The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks

Risky-Choice Framing Effects Result Partly From Mismatched Option Descriptions in Gains and Losses

Textbook psychology holds that people usually prefer a certain option over a risky one when options are framed as gains but prefer the opposite when options are framed as losses. However, this pattern can be amplified, eliminated, or reversed depending on whether option descriptions include only positive information (e.g., "200 people will be saved"), only negative information (e.g., "400 people will not be saved"), or both. Previous studies suggest that framing effects arise only when option descriptions are mismatched across frames. Using online and student samples (Ns = 906 and 521), we investigated 81 framing-effect variants created from matched and mismatched pairs of 18 option descriptions (nine in each frame). Description valence or gist explained substantial variation in risk preferences (prospect theory does not predict such variation), but a considerable framing effect remained in our balanced design. Risky-choice framing effects appear to be partly-but not completely-the result of mismatched comparisons.

Optimistic framing increases responsible investment of investment professionals

The global warming crisis is unlikely to abate while the world continues to collectively fund the extraction and burning of fossil fuels. Carbon divestment is urgently needed to ward off the impending climate emergency. Yet responsible investments still only account for a modest share of global assets. We conduct an incentivized artefactual field experiment to test whether framing divestment as a social norm, communicating it by a person with perceived credibility and expertise (a messenger), and highlighting optimistic attributes bolster responsible investment. Our subjects are investment professionals who have significant influence over the allocation of funds. We provide evidence that optimistic framing increases responsible investment. Assuming a comparable effect size, the observed increase would represent a $3.6 trillion USD global shift in asset allocations.

Changing Decisions: The Interaction between Framing and Decoy Effects

BACKGROUND

Cognitive biases are popular topics in psychology and marketing, as they refer to systematic cognitive tendencies in human thinking that deviate from logical and rational reasoning. The framing effect (FE) and the decoy effect (DE) are examples of cognitive biases that can influence decision making and consumer preferences. The FE involves how options are presented, while the DE involves the addition of a third option that influences the choice between the other two options.

METHODS

We investigated the interaction between the FE and the DE in the case of both incongruent (ID) and congruent (CD) decoys in a sample of undergraduates (n = 471). The study had a two (positive vs. negative valence) × three (original, congruent decoy, incongruent decoy) within-subject design.

RESULTS

The ID option reduces the FE in both positive- and negative-framed conditions compared to the controls, while adding the CD option increases the FE only in the positive-framed condition. Additionally, the inclusion of the CD option enhances the level of decision confidence, whereas no significant differences were found in the ID condition.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings gave new insights into the interplay between two of the most frequent cognitive biases.

COVID-19 stressor reduces risk taking: the role of trait interoception

The Framing Effect (FE) demonstrated that the way two alternatives are displayed affects people's inclination to make a specific choice, showing a risk aversion when alternatives are displayed on positive frames and risk seeking in negative frames. Risk seeking in negative frames is closely linked to loss aversion. Moreover, classical research and the salience-of-losses hypothesis argues that stress may enhance the FE and loss aversion. Recent studies also suggest that the trait interoception and alexithymia could interact and moderate the framing susceptibility. However, experimental paradigms on stress could ignore variables such as threat perception. In this sense, COVID-19 pandemic has become a powerful real-life stressor in many countries. We aimed to study how real-life stressors influence decision-making under risk. A total of 97 participants were divided into a control (n = 48) and an experimental group (n = 49). The experimental group were exposed to a stressor manipulation, a 5 min COVID-19 lockdown documentary. Our results show that COVID-19-related stressors significantly decreased bet acceptance regardless of the frame, also reducing loss aversion. Moreover, interoception was a significant predictor of loss aversion under stress conditions. Our results do not support classical research on stress and FE.

Shape of my likes: how explicit and implicit reference frames shape the liking of insect-based protein bar

A high-protein bar incorporating mealworm powder was developed. The impact of explicit and implicit frame formation on the acceptance and sensory characteristics of this target bar was investigated by comparing it with four commercial protein bars for a total of 275 consumers. To construct the explicit frame, consumers watched a video clip about each frame (environment/nutrition/meal replacement) just before the evaluation. In the no-explicit-frame group, five protein bars were evaluated without video priming. The control group tasted the target sample only without any information. The implicit framework formed during the progress of exposure to various protein bar samples had a greater influence than explicit cues on the acceptance of the target. Promoting the nutritional and environmental merits of edible insects was not sufficient to improve the acceptability of the insect-incorporated protein bar. The liking decreased significantly with the inclusion of the commercial samples during the progress of sequential monadic serving.

Individual differences moderate effects in an Unusual Disease paradigm: A psychophysical data collection lab approach and an online experiment

We report two studies investigating individual intuitive-deliberative cognitive-styles and risk-styles as moderators of the framing effect in Tversky and Kahneman's famous Unusual Disease problem setting. We examined framing effects in two ways: counting the number of frame-inconsistent choices and comparing the proportions of risky choices depending on gain-loss framing. Moreover, in addition to gain-loss frames, we systematically varied the number of affected people, probabilities of surviving/dying, type of disease, and response deadlines. Study 1 used a psychophysical data collection approach and a sample of 43 undergraduate students, each performing 480 trials. Study 2 was an online study incorporating psychophysical elements in a social science approach using a larger and more heterogeneous sample, i.e., 262 participants performed 80 trials each. In both studies, the effect of framing on risky choice proportions was moderated by risk-styles. Cognitive-styles measured on different scales moderated the framing effect only in study 2. The effects of disease type, probability of surviving/dying, and number of affected people on risky choice frequencies were also affected by cognitive-styles and risk-styles but different for both studies and to different extents. We found no relationship between the number of frame-inconsistent choices and cognitive-styles or risk-styles, respectively.

