindfulness cultivated through practices in traditional and research settings, and we conclude by identifying significant gaps in the literature and outline new directions for research.

Early-infant diagnostic predictors of the neuro-behavioral development after neonatal care

Multidimensional diagnosis plays a central role in infant developmental care, which leads to the prediction of future disabilities. Information consolidated from objective and subjective, early and late, central and peripheral data may reveal neuro-pathological mechanisms and realize earlier and more precise preventive intervention. In the current study, we retrospectively searched correlating factors to the following neurological and behavioral development of 'Head Control' and 'Roll Over' using multivariate correlation analysis of differ-ent diagnostic domains over age, subject/object information of the patients who were previously admitted in our neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) and could be developmentally followed up in our outpatient clinic. Based on the hematologic and biochemical data, MRI brain anatomy during NICU hospitalization, we characterized all the acquired data distribution from 31 infants with either 'appeared neurologically normal (ANN, n = 21)’ or 'appeared neurologically abnormal (ANA, n = 10)’ pro tempore, with a physician's clinical judgment before discharge. Besides single factor comparisons between ANN and ANA, we examined their development difference by using the multidimensional information processing, principal component analysis (PCA). The diagnostic predictors of neuro-behavioral development were selected by regression analysis with variable selection. It resulted that hematological and brain anatomical factors seemed correlated to both ‘Head Control’ and ‘Roll Over’. This report suggested certain possibility of the cross-domain translational approach between subjective and objective developmental information through multivariate analyses, with candidate markers preliminarily to be evaluated in further studies.

Differential functional brain network connectivity during visceral interoception as revealed by independent component analysis of fMRI TIME-series

Influential theories of brain-viscera interactions propose a central role for interoception in basic motivational and affective feeling states. Recent neuroimaging studies have underlined the insula, anterior cingulate, and ventral prefrontal cortices as the neural correlates of interoception. However, the relationships between these distributed brain regions remain unclear. In this study, we used spatial independent component analysis (ICA) and functional network connectivity (FNC) approaches to investigate time course correlations across the brain regions during visceral interoception. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was performed in thirteen healthy females who underwent viscerosensory stimulation of bladder as a representative internal organ at different prefill levels, i.e., no prefill, low prefill (100 ml saline), and high prefill (individually adapted to the sensations of persistent strong desire to void), and with different infusion temperatures, i.e., body warm (∼37°C) or ice cold (4-8°C) saline solution. During Increased distention pressure on the viscera, the insula, striatum, anterior cingulate, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, amygdalo-hippocampus, thalamus, brainstem, and cerebellar components showed increased activation. A second group of components encompassing the insula and anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices and temporal-parietal junction showed increased activity with innocuous temperature stimulation of bladder mucosa. Significant differences in the FNC were found between the insula and amygdalo-hippocampus, the insula and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and temporal-parietal junction as the distention pressure on the viscera increased. These results provide new insight into the supraspinal processing of visceral interoception originating from an internal organ.

That's not quite me: limb ownership encoding in the brain

With congruent stimulation of one's limb together with a fake counterpart, an illusory self-attribution of the fake limb can be induced. Such illusions have brought profound insights into the cognitive and neuronal mechanisms underlying temporary changes in body representation, but to put them in perspective, they need to be compared with ownership as experienced for one's real body. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the neuronal correlates of touch under different degrees of body ownership. Participants' left and right arms were stimulated either alone or together with a fake counterpart while this stimulation was synchronous, ambiguous or asynchronous. Synchronous stimulation induced illusory fake arm ownership, but the brain still differentiated between touch to one's real arm and to an illusory 'owned' arm: the degree of arm ownership was encoded positively by activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and lateral occipitotemporal cortex and negatively in the temporoparietal cortex. Conversely, the ventral premotor cortex responded more strongly to synchronous stimulation compared with asynchronous stimulation and with real arm only stimulation. These results offer new insights into the differential representation of the real body vs a body that is temporarily self-attributed following the resolution of multisensory conflict.

Interoception, contemplative practice, and health

Interoception can be broadly defined as the sense of signals originating within the body. As such, interoception is critical for our sense of embodiment, motivation, and well-being. And yet, despite its importance, interoception remains poorly understood within modern science. This paper reviews interdisciplinary perspectives on interoception, with the goal of presenting a unified perspective from diverse fields such as neuroscience, clinical practice, and contemplative studies. It is hoped that this integrative effort will advance our understanding of how interoception determines well-being, and identify the central challenges to such understanding. To this end, we introduce an expanded taxonomy of interoceptive processes, arguing that many of these processes can be understood through an emerging predictive coding model for mind–body integration. The model, which describes the tension between expected and felt body sensation, parallels contemplative theories, and implicates interoception in a variety of affective and psychosomatic disorders. We conclude that maladaptive construal of bodily sensations may lie at the heart of many contemporary maladies, and that contemplative practices may attenuate these interpretative biases, restoring a person’s sense of presence and agency in the world.

Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions: A critical overview

There is considerable overlap between phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions. In this paper, we first review major phenomenological accounts of delusions, beginning with Jaspers' ideas regarding incomprehensibility, delusional mood, and disturbed "cogito" (basic, minimal, or core self-experience) in what he termed "delusion proper" in schizophrenia. Then we discuss later studies of decontextualization and delusional mood by Matussek, changes in self and world in delusion formation according to Conrad's notions of "apophany" and "anastrophe", and the implications of ontological transformations in the felt sense of reality in some delusions. Next we consider consistencies between: a) phenomenological models stressing minimal-self (ipseity) disturbance and hyperreflexivity in schizophrenia, and b) recent neurocognitive models of delusions emphasizing salience dysregulation and prediction error. We voice reservations about homogenizing tendencies in neurocognitive explanations of delusions (the "paranoia paradigm"), given experiential variations in states of delusion. In particular we consider shortcomings of assuming that delusions necessarily or always involve "mistaken beliefs" concerning objective facts about the world. Finally, we offer some suggestions regarding possible neurocognitive factors. Current models that stress hypersalience (banal stimuli experienced as strange) might benefit from considering the potential role of hyposalience in delusion formation. Hyposalience - associated with experiencing the strange as if it were banal, and perhaps with activation of the default mode network - may underlie a kind of delusional derealization and an "anything goes" attitude. Such an attitude would be conducive to delusion formation, yet differs significantly from the hypersalience emphasized in current neurocognitive theories.

