Moral Foundations Theory

Protecting the Innocence of Youth: Moral Sanctity Values Underlie Censorship From Young Children

Three studies examined the relationship between people’s moral values (drawing on moral foundations theory) and their willingness to censor immoral acts from children. Results revealed that diverse moral values did not predict censorship judgments. It was not the case that participants who valued loyalty and authority, respectively, sought to censor depictions of disloyal and disobedient acts. Rather, censorship intentions were predicted by a single moral value—sanctity. The more people valued sanctity, the more willing they were to censor from children, regardless of the types of violations depicted (impurity, disloyalty, disobedience, etc.). Furthermore, people who valued sanctity objected to indecent exposure only to apparently innocent and pure children—those who were relatively young and who had not been previously exposed to immoral acts. These data suggest that sanctity, purity, and the preservation of innocence underlie intentions to censor from young children.

To Confront or to Avoid

What do people want to do in response to witnessing someone violate a moral norm? Prior research posits that violations of distinct norms elicit specific emotions, specifically anger and disgust. We examined whether moral violations analogously elicit distinct behavioral responses, focusing on desires to confront and avoid moral violators. Participants read scenarios depicting harmful and impure actions (Study 1) or violations of all six content domains proposed by Moral Foundations Theory (Study 2). Bayesian inference revealed that participants expressed distinctively high levels of desire to avoid (vs. confront) violators of purity norms. Violations of other moral norms did not similarly elicit unique patterns of avoidance or confrontation. Thus, behavioral responses to moral violators depend in part on which norm was violated, with impure acts eliciting a uniquely strong avoidance response. Moral judgment can serve as a precursor to strategic action in the face of perceived immorality.

Relationship of Moral Foundations to Political Liberalism-Conservatism and Left-Right Orientation in a Finnish Representative Sample

Abstract. In moral foundations research, two single-item measures of political orientation – with anchors labeled “liberal-conservative” or “left-right” – have been alternatively used. Using a Finnish representative sample, we employed both measures. High conservatism was associated with binding foundations (loyalty, authority, and sanctity), while the associations with the individualizing foundations (harm and fairness) were practically zero. By contrast, the left-right dimension was not associated with the sanctity foundation, but was associated with all other foundations. The measures of political orientation were interchangeable only for fairness; harm was more strongly associated with the left-right dimension, and all binding foundations were more strongly associated with the liberal-conservative dimension. This suggests that at least in some countries, the liberal-conservative and left-right measures are not interchangeable.

Illuminating the conceptual structure of the space of moral violations with searchlight representational similarity analysis

Characterizing how representations of moral violations are organized, cognitively and neurally, is central to understanding how people conceive and judge them. Past work has identified brain regions that represent morally relevant features and distinguish moral domains, but has not yet advanced a broader account of where and on what basis neural representations of moral violations are organized. With searchlight representational similarity analysis, we investigate where category membership drives similarity in neural patterns during moral judgment of violations from two key moral domains: Harm and Purity. Representations converge across domains in a network of regions resembling the mentalizing network. However, Harm and Purity violation representations respectively converge in different regions: precuneus (PC) and left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG). Examining substructure within moral domains, Harm violations converge in PC regardless of subdomain (physical harms, psychological harms), while Purity subdomains (pathogen-related violations, sex-related violations) converge in distinct sets of regions - mirroring a dissociation observed in principal-component analysis of behavioral data. Further, we find initial evidence for representation of morally relevant features within these two domain-encoding regions. The present analyses offer a case study for understanding how organization within the complex conceptual space of moral violations is reflected in the organization of neural patterns across the cortex.

