I just lost it! Fear and anger reduce the sense of agency: a study using intentional binding

Arousal, interindividual differences and temporal binding a psychophysiological study

The sense of agency varies as a function of arousal in negative emotional contexts. As yet, it is unknown whether the same is true for positive affect, and how inter-individual characteristics might predict these effects. Temporal binding, an implicit measure of the sense of agency, was measured in 59 participants before and after watching either an emotionally neutral film clip or a positive film clip with high or low arousal. Analyses included participants' individual differences in subjective affective ratings, physiological arousal (pupillometry, skin conductance, heart rate), striatal dopamine levels via eye blink rates, and psychopathy. Linear mixed models showed that sexual arousal decreased temporal binding whereas calm pleasure had no facilitation effect on binding. Striatal dopamine levels were positively linked whereas subjective and physiological arousal may be negatively associated with binding towards actions. Psychopathic traits reduced the effect of high arousal on binding towards actions. These results provide evidence that individual differences influence the extent to which the temporal binding is affected by high arousing states with positive valence.

Novel five-phase model for understanding the nature of misophonia, a conditioned aversive reflex disorder

Background: Misophonia is a recently identified condition in which a person perceives a subtle stimulus (e.g., eating sounds, hair twirling) and has an intense, negative emotional response. Misophonia cannot be classified with established nosological systems. Methods: We present a novel five-phase model of misophonia from a cognitive-behavioral framework. This model identifies a learned reflex of the autonomic nervous system as the primary etiology and maintenance of misophonia. Phase one is anticipatory anxiety and avoidance. Phase two is a conditioned physical reflex (for example, the tensing of calf muscles) that develops through stimulus-response Pavlovian conditioning. Phase three includes intense negative emotional responses and accompanying physiological distress, thoughts, urges, and emotion-driven behavior. Phase four is the individual's coping responses to emotional distress, and phase five is the environmental response and resulting internal and external consequences of the coping behaviors. Each phase helps explain the maintenance of the response and the individual's impairment. Results: Anticipatory anxiety and avoidance of phase one contributes to an increased arousal and awareness of triggers, resulting in increased severity of the trigger experience. Both the Pavlovian-conditioned physical reflex of phase two and the emotion-driven behavior caused by the conditioned emotional response of phase three increase with in vivo exposure to triggers. Phase four includes internal and external coping behaviors to the intense emotions and distress, and phase five includes the consequences of those behaviors. Internal consequences include beliefs fiveand new emotions based on environmental responses to anger and panic. For example, the development of emotions such as shame and guilt, and beliefs regarding how 'intolerable' the trigger is. Conclusions: We assert misophonia is a multi-sensory condition and includes anticipatory anxiety, conditioned physical reflexes, intense emotional and physical distress, subsequent internal and external responses, and environmental consequences.

Influence of voluntary action and outcome valence on the sense of agency

Recent studies have revealed that people might experience a lessened sense of agency for negative consequences by claiming that they were obeying orders. However, little is known about the cognitive neural mechanism behind the reduced sense of agency when individuals are forced to inflict physical harm on others. This study adopted temporal estimation tasks to investigate the internal mechanism of voluntary action on the sense of agency and the moderating effect of outcome valence as measured by event-related potentials (ERPs). In the temporal estimation task, participants were asked to make trade-offs of monetary gains for themselves against painful electric stimuli experienced by strangers, subjectively estimated the perceptual temporal interval between keypress actions (i.e., free or coercive actions) and consequent outcomes (i.e., positive or negative tones) and rated the feeling of control. The results showed that perceived temporal interval was shorter for positive tones compared with negative tones in the coercive condition, and induced more negative N1 and N300 amplitudes, which indicated that the implicit sense of agency was higher. However, the explicit sense of agency was stronger in the free condition than in the coercive condition, which was not influenced by outcome valence. We discuss the implications of utilizing positive feedback and free choice as significant strategies for those experiencing the abnormal sense of agency.