Interoceptive predictions in the brain

Intuition suggests that perception follows sensation and therefore bodily feelings originate in the body. However, recent evidence goes against this logic: interoceptive experience may largely reflect limbic predictions about the expected state of the body that are constrained by ascending visceral sensations. In this Opinion article, we introduce the Embodied Predictive Interoception Coding model, which integrates an anatomical model of corticocortical connections with Bayesian active inference principles, to propose that agranular visceromotor cortices contribute to interoception by issuing interoceptive predictions. We then discuss how disruptions in interoceptive predictions could function as a common vulnerability for mental and physical illness.

Autonomic and brain responses associated with empathy deficits in autism spectrum disorder

Accumulating evidence suggests that autonomic signals and their cortical representations are closely linked to emotional processes, and that related abnormalities could lead to social deficits. Although socio‐emotional impairments are a defining feature of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), empirical evidence directly supporting the link between autonomic, cortical, and socio‐emotional abnormalities in ASD is still lacking. In this study, we examined autonomic arousal indexed by skin conductance responses (SCR), concurrent cortical responses measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging, and effective brain connectivity estimated by dynamic causal modeling in seventeen unmedicated high‐functioning adults with ASD and seventeen matched controls while they performed an empathy‐for‐pain task. Compared to controls, adults with ASD showed enhanced SCR related to empathetic pain, along with increased neural activity in the anterior insular cortex, although their behavioral empathetic pain discriminability was reduced and overall SCR was decreased. ASD individuals also showed enhanced correlation between SCR and neural activities in the anterior insular cortex. Importantly, significant group differences in effective brain connectivity were limited to greater reduction in the negative intrinsic connectivity of the anterior insular cortex in the ASD group, indicating a failure in attenuating anterior insular responses to empathetic pain. These results suggest that aberrant interoceptive precision, as indexed by abnormalities in autonomic activity and its central representations, may underlie empathy deficits in ASD. Hum Brain Mapp 36:3323–3338, 2015. © 2015 The Authors Human Brain Mapping Published byWiley Periodicals, Inc.

Towards multiple interactions of inner and outer sensations in corporeal awareness

Under normal circumstances, different inner- and outer-body sources are integrated to form coherent and accurate mental experiences of the state of the body, leading to the phenomenon of corporeal awareness. How these processes are affected by changes in inner and outer inputs to the body remains unclear. Here, we aim to present empirical evidence in which people with a massive sensory and motor disconnection may continue to experience feelings of general body state awareness without complete control of their inner and outer states. In these clinical populations, the activity of the neural structures subserving inner and outer body processing can be manipulated and tuned by means of body illusions that are usually based on multisensory stimulation. We suggest that a multisensory therapeutic approach could be adopted in the context of therapies for patients suffering from deafferentation and deefferentation. In this way, these individuals could regain a more complete feeling and control of the sensations they experience, which vary widely depending on their neurological condition.

The cortical modulation of stimulus-specific adaptation in the auditory midbrain and thalamus: a potential neuronal correlate for predictive coding

To follow an ever-changing auditory scene, the auditory brain is continuously creating a representation of the past to form expectations about the future. Unexpected events will produce an error in the predictions that should “trigger” the network’s response. Indeed, neurons in the auditory midbrain, thalamus and cortex, respond to rarely occurring sounds while adapting to frequently repeated ones, i.e., they exhibit stimulus specific adaptation (SSA). SSA cannot be explained solely by intrinsic membrane properties, but likely involves the participation of the network. Thus, SSA is envisaged as a high order form of adaptation that requires the influence of cortical areas. However, present research supports the hypothesis that SSA, at least in its simplest form (i.e., to frequency deviants), can be transmitted in a bottom-up manner through the auditory pathway. Here, we briefly review the underlying neuroanatomy of the corticofugal projections before discussing state of the art studies which demonstrate that SSA present in the medial geniculate body (MGB) and inferior colliculus (IC) is not inherited from the cortex but can be modulated by the cortex via the corticofugal pathways. By modulating the gain of neurons in the thalamus and midbrain, the auditory cortex (AC) would refine SSA subcortically, preventing irrelevant information from reaching the cortex.

Interoceptive dysfunction: toward an integrated framework for understanding somatic and affective disturbance in depression

Depression is characterized by disturbed sleep and eating, a variety of other nonspecific somatic symptoms, and significant somatic comorbidities. Why there is such close association between cognitive and somatic dysfunction in depression is nonetheless poorly understood. An explosion of research in the area of interoception-the perception and interpretation of bodily signals-over the last decade nonetheless holds promise for illuminating what have until now been obscure links between the social, cognitive-affective, and somatic features of depression. This article reviews rapidly accumulating evidence that both somatic signaling and interoception are frequently altered in depression. This includes comparative studies showing vagus-mediated effects on depression-like behaviors in rodent models as well as studies in humans indicating both dysfunction in the neural substrates for interoception (e.g., vagus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex) and reduced sensitivity to bodily stimuli in depression. An integrative framework for organizing and interpreting this evidence is put forward which incorporates (a) multiple potential pathways to interoceptive dysfunction; (b) interaction with individual, gender, and cultural differences in interoception; and (c) a developmental psychobiological systems perspective, emphasizing likely differential susceptibility to somatic and interoceptive dysfunction across the lifespan. Combined with current theory and evidence, it is suggested that core symptoms of depression (e.g., anhedonia, social deficits) may be products of disturbed interoceptive-exteroceptive integration. More research is nonetheless needed to fully elucidate the relationship between mind, body, and social context in depression.

Mindfulness meditation modulates reward prediction errors in a passive conditioning task

Reinforcement learning models have demonstrated that phasic activity of dopamine neurons during reward expectation encodes information about the predictability of reward and cues that predict reward. Self-control strategies such as those practiced in mindfulness-based approaches is claimed to reduce negative and positive reactions to stimuli suggesting the hypothesis that such training may influence basic reward processing. Using a passive conditioning task and fMRI in a group of experienced mindfulness meditators and age-matched controls, we tested the hypothesis that mindfulness meditation influence reward and reward prediction error (PE) signals. We found diminished positive and negative PE-related blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses in the putamen in meditators compared with controls. In the meditator group this decrease in striatal BOLD responses to reward PE was paralleled by increased activity in posterior insula, a primary interoceptive region. Critically, responses in the putamen during early trials of the conditioning procedure (run 1) were elevated in both meditators and controls. Overall, these results provide evidence that experienced mindfulness meditators are able to attenuate reward prediction signals to valenced stimuli, which may be related to interoceptive processes encoded in the posterior insula.

