The Semiotics of Death and its Medical Implications

Death as the Cessation of an Organism and the Moral Status Alternative

The mainstream concept of death-the biological one-identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death-one similar to that of Robert Veatch-overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies death with the irreversible cessation of a patient's moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch's original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status.

The ethics of semantics in medicine

In this paper, we discuss the largely neglected topic of semantics in medicine and the associated ethical issues. We analyse several key medical terms from the informed perspective of the healthcare professional, the lay perspective of the patient and the patient's family, and the descriptive perspective of what the term actually signifies objectively. The choice of a particular medical term may deliver different meanings when viewed from these differing perspectives. Consequently, several ethical issues may arise. Technical terms that are not commonly understood by lay people may be used by physicians, consciously or not, and may obscure the understanding of the situation by lay people. The choice of particular medical terms may be accidental use of jargon, an attempt to ease the communication of psychologically difficult information, or an attempt to justify a preferred course of action and/or to manipulate the decision-making process.

How many ways can you die? Multiple biological deaths as a consequence of the multiple concepts of an organism

According to the mainstream position in the bioethical definition of death debate, death is to be equated with the cessation of an organism. Given such a perspective, some bioethicists uphold the position that brain-dead patients are dead, while others claim that they are alive. Regardless of the specific opinion on the status of brain-dead patients, the mere bioethical concept of death, according to many bioethicists, has the merit of being unanimous and univocal, as well as grounded in biology. In the present article, we challenge such a thesis. We provide evidence that theoretical biology operates with a plurality of equally valid organismic concepts, which imply different conclusions regarding the organismal status of a brain-dead patient. Moreover, the theoretical biology concepts of an organism are very distant from the view on an organism that appears by way of bioethicists theorizing on death. We conclude that if death is to be understood as the cessation of an organism, there is no single correct answer to the question of whether a brain-dead patient is alive or dead.

Diagnosing death: the "fuzzy area" between life and decomposition

This paper aims to determine whether it is necessary to propose the extreme of putrefaction as the only unmistakable sign in diagnosing the death of the human organism, as David Oderberg does in a recent paper. To that end, we compare Oderberg's claims to those of other authors who align with him in espousing the so-called theory of hylomorphism but who defend either a neurological or a circulatory-respiratory criterion for death. We then establish which interpretation of biological phenomena is the most reasonable within the metaphysical framework of hylomorphism. In this regard, we hold that technology does not obscure the difference between life and death or confect metaphysically anomalous beings, such as living human bodies who are not organisms or animals of the human species who are informed by a vegetative soul, but instead demands a closer and more careful look at the "fuzzy area" between a healthy (living) organism and a decaying corpse. In the light of hylomorphism, we conclude that neurological and circulatory-respiratory criteria are not good instruments for diagnosing death, since they can offer only probabilistic prognoses of death. Of the two, brain death is further away from the moment of death as it merely predicts cardiac arrest that will likely result in death. Putrefaction, the criterion that Oderberg proposes, is at the opposite end of the fuzzy area. This is undoubtedly a true diagnosis of death, but it is not necessary to wait for putrefaction proper-a relatively late stage of decomposition-to be sure that death has already occurred. Rather, early cadaveric phenomena demonstrate that the matter composing a body is subject to the basic forces governing all matter in its environment and has thus succumbed to the universal current of entropy, meaning that the entropy-resisting activity has ceased to constitute an organismal unity. When this unity is lost, there is no possibility of return.

The Organism as a Whole in an Analysis of Death

Although death statutes permitting physicians to declare brain death are relatively uniform throughout the United States, academic debate persists over the equivalency of human death and brain death. Alan Shewmon showed that the formerly accepted integration rationale was conceptually incomplete by showing that brain-dead patients demonstrated a degree of integration. We provide a more complete rationale for the equivalency of human death and brain death by defending a deeper understanding of the organism as a whole (OaaW) and by using a novel strategy with shared objectives to justify death determination criteria. Our OaaW account describes different types of OaaW, defining human death as the loss of status as a human OaaW. We defend human death as similar to nonhuman death in terms of wakefulness, but also distinct in terms of the sui generis properties, particularly conscious awareness. We thereby defend the equivalency of brain death and human death using a resulting neurocentric rationale.