Attention and expectation likely underlie temporal binding measured using the Libet Clock

An interesting finding that has emerged in studies of the sense of agency is that of a perceived compression of the temporal interval between actions and the outcomes they produce. This is generally referred to as temporal binding. Although temporal binding has been studied using various paradigms, possibly the most popular of these is the Libet Clock task. The Libet task is also interesting because it suggests that temporal binding can be decomposed into two components, one purportedly relating to actions and the other relating to outcomes. These are termed action binding and outcome binding, respectively. In this article, I focus specifically on temporal binding revealed using the Libet Clock task and propose the idea that attention underpins the action binding effect, while outcome binding, on the other hand, is driven by the effects of expectation.

Non-contingent affective outcomes influence judgments of control

Our main goal in these experiments was to examine whether affective valence plays a role in judgments of control (JoC) in intentional action. To test this, we asked participants to completevariationsofasimple aiming task in which words appeared in place of clicked targets. The affective content of the words was manipulated during the experiments but was not contingent on participants' performance. Throughout the task, participants were periodically asked to judge their JoC.Thus, JoC judgments in this task included contributions of a well-established cue to judgments of control, task performance, and a source of affect that was not related to task performance. We found thatmetacognitions of controlvaried consistentlyacross levels of affect, with stronger judgments of being in control for conditions with positive outcome words (e.g., 'puppy') and the weaker judgments of being in control for conditions with negative outcome words (e.g.,'killer').These results suggestaffective outcomes can influence JoC, even though the outcomes are not related to performance.

Consensus on Feedback Statements That Create Responsibility Among People With Parkinson's Disease: A Delphi Study

IMPORTANCE

Sense of agency is associated with a sense of responsibility, which is essential to performing goal-directed occupations.

OBJECTIVE

To reach consensus on a set of extrinsic feedback statements that have the potential to create a sense of responsibility among patients with neurological disorders in the course of performing daily or social occupations.

DESIGN

Anonymous Delphi study with two rounds with international experts and one round with Irani patients with Parkinson's disease (PD).

SETTING

Electronic survey.

PARTICIPANTS

One hundred experts and 73 patients with idiopathic PD.

OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Experts and patients anonymously rated (5 = strongly agree/very effective, 4 = agree/effective, 3 = neither agree nor disagree/uncertain, 2 = disagree/ineffective, 1 = strongly disagree/very ineffective) their level of agreement with each survey statement and the effectiveness of each statement in creating a sense of responsibility in the course of performing daily or social occupations. Consensus was set as an interquartile range of ≤1 and ≥70% agreement in two adjacent categories of a Likert scale.

RESULTS

In the experts' first round, consensus was reached on the level of agreement and effectiveness of 18 statements. In the second round, final consensus was achieved on all statements. In the one patient round, patients reached consensus on all statements. Finally, 34 statements were rated as 4 or 5 in terms of agreement and effectiveness, based on the opinions of experts and patients.

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE

This study has produced a collection of feedback statements that might be useful in occupation-based interventions. What This Article Adds: Extrinsic responsibility feedback delivered while administering occupation-based interventions may increase volition, motivation, and engagement.

Vicarious ostracism reduces observers' sense of agency

Previous findings revealed that social ostracism reduces people's implicit sense of agency. Based on theoretical claims that observed behavior of others may be cognitively represented similarly to one's own behavior, we conducted two experiments to test whether people's own sense of agency can also be impaired by observed social exclusion of others. In Experiment 1, participants recalled episodes referring to vicarious ostracism or inclusion before completing a temporal interval estimation task to assess intentional binding effects (an established implicit measure of the sense of agency). In Experiment 2, participants immersed into a newly designed virtual Cyberball game, in which they witnessed a vicarious ostracism or inclusion scenario, before completing a Libet-style temporal estimation task and an agency questionnaire (an explicit measure of the sense of agency). The findings show, for the first time, that vicarious ostracism reduces both implicit and explicit measures of agency in observers.

The sense of agency for brain disorders: A comprehensive review and proposed framework

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of control over voluntary actions and the outcomes of those actions. Several brain disorders are characterized by an abnormal SoA. To date, there is no robust treatment for aberrant agency across disorders; this is, in large part, due to gaps in our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural correlates of the SoA. This apparent gap stems from a lack of synthesis in established findings. As such, the current review reconciles previously established findings into a novel neurocognitive framework for future investigations of the SoA in brain disorders, which we term the Agency in Brain Disorders Framework (ABDF). In doing so, we highlight key top-down and bottom-up cues that contribute to agency prospectively (i.e., prior to action execution) and retrospectively (i.e., after action execution). We then examine brain disorders, including schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders (ASD), obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD), and cortico-basal syndrome (CBS), within the ABDF, to demonstrate its potential utility in investigating neurocognitive mechanisms underlying phenotypically variable presentations of the SoA in brain disorders.

