Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions: A critical overview

Schizophrenia, the very idea: On self-disorder, hyperreflexivity, and the diagnostic concept

The purpose of the present article is to consider schizophrenia-the very idea-from the perspective of phenomenological psychopathology, with special attention to the problematic nature of the diagnostic concept as well as to the prospect and challenges inherent in focusing on subjective experience. First, we address historical and philosophical topics relevant to the legitimacy of diagnostic categorization-in general and regarding "schizophrenia" in particular. William James's pragmatist approach to categorization is discussed. Then we offer a version of the well-known basic-self or ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) of schizophrenia, but in a significantly revised form (IDMrevised). The revised model better acknowledges the diverse and even seemingly contradictory nature of schizophrenic symptoms while, at the same time, interpreting these in a more unitary fashion via the key concept of hyperreflexivity-a form of exaggerated self-awareness that tends to undermine normal world-directedness and the stability of self-experience. Particular attention is paid to forms of exaggerated "self-presence" that are sometimes neglected yet imbue classically schizophrenic experiences involving subjectivism or quasi-solipsism and/or all-inclusive or ontological forms of paranoia. We focus on the distinctively paradoxical nature of schizophrenic symptomatology. In concluding we consider precursors in the work of Klaus Conrad, Kimura Bin and Henri Grivois. Finally we defend the concept of schizophrenia by considering its distinctive way of altering certain core aspects of the human condition itself.

A new predictive coding model for a more comprehensive account of delusions

Attempts to understand psychosis-the experience of profoundly altered perceptions and beliefs-raise questions about how the brain models the world. Standard predictive coding approaches suggest that it does so by minimising mismatches between incoming sensory evidence and predictions. By adjusting predictions, we converge iteratively on a best guess of the nature of the reality. Recent arguments have shown that a modified version of this framework-hybrid predictive coding-provides a better model of how healthy agents make inferences about external reality. We suggest that this more comprehensive model gives us a richer understanding of psychosis compared with standard predictive coding accounts. In this Personal View, we briefly describe the hybrid predictive coding model and show how it offers a more comprehensive account of the phenomenology of delusions, thereby providing a potentially powerful new framework for computational psychiatric approaches to psychosis. We also make suggestions for future work that could be important in formalising this novel perspective.

Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (1. Comprehensive Review-Dualities of Self- and World-Experience)

A growing body of research supports the role of self-disorders as core phenotypic features of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Self-disorders comprise various alterations of conscious experience whose theoretical understanding continues to present a challenge. The following 2 articles aim to provide further clarification of the nature of self-disorders in schizophrenia by offering a comprehensive review (article 1) and theoretical revision (article 2) of the currently most influential model of altered selfhood in schizophrenia: the basic-self-disturbance or ipseity-disorder model (IDM). This article presents a state-of-the-art overview of the current self-disturbance model and critically assesses its descriptive adequacy with respect to the clinical variability and heterogeneity of the alterations in self- and world-awareness characteristic of schizophrenia. Special attention is paid to experiences of exaggerated basic self, increased "grip" or "hold" on the world, and paradoxical combinations. The next article proposes a theoretical revision of the self-disturbance model by considering how hyperreflexivity might form the crucial common thread or generating factor that unifies the phenomenologically heterogeneous, and sometimes even contradictory features of schizophrenic self-disorders. We outline the implications of our revised model for explanatory research, therapeutic practice, and our general understanding of the abnormalities in question.

Phenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care

This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology's two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of "recovery," defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology's roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.

Delusions and the dilemmas of life: A systematic review and meta-analyses of the global literature on the prevalence of delusional themes in clinical groups

We investigated the prevalence of persecutory, grandiose, reference, control, and religious delusions in adult clinical populations worldwide and whether they differed according to country characteristics or age, gender, or year of publication. 123 studies met inclusion criteria, across 30 countries; 102 (115 samples, n = 20,979) were included in the main random-effects meta-analysis of studies measuring multiple delusional themes (21 in a separate analysis of studies in recording a single theme). Persecutory delusions were most common (pooled point estimate: 64.5%, CI = 60.6-68.3, k = 106, followed by reference (39.7%, CI 34.5-45.3, k = 65), grandiose (28.2, CI 24.8-31.9, k = 100), control 21.6%, CI 17.8-26.0, k = 53), and religious delusions 18.3%, CI 15.4-21.6, k = 50). Data from studies recording one theme were broadly consistent with these findings. There were no effects for study quality or publication date. Prevalences were higher in samples exclusively with psychotic patients but did not differ between developed and developing countries, or by country individualism, power distance, or prevalence of atheism. Religious and control delusions were more prevalent in countries with higher income inequality. We hypothesize that these delusional themes reflect universal human dilemmas and existential challenges.