Death, unity, and the brain

The dead donor rule holds that removing organs from living human beings without their consent is wrongful killing. The rule still prevails in most countries, and I assume it without argument in order to pose the question: is it possible to have a metaphysically correct, clinically relevant analysis of human death that makes organ donation ethically permissible? I argue that the two dominant criteria of death-brain death and circulatory death-are both empirically and metaphysically inadequate as definitions of human death and therefore hold no epistemic value in themselves. I first set out a neo-Aristotelian theory of death as separation of soul (understood as organising principle) and body, which is then fleshed out as loss of organismic integrity. The brain and circulatory criteria are shown to have severe weaknesses as physiological manifestations of loss of integrity. Given the mismatch between what death is, metaphysically speaking, and the dominant criteria accepted by clinicians and philosophers, it turns out that only actual bodily decomposition is a sure sign of death. In this I differ from Alan Shewmon, whose important work I discuss in detail.

Whither brain death?

The publicity surrounding the recent McMath and Muñoz cases has rekindled public interest in brain death: the familiar term for human death determination by showing the irreversible cessation of clinical brain functions. The concept of brain death was developed decades ago to permit withdrawal of therapy in hopeless cases and to permit organ donation. It has become widely established medical practice, and laws permit it in all U.S. jurisdictions. Brain death has a biophilosophical justification as a standard for determining human death but remains poorly understood by the public and by health professionals. The current controversies over brain death are largely restricted to the academy, but some practitioners express ambivalence over whether brain death is equivalent to human death. Brain death remains an accepted and sound concept, but more work is necessary to establish its biophilosophical justification and to educate health professionals and the public.

One or two types of death? Attitudes of health professionals towards brain death and donation after circulatory death in three countries

This study examined health professionals' (HPs) experience, beliefs and attitudes towards brain death (BD) and two types of donation after circulatory death (DCD)--controlled and uncontrolled DCD. Five hundred and eighty-seven HPs likely to be involved in the process of organ procurement were interviewed in 14 hospitals with transplant programs in France, Spain and the US. Three potential donation scenarios--BD, uncontrolled DCD and controlled DCD--were presented to study subjects during individual face-to-face interviews. Our study has two main findings: (1) In the context of organ procurement, HPs believe that BD is a more reliable standard for determining death than circulatory death, and (2) While the vast majority of HPs consider it morally acceptable to retrieve organs from brain-dead donors, retrieving organs from DCD patients is much more controversial. We offer the following possible explanations. DCD introduces new conditions that deviate from standard medical practice, allow procurement of organs when donors' loss of circulatory function could be reversed, and raises questions about "death" as a unified concept. Our results suggest that, for many HPs, these concerns seem related in part to the fact that a rigorous brain examination is neither clinically performed nor legally required in DCD. Their discomfort could also come from a belief that irreversible loss of circulatory function has not been adequately demonstrated. If DCD protocols are to achieve their full potential for increasing organ supply, the sources of HPs' discomfort must be further identified and addressed.

The definition and criterion of death

The definition and criterion of death have been rendered ambiguous by developments in organ support technology, particularly the positive-pressure ventilator and vasopressor medications, that uncouple the unitary loss of vital functions in death and create cases in which the brain has been destroyed while circulation and ventilation can be supported. Developing a biophilosophic analysis of the meaning of death before physicians can declare it requires four sequential steps: (1) agreement on the paradigm conditions that frame the analysis and clarify the task; (2) identifying the definition of death, which makes explicit the meaning of death that is accepted in our consensual usage of the term but that has become obscured by technology; (3) identifying the criterion of death that shows that the definition has been fulfilled, and that can be incorporated into a death statute; and (4) devising bedside tests of death for physicians to perform to satisfy the criterion. Although there is a strong consensus on death determination medical standards in countries around the world that has been enshrined into laws, and accepted by most societies and religions, there remains an active dispute among scholars on the precise definition and criterion of death.