Neurovisceral phenotypes in the expression of psychiatric symptoms

This review explores the proposal that vulnerability to psychological symptoms, particularly anxiety, originates in constitutional differences in the control of bodily state, exemplified by a set of conditions that include Joint Hypermobility, Postural Tachycardia Syndrome and Vasovagal Syncope. Research is revealing how brain-body mechanisms underlie individual differences in psychophysiological reactivity that can be important for predicting, stratifying and treating individuals with anxiety disorders and related conditions. One common constitutional difference is Joint Hypermobility, in which there is an increased range of joint movement as a result of a variant of collagen. Joint hypermobility is over-represented in people with anxiety, mood and neurodevelopmental disorders. It is also linked to stress-sensitive medical conditions such as irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. Structural differences in “emotional” brain regions are reported in hypermobile individuals, and many people with joint hypermobility manifest autonomic abnormalities, typically Postural Tachycardia Syndrome. Enhanced heart rate reactivity during postural change and as recently recognized factors causing vasodilatation (as noted post-prandially, post-exertion and with heat) is characteristic of Postural Tachycardia Syndrome, and there is a phenomenological overlap with anxiety disorders, which may be partially accounted for by exaggerated neural reactivity within ventromedial prefrontal cortex. People who experience Vasovagal Syncope, a heritable tendency to fainting induced by emotional challenges (and needle/blood phobia), are also more vulnerable to anxiety disorders. Neuroimaging implicates brainstem differences in vulnerability to faints, yet the structural integrity of the caudate nucleus appears important for the control of fainting frequency in relation to parasympathetic tone and anxiety. Together there is clinical and neuroanatomical evidence to show that common constitutional differences affecting autonomic responsivity are linked to psychiatric symptoms, notably anxiety.

The impact of perception and presence on emotional reactions: a review of research in virtual reality

Virtual reality (VR) has made its way into mainstream psychological research in the last two decades. This technology, with its unique ability to simulate complex, real situations and contexts, offers researchers unprecedented opportunities to investigate human behavior in well controlled designs in the laboratory. One important application of VR is the investigation of pathological processes in mental disorders, especially anxiety disorders. Research on the processes underlying threat perception, fear, and exposure therapy has shed light on more general aspects of the relation between perception and emotion. Being by its nature virtual, i.e., simulation of reality, VR strongly relies on the adequate selection of specific perceptual cues to activate emotions. Emotional experiences in turn are related to presence, another important concept in VR, which describes the user’s sense of being in a VR environment. This paper summarizes current research into perception of fear cues, emotion, and presence, aiming at the identification of the most relevant aspects of emotional experience in VR and their mutual relations. A special focus lies on a series of recent experiments designed to test the relative contribution of perception and conceptual information on fear in VR. This strand of research capitalizes on the dissociation between perception (bottom–up input) and conceptual information (top-down input) that is possible in VR. Further, we review the factors that have so far been recognized to influence presence, with emotions (e.g., fear) being the most relevant in the context of clinical psychology. Recent research has highlighted the mutual influence of presence and fear in VR, but has also traced the limits of our current understanding of this relationship. In this paper, the crucial role of perception on eliciting emotional reactions is highlighted, and the role of arousal as a basic dimension of emotional experience is discussed. An interoceptive attribution model of presence is suggested as a first step toward an integrative framework for emotion research in VR. Gaps in the current literature and future directions are outlined.

Visually induced nausea causes characteristic changes in cerebral, autonomic and endocrine function in humans

An integrated understanding of the physiological mechanisms involved in the genesis of nausea remains lacking. We aimed to describe the psychophysiological changes accompanying visually induced motion sickness, using a motion video, hypothesizing that differences would be evident between subjects who developed nausea in comparison to those who did not. A motion, or a control, stimulus was presented to 98 healthy subjects in a randomized crossover design. Validated questionnaires and a visual analogue scale (VAS) were used for the assessment of anxiety and nausea. Autonomic and electrogastrographic activity were measured at baseline and continuously thereafter. Plasma vasopressin and ghrelin were measured in response to the motion video. Subjects were stratified into quartiles based on VAS nausea scores, with the upper and lower quartiles considered to be nausea sensitive and resistant, respectively. Twenty-eight subjects were exposed to the motion video during functional neuroimaging. During the motion video, nausea-sensitive subjects had lower normogastria/tachygastria ratio and cardiac vagal tone but higher cardiac sympathetic index in comparison to the control video. Furthermore, nausea-sensitive subjects had decreased plasma ghrelin and demonstrated increased activity of the left anterior cingulate cortex. Nausea VAS scores correlated positively with plasma vasopressin and left inferior frontal and middle occipital gyri activity and correlated negatively with plasma ghrelin and brain activity in the right cerebellar tonsil, declive, culmen, lingual gyrus and cuneus. This study demonstrates that the subjective sensation of nausea is associated with objective changes in autonomic, endocrine and brain networks, and thus identifies potential objective biomarkers and targets for therapeutic interventions.

Baseline effects of transcranial direct current stimulation on glutamatergic neurotransmission and large-scale network connectivity

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) modulates glutamatergic neurotransmission and can be utilized as a novel treatment intervention for a multitude of populations. However, the exact mechanism by which tDCS modulates the brain׳s neural architecture, from the micro to macro scales, have yet to be investigated. Using a within-subjects design, resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) and proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy ((1)H MRS) were performed immediately before and after the administration of anodal tDCS over right parietal cortex. Group independent component analysis (ICA) was used to decompose fMRI scans into 75 brain networks, from which 12 resting-state networks were identified that had significant voxel-wise functional connectivity to anatomical regions of interest. (1)H MRS was used to obtain estimates of combined glutamate and glutamine (Glx) concentrations from bilateral intraparietal sulcus. Paired sample t-tests showed significantly increased Glx under the anodal electrode, but not in homologous regions of the contralateral hemisphere. Increases of within-network connectivity were observed within the superior parietal, inferior parietal, left frontal-parietal, salience and cerebellar intrinsic networks, and decreases in connectivity were observed in the anterior cingulate and the basal ganglia (p<0.05, FDR-corrected). Individual differences in Glx concentrations predicted network connectivity in most of these networks. The observed relationships between glutamatergic neurotransmission and network connectivity may be used to guide future tDCS protocols that aim to target and alter neuroplastic mechanisms in healthy individuals as well as those with psychiatric and neurologic disorders.

