Is Disgust a Homogeneous Emotion?

Are Members of Political Out-Groups More Morally or Physically Disgusting?

Recent research has found that Americans are disgusted by anonymous members of their political out-group. Determining whether the disgust elicited by political out-group members is more physical or moral may contribute to the understating of what enables its elicitation and regulation. Building on research showing the experience of moral disgust involves relatively abstract construal and the experience of physical disgust involves relatively concrete construal, we predicted that disgust experienced toward political out-group members is more moral than physical. Two preregistered experiments (total N=854) found that (a) the effect of level of construal on the intensity of disgust from political out-group members is more similar to the effect of level of construal on moral disgust than on physical disgust, and (b) the appraisal underlying disgust from political out-group members involves more abstract than concrete construal, similar to moral disgust. We discuss implications of these findings for intergroup relations and emotion regulation.

Accuracy and Response Time for Modus Ponens Syllogisms Vary by Controversial Topic and Categorical Emotion

Researchers have documented differential effects of emotion on cognitive processes, debating whether emotion may increase or decrease the response time and accuracy of logical thinking. The current study proposed that differences may be due to variability occurring across topic and categorical emotions, such that assessment of several basic emotional responses in the context of performing logical reasoning tasks may provide an initial indication of these differences. Utilizing modus ponens syllogisms composed of controversial statements, the current study evoked a variety of emotional responses and tested the accuracy of participants' basic logical thinking. Results indicated that logical skills were largely preserved despite the topic and emotion, nonetheless, accuracy varied across syllogism type (controversial vs. control), with increased accuracy on controversial syllogisms. Syllogisms rated as evoking no emotion were answered more accurately than those that evoked any emotion, with disgust and anger associated with less accuracy than no emotion and gladness associated with increased accuracy. Response times also differed across syllogism type, emotion, and emotion intensity.

Can immorality be contracted? Appraisals of moral disgust and contamination fear

While extant research underlines the role of disgust in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) with contamination fear, less research attention has been devoted to moral disgust. This study endeavored to examine the types of appraisals that are elicited by moral disgust in comparison to core disgust, and to examine their associations with both contact and mental contamination symptoms. In a within-participants design, 148 undergraduate students were exposed to core disgust, moral disgust, and anxiety control elicitors via vignettes, and provided appraisal ratings of sympathetic magic, thought-action fusion and mental contamination, as well as compulsive urges. Measures of both contact and mental contamination symptoms were administered. Mixed modeling analyses indicated that core disgust and moral disgust elicitors both provoked greater appraisals of sympathetic magic and compulsive urges than anxiety control elicitors. Further, moral disgust elicitors elicited greater thought-action fusion and mental contamination appraisals than all other elicitors. Overall, these effects were greater in those with higher contamination fear. This study demonstrates how a range of contagion beliefs are evoked by the presence of 'moral contaminants', and that such beliefs are positively associated with contamination concerns. These results shed light on moral disgust as an important target in the treatment of contamination fear.

Expressions of moral disgust reflect both disgust and anger

ABSTRACTPeople often appear to conflate anger and disgust, seemingly using expressions of both emotions interchangeably in response to moral violations. Yet, anger and moral disgust differ in their antecedents and consequences. These empirical observations are associated with two broad theoretical perspectives: one describes expressions of moral disgust as metaphors for anger, whereas the other describes moral disgust as functionally distinct from anger. Both accounts have received empirical support from separate and seemingly inconsistent literatures. The present study seeks to resolve this inconsistency by focusing on the different ways moral emotions have been measured. We formalise three theoretical models of moral emotions: one in which expressions of disgust are purely associated with anger (but not physiological disgust), one in which disgust and anger are fully separated and have distinct functions, and an integrative model that accommodates both metaphorical use in language and distinctive function. We test these models on responses to moral violations (four studies; N = 1608). Our results suggest that moral disgust has distinct functions, but that expressions of moral disgust are sometimes used to convey moralistic anger. These findings have implications for the theoretical status and measurement of moral emotions.