Infants possess an abstract expectation of ingroup support

One pervasive facet of human interactions is the tendency to favor ingroups over outgroups. Remarkably, this tendency has been observed even when individuals are assigned to minimal groups based on arbitrary markers. Why is mere categorization into a minimal group sufficient to elicit some degree of ingroup favoritism? We consider several accounts that have been proposed in answer to this question and then test one particular account, which holds that ingroup favoritism reflects in part an abstract and early-emerging sociomoral expectation of ingroup support. In violation-of-expectation experiments with 17-mo-old infants, unfamiliar women were first identified (using novel labels) as belonging to the same group, to different groups, or to unspecified groups. Next, one woman needed instrumental assistance to achieve her goal, and another woman either provided the necessary assistance (help event) or chose not to do so (ignore event). When the two women belonged to the same group, infants looked significantly longer if shown the ignore as opposed to the help event; when the two women belonged to different groups or to unspecified groups, however, infants looked equally at the two events. Together, these results indicate that infants view helping as expected among individuals from the same group, but as optional otherwise. As such, the results demonstrate that from an early age, an abstract expectation of ingroup support contributes to ingroup favoritism in human interactions.

The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm

The nature of harm—and therefore moral judgment—may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism—the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and—importantly—perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the “dyadic loop,” explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular “foundations,” but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.

Individual differences in the early recognition of moral information in lexical processing: An event-related potential study

Previous studies have shown that intuitive moral cognition occurs at an early stage. However, inconsistent findings indicate that moral information is recognized at a relatively late stage. This study uses the recognition potential (RP) as a neural index and simultaneously measures individuals' moral preferences using the Moral Foundation Questionnaire. We aim to investigate how individual differences in moral preferences modulate the processing of morality in the pre-semantic stage and provide some insights to explain the variation in rapid information processing linked to morality. The participants performed an implicit task in which recognizable words depicting geographical names or behaviors related to moral, disgusting or neutral content alternated with background stimuli at high rates of presentation. The results showed that the early recognition of moral information manifested in the RP depended on an individual's moral concerns. Participants with a higher level of endorsement of the harm/care foundation exhibited a greater net moral effect, namely, greater mean amplitudes of the moral-neutral RP difference waves. Meanwhile, only the group that was more sensitive to the harm/care foundation showed a distinctively larger RP for the moral words than for the neutral words. Overall, these findings suggest that the early processing of moral cognition may hinge on individual differences in moral concerns about other people's suffering.

A closer look at intergroup threat within the dual process model framework: The mediating role of moral foundations

In our study we investigated how right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) are related to perceived intergroup threat, and also tested the potential mediating role of individualizing and binding moral foundations within this relationship pattern. According to our results, both RWA and SDO enhanced the perceived threat related to immigration. Furthermore, the effect of SDO was partly mediated by individualizing moral foundations, while the effect of RWA was partly mediated by both kinds of moral foundations. It seems that perceived intergroup threat, at least to some extent, is influenced by personal moral preferences that can be derived from individual dispositions and motivations.

Making punishment palatable: Belief in free will alleviates punitive distress

Punishing wrongdoers is beneficial for group functioning, but can harm individual well-being. Building on research demonstrating that punitive motives underlie free will beliefs, we propose that free will beliefs help justify punitive impulses, thus alleviating the associated distress. In Study 1, trait-level punitiveness predicted heightened levels of anxiety only for free will skeptics. Study 2 found that higher state-level incarceration rates predicted higher mental health issue rates, only in states with citizens relatively skeptical about free will. In Study 3, participants who punished an unfair partner experienced greater distress than non-punishers, only when their partner did not have free choice. Studies 4 and 5 confirmed experimentally that punitive desires led to greater anxiety only when free will beliefs were undermined by an anti-free will argument. These results suggest that believing in free will permits holding immoral actors morally responsible, thus justifying punishment with diminished negative psychological consequences for punishers.

The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions

Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action’s content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.

Decision Making, Morality, and Machiavellianism: The Role of Dispositional Traits in Gist Extraction

Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) is a promising new framework for evaluating decision making processes related to risk. In brief, FTT argues that individuals use either a mature and meaningful process (i.e., “gist”) or a cold and numbers-based process (i.e., “verbatim”) when making a decision based on information. However, the fundamental meaning that one may extract from a set of information may depend entirely on the motivations, values, and personality of the individual. We argue that in the case of Machiavellianism, individuals may be using gist-based processes, much like others, but arrive at vastly different conclusions with respect to the best course of action. This assertion is based on the fact that Machiavellian individuals lack the fundamental morality and empathy necessary to have concern for others when making decisions. Thus, we outline a theoretical argument as to when gist based extraction may be altered by individual differences. We further discuss the practical implications that individual differences have for decision making through the lens of FTT.