Taking subjectivity seriously: towards a unification of phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience

Nearly all psychiatric diseases involve alterations in subjective, lived experience. The scientific study of the biological basis of mental illness has generally focused on objective measures and observable behaviors, limiting the potential for our understanding of brain mechanisms of disease states and possible treatments. However, applying methods designed principally to interpret objective behavioral measures to the measurement and extrapolation of subjective states presents a number of challenges. In order to help bridge this gap, we draw on the tradition of phenomenology, a philosophical movement concerned with elucidating the structure of lived experience, which emerged in the early 20th century and influenced philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and psychiatry. A number of early phenomenologically-oriented psychiatrists made influential contributions to the field, but this approach retreated to the background as psychiatry moved towards more operationalized disease classifications. Recently, clinical-phenomenological research and viewpoints have re-emerged in the field. We argue that the potential for phenomenological research and methods to generate productive hypotheses about the neurobiological basis of psychiatric diseases has thus far been underappreciated. Using specific examples drawing on the subjective experience of mania and psychosis, we demonstrate that phenomenologically-oriented clinical studies can generate novel and fruitful propositions for neuroscientific investigation. Additionally, we outline a proposal for more rigorously integrating phenomenological investigations of subjective experience with the methods of modern neuroscience research, advocating a cross-species approach with a key role for human subjects research. Collaborative interaction between phenomenology, psychiatry, and neuroscience has the potential to move these fields towards a unified understanding of the biological basis of mental illness.

Construing journeys to recovery from psychosis: A qualitative analysis of first-person accounts

PURPOSE

To perform a qualitative analysis of the factors that were construed as salient in facilitating the process of recovery in the narratives of people with psychosis who had their first-person accounts (FPAs) published in an academic journal.

METHODS

Computerized textual analysis was undertaken of 156 FPAs written by persons who had experienced psychosis and published in the Schizophrenia Bulletin between 1979 and 2020. Constructs were extracted from the FPAs and coded in terms of Mental health treatment and therapy, Self-management and Multiple factors; recovery processes (Connectedness, Hope, Identity, Meaning and Empowerment), Struggles and Turning points.

RESULTS

Psychosis impacted on individuals in profound and diverse ways. This was reflected in the different pathways to recovery included in the FPAs. Underlying the different pathways was the salience of re-engagement in the shared reality of others; development of a cohesive and positive self; empowerment through the use of self-management strategies, and making sense of experience through reconstruing what was meaningful. Personal constructs identified in the FPAs provided insight into both challenges faced and alternative avenues of movement that were perceived as available.

CONCLUSIONS

Processes that support individuals re-engaging with the shared reality of others are central to recovery. Supportive relationships and fostering open dialogue were consistent themes across the different pathways that recovery journeys took. Establishing a meaningful lifestyle and recovering a positive sense of identity were a key challenge following psychosis onset. Appreciation of experiences contained in FPAs has the potential to enhance the effectiveness and humanity of mental health care.

Subjective experience and meaning of delusions in psychosis: a systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis

BACKGROUND

Delusions are a common transdiagnostic feature of psychotic disorders, and their treatment remains suboptimal. Despite the pressing need to better understand the nature, meaning, and course of these symptoms, research into the lived experience of delusional phenomena in psychosis is scarce. Thus, we aimed to explore the lived experience and subjective apprehension of delusions in help-seeking individuals with psychosis, regardless of diagnosis and thematic content of the delusion.

METHODS

In our systematic review and qualitative evidence synthesis, we searched MEDLINE, Embase, PsycINFO, CINAHL, and Web of Science for qualitative studies published in English from database inception, with the last search on Sept 9, 2021. Grey literature search and hand-searching of relevant journals were also done. Studies were eligible if they provided an analysis of lived experience of delusions or predelusional phenomena presented from the perspective of individuals (age 14-65 years) who had developed a clinical high-risk stage of psychosis, or a diagnosable affective or non-affective psychotic disorder (as clinically defined, self-reported, or assessed within the primary study). Studies with only a subset of relevant participants were eligible only if data for the population of interest were reported separately. Studies that did not discriminate between the experience of delusion and other positive symptoms (eg, hallucinations) were included only if data for delusions were reported separately or could be extracted. First-person accounts (and author interpretations) discussing changes in the sense of self, lived world, and meaning in relation to delusions were extracted and synthesised using a novel thematic synthesis approach informed by a critical realist stance and a phenomenological theoretical framework. Analytic themes were developed into a new overarching framework for understanding the emergence of delusional phenomena. The study was registered with PROSPERO, CRD42020222104.