Responses of the public towards the government in times of crisis

We experimentally investigate how and when the public responds to government actions during times of crisis. Public reactions are shown to follow different processes, depending on whether government performs in exemplary or unsatisfactory ways to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 'how' question is addressed by proposing that negative moral emotions mediate public reactions to bad government actions, and positive moral emotions mediate reactions to good government actions. Tests of mediation are conducted while taking into account attitudes and trust in the government as rival hypotheses. The 'when' question is studied by examining self-regulatory moderators governing the experience of moral emotions and their effects. These include conspiracy beliefs, political ideology, attachment coping styles and collective values. A total of 357 citizens of a representative sample of adult Norwegians were randomly assigned to two experimental groups and a control group, where complaining, putting pressure on the government and compliance to Covid-19 policies were dependent variables. The findings show that negative moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing badly on complaining and pressuring the government, with conspiracy beliefs moderating the experience of negative moral emotions and attachment coping moderating the effects of negative moral emotions. The results also show that positive moral emotions mediate the effects of government doing well on compliance with COVID-19 regulations, with political ideology moderating the experience of positive moral emotions and collective values moderating the effects of positive moral emotions.

Emotion Regulation by Psychological Distance and Level of Abstraction: Two Meta-Analyses

Self-reflection is suggested to attenuate feelings, yet researchers disagree on whether adopting a distant or near perspective, or processing the experience abstractly or concretely, is more effective. Given the relationship between psychological distance and level of abstraction, we suggest the "construal-matching hypothesis": Psychological distance and abstraction differently influence emotion intensity, depending on whether the emotion's appraisal involves low-level or high-level construal. Two meta-analyses tested the effects of psychological distance (k = 230) and level-of-abstraction (k = 98) manipulations on emotional experience. A distant perspective attenuated emotional experience (g = 0.52) but with weaker effects for high-level (g = 0.29; for example, self-conscious emotions) than low-level emotions (g= 0.64; for example, basic emotions). Level of abstraction only attenuated the experience of low-level emotions (g = 0.2) and showed a reverse (nonsignificant) effect for high-level emotions (g = -0.13). These results highlight differences between distancing and level-of-abstraction manipulations and the importance of considering the type of emotion experienced in emotion regulation.

Disgust uniquely predicts coping and interpersonal processes beyond anxiety and dysphoria in the context of naturalistic stressors

BACKGROUND

Disgust is theorized to serve a unique function of motivating avoidance of noxious stimuli and setting interpersonal boundaries to prevent contamination. Research has established the relevance of disgust to OCD, posttraumatic stress, and phobias, suggesting transdiagnostic features. However, research has not always accounted for overlap of disgust with other negative emotions, obscuring unique contributions. Moreover, studies have not disentangled between-person (mean levels) and within-person (state) effects. The present study examined within- and between-person relationships of disgust, anxiety, and dysphoria with responses to daily social stressors. We expected disgust would uniquely predict cognitive avoidance and boundary-setting interpersonal behavior.

METHOD

Individuals (N = 159) meeting ADIS-V anxiety/depressive disorder criteria (n = 55) and healthy controls (n = 104) completed online journals about naturalistic social stressors over five weeks (1,923 records), reporting disgust, anxiety, dysphoria, and responses to social stressors.

RESULTS

As expected, disgust uniquely predicted lower acceptance, greater thought suppression, greater self-assertion, and less prosocial behavior, above and beyond anxiety and dysphoria. Several disgust effects were present at both between- and within-person levels, suggesting the relevance of both mean disgust and state fluctuations.

CONCLUSIONS

Results demonstrate unique relevance of disgust for how individuals respond to social stressors.

The experience of disgust by nursing and midwifery students: An interpretative phenomenological approach study

Although disgust is recognized as a common and prominent emotion in healthcare, little is known about how healthcare professionals understand, experience and conceptualize disgust. The aim of the study was to gain an in-depth understanding of how nursing and midwifery students experience, understand and cope with disgust in their clinical work. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Six participants (all women: two nursing students, four midwifery students) from a university in the South of England were interviewed. Four superordinate themes with eight subthemes were identified. Overall, findings suggest that participants experience both moral and physical disgust; however, they find it difficult to talk about and use other terms to describe their experience. Findings are discussed through the lens of social identity theory, to understand the relevance of professional identity and how this might further maintain the disgust taboo. The strategies participants have developed in order to cope with disgust are explored and understood within the current healthcare climate. Future research should focus on ways of addressing the experience of disgust by healthcare professionals in order to improve the quality of care provided, especially in the climate of the COVID-19 crisis.