Moral responsibility, personal regulation, and helping others: A cultural approach to moral reasoning in U.S. evangelical Christian cultures

The way that people think about moral responsibility and personal freedom in their moral judgments is a complex issue that has been extensively theorized and researched from the perspective of Social Domain Theory. In this study, I offer a cultural reinterpretation of the Social Domain Theory of moral reasoning to examine how judgments about helping others are linked to cultural visions of morality and personal freedom within U.S. evangelical Christian religious cultures. Sixteen parent–child dyads from an evangelical Christian church produced conversations in response to hypothetical vignettes about helping others in need. Mixed quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed conceptions of personal freedom that prioritized personal regulation of self in line with standards for helping actions and desires determined by God, rather than personal determination of correct action and desire. Findings are interpreted and discussed in light of local conceptions of morality, self, and helping. I conclude by using these findings to illuminate the role of culture in constituting domains of social knowledge.

Group-focused morality is associated with limited conflict detection and resolution capacity: Neuroanatomical evidence

Group-focused moral foundations (GMFs) - moral values that help protect the group's welfare - sharply divide conservatives from liberals and religiously devout from non-believers. However, there is little evidence about what drives this divide. Moral foundations theory and the model of motivated social cognition both associate group-focused moral foundations with differences in conflict detection and resolution capacity, but in opposing directions. Individual differences in conflict detection and resolution implicate specific neuroanatomical differences. Examining neuroanatomy thus affords an objective and non-biased opportunity to contrast these influential theories. Here, we report that increased adherence to group-focused moral foundations was strongly associated (whole-brain corrected) with reduced gray matter volume in key regions of the conflict detection and resolution system (anterior cingulate cortex and lateral prefrontal cortex). Because reduced gray matter is reliably associated with reduced neural and cognitive capacity, these findings support the idea outlined in the model of motivated social cognition that belief in group-focused moral values is associated with reduced conflict detection and resolution capacity.

Honor as Cultural Mindset: Activated Honor Mindset Affects Subsequent Judgment and Attention in Mindset-Congruent Ways

Honor values articulate gender roles, the importance of reputation in maintaining one’s place in society, and maintaining respect for the groups one belongs to. In that sense honor provides a template for organizing social interactions and hence may be functional even among people and societies that do not report valuing and endorsing honor. We test the prediction that honor influences judgment and attention when activated in two experiments (N = 538). Using a culture-as-situated cognition perspective, we predicted that activating one aspect of honor would activate other aspects, even among individuals who do not much endorse honor values. We tested these predictions among European Americans, a group that is not typically associated with honor values. In each study, participants were randomly assigned to experimental or control groups, which differed in one way: the experimental group read statements about honor values as a first step and the control group did not. Participants then judged stick-figure pairs (judging which is male; Study 1, n = 130) or made lexical decisions (judging whether a letter-string formed a correctly spelled word; Study 2, n = 408). In Study 1, experimental group participants were more likely to choose the visually agentic figure as male. In Study 2, experimental group participants were more accurate at noticing that the letter-string formed a word if the word was an honor-relevant word (e.g., noble), but they did not differ from the control group if the word was irrelevant to honor (e.g., happy). Participants in both studies were just above the neutral point in their endorsement of honor values. Individual differences in honor values endorsement did not moderate the effects of activating an honor mindset. Though honor is often described as if it is located in space, we did not find clear effects of where our letter strings were located on the computer screen. Our findings suggest a new way to consider how honor functions, even in societies in which honor is not a highly endorsed value.