FINDINGS

Of the 3265 records screened, 2115 were identified after duplicate removal. Of these, 1982 were excluded after title and abstract screening and 106 after full-text eligibility assessment. Of the 27 studies entering quality assessment, 24 eligible studies were included in the qualitative evidence synthesis, representing the perspectives of 373 help-seeking individuals with lived experience of delusions in the context of psychosis. Gender was reported as male (n=210), female (n=110), transgender (n=1), or not reported (n=52). Only 13 studies reported ethnicity, with White being predominant. The age of most participants ranged from 15 to 65 years. We found no eligible studies investigating subclinical or predelusional experiences in at-risk mental state populations through qualitative methods. Most studies were undertaken in western, educated, industrialised, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and most included participants had received or self-reported a diagnosis within the schizophrenia spectrum. Studies differed in relation to whether they focused on one kind or theme of delusion or delusional phenomena more generally as a unified category. Three superordinate themes relating to experiential changes and meanings in delusion were identified: (1) a radical rearrangement of the lived world dominated by intense emotions; (2) doubting, losing, and finding oneself again within delusional realities; and (3) searching for meaning, belonging, and coherence beyond mere dysfunction. Based on the review findings and thematic synthesis, we propose the Emergence Model of Delusion to advance understanding of delusional phenomena in psychosis.

INTERPRETATION

Delusions are best understood as strongly individualised and inherently complex phenomena emerging from a dynamic interplay between interdependent subpersonal, personal, interpersonal, and sociocultural processes. Integrative approaches to research on delusion, which consider their potential adaptiveness and favour explanatory pluralism, might be advantageous. Effective clinical care for individuals with psychosis might need adapting to match more closely, and take account of, the subjective experience and meaning of delusions as they are lived through, which might also help redress power imbalances and enduring epistemic injustices in mental health.

FUNDING

Priestley Scholars, Wellcome Trust.

Finding order within the disorder: a case study exploring the meaningfulness of delusions

Can delusions, in the context of psychosis, enhance a person's sense of meaningfulness? The case described here suggests that, in some circumstances, they can. This prompts further questions into the complexities of delusion as a lived phenomenon, with important implications for the clinical encounter. While assumptions of meaninglessness are often associated with concepts of 'disorder', 'harm' and 'dysfunction', we suggest that meaning can nonetheless be found within what is commonly taken to be incomprehensible or even meaningless. A phenomenological and value-based approach appears indispensable for clinicians facing the seemingly paradoxical coexistence of harmfulness and meaningfulness.

Delusional Perception Revisited

Delusional perception designates a sudden, idiosyncratic, and often self-referential delusion triggered by a neutral perceptual content. In classical psychopathology, delusional perception was considered almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. Since delusional perception has been erased from ICD-11 and always been absent in DSM, it risks slipping out of clinical awareness. In this article, we explore the clinical roots of delusional perception, elucidate the psychopathological phenomenon, and discuss its two predominant conceptualizations, i.e., Schneider's well-known two-link model and Matussek's lesser known one-link model. The two-link model posits that delusional perception amounts to an abnormal interpretation of an intact perception, whereas the one-link model posits that the delusional meaning is contained within a changed perception. Despite their differences, both models stress that delusional perception is a primary delusion that takes place within an altered experiential framework that is characteristic of the psychopathological Gestalt of schizophrenia. We discuss the role of delusional perception in future psychopathological and diagnostic assessment and argue that such assessments must be conducted in comprehensive manner, eliciting the psychopathological context within which symptoms and signs are embedded. Finally, we discuss the compatibility of the two models of delusional perception with contemporary cognitive models on delusion and cognitive psychotherapeutic approaches.

Uncovering the realities of delusional experience in schizophrenia: a qualitative phenomenological study in Belgium

BACKGROUND

Delusions in schizophrenia are commonly approached as empirical false beliefs about everyday reality. Phenomenological accounts, by contrast, have suggested that delusions are more adequately understood as pertaining to a different kind of reality experience. How this alteration of reality experience should be characterised, which dimensions of experiential life are involved, and whether delusional reality might differ from standard reality in various ways is unclear and little is known about how patients with delusions value and relate to these experiential alterations. This study aimed to investigate the nature of delusional reality experience, and its subjective apprehension, in individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis.

METHODS

In this qualitative phenomenological study, we recruited individuals with lived experience of delusions and a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis from two psychiatric-hospital services in Belgium using homogenous sampling. Criteria for participation were having undergone at least one psychotic episode with occurring delusional symptoms, present at least 1 year before participation, on the basis of clinical notes assessed by the attending psychiatrist; a schizophrenia-spectrum diagnosis, ascertained through clinical interview by the attending psychiatrist upon admission; being aged between 18 years and 65 years; and having the capacity to give informed consent. Exclusion criteria included worries concerning capacity to consent and risk of distress caused by participation. We did phenomenologically driven semi-structured interviews with the participants to explore the nature of delusional reality experience and their subjective valuation of these experiences. We used interpretative phenomenological analysis, a qualitative method tailored to the in-depth exploration of participants' first-person perspective, to analyse their accounts.

FINDINGS

Between March 2, 2020, and Sept 30, 2020, 18 adults (13 men and five women, aged 19-62 years) participated in the interview study. The findings suggest that delusions are often embedded in wide-ranging alterations of basic reality experience, involving quasi-ineffable atmospheric and ontological qualities that undermine participants' sense of the world as unambiguously real, fully present, and shared with others. We also found that delusional reality experience can differ from standard reality in various ways (ie, in a hypo-real and hyper-real form), across multiple dimensions (eg, meaningfulness, necessity and contingency, and detachment and engagement), and that participants are often implicitly or explicitly aware of the distinction between delusional and standard reality. Delusional experience can have an enduring value and meaning that is not fully captured by a strictly medical perspective.

INTERPRETATION

Increased awareness and recognition of the distinctive nature of delusional reality experience, in both clinical and research settings, can improve diagnostic accuracy, explanatory models, and therapeutic support for individuals with delusions whose lived realities are not always evident from an everyday perspective.

FUNDING

FWO Flanders.

TRANSLATION

For the Dutch translation of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.

Delusion progression process from the perspective of patients with psychoses: A descriptive study based on the primary delusion concept of Karl Jaspers

BACKGROUND

Delusion occupies an important position in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with psychoses. Although Karl Jaspers' concept of the primary delusion (PD) is a key hypothesis in descriptive phenomenology concerning the primordial experience of delusion, to our knowledge it has not been verified in empirical studies of patients with psychosis, and the relationship between PDs and fully developed delusions remains unclear.

METHODS

The subjects were 108 psychiatric patients diagnosed with DSM-IV schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder who had persisting delusions. This investigation used a newly devised semi-structured interview, the Delusion and its Origin Assessment Interview (DOAI), and the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. PDs enquired about in the DOAI were delusional perception, delusional memory, delusional mood, and delusional intuition. Associations of PDs with delusion themes and delusion features extracted from DOAI items by factor analysis were examined using correlational and MANCOVA regression analyses. Reliability studies of the DOAI were also conducted.

RESULTS

The reliability and correlation analyses suggested robust psychometric properties of the DOAI. The percentages of subjects reporting PD phenomena as delusion origins and currently present were 93% and 84%, respectively. MANCOVA revealed several significant associations, including between delusional perception and delusional mood and persecutory themes, between delusional intuition and grandiose delusions, and between delusional perception and intuition and systematization of delusions.

DISCUSSION

This study demonstrates that PDs can be considered as principal origins of delusions by subjects with psychosis, and have meaningful connections with the characteristics of their fully developed delusions. The associations between PDs and delusion characteristics can be interpreted in terms of progression processes of delusions, which are seen as intensification and generalization of cognitive and affective pathologies in PDs. The findings are also consistent with the neurobiological hypothesis that aberrant salience attribution to stimuli, as in PDs, is the primary phenomenon caused by abnormal dopamine system regulation. Further studies are needed to clarify delusion progression processes relating to PDs and to substantiate their clinical meanings.

Delusions beyond beliefs: a critical overview of diagnostic, aetiological, and therapeutic schizophrenia research from a clinical-phenomenological perspective

Delusions are commonly conceived as false beliefs that are held with certainty and which cannot be corrected. This conception of delusion has been influential throughout the history of psychiatry and continues to inform how delusions are approached in clinical practice and in contemporary schizophrenia research. It is reflected in the full psychosis continuum model, guides psychological and neurocognitive accounts of the formation and maintenance of delusions, and it substantially determines how delusions are approached in cognitive-behavioural treatment. In this Review, we draw on a clinical-phenomenological framework to offer an alternative account of delusion that incorporates the experiential dimension of delusion, emphasising how specific alterations to self-consciousness and reality experience underlie delusions that are considered characteristic of schizophrenia. Against that backdrop, we critically reconsider the current research areas, highlighting empirical and conceptual issues in contemporary delusion research, which appear to largely derive from an insufficient consideration of the experiential dimension of delusions. Finally, we suggest how the alternative phenomenological approach towards delusion could offer new ways to advance current research and clinical practice.

Reduced Jumping to Conclusion Bias after Experimentally Induced Enhancement of Subjective Body Boundaries in Psychosis

INTRODUCTION

A disturbed sense of self is frequently discussed as an etiological factor for delusion symptoms in psychosis. Phenomenological approaches to psychopathology posit that lacking the sense that the self is localized within one's bodily boundaries (disembodiment) is one of the core features of the disturbed self in psychosis. The present study examines this idea by experimentally manipulating the sense of bodily boundaries.

METHODS

Seventy-three patients with psychosis were randomly assigned to either a 10-min, guided self-massage in the experimental group (EG) to enhance the sense of bodily boundaries or a control group (CG), which massaged a fabric ring. Effects on an implicit measure (jumping to conclusion bias; JTC) and an explicit measure (Brief State Paranoia Checklist; BSPC) of delusion processes were assessed. The JTC measures the tendency to make a decision with little evidence available, and the BSPC explicitly measures the approval of paranoid beliefs.

RESULTS

Patients in the EG showed a lower JTC (M = 4.11 draws before decision) than the CG (M = 2.43; Cohen's d = 0.64). No significant difference in the BSPC was observed.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION

Our results indicate that enhancing the sense of body boundaries through a self-massage can reduce an implicit bias associated with delusional ideation and correspondingly support the idea that disembodiment might be a relevant factor in the formation of psychotic symptoms.

Parietal-Prefrontal Feedforward Connectivity in Association With Schizophrenia Genetic Risk and Delusions

OBJECTIVE

Conceptualizations of delusion formation implicate deficits in feedforward information updating across the posterior to prefrontal cortices, resulting in dysfunctional integration of new information about contexts in working memory and, ultimately, failure to update overfamiliar prior beliefs. The authors used functional MRI and machine learning models to address individual variability in feedforward parietal-prefrontal information updating in patients with schizophrenia. They examined relationships between feedforward connectivity, and delusional thinking and polygenic risk for schizophrenia.

METHODS

The authors studied 66 schizophrenia patients and 143 healthy control subjects during performance of context updating in working memory. Dynamic causal models of effective connectivity were focused on regions of the prefrontal and parietal cortex potentially implicated in delusion processes. The effect of polygenic risk for schizophrenia on connectivity was examined in healthy individuals. The authors then leveraged support vector regression models to define optimal normalized target connectivity tailored for each patient and tested the extent to which deviation from this target could predict individual variation in severity of delusions.

RESULTS

In schizophrenia patients, updating and manipulating context information was disproportionately less accurate than was working memory maintenance, with an interaction of task accuracy by diagnosis. Patients with delusions also tended to have relatively reduced parietal-prefrontal feedforward effective connectivity during context updating in working memory manipulation. The same connectivity was adversely influenced by polygenic risk for schizophrenia in healthy subjects. Individual patients' deviation from predicted "normal" feedforward connectivity based on the support vector regression models correlated with severity of delusions.

CONCLUSIONS

These computationally derived observations support a role for feedforward parietal-prefrontal information processing deficits in delusional psychopathology and in genetic risk for schizophrenia.

[The understanding of God by Kant and the contribution to the psychopathological definition of delusion]

BACKGROUND

The psychopathological phenomenon of delusion appears almost every day in the routine clinical practice. Although making the diagnosis usually seems clear and simple, the accurate definition of delusion is even now a serious challenge and controversial discussion. This article therefore investigates whether and to what extent the Kantian term of God and his argument for God's existence can make a contribution to the psychopathological definition of delusion.

METHOD

By analyzing Kant's primary literature, the special position of the predicate of existence is presented in order to give an explanation of Kant's term of God. Moreover, Kant's argument for the existence of God is elaborated in his critique of purely practical rationality. Finally, various approximations to a formal definition of delusion are proposed.

RESULTS

It can be shown that there are numerous indications for a formal approach to characterize psychopathological delusion. Kant provides a formal logical explanation of the term of God; however, his proof of God is a moral practical one.

CONCLUSION

A formal aspect in the definition of delusion appears useful. Jasper's criterion of the impossibility of the content of delusion can be critically questioned in terms of being unnecessary. The formal logical aspect in the Kantian term of God, not his moral argument for proof of God can make a contribution to the psychopathological definition of delusion in form of a dimension of the conditional.

Explaining delusional beliefs: a hybrid model

Introduction: In this paper we present and defend a hybrid theory of the development of delusions that incorporates the central ideas of two influential (yet sometimes bitterly opposing) theoretical approaches to delusions-the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. Method: After introducing the central ideas of the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory, we describe the motivations for our conciliatory project, explain the theoretical details of the hybrid theory we propose, and answer potential objections to our proposal. Results: According to the hybrid theory we advance, the first factor of a delusion is physically grounded in an abnormal prediction error, and the second factor is physically grounded in the overestimation of the precision of the abnormal prediction error. Against anticipated objections, we argue that the hybrid theory is internally coherent, and that it constitutes a genuine hybrid between the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. Conclusion: A rapprochement between the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory is both possible and desirable. In particular, our hybrid theory provides a parsimonious and unified account of delusions, whether monothematic or polythematic, across a wide variety of medical conditions.

Varieties of Self Disorder: A Bio-Pheno-Social Model of Schizophrenia

The self-disorder model offers a unifying way of conceptualizing schizophrenia's highly diverse symptoms (positive, negative, disorganized), of capturing their distinctive bizarreness, and of conceiving their longitudinal development. These symptoms are viewed as differing manifestations of an underlying disorder of ipseity or core-self: hyper-reflexivity/diminished-self-presence with accompanying disturbances of "grip" or "hold" on reality. Recent revision to this phenomenological theory, in particular distinguishing primary-vs-secondary factors, offers a bio-pheno-social model that is consistent with recent empirical findings and offers several advantages: (1) It helps account for the temporal variations of the symptoms or syndrome, including longitudinal progression, but also the shorter-term, situationally reactive, and sometimes defensive or quasi-intentional variability of symptom-expression that can occur in schizophrenia (consistent with understanding some aspects of ipseity-disturbance as dynamic and mutable, involving shifting attitudes or experiential orientations). (2) It accommodates the overlapping of some key schizophrenic symptoms with certain nonschizophrenic conditions involving dissociation (depersonalization, derealization), including depersonalization disorder and panic disorder, thereby acknowledging both shared and distinguishing symptoms. (3) It integrates recent neurocognitive and neurobiological as well as psychosocial (eg, influence of trauma and culture) findings into a coherent but multi-factorial neuropsychological account. An adequate model of schizophrenia will postulate shared disturbances of core-self experiences that nevertheless can follow several distinct pathways and occur in various forms. Such a model is preferable to uni-dimensional alternatives-whether of schizophrenia or ipseity-disturbance-given its ability to account for distinctive yet varying experiential and neurocognitive abnormalities found in research on schizophrenia, and to integrate these with recent psychosocial and neurobiological findings.

Multiple Realities and Hybrid Objects: A Creative Approach of Schizophrenic Delusion

Delusion is usually considered in DSM 5 as a false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality, but the issue of delusion raises crucial concerns, especially that of a possible (or absent) continuity between delusional and normal experiences, and the understanding of delusional experience. In the present study, we first aim to consider delusion from a perspectivist angle, according to the Multiple Reality Theory (MRT). In this model inherited from Alfred Schütz and recently addressed by Gallagher, we are not confronting one reality only, but several (such as the reality of everyday life, of imaginary life, of work, of delusion, etc.). In other terms, the MRT states that our own experience is not drawing its meaning from one reality identified as the outer reality but rather from a multiplicity of realities, each with their own logic and style. Two clinical cases illustrate how the Multiple Realities Theory (MRT) may help address the reality of delusion. Everyday reality and the reality of delusion may be articulated under a few conditions, such as compossibility [i.e., Double Book-Keeping (DBK), in Bleulerian terms] or flexibility. There are indeed possible bridges between them. Possible links with neuroscience or psychoanalysis are evoked. As the subject is confronting different realities, so do the objects among and toward which a subject is evolving. We call such objects Hybrid Objects (HO) due to their multiple belonging. They can operate as shifters, i.e., as some functional operators letting one switch from one reality to another. In the final section, we will emphasize how delusion flexibility, as a dynamic interaction between Multiple Realities, may offer psychotherapeutic possibilities within some reality shared with others, entailing relocation of the present subjects in regained access to some flexibility via Multiple Realities and perspectivism.

The imaginative mind

The astounding capacity for the human imagination to be engaged across a wide range of contexts is limitless and fundamental to our day-to-day experiences. Although processes of imagination are central to human psychological function, they rarely occupy center stage in academic discourse or empirical study within psychological and neuroscientific realms. The aim of this paper is to tackle this imbalance by drawing together the multitudinous facets of imagination within a common framework. The processes fall into one of five categories depending on whether they are characterized as involving perceptual/motor related mental imagery, intentionality or recollective processing, novel combinatorial or generative processing, exceptional phenomenology in the aesthetic response, or altered psychological states which range from commonplace to dysfunctional. These proposed categories are defined on the basis of theoretical ideas from philosophy as well as empirical evidence from neuroscience. By synthesizing the findings across these domains of imagination, this novel five-part or quinquepartite classification of the human imagination aids in systematizing, and thereby abets, our understanding of the workings and neural foundations of the human imagination. It would serve as a blueprint to direct further advances in the field of imagination while also promoting crosstalk with reference to stimulus-oriented facets of information processing. A biologically and ecologically valid psychology is one that seeks to explain fundamental aspects of human nature. Given the ubiquitous nature of the imaginative operations in our daily lives, there can be little doubt that these quintessential aspects of the mind should be central to the discussion. Hum Brain Mapp 37:4197-4211, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Delusional Themes Across Affective and Non-Affective Psychoses

The current debate about the diagnostic significance of delusion revolves around two positions. The neurocognitive position conceives delusion as a non-specific, though polymorphic, symptom. The psychopathological position views features of delusion such as content and structure as having meaningful connections with diagnostic entities. This study aims at contributing to this debate by examining the association between delusional themes and diagnosis in a sample of 830 adult psychotic patients. All diagnoses were made by experienced psychiatrists according to DSM-IV or ICD-10 criteria, and in 348 patients were established with the SCID-I. All patients were administered the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS). In each patient, the presence of somatic delusions and delusions of guilt, grandiosity, and persecution was determined by examining the scores on relevant BPRS items. Delusions of guilt were almost pathognomonic for a psychotic depressive condition (psychotic major depression 40%; psychotic bipolar depression 30%; depressed schizoaffective disorder 8%; bipolar and schizoaffective mixed states 6 and 7%, respectively). Only 1% of patients with schizophrenia and no patient with delusional disorder or bipolar or schizoaffective manic state showed such delusions. The difference between unipolar and bipolar depression and the other diagnostic groups was highly significant. Delusions of grandiosity characterized mostly patients with manic symptoms (bipolar mania 20%; bipolar mixed states 19%; manic schizoaffective disorder 10%). They were observed significantly more often in bipolar mania than in schizophrenia (7%). Persecutory delusions were broadly distributed across diagnostic categories. However, they were significantly more frequent among patients with schizophrenia and delusional disorder compared with depressed and manic patients. Somatic delusions were also observed in all diagnostic groups, with no group standing out as distinct from the others in terms of an increased prevalence of somatic delusions. Our findings suggest a middle position in the debate between the neurocognitive and the psychopathological approaches. On the one hand, the widespread observation of persecutory delusions suggests the usefulness of searching for non-specific pathogenic mechanisms. On the other hand, the association between some delusional contents and psychiatric diagnosis suggests that a phenomenological analysis of the delusional experience may be a helpful tool for the clinician in the diagnostic process.

Towards integrating phenomenology and neurocognition: Possible neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance in schizophrenia

Phenomenological research indicates that disturbance of the basic sense of self may be a core phenotypic marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Basic self-disturbance refers to disruption of the sense of ownership of experience and agency of action and is associated with a variety of anomalous subjective experiences. Little is known about the neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance. In this paper, we review recent phenomenological and neurocognitive research and point to a convergence of these approaches around the concept of self-disturbance. Specifically, we propose that subjective anomalies associated with basic self-disturbance may be associated with: 1. source monitoring deficits, which may contribute particularly to disturbances of “ownership” and “mineness” (the phenomenological notion of presence) and 2. aberrant salience, and associated disturbances of memory, prediction, and attention processes, which may contribute to hyper-reflexivity, disturbed “grip” or “hold” on the perceptual and conceptual field, and disturbances of intuitive social understanding (“common sense”). These two streams of research are reviewed in turn before considering ways forward in integrative models, particularly regarding the role of early neurodevelopmental disturbances, primary versus secondary disturbances, and the state versus trait nature of such pathology. Empirical studies are required in a variety of populations in order to test the proposed associations between phenomenological and neurocognitive aspects of self-disturbance in schizophrenia. An integration of findings across the phenomenological and neurocognitive domains would represent a significant advance in the understanding of schizophrenia and possibly enhance early identification and intervention strategies.

A Predictive Coding Account of Psychotic Symptoms in Autism Spectrum Disorder

The co-occurrence of psychotic and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptoms represents an important clinical challenge. Here we consider this problem in the context of a computational psychiatry approach that has been applied to both conditions-predictive coding. Some symptoms of schizophrenia have been explained in terms of a failure of top-down predictions or an enhanced weighting of bottom-up prediction errors. Likewise, autism has been explained in terms of similar perturbations. We suggest that this theoretical overlap may explain overlapping symptomatology. Experimental evidence highlights meaningful distinctions and consistencies between these disorders. We hypothesize individuals with ASD may experience some degree of delusions without the presence of any additional impairment, but that hallucinations are likely indicative of a distinct process.

A Predictive Coding Account of Psychotic Symptoms in Autism Spectrum Disorder

The co-occurrence of psychotic and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptoms represents an important clinical challenge. Here we consider this problem in the context of a computational psychiatry approach that has been applied to both conditions-predictive coding. Some symptoms of schizophrenia have been explained in terms of a failure of top-down predictions or an enhanced weighting of bottom-up prediction errors. Likewise, autism has been explained in terms of similar perturbations. We suggest that this theoretical overlap may explain overlapping symptomatology. Experimental evidence highlights meaningful distinctions and consistencies between these disorders. We hypothesize individuals with ASD may experience some degree of delusions without the presence of any additional impairment, but that hallucinations are likely indicative of a distinct process.

Can factitious disorder reach delusional level? A case study

The paper describes a patient, who has been consulted and hospitalized multiple times, due to dermatological lesions on his face. We will present his medical history and describe circumstances leading to the final diagnosis of factitious disorder. In the theoretical part we will try to answer the question, whether the extreme severity of the factitious disorders can, at some point, reach the level of delusions.

Delusions in first-episode psychosis: Principal component analysis of twelve types of delusions and demographic and clinical correlates of resulting domains

Although delusions represent one of the core symptoms of psychotic disorders, it is remarkable that few studies have investigated distinct delusional themes. We analyzed data from a large sample of first-episode psychosis patients (n=245) to understand relations between delusion types and demographic and clinical correlates. First, we conducted a principal component analysis (PCA) of the 12 delusion items within the Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS). Then, using the domains derived via PCA, we tested a priori hypotheses and answered exploratory research questions related to delusional content. PCA revealed five distinct components: Delusions of Influence, Grandiose/Religious Delusions, Paranoid Delusions, Negative Affect Delusions (jealousy, and sin or guilt), and Somatic Delusions. The most prevalent type of delusion was Paranoid Delusions, and such delusions were more common at older ages at onset of psychosis. The level of Delusions of Influence was correlated with the severity of hallucinations and negative symptoms. We ascertained a general relationship between different childhood adversities and delusional themes, and a specific relationship between Somatic Delusions and childhood neglect. Moreover, we found higher scores on Delusions of Influence and Negative Affect Delusions among cannabis and stimulant users. Our results support considering delusions as varied experiences with varying prevalences and correlates.

The doxastic shear pin: delusions as errors of learning and memory

We reconsider delusions in terms of a "doxastic shear pin", a mechanism that errs so as to prevent the destruction of the machine (brain) and permit continued function (in an attenuated capacity). Delusions may disable flexible (but energetically expensive) inference. With each recall, delusions may be reinforced further and rendered resistant to contradiction. We aim to respond to deficit accounts of delusions - that delusions are only a problem without any benefit - by considering delusion formation and maintenance in terms of predictive coding. We posit that brains conform to a simple computational principle: to minimize prediction error (the mismatch between prior top-down expectation and current bottom-up input) across hierarchies of brain regions and psychological representation. Recent data suggest that delusions may form in the absence of constraining top-down expectations. Then, once formed, they become new priors that motivate other beliefs, perceptions, and actions by providing strong (sometimes overriding) top-down expectation. We argue that delusions form when the shear-pin breaks, permitting continued engagement with an overwhelming world, and ongoing function in the face of paralyzing difficulty. This crucial role should not be ignored when we treat delusions: we need to consider how a person will function in the world without them..

Phenomenology and neurobiology of self disorder in schizophrenia: Secondary factors

Schizophrenia is a diverse and varying syndrome that defies most attempts at classification and pathogenetic explanation. This is the second of two articles offering a comprehensive model meant to integrate an understanding of schizophrenia-related forms of subjectivity, especially anomalous core-self experience (disturbed ipseity), with neurocognitive and neurodevelopmental findings. Previously we discussed the primary or foundational role of disturbed intermodal perceptional integration ("perceptual dys-integration"). Here we discuss phenomenological alterations that can be considered secondary in a pathogenetic sense--whether as consequential products downstream from a more originary disruption, or as defensive reactions involving quasi-intentional or even volitional compensations to the more primary disruptions. These include secondary forms of: 1, hyperreflexivity, 2, diminished self-presence (self-affection), and 3. disturbed "rip" or "hold" on the cognitive/perceptual field of awareness. We consider complementary relations between these secondary abnormal experiences while also considering their temporal relationships and pathogenetic intertwining with the more primary phenomenological alterations discussed previously, all in relation to the neurodevelopmental model. The secondary phenomena can be understood as highly variable factors involving overall orientations or attitudes toward experience; they have some affinities with experiences of meditation, introspectionism, and depersonalization defense. Also, they seem likely to become more pronounced during adolescence as a result of new cognitive capacities related to development of the prefrontal lobes, especially attention allocation, executive functions, abstraction, and meta-awareness. Heterogeneity in these secondary alterations might help explain much of the clinical diversity in schizophrenia, both between patients and within individual patients over time--without however losing sight of key underlying commonalities.

Self-Disturbance and the Bizarre: On Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenic Delusions

The notion of 'bizarre delusion' has come into question in contemporary anglophone psychopathology. In DSM-5, it no longer serves as a special criterion for diagnosing schizophrenia nor as an exclusion criterion for delusional disorder. Empirical studies influencing this development have, however, been relatively sparse and subject to methodological criticism. Major reviews have concluded that current conceptualizations of bizarre delusions may require rethinking and refinement. Defining bizarreness entails a return to Jaspers, whose influential views on the supposed incomprehensibility of bizarre delusions and schizophrenic experience are more nuanced than is generally recognized. Jaspers insisted we must 'get behind' three 'external characteristics' (extraordinary conviction, imperviousness, impossible content) in order to acknowledge a 'primary experience traceable to the illness' in the 'delusions proper' of schizophrenia. He also denied that one could empathize with or otherwise 'understand' this basis. Here, we focus on three features of bizarre delusions that Jaspers foregrounded as illustrating schizophrenic incomprehensibility: disturbance of the cogito, certitude combined with inconsequentiality, delusional mood. We link these with the contemporary ipseity disturbance model of schizophrenia, arguing that Jaspers' examples of incomprehensibility can be understood as manifestations of the three complementary aspects of ipseity-disturbance: diminished self-presence, hyperreflexivity and disturbed grip/hold. We follow Jaspers' lead in acknowledging a distinctive strangeness that defies ready comprehension, but we challenge the absolutism of Jaspers' skepticism by offering a phenomenological account that comprehends bizarreness in two ways: rendering it psychologically understandable, and fitting the various instances of bizarreness into a comprehensive explanatory framework.