Effect of exogenous testosterone in the context of energy deficit on risky choice: Behavioural and neural evidence from males

Previous research has shown greater risk aversion when people make choices about lives than cash. We tested the hypothesis that compared to placebo, exogenous testosterone administration would lead to riskier choices about cash than lives, given testosterone's association with financial risk-taking and reward sensitivity. A double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized trial was conducted to test this hypothesis (Clinical Trials Registry: NCT02734238, www.clinicaltrials.gov). We collected functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from 50 non-obese males before and shortly after 28 days of severe exercise-and-diet-induced energy deficit, during which testosterone (200 mg testosterone enanthate per week in sesame oil) or placebo (sesame seed oil only) was administered. Because we expected circulating testosterone levels to be reduced due to severe energy deficit, testosterone administration served a restorative function to mitigate the impact of energy deficit on testosterone levels. The fMRI task involved making choices under uncertainty for lives and cash. We also manipulated whether the outcomes were presented as gains or losses. Consistent with prospect theory, we observed the reflection effect such that participants were more risk averse when outcomes were presented as gains than losses. Brain activation in the thalamus covaried with individual differences in exhibiting the reflection effect. Testosterone did not impact choice, but it increased sensitivity to negative feedback following risky choices. These results suggest that exogenous testosterone administration in the context of energy deficit can impact some aspects of risky choice, and that individual differences in the reflection effect engage a brain structure involved in processing emotion, reward and risk.

The Impact of Childhood Socioeconomic Status on Adolescents' Risk Behaviors: The Role of Physiological and Psychological Threats

Adolescence is a period of high levels of risk behavior. The present research aims to examine the influences of childhood socioeconomic status (SES) on risk behaviors in gain or loss domains among adolescents and the roles of threats in this effect. In experiment 1, a total of 107 adolescents (M_age = 14.80; SD_age = 1.15) were asked to complete the childhood socioeconomic status scale before they took part in a risk behavior task under the gain and loss situation. A total of 149 adolescents (M_age = 14.24; SD_age = 1.11) in experiment 2a and 139 adolescents (M_age = 13.88; SD_age = 1.09) in experiment 2b completed the childhood socioeconomic status scale before they took part in a risk behavior task under the gain and loss situation under physiological threats and psychological threats, respectively. The results showed that high-childhood-SES adolescents tend to take more risks than low-childhood-SES adolescents in the gain domain, while low-childhood-SES adolescents tend to take more risks than high-childhood-SES adolescents in the loss domain. Threats amplified the impact of childhood socioeconomic status on adolescents' risk behaviors in the gain and loss domains. When a physiological threat or psychological threat was primed, compared to the control group, in the gain situation, the extent to which high-childhood-SES adolescents showed greater risk seeking than low-childhood-SES adolescents became larger; in the loss domain, the extent to which low-childhood-SES adolescents showed greater risk seeking than high-childhood-SES adolescents became larger.

Accelerating Psychological Science With Metastudies: A Demonstration Using the Risky-Choice Framing Effect

A metastudy is a set of many tiny studies (microstudies) created from a much larger collection of possibilities. Metastudies can yield many of the benefits of time-consuming replications and meta-analyses but more efficiently and with greater attention to generalizability and the causal effects of moderators. Statistical precision and power are higher than in studies with the same total sample size but with fewer conditions and more participants per condition. In this article, we describe metastudies and their benefits, demonstrate how to conduct a metastudy using the well-known risky-choice framing effect as an example, and report on the generalizability of that effect. In three metastudies (total N = 2,338), the framing effect generalized well across most of the potential moderators tested, as was expected. Surprisingly, however, the effect was up to twice as large when the certain option was replaced with a slightly risky option; prospect theory predicts the opposite, and fuzzy-trace theory predicts no difference. Metastudies provide a relatively quick and not-so-painful way of examining an effect's generalizability without waiting for a meta-analysis. Both individual labs and multilab networks are encouraged to shift from traditional studies to metastudies.

Keep your budget together! Investigating determinants on risky decision-making about losses

The present study investigates the influence of framing, different amounts to lose, and probabilities of a risky and sure choice option, time limits, and need on risky decision-making. For a given block of trials, participants were equipped with a personal budget (number of points). On each trial within a block, a specific initial amount is possibly taken from the budget by the outcome of a gamble or the choice of a sure loss option. The goal was to avoid losing points from the budget for not falling below a predefined need threshold. Three different levels of induced need were included. Employing a psychophysical experimental approach, we furthermore tested a sequential component of human risk behavior towards a need threshold inspired by research on animal foraging behavior. Risk-sensitivity models and the Stone-Geary framework serve as generating hypotheses on need thresholds. We found that framing, need, and probabilities influenced risky choices. Time limits and initial amounts moderated the framing effect. No sequential component was observed.