The predictive mind and the experience of visual art work

Among the main challenges of the predictive brain/mind concept is how to link prediction at the neural level to prediction at the cognitive-psychological level and finding conceptually robust and empirically verifiable ways to harness this theoretical framework toward explaining higher-order mental and cognitive phenomena, including the subjective experience of aesthetic and symbolic forms. Building on the tentative prediction error account of visual art, this article extends the application of the predictive coding framework to the visual arts. It does so by linking this theoretical discussion to a subjective, phenomenological account of how a work of art is experienced. In order to engage more deeply with a work of art, viewers must be able to tune or adapt their prediction mechanism to recognize art as a specific class of objects whose ontological nature defies predictability, and they must be able to sustain a productive flow of predictions from low-level sensory, recognitional to abstract semantic, conceptual, and affective inferences. The affective component of the process of predictive error optimization that occurs when a viewer enters into dialog with a painting is constituted both by activating the affective affordances within the image and by the affective consequences of prediction error minimization itself. The predictive coding framework also has implications for the problem of the culturality of vision. A person's mindset, which determines what top-down expectations and predictions are generated, is co-constituted by culture-relative skills and knowledge, which form hyperpriors that operate in the perception of art.

Subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli activate neural responses in anterior cingulate cortex, fusiform gyrus and insula: a meta-analysis of fMRI studies

Background

Non-conscious neural activation may underlie various psychological functions in health and disorder. However, the neural substrates of non-conscious processing have not been entirely elucidated. Examining the differential effects of arousing stimuli that are consciously, versus unconsciously perceived will improve our knowledge of neural circuitry involved in non-conscious perception. Here we conduct preliminary analyses of neural activation in studies that have used both subliminal and supraliminal presentation of the same stimulus.

Methods

We use Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) to examine functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies that uniquely present the same stimuli subliminally and supraliminally to healthy participants during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We included a total of 193 foci from 9 studies representing subliminal stimulation and 315 foci from 10 studies representing supraliminal stimulation.

Results

The anterior cingulate cortex is significantly activated during both subliminal and supraliminal stimulus presentation. Subliminal stimuli are linked to significantly increased activation in the right fusiform gyrus and right insula. Supraliminal stimuli show significantly increased activation in the left rostral anterior cingulate.

Conclusions

Non-conscious processing of arousing stimuli may involve primary visual areas and may also recruit the insula, a brain area involved in eventual interoceptive awareness. The anterior cingulate is perhaps a key brain region for the integration of conscious and non-conscious processing. These preliminary data provide candidate brain regions for further study in to the neural correlates of conscious experience.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s40359-014-0052-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Neural and sympathetic activity associated with exploration in decision-making: further evidence for involvement of insula

We previously reported that sympathetic activity was associated with exploration in decision-making indexed by entropy, which is a concept in information theory and indexes randomness of choices or the degree of deviation from sticking to recent experiences of gains and losses, and that activation of the anterior insula mediated this association. The current study aims to replicate and to expand these findings in a situation where contingency between options and outcomes is manipulated. Sixteen participants performed a stochastic decision-making task in which we manipulated a condition with low uncertainty of gain/loss (contingent-reward condition) and a condition with high uncertainty of gain/loss (random-reward condition). Regional cerebral blood flow was measured by (15)O-water positron emission tomography (PET), and cardiovascular parameters and catecholamine in the peripheral blood were measured, during the task. In the contingent-reward condition, norepinephrine as an index of sympathetic activity was positively correlated with entropy indicating exploration in decision-making. Norepinephrine was negatively correlated with neural activity in the right posterior insula, rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsal pons, suggesting neural bases for detecting changes of bodily states. Furthermore, right anterior insular activity was negatively correlated with entropy, suggesting influences on exploration in decision-making. By contrast, in the random-reward condition, entropy correlated with activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal cortices but not with sympathetic activity. These findings suggest that influences of sympathetic activity on exploration in decision-making and its underlying neural mechanisms might be dependent on the degree of uncertainty of situations.

Dynamical predictions of insular hubs for social cognition and their application to stroke

The insular cortex (IC) is considered a rich hub for context-sensitive emotions/social cognition. Patients with focal IC stroke provide unique opportunities to study socio-emotional processes. Nevertheless, Couto et al. (2013b) have recently reported controversial results regarding IC involvement in emotion and social cognition. Similarly, patients with similar lesions show high functional variability, ranging from almost totally preserved to strongly impaired behavior. Critical evidence suggests that the variability of these patients in the above domains can be explained by enhanced neuroplasticity, compensatory processes, and functional remapping after stroke. Therefore, socio-emotional processes would depend on long-distance connections between the IC and frontotemporal regions. We propose that predictive coding and effective connectivity represent a novel approach to explore functional connectivity and assess compensatory, contralateral, and subsidiary network differences among focal stroke patients. This approach would help explain why socio-emotional performance is so variable within this population.

Autism, oxytocin and interoception

Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by profound social and verbal communication deficits, stereotypical motor behaviors, restricted interests, and cognitive abnormalities. Autism affects approximately 1% of children in developing countries. Given this prevalence, identifying risk factors and therapeutic interventions are pressing objectives—objectives that rest on neurobiologically grounded and psychologically informed theories about the underlying pathophysiology. In this article, we review the evidence that autism could result from a dysfunctional oxytocin system early in life. As a mediator of successful procreation, not only in the reproductive system, but also in the brain, oxytocin plays a crucial role in sculpting socio-sexual behavior. Formulated within a (Bayesian) predictive coding framework, we propose that oxytocin encodes the saliency or precision of interoceptive signals and enables the neuronal plasticity necessary for acquiring a generative model of the emotional and social 'self.' An aberrant oxytocin system in infancy could therefore help explain the marked deficits in language and social communication—as well as the sensory, autonomic, motor, behavioral, and cognitive abnormalities—seen in autism.

Potential self-regulatory mechanisms of yoga for psychological health

Research suggesting the beneficial effects of yoga on myriad aspects of psychological health has proliferated in recent years, yet there is currently no overarching framework by which to understand yoga’s potential beneficial effects. Here we provide a theoretical framework and systems-based network model of yoga that focuses on integration of top-down and bottom-up forms of self-regulation. We begin by contextualizing yoga in historical and contemporary settings, and then detail how specific components of yoga practice may affect cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and autonomic output under stress through an emphasis on interoception and bottom-up input, resulting in physical and psychological health. The model describes yoga practice as a comprehensive skillset of synergistic process tools that facilitate bidirectional feedback and integration between high- and low-level brain networks, and afferent and re-afferent input from interoceptive processes (somatosensory, viscerosensory, chemosensory). From a predictive coding perspective we propose a shift to perceptual inference for stress modulation and optimal self-regulation. We describe how the processes that sub-serve self-regulation become more automatized and efficient over time and practice, requiring less effort to initiate when necessary and terminate more rapidly when no longer needed. To support our proposed model, we present the available evidence for yoga affecting self-regulatory pathways, integrating existing constructs from behavior theory and cognitive neuroscience with emerging yoga and meditation research. This paper is intended to guide future basic and clinical research, specifically targeting areas of development in the treatment of stress-mediated psychological disorders.

