Clarifying the Normative Significance of 'Personality Changes' Following Deep Brain Stimulation

Deep Brain Stimulation and Neuropsychiatric Anthropology - The "Prosthetisability" of the Lifeworld

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) represents a key area of neuromodulation that has gained wide adoption for the treatment of neurological and experimental testing for psychiatric disorders. It is associated with specific therapeutic effects based on the precision of an evolving mechanistic neuroscientific understanding. At the same time, there are obstacles to achieving symptom relief because of the incompleteness of such an understanding. These obstacles are at least in part based on the complexity of neuropsychiatric disorders and the incompleteness of DBS devices to represent prosthetics that modulate the breadth of pathological processes implicated in these disorders. Neuroprostheses, such as an implanted DBS system, can have vast effects on subjects in addition to the specific neuropsychiatric changes they are intended to produce. These effects largely represent blind spots in the current debate on neuromodulation. Anthropological accounts can illustrate the broad existential dimensions of patients' illness and responses to neural implants. In combination with current neuroscientific understanding, neuropsychiatric anthropology may illuminate the possibilities and limits of neurodevices as technical "world enablers".

Adolescent OCD Patient and Caregiver Perspectives on Identity, Authenticity, and Normalcy in Potential Deep Brain Stimulation Treatment

The ongoing debate within neuroethics concerning the degree to which neuromodulation such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) changes the personality, identity, and agency (PIA) of patients has paid relatively little attention to the perspectives of prospective patients. Even less attention has been given to pediatric populations. To understand patients' views about identity changes due to DBS in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), the authors conducted and analyzed semistructured interviews with adolescent patients with OCD and their parents/caregivers. Patients were asked about projected impacts to PIA generally due to DBS. All patient respondents and half of caregivers reported that DBS would impact patient self-identity in significant ways. For example, many patients expressed how DBS could positively impact identity by allowing them to explore their identities free from OCD. Others voiced concerns that DBS-related resolution of OCD might negatively impact patient agency and authenticity. Half of patients expressed that DBS may positively facilitate social access through relieving symptoms, while half indicated that DBS could increase social stigma. These views give insights into how to approach decision-making and informed consent if DBS for OCD becomes available for adolescents. They also offer insights into adolescent experiences of disability identity and "normalcy" in the context of OCD.

In Situ Reprogramming of Neurons and Glia - A Risk in Altering Memory and Personality?

The recent emergence of reprogramming technologies to convert brain cell types or epigenetically alter neurons and neural progenitors in vivo and in situ hold significant promises in brain repair and neuronal aging reversal. However, given the significant epigenetic and transcriptomic changes to components of the existing neuronal cells and network, we question if these reprogramming technology might inadvertently alter or erase memory engrams, conceivably resulting in changes in narrative identity or personality. We suggest that the nature of these alterations might be less predictable compared to memory and personality changes known to be associated with diseases, drugs or brain stimulation therapies. While research in applying reprogramming technologies to neurological ailments and aging should continue, more targeted analyses should be put in place in animal experiments to gauge the severity and degree of memory alterations, and appropriate risk and benefit analyses should be conducted before these technologies move into human trials.

Looking through the lens of stigma: Understanding and anticipating concerns about the responsible development and use of psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs)

Psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs) show promise for treating depression, but few studies have examined stakeholders' views on them. Using interview data and survey data that analyzed the views of psychiatrists, patients, caregivers, and the general public, a conceptual map was created to represent stakeholders' views on four PEIs: electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), deep brain stimulation (DBS), and adaptive brain implants (ABIs). Stigma emerged as a key theme connecting diverse views, revealing that it is a significant factor in the acceptance and usage of PEIs. Stigma not only discourages seeking mental health services for depression but also inhibits the acceptance of PEIs. Addressing the pervasive and complex effects of stigma highlights the need to change societal attitudes toward mental illnesses and their treatments and to provide support to patients who may benefit from these interventions. The map also demonstrates the value of conceptual mapping for anticipating and mitigating ethical considerations in the development and use of PEIs.

Researcher Views on Changes in Personality, Mood, and Behavior in Next-Generation Deep Brain Stimulation

The literature on deep brain stimulation (DBS) and adaptive DBS (aDBS) raises concerns that these technologies may affect personality, mood, and behavior. We conducted semi-structured interviews with researchers (n = 23) involved in developing next-generation DBS systems, exploring their perspectives on ethics and policy topics including whether DBS/aDBS can cause such changes. The majority of researchers reported being aware of personality, mood, or behavioral (PMB) changes in recipients of DBS/aDBS. Researchers offered varying estimates of the frequency of PMB changes. A smaller majority reported changes in personality specifically. Some expressed reservations about the scientific status of the term 'personality,' while others used it freely. Most researchers discussed negative PMB changes, but a majority said that DBS/aDBS can also result in positive changes. Several researchers viewed positive PMB changes as part of the therapeutic goal in psychiatric applications of DBS/aDBS. Finally, several discussed potential causes of PMB changes other than the device itself.

Participant perceptions of changes in psychosocial domains following participation in an adaptive deep brain stimulation trial

BACKGROUND

There has been substantial controversy in the neuroethics literature regarding the extent to which deep brain stimulation (DBS) impacts dimensions of personality, mood, and behavior.

OBJECTIVE/HYPOTHESIS

Despite extensive debate in the theoretical literature, there remains a paucity of empirical data available to support or refute claims related to the psychosocial changes following DBS.

METHODS

A mixed-methods approach was used to examine the perspectives of patients who underwent DBS regarding changes to their personality, authenticity, autonomy, risk-taking, and overall quality of life.

RESULTS

Patients (n = 21) who were enrolled in adaptive DBS trials for Parkinson's disease, essential tremor, obsessive-compulsive disorder, Tourette's syndrome, or dystonia participated. Qualitative data revealed that participants, in general, reported positive experiences with alterations in what was described as 'personality, mood, and behavior changes.' The majority of participants reported increases in quality of life. No participants reported 'regretting the decision to undergo DBS.'

CONCLUSION(S)

The findings from this patient sample do not support the narrative that DBS results in substantial adverse changes to dimensions of personality, mood, and behavior. Changes reported as "negative" or "undesired" were few in number, and transient in nature.

How I became myself after merging with a computer: Does human-machine symbiosis raise human rights issues?

Novel usages of brain stimulation combined with artificially intelligent (AI) systems promise to address a large range of diseases. These new conjoined technologies, such as brain-computer interfaces (BCI), are increasingly used in experimental and clinical settings to predict and alleviate symptoms of various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Due to their reliance on AI algorithms for feature extraction and classification, these BCI systems enable a novel, unprecedented, and direct connection between human cognition and artificial information processing. In this paper, we present the results of a study that investigates the phenomenology of human-machine symbiosis during a first-in-human experimental BCI trial designed to predict epileptic seizures. We employed qualitative semi-structured interviews to collect user experience data from a participant over a six-years period. We report on a clinical case where a specific embodied phenomenology emerged: namely, after BCI implantation, the patient reported experiences of increased agential capacity and continuity; and after device explantation, the patient reported persistent traumatic harms linked to agential discontinuity. To our knowledge, this is the first reported clinical case of a patient experiencing persistent agential discontinuity due to BCI explantation and potential evidence of an infringement on patient right, where the implanted person was robbed of her de novo agential capacities when the device was removed.

Neurorights as Hohfeldian Privileges

This paper argues that calls for neurorights propose an overcomplicated approach. It does this through analysis of ‘rights’ using the influential framework provided by Wesley Hohfeld, whose analytic jurisprudence is still well regarded in its clarificatory approach to discussions of rights. Having disentangled some unclarities in talk about rights, the paper proposes the idea of ‘novel human rights’ is not appropriate for what is deemed worth protecting in terms of mental integrity and cognitive liberty. That is best thought of in terms of Hohfeld’s account of ‘right’ as privilege. It goes on to argue that as privileges, legal protections are not well suited to these cases. As such, they cannot be ‘novel human rights’. Instead, protections for mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best accounted for in terms of familiar and established rational and discursive norms. Mental integrity is best thought of as evaluable in terms of familiar rational norms, and cognitive freedom is constrained by appraisals of sense-making. Concerns about how neurotechnologies might pose particular challenges to mental integrity and cognitive liberty are best protected through careful use of existing legislation on data protection, not novel rights, as it is via data that risks to integrity and liberty are manifested.

Closed-Loop Neuromodulation and Self-Perception in Clinical Treatment of Refractory Epilepsy

Background: Newer "closed-loop" neurostimulation devices in development could, in theory, induce changes to patients' personalities and self-perceptions. Empirically, however, only limited data of patient and family experiences exist. Responsive neurostimulation (RNS) as a treatment for refractory epilepsy is the first approved and commercially available closed-loop brain stimulation system in clinical practice, presenting an opportunity to observe how conceptual neuroethical concerns manifest in clinical treatment.Methods: We conducted ethnographic research at a single academic medical center with an active RNS treatment program and collected data via direct observation of clinic visits and in-depth interviews with 12 patients and their caregivers. We used deductive and inductive analyses to identify the relationship between these devices and patient changes in personality and self-perception.Results: Participants generally did not attribute changes in patients' personalities or self-perception to implantation of or stimulation using RNS. They did report that RNS affected patients' experiences and conceptions of illness. In particular, the capacity to store and display electrophysiological data produced a common frame of reference and a shared vocabulary among patients and clinicians.Discussion: Empirical experiences of a clinical population being treated with closed-loop neuromodulation do not corroborate theoretical concerns about RNS devices described by neuroethicists and technology developers. However, closed-loop devices demonstrated an ability to change illness experiences. Even without altering identify and self-perception, they provided new cultural tools and metaphors for conceiving of epilepsy as an illness and of the process of diagnosis and treatment. These findings call attention to the need to situate neuroethical concerns in the broader contexts of patients' illness experiences and social circumstances.

Memory Modification and Authenticity: A Narrative Approach

The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity.

They Affect the Person, but for Better or Worse? Perceptions of Electroceutical Interventions for Depression Among Psychiatrists, Patients, and the Public

Responding to reports of cases of personality change following deep brain stimulation, neuroethicists have debated the nature and ethical implications of these changes. Recently, this literature has been challenged as being overblown and therefore potentially an impediment to patients accessing needed treatment. We interviewed 16 psychiatrists, 16 patients with depression, and 16 members of the public without depression, all from the Midwestern United States, about their views on how three electroceutical interventions (deep brain stimulation, electroconvulsive therapy, and transcranial magnetic stimulation) used to treat depression might affect the self. Participants were also asked to compare the electroceuticals' effects on the self with the effects of commonly used depression treatments (psychotherapy and pharmaceuticals). Using qualitative content analysis, we found that participants' views on electroceuticals' potential effects on the self mainly focused on treatment effectiveness and side effects. Our results have implications for both theoretical discussions in neuroethics and clinical practice in psychiatry.

A note on psychological continuity theories of identity and neurointerventions

An important concern sometimes voiced in the neuroethical literature is that swift and radical changes to the parts of a person's mental life essential for sustaining his/her numerical identity can result in the person ceasing to exist-in other words, that these changes may disrupt psychological continuity. Taking neurointerventions used for rehabilitative purposes as a point of departure, this short paper argues that the same radical alterations of criminal offenders' psychological features which under certain conditions would result in a disruption of numerical identity (and, thus, the killing of the offender) can be achieved without these having any effect on numerical identity. Thus, someone interested in making radical alterations to offenders' psychology can avoid the charge that this would kill the offenders, while still achieving a radical transformation of them. The paper suggests that this possibility makes the question of what kinds of qualitive alterations to offenders' identity are morally permissible (more?) pressing, but then briefly highlights some challenges for arguments against making radical qualitative identity alterations to offenders.

Incoming ethical issues for deep brain stimulation: when long-term treatment leads to a 'new form of the disease'

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) has been regarded as an efficient and safe treatment for Parkinson's disease (PD) since being approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997. It is estimated that more than 150 000 patients have been implanted, with a forecasted rapid increase in uptake with population ageing. Recent longitudinal follow-up studies have reported a significant increase in postoperative survival rates of patients with PD implanted with DBS as compared with those not implanted with DBS. Although DBS tends to increase life expectancy for most patients with PD, this medical benefit does not come without attendant negative consequences. For example, emerging forms of iatrogenic harms are sometimes induced-harms which were not initially expected when clinicians proposed neurosurgery and patients or their guardians consented to the treatment. We report and discuss the clinical case of a patient who was implanted with DBS more than 20 years ago (at the time of writing) and is now experiencing unexpected stages of PD. This case illustrates how extending the life span without improving quality of life may introduce a burden of harms for patients and families. As well, this case shows why we should prepare for the expanding numbers of PD-implanted patients experiencing a gain of longevity but with severe stages of disease leading to diminution in quality of life. This newly observed effect of DBS treatment requires us to explore ethical questions related to iatrogenic harms, informed consent, end of life and caregivers' burden.