Fear appeal, coping appeal and mobile health technology persuasion: a two-stage scenario-based survey of the elderly

Purpose

Prior researches on the adoption of mobile health services (MHS) concentrate on the subjective cognitive appraisals resulting in technology adoption, while ignoring how to shape those cognitive appraisals by the objective message design strategies which are easier to operate in practice. Based on protection motivation theory (PMT), the current research aims to explore the antecedents of cognitive appraisals by focusing on message design strategies of fear appeal and coping appeal.

Design/methodology/approach

A two-stage scenario-based survey of 204 participants was conducted to collect data. The authors chose SPSS and covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) approach with the software LISREL 8.8 to test our model.

Findings

The results show that the relationship between fear appeal and fear arousal is inverted U-shaped such that the degree of fear arousal is the greatest when the fear appeal is at a moderate level. Perceived usefulness for the message with negative framing is higher than that with positive framing. Furthermore, fear appeal and coping appeal have a significant interaction on the adoption of MHS at different stages.

Research limitations/implications

The sample data of this study come from a special health service of a special group in China, which limits the universality of our research results for other groups or health care services. Therefore, future researchers can validate the model in other research scenarios and sample populations.

Originality/value

This study shows how fear appeal and coping appeal work together to influence individuals' adoption intention. The authors’ findings expand the theoretical depth of PMT and fear theory, enriching the theoretical connotation of framing effect in mobile health technology adoption context, which add new insights to design more persuasive messages through fear appeal and coping appeal for researchers and MHS providers in mobile health communication or propaganda.

How Power Influences Decision-Makers' Investment Behavior in the Domains of Loss and Gain

We present a study (N = 645) investigating how power alters people’s propensity to take investment risks in a changing decision context of gains and losses and the intensity of their reactions to this experience. The results indicate that people in a state of power made more risky investment decisions than the control group regardless of prior gain or loss outcome, whereas people lacking power took less investment risk than the control group, regardless of previous outcomes. Moreover, people with power and those lacking power differed in their reactions to gains and losses, with the former reacting more to gains and the latter to losses.

The impact of COVID-19

BACKGROUND

Behavioral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have become highly polarized, and public health initiatives often try to use different frames to influence behavior. If the polarization of behaviors is related to differences in responses to frames, then different health messages could be targeted to different groups to influence behavior.

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether risk preferences and susceptibility to gain/loss frames have been affected by COVID-19 and whether they differ along partisan lines.

METHODS

Using repeated cross-sectional data from a nationally representative dataset in the United States replicating the disease outbreak scenario collected before and after the onset of COVID-19, we test whether responsiveness to the gain/loss frames has changed over time and whether the responsiveness varies by political affiliation.

RESULTS

The experimental results show that the risk preferences of the U.S. population is very susceptible to the framing of choices, consistent with the literature finding risk loving preferences under the loss frame and risk aversion under the gain frame. However, the experience of COVID-19 does not appear to have changed the responsiveness, nor are there significant differences between conservatives/Republicans and liberals/Democrats.

CONCLUSION

Targeting different partisan groups with different risk-related message frames is unlikely to be effective at altering behaviors.

Lay, professional, and artificial intelligence perspectives on risky medical decisions and COVID-19: How does the number of lives matter in clinical trials framed as gains versus losses?

Outcomes of clinical trials need to be communicated effectively to make decisions that save lives. We investigated whether framing can bias these decisions and if risk preferences shift depending on the number of patients. Hypothetical information about two medicines used in clinical trials having a sure or a risky outcome was presented in either a gain frame (people would be saved) or a loss frame (people would die). The number of patients who signed up for the clinical trials was manipulated in both frames in all the experiments. Using an unnamed disease, lay participants (experiment 1) and would-be medical professionals (experiment 2) were asked to choose which medicine they would have administered. For COVID-19, lay participants were asked which medicine should medical professionals (experiment 3), artificially intelligent software (experiment 4), and they themselves (experiment 5) favour to be administered. Broadly consistent with prospect theory, people were more risk-seeking in the loss frames than the gain frames. However, risk-aversion in gain frames was sensitive to the number of lives with risk-neutrality at low magnitudes and risk-aversion at high magnitudes. In the loss frame, participants were mostly risk-seeking. This pattern was consistent across laypersons and medical professionals, further extended to preferences for choices that medical professionals and artificial intelligence programmes should make in the context of COVID-19. These results underscore how medical decisions can be impacted by the number of lives at stake while revealing inconsistent risk preferences for clinical trials during a real pandemic.

Risky choice framing by experience: A methodological note

In classic research on judgment and decision making under risk, risk is described by providing participants with the respective outcomes and probabilities in a summary format. Recent research has introduced a different paradigm – decisions-by-experience – where participants learn about risk by sampling from the outcomes, rather than by summary descriptions. This latter research reports a description-experience gap, indicating that some of the classic patterns of risk attitude reverse when people experience the risk. Recent research has attempted to investigate risky choice framing in the decisions-by-experience paradigm. I discuss how this research runs into problems in properly manipulating framing in decisions by experience. Drawing from framing research with animals, I argue that framing effects also exist in experience tasks. The classic Asian Disease task, however, awaits proper translation into an experience paradigm.