Processing of proprioceptive and vestibular body signals and self-transcendence in Ashtanga yoga practitioners

In the rod and frame test (RFT), participants are asked to set a tilted visual linear marker (i.e., a rod), embedded in a square, to the subjective vertical, irrespective of the surrounding frame. People not influenced by the frame tilt are defined as field-independent, while people biased in their rod verticality perception are field-dependent. Performing RFT requires the integration of proprioceptive, vestibular and visual signals with the latter accounting for field-dependency. Studies indicate that motor experts in body-related, balance-improving disciplines tend to be field-independent, i.e., better at verticality perception, suggesting that proprioceptive and vestibular expertise acquired by such exercise may weaken the influence of irrelevant visual signals. What remains unknown is whether the effect of body-related expertise in weighting perceptual information might also be mediated by personality traits, in particular those indexing self-focusing abilities. To explore this issue, we tested field-dependency in a class of body experts, namely yoga practitioners and in non-expert participants. Moreover we explored any link between performance on RFT and self-transcendence (ST), a complex personality construct, which refers to tendency to experience spiritual feelings and ideas. As expected, yoga practitioners (i) were more accurate in assessing the rod's verticality on the RFT, and (ii) expressed significantly higher ST. Interestingly, the performance in these two tests was negatively correlated. More specifically, when asked to provide verticality judgments, highly self-transcendent yoga practitioners were significantly less influenced by a misleading visual context. Our results suggest that being highly self-transcendent may enable yoga practitioners to optimize verticality judgment tasks by relying more on internal (vestibular and proprioceptive) signals coming from their own body, rather than on exteroceptive, visual cues.

Tickle me, I think I might be dreaming! Sensory attenuation, self-other distinction, and predictive processing in lucid dreams

The contrast between self- and other-produced tickles, as a special case of sensory attenuation for self-produced actions, has long been a target of empirical research. While in standard wake states it is nearly impossible to tickle oneself, there are interesting exceptions. Notably, participants awakened from REM (rapid eye movement-) sleep dreams are able to tickle themselves. So far, however, the question of whether it is possible to tickle oneself and be tickled by another in the dream state has not been investigated empirically or addressed from a theoretical perspective. Here, we report the results of an explorative web-based study in which participants were asked to rate their sensations during self-tickling and being tickled during wakefulness, imagination, and lucid dreaming. Our results, though highly preliminary, indicate that in the special case of lucid control dreams, the difference between self-tickling and being tickled by another is obliterated, with both self- and other produced tickles receiving similar ratings as self-tickling during wakefulness. This leads us to the speculative conclusion that in lucid control dreams, sensory attenuation for self-produced tickles spreads to those produced by non-self dream characters. These preliminary results provide the backdrop for a more general theoretical and metatheoretical discussion of tickling in lucid dreams in a predictive processing framework. We argue that the primary value of our study lies not so much in our results, which are subject to important limitations, but rather in the fact that they enable a new theoretical perspective on the relationship between sensory attenuation, the self-other distinction and agency, as well as suggest new questions for future research. In particular, the example of tickling during lucid dreaming raises the question of whether sensory attenuation and the self-other distinction can be simulated largely independently of external sensory input.

Affective coding: the emotional dimension of agency

The sense of agency (SoA) (i.e., the registration that I am the initiator and controller of my actions and relevant events) is associated with several affective dimensions. This makes it surprising that the emotion factor has been largely neglected in the field of agency research. Current empirical investigations of the SoA mainly focus on sensorimotor signals (i.e., efference copy) and cognitive cues (i.e., intentions, beliefs) and on how they are integrated. Here we argue that this picture is not sufficient to explain agency experience, since agency and emotions constantly interact in our daily life by several ways. Reviewing first recent empirical evidence, we show that self-action perception is in fact modulated by the affective valence of outcomes already at the sensorimotor level. We hypothesize that the "affective coding" between agency and action outcomes plays an essential role in agency processing, i.e., the prospective, immediate or retrospective shaping of agency representations by affective components. This affective coding of agency be differentially altered in various neuropsychiatric diseases (e.g., schizophrenia vs. depression), thus helping to explain the dysfunctions and content of agency experiences in these diseases.

How do you feel when you can't feel your body? Interoception, functional connectivity and emotional processing in depersonalization-derealization disorder

Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DD) typically manifests as a disruption of body self-awareness. Interoception -defined as the cognitive processing of body signals- has been extensively considered as a key processing for body self-awareness. In consequence, the purpose of this study was to investigate whether there are systematic differences in interoception between a patient with DD and controls that might explain the disembodiment symptoms suffered in this disease. To assess interoception, we utilized a heartbeat detection task and measures of functional connectivity derived from fMRI networks in interoceptive/exteroceptivo/mind-wandering states. Additionally, we evaluated empathic abilities to test the association between interoception and emotional experience. The results showed patient's impaired performance in the heartbeat detection task when compared to controls. Furthermore, regarding functional connectivity, we found a lower global brain connectivity of the patient relative to controls only in the interoceptive state. He also presented a particular pattern of impairments in affective empathy. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental research that assesses the relationship between interoception and DD combining behavioral and neurobiological measures. Our results suggest that altered neural mechanisms and cognitive processes regarding body signaling might be engaged in DD phenomenology. Moreover, our study contributes experimental data to the comprehension of brain-body interactions and the emergence of self-awareness and emotional feelings.

Mindfulness training modulates value signals in ventromedial prefrontal cortex through input from insular cortex

Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) encodes value signals that can be modulated by top-down cognitive input such as semantic knowledge, price incentives, and monetary favors suggesting that such biases may have an identified biological basis. It has been hypothesized that mindfulness training (MT) provides one path for gaining control over such top-down influences; yet, there have been no direct tests of this hypothesis. Here, we probe the behavioral and neural effects of MT on value signals in vmPFC in a randomized longitudinal design of 8 weeks of MT on an initially naïve subject cohort. The impact of this within-subject training was assessed using two paradigms: one that employed primary rewards (fruit juice) in a simple conditioning task and another that used a well-validated art-viewing paradigm to test bias of monetary favors on preference. We show that MT behaviorally censors the top-down bias of monetary favors through a measurable influence on value signals in vmPFC. MT also modulates value signals in vmPFC to primary reward delivery. Using a separate cohort of subjects we show that 8 weeks of active control training (ACT) generates the same behavioral impact also through an effect on signals in the vmPFC. Importantly, functional connectivity analyses show that value signals in vmPFC are coupled with bilateral posterior insula in the MT groups in both paradigms, but not in the ACT groups. These results suggest that MT integrates interoceptive input from insular cortex in the context of value computations of both primary and secondary rewards.