Non-political anger shifts political preferences towards stronger leaders

Past research has shown that anger is associated with support for confrontational and punitive responses during crises, and notably with the endorsement of authoritarian ideologies. One important question is whether it is anger generated specifically in a political context that explains the association between anger and specific political preferences or whether any feeling of anger would be associated with changes in political attitudes. Here, we tested the effect of non-politically motivated incidental anger on the preference for strong leaders. In line with past research, we predicted that anger would increase preferences for strong leaders. Across two experiments, we exposed participants to an anger induction task. Before and after this experimental manipulation, we measured participants' political leader preferences by asking them to choose between the faces of two leaders they would vote for in a hypothetical election. The level of self-reported anger predicted the probability of choosing more dominant-looking and less trustworthy-looking leaders after the induction, suggesting that even non-political incidental anger increases preferences for strong leaders.

Sense of agency during and following recovery from anorexia nervosa

The need to feel in control is central to anorexia nervosa (AN). The sense of control in AN has only been studied through self-report. This study investigated whether implicit sense of control (sense of agency; SoA) differs across AN patients, recovered AN (RAN) patients and healthy controls (HC). Furthermore, we assessed whether state anxiety is influenced by negative emotional states. SoA was measured with the intentional binding task (IB) and state-anxiety levels through a questionnaire. We did not find any evidence of differences in SoA between groups. Furthermore, state anxiety was not a significant predictor of SoA. Further research into SoA in AN should focus on other features of the SoA that are not targeted by the IB task.

How Positive and Negative Emotions Promote Ritualistic Consumption Through Different Mechanisms

Ritualistic consumption refers to integrating ritual elements into the process of product design and usage. By conducting three studies, we find that ritualistic consumption can offer new and interesting experiences and help consumers gain a sense of control. Both positive and negative emotions can promote ritualistic consumption tendencies. However, their underlying psychological mechanisms are different. Specifically, positive emotion can arouse consumers’ desire for interesting experience and thus promotes their preference for ritualistic consumption, while negative emotion can arouse consumers’ need for control and thus promote their preference for ritualistic consumption. Our research results offer a theoretical contribution and practical inspiration for emotional marketing.

Belief in control: Voluntary choice enhances subsequent task performance under undefeated choice-outcome causation

Humans have volition through which they act upon and change the external environment. As an exercise of volition, making a voluntary choice facilitates subsequent behavioral performance relative to making a forced choice. However, it is unclear how this facilitation is constrained by the perceived relationship between a choice and its outcome. In a series of experiments, participants were free or forced to choose one of two presented pictures. The outcome of the choice was then revealed, which could be: always the chosen picture or always the unchosen picture (i.e., confirmed choice-outcome causation), a blank screen with no picture at all (i.e., unrevealed choice-outcome relation), the chosen or unchosen picture with equal probability (i.e., defeated choice-outcome causation), or a third picture different from the two preceding options (again, defeated choice-outcome causation). Participants then complete a visual search task with the task-irrelevant picture (or the blank screen) serving as a background. Results showed that search performance was improved after a voluntary choice under both confirmed causation and unrevealed relation, but not under defeated causation. Over individuals, the improved performance due to voluntary choice under confirmed causation positively correlated with the improved performance under unrevealed relation, and with reported belief in controlling the outcome of the choice. Our findings suggest that the exercise of volition motivates subsequent behavior, and this motivation is restricted to "undefeated" choice-outcome causation which affords a belief in controlling the outcome by exerting volition.