Organ and Tissue Donation and Transplantation

Since 1968, vital organs, necessary for life, have been removed from patients for transplantation into patients in whom corresponding organs have ceased to function. Since then this has been morally justified by the claim that the donor is “brain dead” or has suffered “cardiac death.” Brain death is defined as complete and irreversible loss of all brain function, and cardiac death is declared two to five minutes after cessation of the heartbeat.

The moral problem is that the criteria used to declare that brain death or cardiac death has occurred are arbitrary, open to serious world-wide debate, variable in definition and application, and, more seriously, do not necessarily provide moral certainty that real death has occurred and that such organ retrieval does not actually cause the death of the donor.

This problem has been debated over the years at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and remains a subject of legitimate debate to this day. The declaration of brain death or cardiac death also does not appear to be consistent with the teaching of Pope Benedict XVI that the definition of death receive the consensus of the entire scientific community and does not give everyone certainty that the primary criterion is respect for the life of the donor and that the organs are removed from a dead body, a cadaver.

The Death of a Person

Drawing upon Lynne Baker's idea of the person derivatively possessing the properties of a constituting organism, I argue that even if persons aren't identical to living organisms, they can each literally die a biological death. Thus we can accept that we're not essentially organisms and can still die without having to admit that there are two concepts and criteria of death as Jeff McMahan and Robert Veatch do. Furthermore, we can accept James Bernat's definition of "death" without having to insist, as he does, that persons are identical to organisms or that persons can only die metaphorical deaths.

The whole-brain concept of death remains optimum public policy

The definition of death is one of the oldest and most enduring problems in biophilosophy and bioethics. Serious controversies over formally defining death began with the invention of the positive-pressure mechanical ventilator in the 1950s. For the first time, physicians could maintain ventilation and, hence, circulation on patients who had sustained what had been previously lethal brain damage. Prior to the development of mechanical ventilators, brain injuries severe enough to induce apnea quickly progressed to cardiac arrest from hypoxemia. Before the 1950s, the loss of spontaneous breathing and heartbeat (“vital functions”) were perfect predictors of death because the functioning of the brain and of all other organs ceased rapidly and nearly simultaneously thereafter, producing a unitary death phenomenon. In the pretechnological era, physicians and philosophers did not have to consider whether a human being who had lost certain “vital functions” but had retained others was alive, because such cases were technically impossible.

Science and society: death, unconsciousness and the brain

The concept of death has evolved as technology has progressed. This has forced medicine and society to redefine its ancient cardiorespiratory centred diagnosis to a neurocentric diagnosis of death. The apparent consensus about the definition of death has not yet appeased all controversy. Ethical, moral and religious concerns continue to surface and include a prevailing malaise about possible expansions of the definition of death to encompass the vegetative state or about the feared bias of formulating criteria so as to facilitate organ transplantation.

The concept and practice of brain death

Brain death, the colloquial term for the determination of human death by showing the irreversible cessation of the clinical functions of the brain, has been practiced since the 1960s and is growing in acceptance throughout the world. Of the three concepts of brain death--the whole-brain formulation, the brain stem formulation, and the higher brain formulation--the whole-brain formulation is accepted and practiced most widely. There is a rigorous conceptual basis for regarding whole-brain death as human death based on the biophilosophical concept of the loss of the organism as a whole. The diagnosis of brain death is primarily a clinical determination but laboratory tests showing the cessation of intracranial blood flow can be used to confirm the clinical diagnosis in cases in which the clinical tests cannot be fully performed or correctly interpreted. Because of evidence that some physicians fail to perform or record brain death tests properly, it is desirable to require a confirmatory test when inadequately experienced physicians conduct brain death determinations. The world's principal religions accept brain death with a few exceptions. Several scholars continue to reject brain death on conceptual grounds and urge that human death determination be based on the irreversible cessation of circulation. But despite the force of their arguments they have neither persuaded any jurisdictions to abandon brain death statutes nor convinced medical groups to change clinical practice guidelines. Other scholars who, on more pragmatic grounds, have called for the abandonment of brain death as an anachronism or an unnecessary prerequisite for multi-organ procurement, similarly have not convinced public policy makers to withdraw the dead-donor rule. Despite a few residual areas of controversy, brain death is a durable concept that has been accepted well and has formed the basis of successful public policy in diverse societies throughout the world.