Evolutionary appearance of von Economo's neurons in the mammalian cerebral cortex

von Economo’s neurons (VENs) are large, spindle-shaped projection neurons in layer V of the frontoinsular (FI) cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex. During human ontogenesis, the VENs can first be differentiated at late stages of gestation, and increase in number during the first eight postnatal months. VENs have been identified in humans, chimpanzee, bonobos, gorillas, orangutan and, more recently, in the macaque. Their distribution in great apes seems to correlate with human-like social cognitive abilities and self-awareness. VENs are also found in whales, in a number of different cetaceans, and in the elephant. This phylogenetic distribution may suggest a correlation among the VENs, brain size and the “social brain.” VENs may be involved in the pathogenesis of specific neurological and psychiatric diseases, such as autism, callosal agenesis and schizophrenia. VENs are selectively affected in a behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia in which empathy, social awareness and self-control are seriously compromised, thus associating VENs with the social brain. However, the presence of VENs has also been related to special functions such as mirror self-recognition. Areas containing VENs have been related to motor awareness or sense-of-knowing, discrimination between self and other, and between self and the external environment. Along this line, VENs have been related to the “global Workspace” architecture: in accordance the VENs have been correlated to emotional and interoceptive signals by providing fast connections (large axons = fast communication) between salience-related insular and cingulate and other widely separated brain areas. Nevertheless, the lack of a characterization of their physiology and anatomical connectivity allowed only to infer their functional role based on their location and on the functional magnetic resonance imaging data. The recent finding of VENs in the anterior insula of the macaque opens the way to new insights and experimental investigations.

Abnormal autonomic and associated brain activities during rest in autism spectrum disorder

Autism spectrum disorders are associated with social and emotional deficits, the aetiology of which are not well understood. A growing consensus is that the autonomic nervous system serves a key role in emotional processes, by providing physiological signals essential to subjective states. We hypothesized that altered autonomic processing is related to the socio-emotional deficits in autism spectrum disorders. Here, we investigated the relationship between non-specific skin conductance response, an objective index of sympathetic neural activity, and brain fluctuations during rest in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder relative to neurotypical controls. Compared with control participants, individuals with autism spectrum disorder showed less skin conductance responses overall. They also showed weaker correlations between skin conductance responses and frontal brain regions, including the anterior cingulate and anterior insular cortices. Additionally, skin conductance responses were found to have less contribution to default mode network connectivity in individuals with autism spectrum disorders relative to controls. These results suggest that autonomic processing is altered in autism spectrum disorders, which may be related to the abnormal socio-emotional behaviours that characterize this condition.

Striking discrepancy of anomalous body experiences with normal interoceptive accuracy in depersonalization-derealization disorder

Background

Disembodiment is a core feature of depersonalization disorder (DPD). Given the narratives of DPD patients about their disembodiment and emotional numbing and neurobiological findings of an inhibition of insular activity, DPD may be considered as a mental disorder with specific impairments of interoceptive awareness and body perception.

Methods

We investigated cardioceptive accuracy (CA) of DPD patients (n = 24) as compared to healthy controls (n = 26) with two different heartbeat detection tasks (“Schandry heartbeat counting task” and “Whitehead heartbeat discrimination task”). Self-rated clearness of body perception was measured by questionnaire.

Results

Contrary to our hypothesis, DPD patients performed similarly to healthy controls on the two different heartbeat detection tasks, and they had equal scores regarding their self-rated clearness of body perception. There was no correlation of the severity of “anomalous body experiences” and depersonalization with measures of interoceptive accuracy. Only among healthy controls CA in the Schandry task was positively correlated with self-rated clearness of body perception. Depersonalization was unrelated to severity of depression or anxiety, while depression and anxiety were highly correlated. Anxiety and depression did not modify the associations of depersonalization with interoceptive accuracy.

Conclusions

Our main findings highlight a striking discrepancy of normal interoception with overwhelming experiences of disembodiment in DPD. This may reflect difficulties of DPD patients to integrate their visceral and bodily perceptions into a sense of their selves. This problem may be considered an important target for psychotherapeutic treatment approaches.

A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia

Normal perception involves experiencing objects within perceptual scenes as real, as existing in the world. This property of "perceptual presence" has motivated "sensorimotor theories" which understand perception to involve the mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. However, the mechanistic basis of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery has remained unclear. Sensorimotor theory also struggles to explain instances of perception, such as synesthesia, that appear to lack perceptual presence and for which relevant sensorimotor contingencies are difficult to identify. On alternative "predictive processing" theories, perceptual content emerges from probabilistic inference on the external causes of sensory signals, however, this view has addressed neither the problem of perceptual presence nor synesthesia. Here, I describe a theory of predictive perception of sensorimotor contingencies which (1) accounts for perceptual presence in normal perception, as well as its absence in synesthesia, and (2) operationalizes the notion of sensorimotor contingencies and their mastery. The core idea is that generative models underlying perception incorporate explicitly counterfactual elements related to how sensory inputs would change on the basis of a broad repertoire of possible actions, even if those actions are not performed. These "counterfactually-rich" generative models encode sensorimotor contingencies related to repertoires of sensorimotor dependencies, with counterfactual richness determining the degree of perceptual presence associated with a stimulus. While the generative models underlying normal perception are typically counterfactually rich (reflecting a large repertoire of possible sensorimotor dependencies), those underlying synesthetic concurrents are hypothesized to be counterfactually poor. In addition to accounting for the phenomenology of synesthesia, the theory naturally accommodates phenomenological differences between a range of experiential states including dreaming, hallucination, and the like. It may also lead to a new view of the (in)determinacy of normal perception.

Topographically organized projection to posterior insular cortex from the posterior portion of the ventral medial nucleus in the long-tailed macaque monkey

Prior anterograde tracing work identified somatotopically organized lamina I trigemino- and spinothalamic terminations in a cytoarchitectonically distinct portion of posterolateral thalamus of the macaque monkey, named the posterior part of the ventral medial nucleus (VMpo; Craig [2004] J. Comp. Neurol. 477:119-148). Microelectrode recordings from clusters of selectively thermoreceptive or nociceptive neurons were used to guide precise microinjections of various tracers in VMpo. A prior report (Craig and Zhang [2006] J. Comp. Neurol. 499:953-964) described retrograde tracing results, which confirmed the selective lamina I input to VMpo and the anteroposterior (head to foot) topography. The present report describes the results of microinjections of anterograde tracers placed at different levels in VMpo, based on the anteroposterior topographic organization of selectively nociceptive units and clusters over nearly the entire extent of VMpo. Each injection produced dense, patchy terminal labeling in a single coherent field within a distinct granular cortical area centered in the fundus of the superior limiting sulcus. The terminations were distributed with a consistent anteroposterior topography over the posterior half of the superior limiting sulcus. These observations demonstrate a specific VMpo projection area in dorsal posterior insular cortex that provides the basis for a somatotopic representation of selectively nociceptive lamina I spinothalamic activity. These results also identify the VMpo terminal area as the posterior half of interoceptive cortex; the anterior half receives input from the vagal-responsive and gustatory neurons in the basal part of the ventral medial nucleus.