Motivation(s) from control: response-effect contingency and confirmation of sensorimotor predictions reinforce different levels of selection

Humans and other animals live in dynamic environments. To reliably manipulate the environment and attain their goals they would benefit from a constant modification of motor-responding based on responses' current effect on the current environment. It is argued that this is exactly what is achieved by a mechanism that reinforces responses which have led to accurate sensorimotor predictions. We further show that evaluations of a response's effectiveness can occur simultaneously, driven by at least two different processes, each relying on different statistical properties of the feedback and affecting a different level of responding. Specifically, we show the continuous effect of (a) a sensorimotor process sensitive only to the conditional probability of effects given that the agent acted on the environment (i.e., action-effects) and of (b) a more abstract judgement or inference that is also sensitive to the conditional probabilities of occurrence of feedback given no action by the agent (i.e., inaction-effects). The latter process seems to guide action selection (e.g., should I act?) while the former the manner of the action's execution. This study is the first to show that different evaluation processes of a response's effectiveness influence different levels of responding.

The obedient mind and the volitional brain: A neural basis for preserved sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion

Milgram’s classical studies famously suggested a widespread willingness to obey authority, even to the point of inflicting harm. Important situational factors supporting obedience, such as proximity with the victim, have been established. Relatively little work has focused on how coercion affects individual cognition, or on identifying the cognitive factors that underlie inter-individual differences in the tendency to yield to coercion. Here, we used fMRI to investigate the neural systems associated with changes in volitional processes associated with sense of agency and sense of responsibility under coercion. Participants either freely chose, or were instructed by the experimenter, to give mildly painful electric shocks to another participant, or to refrain from doing so. We have previously shown that coercion reduces temporal binding, which has been proposed as an implicit proxy measure of sense of agency. We tested how reduced agency under coercion related to differences in neural activity between free choice and coercion. In contrast to previous studies and to participants performing the task outside the MRI scanner, on average there was no effect of coercion on agency for participants in the scanner. However, greater activity in the medial frontal gyrus was reliably associated with greater agency under coercion. A similar association was found using explicit responsibility ratings. Our findings suggest that medial frontal processes, perhaps related to volition during action planning and execution, may help to preserve a sense of accountability under coercion. Further, participants who administered more shocks under free choice showed reduced activity during free choice trials in brain areas associated with social cognition. Possibly, this might reflect participants cognitively distancing themselves from the recipient of the shocks under free choice, whereas this was not observed under coercion.

The Interplay Between Affective Processing and Sense of Agency During Action Regulation: A Review

Sense of agency is the feeling of being in control of one's actions and their perceivable effects. Most previous research identified cognitive or sensory determinants of agency experience. However, it has been proposed that sense of agency is also bound to the processing of affective information. For example, during goal-directed actions or instrumental learning we often rely on positive feedback (e.g., rewards) or negative feedback (e.g., error messages) to determine our level of control over the current task. Nevertheless, we still lack a scientific model which adequately explains the relation between affective processing and sense of agency. In this article, we review current empirical findings on how affective information modulates agency experience, and, conversely, how sense of agency changes the processing of affective action outcomes. Furthermore, we discuss in how far agency-related changes in affective processing might influence the ability to enact cognitive control and action regulation during goal-directed behavior. A preliminary model is presented for describing the interplay between sense of agency, affective processing, and action regulation. We propose that affective processing could play a role in mediating the influence between subjective sense of agency and the objective ability to regulate one's behavior. Thus, determining the interrelation between affective processing and sense of agency will help us to understand the potential mechanistic basis of agency experience, as well as its functional significance for goal-directed behavior.

Exploring the relationship between perceived Action-Outcome distance and Agency: Evidence from temporal binding

Intentional actions are usually accompanied by a sense of agency (SoA), along with a perceived shortening of action-outcome intervals known as the intentional binding (IB) effect. This is at least partly associated with the perceived strength of action-outcome relationships, which have been described in terms of distance (e.g., a 'distancing effect'). Given that actions in the modern world are increasingly distant from their outcomes, the current study aimed to explore the effect of perceived spatial distance on the strength of IB. Participants voluntarily triggered, or passively observed, a circle on a background that was either flat or appeared three-dimensional, and estimated action-outcome delays. Depth cues modified the circle's perceived distance while the circle itself did not change. When viewed on a forced-perspective background, interval estimates increased with apparent distance, but only when outcomes were caused by intentional actions. This suggests that agency is reduced for outcomes that appear further away.