That’s not fair! unfair treatment spills over into individual risky financial decisions

Studies indicate that experiencing unfairness may influence subsequent decisions. There is initial evidence that this is also true for gambling decisions made after an experience of unfair treatment in a financial domain. The presented studies test whether this can be extended to other domains of financial risk-taking, such as investments. Moreover, we aim to investigate whether the effects of such experience in one domain generalize to other domains. Three experimental studies were conducted to investigate how unfair treatment coming from varied domains affects individuals’ propensities to make risky investment and gambling choices in subsequent tasks. The experience of being a victim or a beneficiary of unfair treatment in financial and non-financial domains was induced and the propensity to take investment and gambling risks was measured. The results of the experiments indicated that the experience of unfairness influences the propensity to make risky financial choices but the domain in which it is experienced plays an important role. Being a victim of financial unfairness makes people more prone to take investment risk and build riskier investing portfolios with more stocks and fewer bonds than when they are beneficiaries or when they are treated fairly. Moreover, being the beneficiary of unfair treatment in a financial domain makes people less prone to choose a sure option (vs risky) in lottery tasks. The abovementioned relationships are exactly the opposite when the experience of (un)fairness comes from a task in a non-financial context. Specifically, the experience of unfair treatment in a non-financial domain leads people to be less prone to make risky investment choices, and it enhances the propensity to build safer investment portfolios with more bonds and fewer stocks than people from the unfair-beneficiary and fair groups. Furthermore, being the beneficiary of unfair treatment in a non-financial context makes people more prone to choose sure option in lottery task.

Are Impulsive Decisions Always Irrational? An Experimental Investigation of Impulsive Decisions in the Domains of Gains and Losses

Intertemporal choices are very prevalent in daily life, ranging from simple, mundane decisions to highly consequential decisions. In this context, thinking about the future and making sound decisions are crucial to promoting mental and physical health, as well as a financially sustainable lifestyle. In the present study, we set out to investigate some of the possible underlying mechanisms, such as cognitive factors and emotional states, that promote future-oriented decisions. In a cross-sectional experimental study, we used a gain and a loss version of an intertemporal monetary choices task. Our main behavioural result indicated that people are substantially more impulsive over smaller and sooner monetary losses compared to equivalent gains. In addition, for both decisional domains, significant individual difference predictors emerged, indicating that intertemporal choices are sensitive to the affective and cognitive parameters. By focusing on the cognitive and emotional individual factors that influence impulsive decisions, our study could constitute a building block for successful future intervention programs targeted at mental and physical health issues, including gambling behaviour.

The Scaling and Modeling of Pay and the Robustness of the Effect of Core Self Evaluations on Career Success

A number of recent studies used nominal pay in estimating the effects of individual differences, particularly core-self-evaluation, on career success. We show that this practice may lead to results that are substantively different from the results when the logarithm of pay is used. We conduct three constructive replications of previous studies, and argue that substantive conclusion based on the results of nominal pay are misleading.

Fear From Afar, Not So Risky After All: Distancing Moderates the Relationship Between Fear and Risk Taking

A growing line of research has shown that individuals can regulate emotional biases in risky judgment and decision-making processes through cognitive reappraisal. In the present study, we focus on a specific tactic of reappraisal known as distancing. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion and the emotion regulation literature, we examine how distancing moderates the relationship between fear and risk taking and anger and risk taking. In three pre-registered studies (N_total = 1,483), participants completed various risky judgment and decision-making tasks. Replicating previous results, Study 1 revealed a negative relationship between fear and risk taking and a positive relationship between anger and risk taking at low levels of distancing. Study 2 replicated the interaction between fear and distancing but found no interaction between anger and distancing. Interestingly, at high levels of distancing, we observed a reversal of the relationship between fear and risk taking in both Study 1 and 2. Study 3 manipulated emotion and distancing by asking participants to reflect on current fear-related and anger-related stressors from an immersed or distanced perspective. Study 3 found no main effect of emotion nor any evidence of a moderating role of distancing. However, exploratory analysis revealed a main effect of distancing on optimistic risk estimation, which was mediated by a reduction in self-reported fear. Overall, the findings suggest that distancing can help regulate the influence of incidental fear on risk taking and risk estimation. We discuss implications and suggestions for future research.

Reliability of moral decision-making: Evidence from the trolley dilemma

The application of framing effects in the field of moral judgement has offered a golden opportunity to assess the reliability of people's moral judgements and decisions. To date, however, these studies are still scarce and they suffer from multiple methodological issues. Therefore, this study aims to provide further insights into the reliability of moral judgements while fixing these methodological shortcomings. In this study, we employed the classic trolley dilemma moral decision-making paradigm to determine the extent to which moral decisions are susceptible to framing effects. A total of 1,040 participants were included in the study. The data revealed that choices of participants did not significantly differ between the two frames. Equivalence tests confirmed that the associated effect size was very small. Further exploratory analyses revealed an unplanned interaction between the framing effect and the target of the framing manipulation. This result became from marginally statistically significant to insignificant following different sensitivity analyses. The implications and limitations of these findings and directions for future research are discussed.