Cultivating Disgust: Prospects and Moral Implications

Is disgust morally valuable? The answer to that question turns, in large part, on what we can do to shape disgust for the better. But this cultivation question has received surprisingly little attention in philosophical debates. To address this deficiency, this article examines empirical work on disgust and emotion regulation. This research reveals that while we can exert some control over how we experience disgust, there’s little we can do to substantively change it at a more fundamental level. These empirical insights have revisionary implications both for debates about disgust’s moral value and for our understanding of agency and moral development more generally.

Disgust sensitivity mediates the link between homophobia and sexual orientation obsessive-compulsive symptoms

Previous research has shown that intrusive thoughts in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) often focus on emotionally significant aspects of individuals' lives (e.g., values and beliefs). The current study sought to expand our understanding of OC symptoms related to sexual orientation (SO-OC symptoms) by investigating the roles of homophobia (i.e., negative attitudes, affect, and behaviors toward individuals with a same-gender orientation) and disgust propensity and sensitivity. A total of 592 self-identified heterosexual college students were recruited to complete measures of homophobia, disgust propensity and sensitivity, and SO-OC symptoms. Results of separate parallel mediation analyses indicated that the relationships between homophobic affect/attitudes and avoidance/aggression on one hand, and SO-OC symptoms on the other, were partially mediated specifically by disgust sensitivity, after controlling for gender. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed, including how homophobia can be conceptualized as a disgust response in the treatment of SO-OC symptoms, as well as how other constructs of potential interest (sexual and moral disgust, religiosity, conservative sexual ideology) can be examined in future research.

PsychTable.org: A tool for biopolitical researchers, policymakers, and citizens

PsychTable.org is a new online, mass-collaborative tool for the social sciences that aggregates evidence for and classifies the evolved psychological adaptations (EPAs) that have been proposed to comprise the human mind. This article provides an overview of the need for this reference tool and how it can benefit researchers who incorporate the behavioral sciences into their work. The article walks the reader through a hypothetical use case for PsychTable.org and describes the features of the website. PsychTable.org is intended to help key stakeholders better understand the linkages between EPAs and political behavior, public policy, and ethics.

Development and psychometric evaluation of the colostomy disgust scale in patients with colostomy

OBJECTIVE

To establish and validate the Colostomy Disgust Scale (CDS) for assessing disgust in colostomy patients.

DESIGN

Triphasic, cross-sectional psychometric study.

SETTING

A total of 423 patients with colostomy (222 first samples and 201 s samples) were recruited from a tertiary hospital between January 2015 and April 2016.

METHODS

Three phases were undertaken: (a) item generation, (b) item selection and (c) evaluation and validation. The evaluation and validation of the CDS were performed through feasibility and initial item analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and internal consistency.

RESULTS

Following item generation and item selection, a 22-item CDS was generated. Principal axis factoring indicated a two-factor solution for the proposed CDS model, which was also verified by confirmatory factor analysis. Moreover, the proposed CDS had a high internal consistency.

CONCLUSION

The CDS is a self-report instrument with initial evidence for its validity and reliability. It is a promising tool to identify the triggers of disgust in colostomy contexts, which can be of great importance for promoting the mental health of colostomy patients.

Child Sexual Abuse and the Moralization of Purity

Recent studies were able to associate disgust with the moral domain of purity, as well as a heightened sensitivity to disgust with sexual victimization. However, no empirical evidence has yet to document the exact relation between sexual victimization and its impact on the moralization of purity. Therefore, the present study aimed to examine the relationship between child sexual abuse (CSA) and the moral domain of purity, by means of judgments toward three different types of disgust: pathogen, sexual and moral. To test this, The Three Domains of Disgust Scale (TDDS) was given to both CSA participants (n = 29) and to a non-sexually abused population (N-SAP; n = 31). . Results have shown a statistically significant difference between the CSA and N-SAP groups on the combined dependent variables (i.e., pathogen, sexual and moral disgust). However, only the sexual disgust domain, out of the other two domains has been found to hold significance. Furthermore, consistent with previous empirical findings, similar gender patterns of moral judgments have been found between the two groups (i.e., CSA and N-SAP), though with a statistical significance only in the sexual domain. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Disgust, Anger, and Aggression: Further Tests of the Equivalence of Moral Emotions

People often report disgust toward moral violations. Some perspectives posit that this disgust is indistinct from anger. Here, we replicate and extend recent work suggesting that disgust and anger toward moral violations are in fact distinct in terms of the situations in which they are activated and their correspondence with aggressive sentiments. We tested three hypotheses concerning emotional responses to moral violations: (1) disgust is associated with lower-cost, indirectly aggressive motives (e.g., gossip and social exclusion), whereas anger is associated with higher-cost, directly aggressive motives (e.g., physical violence); (2) disgust is higher toward violations affecting others than it is toward violations affecting the self, and anger is higher toward violations affecting the self than it is toward violations affecting others; and (3) abilities to inflict costs on or withhold benefits from others (measured via physical strength and physical attractiveness, respectively) relate to anger, but not to disgust. These hypotheses were tested in a within-subjects study in which 233 participants came to the lab twice and reported their emotional responses and aggressive sentiments toward self-targeting and other-targeting moral violations. Participants’ upper body strength and physical attractiveness were also measured with a dynamometer and photograph ratings, respectively. The first two hypotheses were supported – disgust (but not anger) was related to indirect aggression whereas anger (but not disgust) was related to direct aggression, and disgust was higher toward other-targeting violations whereas anger was higher toward self-targeting violations. However, physical strength and physical attractiveness were unrelated to anger or disgust or to endorsements of direct or indirect aggression.

Heteronormativity, Disgust Sensitivity, and Hostile Attitudes toward Gay Men: Potential Mechanisms to Maintain Social Hierarchies

Within a social hierarchy based on sexual orientation, heteronormative ideology serves as a social force that maintains dominant group members' status (e.g., heterosexual men). Disgust may be an emotional reaction to gay men's violation of heteronormativity (i.e., same-sex sexual behavior) and motivate hostile attitudes toward gay men to promote interpersonal and intergroup boundaries. Based on this theoretical framework, we hypothesized that sexual disgust-compared to pathogen or moral disgust-would be most strongly associated with antigay hostility and would statistically mediate its relationship with heteronormativity. Heterosexual men in the United States (n = 409) completed an online questionnaire assessing heteronormative ideology, disgust sensitivity, and hostile attitudes toward gay men. Results support the hypotheses and suggest that gay men's sexual behavior is the most likely elicitor of disgust and antigay hostility, as opposed to a perceived pathogen threat or moral transgression. The findings indicate that heteronormative attitudes and sexual disgust are likely contributors to antigay hostility. Thus, intervention efforts should seek to improve tolerance of same-sex sexual behavior among heterosexual men, which may mitigate emotional reactions and hostile attitudes toward gay men.

Self-reported and experimentally induced self-disgust is heightened in Parkinson's disease: Contribution of behavioural symptoms

Parkinson’s disease (PD) is associated with deficits in the recognition and expression of basic emotions, although self-reported levels of the self-conscious emotions shame and embarrassment are higher. However, one self-conscious emotion—self-disgust–which has been shown to have a negative impact on psychological wellbeing, has not been investigated in PD before. Here we employed self-report measures of self-conscious emotions, and an emotion induction paradigm involving images of the self, and narrated personal vignettes of instances when patients with PD (and controls) found themselves disgusting. We found that self-reported and induced levels of self-disgust were higher in PD patients than in matched controls, and that trait self-disgust was specifically related to disorders of impulse control in PD patients. Given the link between self-disgust and impaired psychological wellbeing, and the prevalence of anxiety and depression in PD, self-disgust might make a useful therapeutic target for psychological interventions in the condition.

Is Disgust a "Conservative" Emotion?

Extant political-psychological research has identified stable, context-independent differences between conservatives and liberals in a wide range of preferences and psychological processes. One consistent finding is that conservatives show higher disgust sensitivity than liberals. This finding, however, is predominantly based on assessments of disgust to specific elicitors, which confound individuals' sensitivity and propensity to the experience of disgust with the extent to which they find specific elicitors disgusting. Across five studies, we vary specific elicitors of disgust, showing that the relations between political orientation and disgust sensitivity depend on the specific set of elicitors used. We also show that disgust sensitivity is not associated with political orientation when measured with an elicitor-unspecific scale. Taken together, our findings suggest that the differences between conservatives and liberals in disgust sensitivity are context dependent rather than a stable personality difference. Broader theoretical implications are discussed.

A Proximal Perspective on Disgust

The functional basis of disgust in disease avoidance is widely accepted; however, there is disagreement over what disgust is. This is a significant problem, as basic questions about disgust require knowing if single/multiple forms/processes exist. We address this issue with a new model with one form of disgust generated by multiple processes: (a) pure disgust experienced during gastrointestinal illness; (b) somatosensory disgust elicited by specific cues that activate the pure disgust state; (c) anticipatory disgust elicited by associations between distance cues for somatosensory disgust and requiring threat evaluation; (d) simulated disgusts elicited by imagining somatosensory and anticipatory disgust and frequently involving other emotions. Different contamination processes interlink (a–d). The implications of our model for fundamental questions about disgust (e.g., emotion status; continuation into animals) are examined.

Deceived, Disgusted, and Defensive: Motivated Processing of Anti-Tobacco Advertisements

A 2 × 2 experiment was conducted, where participants watched anti-tobacco messages that varied in deception (content portraying tobacco companies as dishonest) and disgust (negative graphic images) content. Psychophysiological measures, self-report, and a recognition test were used to test hypotheses generated from the motivated cognition framework. The results of this study indicate that messages containing both deception and disgust push viewers into a cascade of defensive responses reflected by increased self-reported unpleasantness, reduced resources allocated to encoding, worsened recognition memory, and dampened emotional responses compared to messages depicting one attribute or neither. Findings from this study demonstrate the value of applying a motivated cognition theoretical framework in research on responses to emotional content in health messages and support previous research on defensive processing and message design of anti-tobacco messages.

Effect of Partners' Disgust Responses on Psychological Wellbeing in Cancer Patients

The aim of this study was to explore quantitatively the relationship between disgust responses in cancer patients and their partners, and in turn their relationship to patients' psychological well-being. We recruited 50 participants with heterogeneous cancer diagnoses and their partners from cancer-related groups (e.g., charities). Patients completed questionnaires to determine levels of disgust propensity, disgust sensitivity, self-disgust, and symptoms of anxiety and depression. Disgust propensity and sensitivity were also assessed in their partners. Partners' disgust sensitivity was significantly positively correlated with cancer patients' self-disgust, disgust propensity, and depression. Path analyses suggested that patients' self-disgust plays a role in mediating the effect of partners' disgust sensitivity on patients' psychological well-being. This study provides the first quantitative evidence that psychological well-being in cancer patients is contingent on their partners' sensitivity to disgust, and that patients' self-disgust plays a mediating role. Focusing therapeutically on disgust responses could well be beneficial to people with cancer.

Moral vindications

Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions.

Disgust and Anger Relate to Different Aggressive Responses to Moral Violations

In response to the same moral violation, some people report experiencing anger, and others report feeling disgust. Do differences in emotional responses to moral violations reflect idiosyncratic differences in the communication of outrage, or do they reflect differences in motivational states? Whereas equivalence accounts suggest that anger and disgust are interchangeable expressions of condemnation, sociofunctional accounts suggest that they have distinct antecedents and consequences. We tested these accounts by investigating whether anger and disgust vary depending on the costs imposed by moral violations and whether they differentially correspond with aggressive tendencies. Results across four studies favor a sociofunctional account: When the target of a moral violation shifts from the self to another person, anger decreases, but disgust increases. Whereas anger is associated with high-cost, direct aggression, disgust is associated with less costly indirect aggression. Finally, whether the target of a moral violation is the self or another person influences direct aggression partially via anger and influences indirect aggression partially via disgust.

Moralization Through Moral Shock

The current research tested whether exposure to disgusting images increases moral conviction and whether this happens in the presence of incidental disgust cues versus disgust cues relevant to the target of moralization. Across two studies, we exposed participants to one of the four sets of disgusting versus control images to test the moralization of abortion attitudes: pictures of aborted fetuses, animal abuse, non-harm related disgusting images, harm related disgusting images, or neutral pictures, at either sub- or supraliminal levels of awareness. Moral conviction about abortion increased (compared with control) only for participants exposed to abortion-related images at speeds slow enough to allow conscious awareness. Study 2 replicated this finding, and found that the relationship between attitudinally relevant disgust and moral conviction was mediated by disgust, and not anger or harm appraisals. Findings are discussed in terms of their relevance for intuitionist theories of morality and moral theories that emphasize harm.

Interrelations of Justice, Rejection, Provocation, and Moral Disgust Sensitivity and Their Links with the Hostile Attribution Bias, Trait Anger, and Aggression

Several personality dispositions with common features capturing sensitivities to negative social cues have recently been introduced into psychological research. To date, however, little is known about their interrelations, their conjoint effects on behavior, or their interplay with other risk factors. We asked N = 349 adults from Germany to rate their justice, rejection, moral disgust, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attribution bias, trait anger, and forms and functions of aggression. The sensitivity measures were mostly positively correlated; particularly those with an egoistic focus, such as victim justice, rejection, and provocation sensitivity, hostile attributions and trait anger as well as those with an altruistic focus, such as observer justice, perpetrator justice, and moral disgust sensitivity. The sensitivity measures had independent and differential effects on forms and functions of aggression when considered simultaneously and when controlling for hostile attributions and anger. They could not be integrated into a single factor of interpersonal sensitivity or reduced to other well-known risk factors for aggression. The sensitivity measures, therefore, require consideration in predicting and preventing aggression.

When care situations evoke difficult emotions in nursing staff members: an ethnographic study in two Norwegian nursing homes

BACKGROUND

Caring practice in nursing homes is a complex topic, especially the challenges of meeting the basic needs of residents when their behaviour evokes difficult emotions. Cognitive and physical changes related to aging and disability can contribute to behaviours considered to be unacceptable. For example, resident behaviours such as spitting, making a mess with food or grinding teeth are behaviours that most people do not want to see, hear or experience. The aim of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how nursing home staff members deal with such behaviours in care situations.

METHODS

This article draws on ethnographic data to describe how nursing home staff members manage unpleasant resident behaviours. The study was based on two long-term units in two Norwegian public nursing homes. The Region's Medical Ethics Committee and the Norwegian Social Science Data Services granted approval. In total, 45 participants (37 nursing aides and eight nurses) agreed to participate in this study. Ten of the participants were interviewed at the end of the field study.

RESULTS

This study indicates that nursing home staff members experience difficult emotions related to some residents' behaviours. However, they found these feelings difficult to express and rarely verbalized them openly. In addition, they were characterized by a strong obligation to help all residents, despite their own feelings. Therefore, it appears that an inner struggle occurs as a part of everyday practice.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite these difficult emotions, nursing staff members believed that they needed to manage their responses and continued to offer good care to all residents. These findings extend our understanding of this unarticulated part of nursing home practice.

Different timing features in brain processing of core and moral disgust pictures: an event-related potentials study

Disgust, an emotion motivating withdrawal from offensive stimuli, protects us from the risk of biological pathogens and sociomoral violations. Homogeneity of its two types, namely, core and moral disgust has been under intensive debate. To examine the dynamic relationship between them, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) for core disgust, moral disgust and neutral pictures while participants performed a modified oddball task. ERP analysis revealed that N1 and P2 amplitudes were largest for the core disgust pictures, indicating automatic processing of the core disgust-evoking pictures. N2 amplitudes were higher for pictures evoking moral disgust relative to core disgust and neutral pictures, reflecting a violation of social norms. The core disgust pictures elicited larger P3 and late positive potential (LPP) amplitudes in comparison with the moral disgust pictures which, in turn, elicited larger P3 and LPP amplitudes when compared to the neutral pictures. Taken together, these findings indicated that core and moral disgust pictures elicited different neural activities at various stages of information processing, which provided supporting evidence for the heterogeneity of disgust.

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust, anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of "contamination". However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.

Gender differences when touching something gross: unpleasant? No. Disgusting? Yes!

While many studies find women self-report higher disgust sensitivity than men, few studies have examined gender differences with behavioral tasks in senses other than vision. On a haptic task, we tested the hypothesis that women would report greater disgust but not greater unpleasantness than men. Forty-four undergraduates (29 women) touched 8 out-of-sight stimuli with sensory (unpleasantness) and emotional (disgust) responses recorded. The stimuli consisted of 2 neutral, 2 pleasant, and 4 unpleasant (3 disgust-evoking) objects. No gender differences were found for reporting stimuli unpleasantness. In contrast, women rated their disgust significantly higher than men when touching the high disgust-evoking objects. Unpleasantness of the stimuli correlated with disgust to the objects, but disgust sensitivity (Disgust Scale-Revised) was not a strong predictor of disgust responses. Besides differentiating unpleasantness from disgust, this was also the first study to show gender differences in a disgust-evoking haptic task.

A Constructionist Review of Morality and Emotions

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many “whole number” accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality–emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality–emotion links.

Delineating the Influence of Emotion and Reason on Morality and Punishment

The present article examines the available literature on the association between emotion, conscious reasoning, morality, and punishment. Although conscious reasoning has traditionally been implicated in moral judgment, contemporary research suggests that emotions play a primary role in moral judgment. This article reviews the different lines of evidence supporting the role of emotion in moral decision-making. Disgust seems to be unique from other emotions in its ability to influence moral judgment. Immorality often elicits disgust, individuals sensitive to experiencing disgust tend to make more severe moral judgments, and experimental disgust inductions can influence judgments about moral violations. However, the extent to which the emotion-moral judgment association extends to decisions about punishment remains unclear. This review considers various concepts, including moral outrage, responsibility, and blameworthiness that may influence the extent to which emotion informs punishment decisions. The implications of these findings for current thinking on morality and punishment, and future directions for research are discussed.

Specificity of disgust domains in the prediction of contamination anxiety and avoidance: a multimodal examination

Although core, animal-reminder, and contamination disgust are viewed as distinct "types" of disgust vulnerabilities, the extent to which individual differences in the three disgust domains uniquely predict contamination-related anxiety and avoidance remains unclear. Three studies were conducted to fill this important gap in the literature. Study 1 was conducted to first determine if the three types of disgust could be replicated in a larger and more heterogeneous sample. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a bifactor model consisting of a "general disgust" dimension and the three distinct disgust dimensions yielded a better fit than a one-factor model. Structural equation modeling in Study 2 showed that while latent core, animal-reminder, and contamination disgust factors each uniquely predicted a latent "contamination anxiety" factor above and beyond general disgust, only animal-reminder uniquely predicted a latent "non-contamination anxiety" factor above and beyond general disgust. However, Study 3 found that only contamination disgust uniquely predicted behavioral avoidance in a public restroom where contamination concerns are salient. These findings suggest that although the three disgust domains are associated with contamination anxiety and avoidance, individual differences in contamination disgust sensitivity appear to be most uniquely predictive of contamination-related distress. The implications of these findings for the development and maintenance of anxiety-related disorders marked by excessive contamination concerns are discussed.

Stealing is not gross: language distinguishes visceral disgust from moral violations

The similarity between moral and visceral disgust is a current topic of debate. One method of investigating this issue has been to examine the use of language. Prior work has shown that the words disgust and anger are often used interchangeably to describe offense toward immoral behavior involving harm (autonomy violations), whereas "grossed out" is reserved for viscerally repulsive stimuli. Based on these findings we developed a questionnaire and tested 126 undergraduates for how they used the words disgusted, angry, grossed out, and morally right or morally wrong to rate various responses toward ethics of autonomy social situations. We found that grossed out was least endorsed for these transgressions and that ratings on this measure did not correspond to ratings of moral wrongness. Moreover, individual differences in visceral disgust sensitivity had no association with participants' evaluations or use of any of the descriptors. By contrast, ratings for angry and disgusted were equivalently and highly endorsed for autonomy violations, and the ratings given with these descriptors also corresponded to the ratings given for moral wrongness. These findings add to growing evidence that moral disgust is not visceral (gross) but rather appears to be representative of anger even though autonomy violations are often labeled as "disgusting".