The Immoral Assumption Effect: Moralization Drives Negative Trait Attributions

Jumping to negative conclusions about other people's traits is judged as morally bad by many people. Despite this, across six experiments (total N = 2,151), we find that multiple types of moral evaluations--even evaluations related to open-mindedness, tolerance, and compassion--play a causal role in these potentially pernicious trait assumptions. Our results also indicate that moralization affects negative-but not positive-trait assumptions, and that the effect of morality on negative assumptions cannot be explained merely by people's general (nonmoral) preferences or other factors that distinguish moral and nonmoral traits, such as controllability or desirability. Together, these results suggest that one of the more destructive human tendencies--making negative assumptions about others--can be caused by the better angels of our nature.

Moral dimensions of human-wildlife conflict

Despite increasing support for conservation globally, controversy over specific conservation policies persists among diverse stakeholders. Investigating the links between morals in relation to conservation can help increase understanding about why humans support or oppose policy, especially related to human-wildlife conflict or human conflict over wildlife. Yet the moral dimension of human-wildlife conflict has mostly gone unconsidered and unmeasured; thus, policy and programmatic efforts to reduce controversy may be missing a key part of the equation. We conducted a web-based survey (n = 1239 respondents) in Michigan (U.S.A.) to investigate cognitive and emotional influences on the value-behavior relationship. Respondents were identified by their interest and involvement in Michigan wolf management. The survey consisted of questions about values, emotions, cognitions, and behaviors relative to wolves in Michigan. We used path analysis to explore whether emotions and cognitions mediated the relationship between value and behavior. Most respondents attributed intrinsic value to wolves (n = 734) and all life (n = 773) and engaged in behaviors that benefited wolf populations and ecosystems regardless of stakeholder group (e.g., environmentalist, farmer). Attributing intrinsic value to wolves was positively related to favorable emotions toward wolves and cognitive assessments that hunting and trapping of wolves is unacceptable. Despite similarities in attribution of intrinsic value, groups differed in emotions and cognitions about wolf hunting. These differences provide a useful way to predict stakeholder behavior. Our findings may inform interventions aimed at increasing support for wolf management policies and positive interactions among stakeholders and wildlife. Leveraging agreement over intrinsic value may foster cooperation among stakeholders and garner support for controversial conservation policy.

Moral Elevation and Moral Beauty: A Review of the Empirical Literature

Moral elevation is defined as the emotional response to witnessing acts of moral beauty. Studies have found that elevation entails pleasant feelings of warmth in the chest, feeling uplifted, moved, and optimistic about humanity. Elevation motivates affiliation with others as well as moral action tendencies. The main goal of this review was to gather and organize the empirical findings from the last 16 years of elevation research with regard to psychological and physiological characteristics, motivational tendencies, behavioral outcomes, neuronal mechanisms, moderators, and correlates of elevation. A secondary goal was to examine whether elevation is congruent with Fredrickson's (2001) broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. It was concluded that there is strong evidence that elevation broadens the thought-action repertoire and relatively weak evidence that it builds lasting resources. Potential evolutionary functions, the forms of measurement of elevation, the process of how elevation is triggered, practical applications and directions for future research were also addressed.

Pluralistic morality and collective action: The role of moral foundations

Starting from the pluralistic view of morality proposed by the moral foundations theory, this paper aims at highlighting the plurality of personal moral concerns that may drive people to collective action and at investigating how they are connected with other personal and group-based motivations to act (i.e., moral obligation, moral convictions, politicized group identity, group efficacy, and group-based anger). Moral foundations can be distinguished into individualizing foundations, aimed at protecting individual rights and well-being; and binding foundations, aimed at tightening people into ordered communities. We expected that collective action intention would be most strongly associated with an individualizing foundation in equality-focused movements, and with a binding foundation in conformity-focused ones. Four studies that examined activists of both liberal and conservative movements confirmed these expectations. The relevant foundations predicted collective action mainly through the mediation of moral obligation and politicized identity, but they also had some effects above and beyond them.

Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy

Experimental philosophy brings empirical methods to philosophy. These methods are used to probe how people think about philosophically interesting things such as knowledge, morality, and freedom. This paper explores the contribution that qualitative methods have to make in this enterprise. I argue that qualitative methods have the potential to make a much greater contribution than they have so far. Along the way, I acknowledge a few types of resistance that proponents of qualitative methods in experimental philosophy might encounter, and provide reasons to think they are ill-founded.