Self-reported daily sleep quality modulates the impact of the framing effect on outcome evaluation in decision-making under uncertainty: An ERP study

A growing body of research has largely confirmed and supported the idea that experimental sleep loss, such as sleep deprivation or sleep restriction, could affect individuals' risk-taking behavior and brain activity. However, whether self-reported sleep quality resulting from daily life modulates how feedback is evaluated during decision-making is still unclear. In this study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) with a Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) to investigate how self-reported daily sleep quality modulates the brain's response to feedback from decision-making in the gain and loss frames. Behavioral data showed an increased aversion to uncertainty in the gain frame relative to the loss frame for individuals with higher sleep quality. However, this was not true for individuals with lower voluntary sleep quality. Similarly, the ERP data demonstrated that individuals with lower self-reported daily sleep quality displayed no changes in feedback-related negativity (FRN) in response to outcomes from decision-making in the gain and loss frames; however, individuals with higher self-reported daily sleep quality showed a greater FRN in response to decision-making in the gain frame than that in the loss frame. A Pearson correlation analysis showed that self-reported daily sleep quality was positively related to the variance of the FRN amplitude in response to the gain and loss frames. These findings suggest that framing effects on decision-making under uncertainty may depend on self-reported daily sleep quality and that the effects disappear when the sleep quality declines.

A Cognitive-Emotional Model to Explain Message Framing Effects: Reducing Meat Consumption

We tested the plausibility of a cognitive-emotional model to understand the effects of messages framed in terms of gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss, and related to the health consequences of red/processed meat consumption. A total of 544 Italian participants reported their attitude toward reduced red/processed meat consumption and intention to eat red/processed meat (time 1 questionnaire). One week later, participants were randomly assigned to four different message conditions: (a) gain messages focused on the positive health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; (b) non-loss messages focused on the avoided negative health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; (c) non-gain messages focused on the missed positive health outcomes associated with high meat consumption; (d) loss messages focused on the negative health outcomes associated with high meat consumption (message sending). After reading the messages, participants answered a series of questions regarding their emotional and cognitive reactions to the messages, their evaluation of the messages, and again their attitude and intention toward red/processed meat consumption (time 2 questionnaire). Comparing different multivariate linear models under the Bayesian approach, we selected the model with the highest plausibility conditioned to observed data. In this model, message-induced fear influenced systematic processing, which in turn positively influenced message evaluation and attitude, leading to reduced intention to consume red/processed meat. Vice versa, message-induced anger reduced systematic processing, which in turn negatively influenced message evaluation, and led to no effect on attitude and intention. The comparison among message conditions showed that gain and non-loss messages activated integrated emotional and cognitive processing of the health recommendation, while loss and non-gain messages mainly activated emotional shortcuts toward attitude and intention. Overall, these results advance our comprehension of the effects of message framing on receivers' attitudes and intentions.

Risky choice framing with various problem descriptions: A replication and extension study

In “Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory”, Kühberger and Tanner (2010) examined the impacts of removing stated zero/non-zero complements of risky options on the gain/loss framing effect. They also tested two rival theoretical explanations for this effect: prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory. The present study aimed to examine the reliability and robustness of the evidence provided by Kühberger and Tanner by precise replication in Study 1. The original findings were reported for conditions in which the probability of the risky option was fixed, and the expected value of the two alternatives was approximately equivalent. The present study also aimed to examine the generality of their findings under additional conditions in which large, medium and small probabilities of the risky option were assigned, and the expected value of the certain or risky options differed. The main findings of Kühberger and Tanner (2010) were successfully replicated and confirmed under the original and additional conditions. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Risky financial choices in a gain and loss decision frame – the role of chronic and situationally induced time perspectives

The aim of the research was to explore the relationship between people’s Time Perspectives (TPs) (chronic and induced) and their propensity to take financial risks in gambling tasks with a gain and loss decision frame. The results of the study 1 (N1 = 1093) revealed that a higher chronic Present Hedonistic TP is related to a preference for unsure options in loss and gain frames, while a higher chronic Past Negative TP is related to a preference for sure options in a gain frame of financial choice, but for unsure options in a loss frame. Moreover, higher chronic Future TP is related to unsure option preference in a loss decision frame. The results of the study 2 (N2 = 563) showed that the induced Past Negative TP (in a gain frame) and Present Hedonistic TP (in both decision frames) lead to similar patterns of results to those observed for the chronic TPs.

Framing effects on financial and health problems in gambling disorder

Gambling disorder (GD) patients show excessively risky decision-making in the financial domain. We aimed to clarify whether GD patients show risky decision-making in domain-general or in domain-specific. Furthermore, we also investigated the effect of the well-known cognitive bias, the framing effect on GD's decision-making under risk. Sixty-two male GD patients and 74 age-matched healthy male controls (HC) conducted a risky choice task in which they should choose solutions for difficult situations between a sure and a risky option that had the same expectations. Six situations were prepared for each financial and health domain. For each domain, three situations were presented with options using positive frames, and the other three situations were presented with options using negative frames. The results showed that GD chose more risky options in the financial domain with positive frames than HC, but chose comparably in the financial domain with negative frames, whereas GD and HC chose comparably in the health domain regardless of the frames. Thus, GD showed risky decision-making in domain-specific. In addition, the results indicate the importance of considering the influence of the framing effect for assessment of risky decision-making by GD. Domains and the influence of the framing effect should be considered when decision-making patterns of neuropsychiatric disorders are studied.

Gamble for the needy! Does identifiability enhances donation?

To investigate how neediness and identifiability of a recipient influence the willingness of a donor to invest resources in charity-like lotteries we propose a new game, called ‘need game’. Similar to the dictator game, the need game includes two players, one active player (the donor or dictator) and one passive player (the recipient). Both players require a minimum need (N_D and N_R), expressed in terms of points. The donor is endowed with K_D points and must retain at least N_D points, i.e., the need, with N_D < K_D, at the end of the game with n rounds. The recipient starts with K_R points and must end the game with at least N_R points, i.e., the need, with K_R < N_R < K_D. The donor is asked to choose one of three different amounts from K_D to place a bet on a lottery. If won, the gain is added to the endowment. If lost, the recipient receives the points. The recipient is paid only when his/her need threshold is obtained; likewise the donor gets paid only when his/her need threshold is maintained. The main focus here is on need of both players (N_D = N_R = 2, 200, and ND = N_R = 0 serving as baseline control) and the identifiability of the recipient (no information, described by text and picture, and physical presence). We probe whether the amount invested by the donor depends on need and identifiability of the recipient. In addition, we include the framing of the game as gain or loss, different probabilities to win/lose, and different time limits as covariates. We found that each of these factors can play a role when investing in charity-like lotteries.

The interplay between the importance of a decision and emotion in decision-making

Decision-making literature has demonstrated that individuals' preferences are strongly affected by the way in which choices are presented. This cognitive bias, termed the framing effect, is influenced by the importance of the possible outcomes that a decision can have. However, the direction of this influence remains poorly understood. The aim of this paper was to examine the role of the importance of a decision in framing susceptibility and to explore a potential mechanism underlying this influence. Our first study revealed that participants display a framing effect when their decision implies a high importance outcome, but resist framing manipulation when their decision implies a low importance outcome. Our second study confirmed that an increase in the importance of a decision is associated with increasing framing susceptibility. Moreover, a moderated mediation analysis revealed that the more a decision was important, the more the gain and loss frames aroused opposite emotions, and this accounted for the increase in framing susceptibility. The results of these two studies confirmed that an increase in the importance of a decision is associated with increasing framing susceptibility and suggest that this influence on framing susceptibility is underpinned by emotion. Implications and direction for future studies are discussed.

Gains v. losses, or context dependence generated by confusion?

Tversky and Kahneman introduced the term framing for the finding that people give different answers to the same question depending on the way it is posed. One form of framing involves presenting the same outcome as either a gain or a loss. An experiment on starlings by Marsh and Kacelnik suggests that this form of framing occurs in non-humans. We argue that the experimental result demonstrates framing in the general sense of context dependence but does not provide compelling evidence of framing in terms of gains and losses. A version of scalar utility theory which is extended to include the possibility of memory errors accounts for the data and suggests future lines of research.

Rational Fouls? Loss aversion on organizational and individual goals influence decision quality

When organizational tasks require accurate decision-making, it is of interest to examine the quality of decisions in general, and specifically the conditions under which it deteriorates. Many important decisions are made by individuals at work who are hired to pursue organizational goals but also have individual goals, but the potential effects of having two goal sets has not seen enough theoretical and empirical treatment. We are particularly interested in the effects of organizational and individual goals leading to loss framing in decision-making, and in their interaction. We take predictions on loss aversion that have been explored most extensively in experimental studies and investigate them in a high-stakes field context involving organizations: football (soccer) in a European top division. We show that fouls (destructive play) are made rationally overall, and with reductions in rationality that follow the predictions of prospect theory. We show that the main mechanism behind the findings is that decision-making in a loss frame is less sensitive to cost/benefit calculations.

The Effects of Goal Framing on Energy Drink Consumption: The Moderating Role of Temporal Framing

BACKGROUND

With the rapid expansion of the energy drink market, concerns associated with its adverse effects have been raised. This research examines how goal framing moderated by temporal framing affects attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control related to energy drink consumption.

METHODS

A 2 (goal framing: gain vs. loss) × 2 (temporal framing: present-oriented vs. future-oriented) randomised experiment was employed. The sample consisted of 195 college students who consume energy drinks.

RESULTS

Results showed that a future-oriented message was more effective than a present-oriented one when used in gain framing in increasing perceived behavioral control, as predicted. A future-oriented message was also more effective in increasing perceived negative subjective norms, but only when used in loss framing; this was the opposite of the predicted result.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings extend previous research on goal framing by (1) identifying an important moderator-temporal framing-in processing health promotion messages about energy drink consumption and (2) examining such moderated effects on different psychological factors. The findings of this study are expected to inform the development of more effective message strategies in health domains.

The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory: The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability

Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes with probabilities. Recent studies suggest that people’s numeracy affect their decision making. We therefore conducted a large-scale conceptual replication of the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where we targeted participants with larger variability in numeracy. Because people low in numeracy may be more dependent on anchors in the form of other judgments we also manipulated design type (within-subject design, vs. single-stimuli design, where participants assess only one problem). The results from about 1,800 participants showed that design type had no effect on the modal choices. The rate of replication of the paradoxes in Kahneman and Tversky was poor and positively related to the participants’ numeracy. The Probabilistic Insurance Effect was observed at all levels of numeracy. The Reflection Effects were not fully replicated at any numeracy level. The Certainty and Isolation Effects explained by nonlinear probability weighting were replicated only at high numeracy. No participant exhibited all 9 paradoxes and more than 50% of the participants exhibited at most three of the 9 paradoxes. The choices by the participants with low numeracy were consistent with a shift towards a cautionary non-compensatory strategy of minimizing the risk of receiving the worst possible outcome. We discuss the implications for the psychological assumptions of PT.

Moderators of framing effects in variations of the Asian Disease problem: Time constraint, need, and disease type

This study examined framing effects in decisions concerning public health. Tversky and Kahneman’s famous Asian Disease Problem served as experimental paradigm. Subjects chose between a sure and a risky option either presented as gains (saving lives) or as losses (dying). The amount of risk varied in terms of different probabilities. The number of affected people was either small (low need) or large (high need). Additionally, the decisions were linked to three different types of diseases (unusual infection, AIDS, leukemia). We also implemented two different time constraints during which the subjects had to give a response. Finally, we tested a within-subject design. The data analysis assuming a linear mixed effects model revealed significant effects of framing, probabilities, and need. Furthermore, the type of disease and time constraints were moderating the framing effect. Across the different diseases, framing effects were amplified when decision time was short.

Is the framing effect a framing affect?

Over the past 30 years, researchers have shown that human choices are highly sensitive to the ways in which alternatives are presented. For example, when individuals face a choice between a sure and a risky option, their willingness to take risks varies depending on whether the alternatives are framed in terms of gain or loss. The current major hypothesis that explains such a framing effect predicts that compared with an equivalent risky option, sure gains are emotionally attractive and sure losses are emotionally aversive. Using a behavioural paradigm, the main objective of the current study was to experimentally observe the extent to which the emotional attraction to sure gains and aversion to sure losses are at the core of framing susceptibility. First, our results showed that, as the literature suggests, the emotional attraction to sure gains and aversion to sure losses underpin the framing effect. Second, our results showed that methodological factors moderated the role of these emotional mechanisms in the framing effect. Implications and directions for future studies are discussed.

Is human life worth peanuts? Risk attitude changes in accordance with varying stakes

Risk aversion is well-known as a general and robust characteristic of people’s decision making: people are less likely to gamble when they are unsure if they will obtain the expected value of the bet made. The “peanuts effect” is, however, an exception to this general rule. The “peanuts effect,” which states that people are more willing to gamble when playing for “peanuts” (a small outcome), has been stably observed in the context of a small monetary stake. We conducted two types of experiments to verify whether the peanuts effect still occurred when the type of stakes changed. We had two main findings. On the one hand, people tended to gamble more for a qualitatively smaller value when the stake was material in nature, meaning that the “peanuts effect” occurred with a qualitatively low stake. On the other hand, people were willing to take a risk for a qualitatively larger value when the stake was a human life: this is the opposite phenomenon of the “peanuts effect.”

Identifying new susceptibility genes on dopaminergic and serotonergic pathways for the framing effect in decision-making

The framing effect refers the tendency to be risk-averse when options are presented positively but be risk-seeking when the same options are presented negatively during decision-making. This effect has been found to be modulated by the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) and the catechol-o-methyltransferase gene (COMT) polymorphisms, which are on the dopaminergic and serotonergic pathways and which are associated with affective processing. The current study aimed to identify new genetic variations of genes on dopaminergic and serotonergic pathways that may contribute to individual differences in the susceptibility to framing. Using genome-wide association data and the gene-based principal components regression method, we examined genetic variations of 26 genes on the pathways in 1317 Chinese Han participants. Consistent with previous studies, we found that the genetic variations of the SLC6A4 gene and the COMT gene were associated with the framing effect. More importantly, we demonstrated that the genetic variations of the aromatic-L-amino-acid decarboxylase (DDC) gene, which is involved in the synthesis of both dopamine and serotonin, contributed to individual differences in the susceptibility to framing. Our findings shed light on the understanding of the genetic basis of affective decision-making.

Age, Loss Minimization, and the Role of Probability for Decision-Making

BACKGROUND

Older adults are stereotypically considered to be risk averse compared to younger age groups, although meta-analyses on age and the influence of gain/loss framing on risky choices have not found empirical evidence for age differences in risk-taking.

OBJECTIVE

The current study extends the investigation of age differences in risk preference by including analyses on the effect of the probability of a risky option on choices in gain versus loss situations.

METHODS

Participants (n = 130 adults aged 19-80 years) chose between a certain option and a risky option of varying probability in gain- and loss-framed gambles with actual monetary outcomes.

RESULTS

Only younger adults displayed an overall framing effect. Younger and older adults responded differently to probability fluctuations depending on the framing condition. Older adults were more likely to choose the risky option as the likelihood of avoiding a larger loss increased and as the likelihood of a larger gain decreased. Younger adults responded with the opposite pattern: they were more likely to choose the risky option as the likelihood of a larger gain increased and as the likelihood of avoiding a (slightly) larger loss decreased.

CONCLUSION

Results suggest that older adults are more willing to select a risky option when it increases the likelihood that larger losses be avoided, whereas younger adults are more willing to select a risky option when it allows for slightly larger gains. This finding supports expectations based on theoretical accounts of goal orientation shifting away from securing gains in younger adulthood towards maintenance and avoiding losses in older adulthood. Findings are also discussed in respect to the affective enhancement perspective and socioemotional selectivity theory.

A Meta-Analytic Re-Appraisal of the Framing Effect

Abstract. We reevaluated and reanalyzed the data of Kühberger’s (1998) meta-analysis on framing effects in risky decision making by using p-curve. This method uses the distribution of only significant p-values to correct the effect size, thus taking publication bias into account. We found a corrected overall effect size of d = 0.52, which is considerably higher than the effect reported by Kühberger (d = 0.31). Similarly to the original analysis, most moderators proved to be effective, indicating that there is not the risky-choice framing effect. Rather, the effect size varies with different manipulations of the framing task. Taken together, the p-curve analysis shows that there are reliable risky-choice framing effects, and that there is no evidence of intense p-hacking. Comparing the corrected estimate to the effect size reported in the Many Labs Replication Project (MLRP) on gain-loss framing (d = 0.60) shows that the two estimates are surprisingly similar in size. Finally, we conducted a new meta-analysis of risk framing experiments published in 2016 and again found a similar effect size (d = 0.56). Thus, although there is discussion on the adequate explanation for framing effects, there is no doubt about their existence: risky-choice framing effects are highly reliable and robust. No replicability crisis there.

Overdistribution illusions: Categorical judgments produce them, confidence ratings reduce them

Overdistribution is a form of memory distortion in which an event is remembered as belonging to too many episodic states, states that are logically or empirically incompatible with each other. We investigated a response formatting method of suppressing 2 basic types of overdistribution, disjunction and conjunction illusions, which parallel some classic illusions in the judgment and decision making literature. In this method, subjects respond to memory probes by rating their confidence that test cues belong to specific episodic states (e.g., presented on List 1, presented on List 2), rather than by making the usual categorical judgments about those states. The central prediction, which was derived from the task calibration principle of fuzzy-trace theory, was that confidence ratings should reduce overdistribution by diminishing subjects' reliance on noncompensatory gist memories. The data of 3 experiments agreed with that prediction. In Experiment 1, there were reliable disjunction illusions with categorical judgments but not with confidence ratings. In Experiment 2, both response formats produced reliable disjunction illusions, but those for confidence ratings were much smaller than those for categorical judgments. In Experiment 3, there were reliable conjunction illusions with categorical judgments but not with confidence ratings. Apropos of recent controversies over confidence-accuracy correlations in memory, such correlations were positive for hits, negative for correct rejections, and the 2 types of correlations were of equal magnitude. (PsycINFO Database Record

Immorally obtained principal increases investors' risk preference

Capital derived from immoral sources is increasingly circulated in today’s financial markets. The moral associations of capital are important, although their impact on investment remains unknown. This research aims to explore the influence of principal source morality on investors’ risk preferences. Three studies were conducted in this regard. Study 1 finds that investors are more risk-seeking when their principal is earned immorally (through lying), whereas their risk preferences do not change when they invest money earned from neutral sources after engaging in immoral behavior. Study 2 reveals that guilt fully mediates the relationship between principal source morality and investors’ risk preferences. Studies 3a and 3b introduce a new immoral principal source and a new manipulation method to improve external validity. Guilt is shown to the decrease the subjective value of morally flawed principal, leading to higher risk preference. The findings show the influence of morality-related features of principal on people’s investment behavior and further support mental account theory. The results also predict the potential threats of “grey principal” to market stability.

High But Not Low Probability of Gain Elicits a Positive Feeling Leading to the Framing Effect

Human risky decision-making is known to be highly susceptible to profit-motivated responses elicited by the way in which options are framed. In fact, studies investigating the framing effect have shown that the choice between sure and risky options depends on how these options are presented. Interestingly, the probability of gain of the risky option has been highlighted as one of the main factors causing variations in susceptibility to the framing effect. However, while it has been shown that high probabilities of gain of the risky option systematically lead to framing bias, questions remain about the influence of low probabilities of gain. Therefore, the first aim of this paper was to clarify the respective roles of high and low probabilities of gain in the framing effect. Due to the difference between studies using a within- or between-subjects design, we conducted a first study investigating the respective roles of these designs. For both designs, we showed that trials with a high probability of gain led to the framing effect whereas those with a low probability did not. Second, as emotions are known to play a key role in the framing effect, we sought to determine whether they are responsible for such a debiasing effect of the low probability of gain. Our second study thus investigated the relationship between emotion and the framing effect depending on high and low probabilities. Our results revealed that positive emotion was related to risk-seeking in the loss frame, but only for trials with a high probability of gain. Taken together, these results support the interpretation that low probabilities of gain suppress the framing effect because they prevent the positive emotion of gain anticipation.

The effects of surrounding positive and negative experiences on risk taking

Two experiments explored how the context of recently experiencing an abundance of positive or negative outcomes within a series of choices influences risk preferences. In each experiment, choices were made between a series of pairs of hypothetical 50/50 two-outcome gambles. Participants experienced a control set of mixed outcome gamble pairs intermingled with a randomly assigned set of (a) all-gain, (b) all-loss, or (c) a mixture of all-gain and all-loss gamble pairs. In both experiments, a positive experience led to reduced risk taking in the control set and a negative experience led to increased risk taking. These patterns persisted even after the all-gain and all-loss gamble pairs were no longer present. In addition, we showed that the good luck attributed to positive experiences was associated with decreased, rather than increased, risk taking. These results ran counter to the house money effect, and could not readily be accounted for by changes in assets. We suggest that the goals associated with the predominant valence are likely to be assimilated and applied to other choices within a given situation. We also discuss the need to learn more about the characteristics of choice bracketing and mental accounting that influence which aspects of situational context will be included or excluded from consideration when making each choice.