The influence of anger on empathy and theory of mind

Social cognition allows humans to understand and predict other people's behavior by inferring or sharing their emotions, intentions and beliefs. Few studies have investigated the impact of one's own emotional state on understanding others. Here, we tested the effect of being in an angry state on empathy and theory of mind (ToM). In a between-groups design we manipulated anger status with different paradigms in three studies (autobiographical recall (N = 45), negative feedback (N = 49), frustration (N = 46)) and checked how this manipulation affected empathic accuracy and performance in the EmpaToM. All paradigms were successful in inducing mild anger. We did not find the expected effect of anger on empathy or ToM performance but observed small behavioral changes. Together, our results validate the use of three different anger induction paradigms and speak for rather weak behavioral effects of mild state anger on empathy and ToM.

A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments

In the seminal Libet experiment (Libet et al., 1983), unconscious brain activity preceded the self-reported, conscious intention to move. This was repeatedly interpreted as challenging the view that (conscious) mental states cause behavior and, prominently, as challenging the existence of free will. Extensive discussions in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and jurisprudence followed, but further empirical findings were heterogeneous. However, a quantitative review of the literature summarizing the evidence of Libet-style experiments is lacking. The present meta-analysis fills this gap. The results revealed a temporal pattern that is largely consistent with the one found by Libet and colleagues. Remarkably, there were only k = 6 studies for the time difference between unconscious brain activity and the conscious intention to move - the most crucial time difference regarding implications about conscious causation and free will. Additionally, there was a high degree of uncertainty associated with this meta-analytic effect. We conclude that some of Libet et al.'s findings appear more fragile than anticipated in light of the substantial scientific work that built on them.

Deceleration Assistance Mitigated the Trade-off Between Sense of Agency and Driving Performance

Driving assistance technology has gained traction in recent years and is becoming more widely used in vehicles. However, drivers usually experience a reduced sense of agency when driving assistance is active even though automated assistance improves driving performance by reducing human error and ensuring quick reactions. The present study examined whether driving assistance can maintain human sense of agency during early deceleration in the face of collision risk, compared with manual deceleration. In the experimental task, participants decelerate their vehicle in a driving simulator to avoid collision with a vehicle that suddenly cut in front of them and decelerated. In the assisted condition, the system performed deceleration 100 ms after the cut-in. Participants were instructed to decelerate their vehicle and follow the vehicle that cut-in. This design ensured that the deceleration assistance applied a similar control to the vehicle as the drivers intended to, only faster and smoother. Participants rated their sense of agency and their driving performance. The results showed that drivers maintained their sense of agency and improved driving performance under driving assistance. The findings provided insights into designing driving assistance that can maintain drivers' sense of agency while improving future driving performance. It is important to establish a mode of joint-control in which the system shares the intention of human drivers and provides improved execution of control.

Nipped in the Bud: COVID-19 Reveals the Malleability of STEM Student Self-Efficacy

When a global pandemic hits during a longitudinal study of biology student success, researchers can unearth rich information about student resilience. By sharing case studies from two demographically different midsized 4-year institutions, this article illustrates the aspects of student self-efficacy beliefs that were undercut by the shift to emergency remote instruction (ERI) in introductory biology courses in Spring 2020: agency and belonging. By assessing student predictions of exam performance and analyzing themes from 276 student narrative surveys, we highlight the power of a careful balance between cognitive and social interventions to help students recover. Students in this study showed a 50% loss of efficacy beliefs after ERI (midsemester) but were able to improve to at least 75% above starting efficacy beliefs after instructor interventions. Thus, we also show how academic efficacy is highly malleable and is mediated in relationships. In turn, we demonstrate a new assessment model that uses student narrative writing to reveal "invisible" threats to students' perceptions of their capacity to succeed. Finally, we generalize from their findings to provide recommendations for effective strategies for supporting those students for whom every semester feels like a pandemic.

Intended emotions influence intentional binding with emotional faces: Larger binding for intended negative emotions

The effect of emotions on Intentional binding (IB) is equivocal. In addition, most studies on IB have not manipulated emotional content of intentions. This study investigates the effect of intended and outcome emotions using emotional faces (happy or disgust face in experiment 1 and a happy or angry face in experiment 3). To see whether the effects are due to priming, we used instructions with a happy-disgust pair in experiment 2 and happy-angry pair in experiment 4. Outcome emotional faces were not predictable. Results showed that intending a negative emotional face resulted in shorter action-outcome interval judgments compared to a happy face irrespective of the emotional content of the outcome face. This effect was absent in experiments 2 and 4 with instructed emotions. In addition to showing the importance of having explicit intentions, the results show that emotional content of our intentions does influence IB possibly due to prospective mechanisms.

Right parietotemporal activity predicts sense of agency under uncertain delays of sensory outcomes

Sense of agency is the experience of control over one's own action and its consequent outcomes. The perceived time between a motor action and its consequent sensory outcomes (e.g., a flash of light) is shorter for a voluntary than involuntary action, a phenomenon known as intentional binding, which has been used extensively as an implicit measure of sense of agency. We developed a novel task in which participants had to respond whether a flash appeared immediately or with a delay relative to their voluntary action. We found that under high, but not low, uncertainty about the perceived time between voluntary finger movement and a subsequent flash of light, a prediction signal was generated in the right inferior parietal lobule prior to motor action. This prediction signal was linked to the emergence of a sudden insight solution (colloquially referred to as "Aha!" moment) in the right superior temporal gyrus prior to response. Single-trial event-related potential analysis revealed a reliable correlation between amplitudes of premotor and preresponse activities. The results suggest the existence of a predictive mechanism under high uncertainty about the timing of the sensory consequences of a voluntary motor action. The results are in line with the optimal cue integration theory of sense of agency, which states that both predictive and postdictive agency cues are crucial for the formation of sense of agency and the weight of each type of cue (predictive or postdictive) depends on their availability and reliability.NEW & NOTEWORTHY According to the optimal cue integration theory, the formation of sense of agency relies on both predictive and postdictive agency cues and how they are weighted based on their availability and reliability. Using a novel paradigm, we show for the first time a possible existence of a prediction signal prior to voluntary movement, which appears when postdictive agency cues (i.e., the judgment of the time between voluntary movement and a subsequent flash) are not reliable.

Threats to epistemic agency in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs

A good therapeutic relationship in mental health services is a predictor of positive clinical outcomes for people who seek help for distressing experiences, such as voice hearing and paranoia. One factor that may affect the quality of the therapeutic relationship and raises further ethical issues is the impact of the clinical encounter on users' sense of self, and in particular on their sense of agency. In the paper, we discuss some of the reasons why the sense of epistemic agency may be especially fragile in young people with unusual experiences and beliefs. We argue that it is important to identify and avoid behaviours that can undermine young people's contributions as epistemic agents in the clinical encounter.

Influence of arousal on intentional binding: Impaired action binding, intact outcome binding

Emotional states have been indicated to affect intentional binding, resulting in an increase or decrease as a function of valence and arousal. Sexual arousal is a complex emotional state proven to impair attentional and perceptual processes, and is therefore highly relevant to feeling in control over one’s actions. We suggest that sexual arousal affects intentional binding in the same way as highly negative arousing states such as fear and anger. Ninety participants performed the intentional binding task before and after watching an either sexually arousing or emotionally neutral film clip. Analyses were conducted for the subcomponents action and outcome binding separately including the change in arousal before and after the emotion induction as a continuous measure. Results showed an interactive effect for time of measurement (before and after emotion induction) and arousal change on action binding: a decrease in action binding was noted in participants who reported to be more aroused and an increase in action binding was observed for participants who reported to be less aroused. Results emphasize that alterations in action binding are likely to reflect the deficits in the dopaminergic system involved in action execution. An impaired feeling of control in aroused states may play a crucial role for the underlying psychological mechanisms of impulsive violent behavior.

Feeling in Control: The Role of Cardiac Timing in the Sense of Agency

The sense of agency describes the experience of controlling one’s body to cause desired effects in the world. We explored whether this is influenced by interoceptive processes. Specifically, we investigated whether the sense of agency changes depending on where, in the cardiac cycle (systole or diastole), the action was executed and where the outcome of the action occurred. In two experiments, participants completed decision-making task to win/lose money. Explicit (ratings of control) and implicit (temporal judgement) measures of agency were differentially affected by cardiovascular state. Implicit agency scores were affected by the cardiac phase at the point of action execution. Explicit ratings of control were affected by the type of (free vs. instructed) and by outcome valence (win vs. lose). The time of the action was uniformly distributed across the cardiac cycle. These results show interoceptive impact on agency, but that cardiac cycle may affect explicit and implicit agency differently.

#lockdown: Network-Enhanced Emotional Profiling in the Time of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic forced countries all over the world to take unprecedented measures, like nationwide lockdowns. To adequately understand the emotional and social repercussions, a large-scale reconstruction of how people perceived these unexpected events is necessary but currently missing. We address this gap through social media by introducing MERCURIAL (Multi-layer Co-occurrence Networks for Emotional Profiling), a framework which exploits linguistic networks of words and hashtags to reconstruct social discourse describing real-world events. We use MERCURIAL to analyse 101,767 tweets from Italy, the first country to react to the COVID-19 threat with a nationwide lockdown. The data were collected between the 11th and 17th March, immediately after the announcement of the Italian lockdown and the WHO declaring COVID-19 a pandemic. Our analysis provides unique insights into the psychological burden of this crisis, focussing on—(i) the Italian official campaign for self-quarantine (#iorestoacasa), (ii) national lockdown (#italylockdown), and (iii) social denounce (#sciacalli). Our exploration unveils the emergence of complex emotional profiles, where anger and fear (towards political debates and socio-economic repercussions) coexisted with trust, solidarity, and hope (related to the institutions and local communities). We discuss our findings in relation to mental well-being issues and coping mechanisms, like instigation to violence, grieving, and solidarity. We argue that our framework represents an innovative thermometer of emotional status, a powerful tool for policy makers to quickly gauge feelings in massive audiences and devise appropriate responses based on cognitive data.

Time for Action: Verbal Action Cues Influence Temporal Binding

Prior research has shown that our perception of time is compressed when we volitionally perform actions, a phenomenon referred to as temporal binding. In three studies, we investigated the degree to which contextual cues that signaled other agents and related to actions would influence binding, given that those cues may affect individual's feelings of independent action performance. Participants heard action verbalizations that did or did not match actions that participants had already begun performing. Participants' time estimates of the intervals between action initiations and action effects were higher on trials in which they heard verbalizations that matched their ongoing actions, and lower on trials in which the verbalizations and actions did not match. Such effects did not occur when participants passively observed actions and effects being caused by the computer. These results show that the compatibility of action cues with ongoing actions influences temporal binding effects, suggesting that they influence our feelings of having been an independent agent.

The impact of eye contact on the sense of agency

Recent research suggests that eye contact can lead to enhanced self-awareness. A related phenomenon, the sense of agency deals with the notion of the self as the origin of our actions. Possible links between eye contact and agency have been so far neglected. Here, we investigated whether an implicit sense of agency could be modulated by eye gaze. We asked participants to respond (button press) to a face stimulus: looking or not at the participant (experiment 1); or displaying distinct eye gaze before or after a mask (experiment 2). After each trial, participants estimated the time between their key press and the ensuing effects. We found enhanced intentional binding for conditions that involved direct compared to averted gaze. This study supports the idea that eye contact is an important cue that affects complex cognitive processes and suggests that modulating self-processing can impact the sense of agency.

Compress global, dilate local: Intentional binding in action-outcome alternations

Intentional binding refers to subjective temporal attraction between an action and its outcome. However, the nature of intentional binding in multiple actions remains unclear. We examined intentional binding in alternated action-outcome dyads. Participants actively or passively pressed a key, followed by a tone, and they again pressed the key; resulting in four keypress-tone dyads in a trial. Participants reproduced the duration of alternated keypress-tone dyads or the temporal interval between a dyad embedded in the alternations. The reproduced duration was shorter in the active than in the passive condition, suggesting the intentional binding in action-outcome alternations. In contrast, the reproduced interval between a dyad was longer in the active condition and did not correlate with the reproduced duration. These results suggest that subjective time during actions relies not only on an internal clock but also on postdictive biases that are switched based on what we recall.