Moralized Rationality: Relying on Logic and Evidence in the Formation and Evaluation of Belief Can Be Seen as a Moral Issue

In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. Eight studies are reported in which an instrument to measure individual differences in moralized rationality is validated. Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1-3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5). We further demonstrate that the MRS predicts morally laden reactions, such as a desire for punishment, of people who rely on irrational (vs. rational) ways of forming and evaluating beliefs (Studies 6 and 7). Finally, we show that the MRS uniquely predicts motivation to contribute to a charity that works to prevent the spread of irrational beliefs (Study 8). We conclude that (1) there are stable individual differences in the extent to which people moralize a reliance on rationality in the formation and evaluation of beliefs, (2) that these individual differences do not reduce to the personal importance attached to rationality, and (3) that individual differences in moralized rationality have important motivational and interpersonal consequences.

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.

Which Moral Foundations Predict Willingness to Make Lifestyle Changes to Avert Climate Change in the USA?

Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory identifies five moral axes that can influence human motivation to take action on vital problems like climate change. The theory focuses on five moral foundations, including compassion, fairness, purity, authority, and ingroup loyalty; these have been found to differ between liberals and conservatives as well as Democrats and Republicans. Here we show, based on the Cornell National Social Survey (USA), that valuations of compassion and fairness were strong, positive predictors of willingness to act on climate change, whereas purity had a non-significant tendency in the positive direction (p = 0.07). Ingroup loyalty and authority were not supported as important predictor variables using model selection (ΔAICc__). Compassion and fairness were more highly valued by liberals, whereas purity, authority, and in-group loyalty were more highly valued by conservatives. As in previous studies, participants who were younger, more liberal, and reported greater belief in climate change, also showed increased willingness to act on climate change. Our research supports the potential importance of moral foundations as drivers of intentions with respect to climate change action, and suggests that compassion, fairness, and to a lesser extent, purity, are potential moral pathways for personal action on climate change in the USA.

Health Values and Treatment Goals of Older, Multimorbid Adults Facing Life-Threatening Illness

OBJECTIVES

To identify a taxonomy of health-related values that frame goals of care of older, multimorbid adults who recently faced cancer diagnosis and treatment.

DESIGN

Qualitative analysis of data from a longitudinal cohort study of multimorbid cancer survivors.

SETTING

Cancer registries from regional Department of Veterans Affairs networks in New England and southeast Texas.

PARTICIPANTS

Multimorbid adults who completed interviews 12 months after diagnosis of head and neck, colorectal, gastric, or esophageal cancer and after cancer treatment (N = 146).

MEASUREMENTS

An interdisciplinary team conducted thematic analyses of participants' intuitive responses to two questions: Now that you have had cancer and may face ongoing decisions about medical care in the future, what would you want your family, friends, and doctors to know about you, in terms of what is most important to you in your life? If your cancer were to recur, is there anything you'd want to be sure your loved ones knew about you and your goals of care?

RESULTS

Analysis revealed five distinct health-related values that guide how multimorbid cancer survivors conceptualize specific health care goals and medical decisions: self-sufficiency, life enjoyment, connectedness and legacy, balancing quality and length of life, and engagement in care. Participants typically endorsed more than one value as important.

CONCLUSION

Older multimorbid adults who recently faced life-threatening cancer endorsed a multidimensional taxonomy of health-related values. These health-related values guide how they frame their goals for care and treatment preferences. Eliciting individuals' sense of their values during clinical encounters may improve their experiences with health care and more effectively align treatments with goals of care.

Binding Moral Foundations and the Narrowing of Ideological Conflict to the Traditional Morality Domain

Moral foundations theory (MFT) posits that binding moral foundations (purity, authority, and ingroup loyalty) are rooted in the need for groups to promote order and cohesion, and that they therefore underlie political conservatism. We present evidence that binding foundations (and the related construct of disgust sensitivity) are associated with lower levels of ideological polarization on political issues outside the domain of moral traditionalism. Consistent support for this hypothesis was obtained from three large American Internet-based samples and one large national sample of New Zealanders (combined N = 7,874). We suggest that when political issues do not have inherent relevance to moral traditionalism, binding foundations promote a small centrist shift away from ideologically prescribed positions, and that they do so out of desire for national uniformity and cohesion.