The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy

This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense. Empirical data from research on mind wandering and nocturnal dreaming clearly show that phenomenally represented cognitive processing is mostly an automatic, non-agentive process and that personal-level cognition is an exception rather than the rule. This raises an interesting new version of the mind-body problem: How is subpersonal cognition causally related to personal-level thought? More fine-grained phenomenological descriptions for what we called “conscious thought” in the past are needed, as well as a functional decomposition of umbrella terms like “mind wandering” into different target phenomena and a better understanding of the frequent dynamic transitions between spontaneous, task-unrelated thought and meta-awareness. In an attempt to lay some very first conceptual foundations for the now burgeoning field of research on mind wandering, the third section proposes two new criteria for individuating single episodes of mind-wandering, namely, the “self-representational blink” (SRB) and a sudden shift in the phenomenological “unit of identification” (UI). I close by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between mind wandering research and philosophy of mind.

What do you feel? Adolescent drug and alcohol users show altered brain response to pleasant interoceptive stimuli

BACKGROUND

Altered interoception, i.e., processing of stimuli from inside the body, has been considered an important component of drug-taking behavior. However, approaches to examine interoceptive sensitivity in humans have been limited. This study examined the hypothesis that adolescents with substance use disorder show altered interoceptive processing, measured by stimulating mechano-receptive C-fibers (MR-CF) via soft touch.

METHODS

Adolescents with substance use disorders (SUD, n=15) and comparison youth (CON, n=17) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during anticipation or reception of a positively valenced "Soft Touch" consisting of MR-CF stimulation to the palm or forearm. Visual analog scales (VAS) indexed subjective interoceptive experience (e.g., pleasantness, intensity).

RESULTS

Across all conditions, SUD displayed attenuated left posterior insula activation compared to CON. Greater left anterior insula and right lentiform nucleus activation was evident during the application of soft touch for SUD but not for CON. Whereas for CON, greater left anterior insula activation was associated with higher pleasantness ratings, pleasantness was linked to less anterior insula activation in SUD. Finally, within SUD, attenuated posterior insula activation was related to more recent cannabis use.

CONCLUSIONS

SUD adolescents exhibit blunted somatovisceral processing of pleasant stimulation, heightened sensitivity in regions responsible for processing reward value, and altered relationships between interoceptive processing and subjective experience.

Facets and mechanisms of adaptive pain behavior: predictive regulation and action

Neural mechanisms underlying nociception and pain perception are considered to serve the ultimate goal of limiting tissue damage. However, since pain usually occurs in complex environments and situations that call for elaborate control over behavior, simple avoidance is insufficient to explain a range of mammalian pain responses, especially in the presence of competing goals. In this integrative review we propose a Predictive Regulation and Action (PRA) model of acute pain processing. It emphasizes evidence that the nervous system is organized to anticipate potential pain and to adjust behavior before the risk of tissue damage becomes critical. Regulatory processes occur on many levels, and can be dynamically influenced by local interactions or by modulation from other brain areas in the network. The PRA model centers on neural substrates supporting the predictive nature of pain processing, as well as on finely-calibrated yet versatile regulatory processes that ultimately affect behavior. We outline several operational categories of pain behavior, from spinally-mediated reflexes to adaptive voluntary action, situated at various neural levels. An implication is that neural processes that track potential tissue damage in terms of behavioral consequences are an integral part of pain perception.

Neural primacy of the salience processing system in schizophrenia

For effective information processing, two large-scale distributed neural networks appear to be critical: a multimodal executive system anchored on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and a salience system anchored on the anterior insula. Aberrant interaction among distributed networks is a feature of psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia. We used whole-brain Granger causal modeling using resting fMRI and observed a significant failure of both the feedforward and reciprocal influence between the insula and the DLPFC in schizophrenia. Further, a significant failure of directed influence from bilateral visual cortices to the insula was also seen in patients. These findings provide compelling evidence for a breakdown of the salience-execution loop in the clinical expression of psychosis. In addition, this offers a parsimonious explanation for the often-observed “frontal inefficiency,” the failure to recruit prefrontal system when salient or novel information becomes available in patients with schizophrenia.

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A salience-executive loop emerges on fMRI whole-brain Granger causal analysis

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At rest, DLPFC has inhibitory Granger influence on the salience network

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In schizophrenia, the salience-executive interaction is diminished

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Visual cortex fails to influence the salience network in schizophrenia

Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions

This joint article reflects the authors' personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, Maine, USA, in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio, Texas. Here, we summarize recent advances in our understanding of subjectivity in humans and other animals, including empirical, applied, technical, and conceptual insights. These include the evidence for the importance of fronto-parietal connectivity and of “top-down” processes, both of which enable information to travel across distant cortical areas effectively, as well as numerous dissociations between consciousness and cognitive functions, such as attention, in humans. In addition, we describe the development of mental imagery paradigms, which made it possible to identify covert awareness in non-responsive subjects. Non-human animal consciousness research has also witnessed substantial advances on the specific role of cortical areas and higher order thalamus for consciousness, thanks to important technological enhancements. In addition, much progress has been made in the understanding of non-vertebrate cognition relevant to possible conscious states. Finally, major advances have been made in theories of consciousness, and also in their comparison with the available evidence. Along with reviewing these findings, each author suggests future avenues for research in their field of investigation.

Anterior insular cortex and emotional awareness

This paper reviews the foundation for a role of the human anterior insular cortex (AIC) in emotional awareness, defined as the conscious experience of emotions. We first introduce the neuroanatomical features of AIC and existing findings on emotional awareness. Using empathy, the awareness and understanding of other people's emotional states, as a test case, we then present evidence to demonstrate: 1) AIC and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are commonly coactivated as revealed by a meta-analysis, 2) AIC is functionally dissociable from ACC, 3) AIC integrates stimulus-driven and top-down information, and 4) AIC is necessary for emotional awareness. We propose a model in which AIC serves two major functions: integrating bottom-up interoceptive signals with top-down predictions to generate a current awareness state and providing descending predictions to visceral systems that provide a point of reference for autonomic reflexes. We argue that AIC is critical and necessary for emotional awareness.

Cognitive modulation of psychophysical, respiratory and autonomic responses to cold pressor test

In healthy subjects with high hypnotisability (highs) under hypnosis, subjectively effective suggestions for analgesia abolish the increases in blood pressure associated with cold pressor test (cpt) by reducing the peripheral vascular resistance. The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of the suggestions of analgesia on the responses to cpt in healthy highs (n = 22) and in low hypnotisable participants (lows, n = 22) out of hypnosis. Cpt was administered without (CPT) and with suggestions for analgesia (CPT+AN). Psychophysical (pain intensity, pain threshold, cpt duration (time of immersion) and pain tolerance, defined as the difference between cpt duration and pain threshold), respiratory (amplitude and frequency) and autonomic variables (tonic skin conductance, mean RR interval (RR = 1/heart rate), blood pressure, skin blood flow) were studied. The suggestions for analgesia increased cpt duration and RR in both groups, but decreased pain intensity and enhanced pain threshold only in highs; in both groups they did not modulate systolic blood pressure, tonic skin conductance and skin blood flow; thus, increased parasympathetic activity appears responsible for the heart rate reduction induced by suggestions in both groups. In conclusion, our findings show that suggestions modulate pain experience differentially in highs and lows, and are partially effective also in lows. We hypothesize that the mechanisms responsible for the efficacy of suggestions in healthy lows may be involved also in their efficacy in chronic pain patients with low hypnotisability.

Bodily pleasure matters: velocity of touch modulates body ownership during the rubber hand illusion

The sense of body ownership represents a fundamental aspect of our self-consciousness. Influential experimental paradigms, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI), in which a seen rubber hand is experienced as part of one's body when one's own unseen hand receives congruent tactile stimulation, have extensively examined the role of exteroceptive, multisensory integration on body ownership. However, remarkably, despite the more general current interest in the nature and role of interoception in emotion and consciousness, no study has investigated how the illusion may be affected by interoceptive bodily signals, such as affective touch. Here, we recruited 52 healthy, adult participants and we investigated for the first time, whether applying slow velocity, light tactile stimuli, known to elicit interoceptive feelings of pleasantness, would influence the illusion more than faster, emotionally-neutral, tactile stimuli. We also examined whether seeing another person's hand vs. a rubber hand would reduce the illusion in slow vs. fast stroking conditions, as interoceptive signals are used to represent one's own body from within and it is unclear how they would be integrated with visual signals from another person's hand. We found that slow velocity touch was perceived as more pleasant and it produced higher levels of subjective embodiment during the RHI compared with fast touch. Moreover, this effect applied irrespective of whether the seen hand was a rubber or a confederate's hand. These findings provide support for the idea that affective touch, and more generally interoception, may have a unique contribution to the sense of body ownership, and by implication to our embodied psychological "self."

The embodied transcendental: a Kantian perspective on neurophenomenology

Neurophenomenology is a research programme aimed at bridging the explanatory gap between first-person subjective experience and neurophysiological third-person data, through an embodied and enactive approach to the biology of consciousness. The present proposal attempts to further characterize the bodily basis of the mind by adopting a naturalistic view of the phenomenological concept of intentionality as the a priori invariant character of any lived experience. Building on the Kantian definition of transcendentality as “what concerns the a priori formal structures of the subject's mind” and as a precondition for the very possibility of human knowledge, we will suggest that this transcendental core may in fact be rooted in biology and can be examined within an extension of the theory of autopoiesis. The argument will be first clarified by examining its application to previously proposed elementary autopoietic models, to the bacterium, and to the immune system; it will be then further substantiated and illustrated by examining the mirror-neuron system and the default mode network as biological instances exemplifying the enactive nature of knowledge, and by discussing the phenomenological aspects of selected neurological conditions (neglect, schizophrenia). In this context, the free-energy principle proposed recently by Karl Friston will be briefly introduced as a rigorous, neurally-plausible framework that seems to accomodate optimally these ideas. While our approach is biologically-inspired, we will maintain that lived first-person experience is still critical for a better understanding of brain function, based on our argument that the former and the latter share the same transcendental structure. Finally, the role that disciplined contemplative practices can play to this aim, and an interpretation of the cognitive processes taking place during meditation under this perspective, will be also discussed.

Minimal self-models and the free energy principle

The term “minimal phenomenal selfhood” (MPS) describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body as both part of the physical world, and the enabling condition for being in this world (Gallagher, 2005a; Grafton, 2009). A recent account of MPS (Metzinger, 2004a) centers on the consideration that minimal selfhood emerges as the result of basic self-modeling mechanisms, thereby being founded on pre-reflective bodily processes. The free energy principle (FEP; Friston, 2010) is a novel unified theory of cortical function built upon the imperative that self-organizing systems entail hierarchical generative models of the causes of their sensory input, which are optimized by minimizing free energy as an approximation of the log-likelihood of the model. The implementation of the FEP via predictive coding mechanisms and in particular the active inference principle emphasizes the role of embodiment for predictive self-modeling, which has been appreciated in recent publications. In this review, we provide an overview of these conceptions and illustrate thereby the potential power of the FEP in explaining the mechanisms underlying minimal selfhood and its key constituents, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective, and the experience of mineness. We conclude that the conceptualization of MPS can be well mapped onto a hierarchical generative model furnished by the FEP and may constitute the basis for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-referral, as well as the understanding of other minds.

The social modulation of pain: others as predictive signals of salience - a systematic review

Several studies in cognitive neuroscience have investigated the cognitive and affective modulation of pain. By contrast, fewer studies have focused on the social modulation of pain, despite a plethora of relevant clinical findings. Here we present the first review of experimental studies addressing how interpersonal factors, such as the presence, behavior, and spatial proximity of an observer, modulate pain. Based on a systematic literature search, we identified 26 studies on experimentally induced pain that manipulated different interpersonal variables and measured behavioral, physiological, and neural pain-related responses. We observed that the modulation of pain by interpersonal factors depended on (1) the degree to which the social partners were active or were perceived by the participants to possess possibility for action; (2) the degree to which participants could perceive the specific intentions of the social partners; (3) the type of pre-existing relationship between the social partner and the person in pain, and lastly, (4) individual differences in relating to others and coping styles. Based on these findings, we propose that the modulation of pain by social factors can be fruitfully understood in relation to a recent predictive coding model, the free energy framework, particularly as applied to interoception and social cognition. Specifically, we argue that interpersonal interactions during pain may function as social, predictive signals of contextual threat or safety and as such influence the salience of noxious stimuli. The perception of such interpersonal interactions may in turn depend on (a) prior beliefs about interpersonal relating and (b) the certainty or precision by which an interpersonal interaction may predict environmental threat or safety.