What We Talk About When We Talk About Morality: Deontological, Consequentialist, and Emotive Language Use in Justifications Across Foundation-Specific Moral Violations

Morality is inherently social, yet much extant work in moral psychology ignores the central role of social processes in moral phenomena. To partly address this, this article examined the content of persuasive moral communication-the way people justify their moral attitudes in persuasive contexts. Across two studies, we explored variation in justification content (deontological, consequentialist, or emotive) as a function of moral foundations. Using justification selection techniques (Study 1) and open-ended justification production (Study 2), results demonstrate a preference (a) for deontological appeals in justifications for the sanctity foundation, (b) for consequentialist appeals for the individualizing foundations (care and fairness), and (c) for emotive appeals in justifications for the binding foundations (loyalty, authority and sanctity). The present research questions the generality of inferences about the primacy of emotions/intuition in moral psychology research and highlights the important role of reasons in persuasive moral communication.

The Social Psychology of Intergroup Toleration

The global increase in cultural and religious diversity has led to calls for toleration of group differences to achieve intergroup harmony. Although much social-psychological research has examined the nature of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, and its impact on targets of these biases, little research has examined the nature and impact of toleration for intergroup relations. Toleration does not require that people give up their objections to out-group norms and practices but rather mutual accommodation. Integrating research from various social sciences, we explore the nature of intergroup tolerance including its three components—objection, acceptance, and rejection—while drawing out its implications for future social-psychological research. We then explore some psychological consequences to social groups that are the object of toleration. By doing so, we consider the complex ways in which intergroup tolerance impacts both majority and minority groups and the dynamic interplay of both in pluralistic societies.

Moral foundations vignettes: a standardized stimulus database of scenarios based on moral foundations theory

Research on the emotional, cognitive, and social determinants of moral judgment has surged in recent years. The development of moral foundations theory (MFT) has played an important role, demonstrating the breadth of morality. Moral psychology has responded by investigating how different domains of moral judgment are shaped by a variety of psychological factors. Yet, the discipline lacks a validated set of moral violations that span the moral domain, creating a barrier to investigating influences on judgment and how their neural bases might vary across the moral domain. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by developing and validating a large set of moral foundations vignettes (MFVs). Each vignette depicts a behavior violating a particular moral foundation and not others. The vignettes are controlled on many dimensions including syntactic structure and complexity making them suitable for neuroimaging research. We demonstrate the validity of our vignettes by examining respondents' classifications of moral violations, conducting exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, and demonstrating the correspondence between the extracted factors and existing measures of the moral foundations. We expect that the MFVs will be beneficial for a wide variety of behavioral and neuroimaging investigations of moral cognition.

Epistemic Motivation and the Structure of Moral Intuition: Dispositional Need for Closure as a Predictor of Individualizing and Binding Morality

Moral foundations theory argues that morality encompasses both group–preserving binding concerns about in–group loyalty, authority and purity and individualizing concerns about harm avoidance and fairness. Although studies have examined the relationship between sociopolitical attitudes and the moral foundations, the relationship between individual differences in epistemic motivation—as indexed by need for cognitive closure—and moral intuition remains unexplored. Given the role of groups in providing epistemic security, we hypothesized that the need for closure would be most strongly related to support for the foundations most central to the regulation of group ties, that is, the binding foundations as opposed to the individualizing ones. Data from three samples provided evidence for this. Unpacking this pattern, we also found that those high in need for closure endorsed all foundations, whereas those low in need for closure emphasized only the individualizing ones. Finally, we found that the relationship between need for closure and the binding foundations was mediated by right–wing authoritarianism, an orientation closely linked to a desire for the preservation of conventional in–group morality. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology