The Role of Ontogeny in the Evolution of Human Cooperation

Infants' use of the index finger for social and non-social purposes during the first two years of life: A cross-cultural study

The emergence of the pointing gesture is a major developmental milestone in human infancy. Pointing fosters preverbal communication and is key for language and theory of mind development. Little is known about its ontogenetic origins and whether its pathway is similar across different cultures. The goal of this study was to examine the theoretical proposal that social pointing is preceded by a non-social use of the index finger and later becomes a social-communicative gesture. Moreover, the study investigated to which extent the emergence of social pointing differs cross-culturally. We assessed non-social index-finger use and social pointing in 647 infants aged 3- to 24 months from 4 different countries (China, Germany, Japan, and Türkiye). Non-social index-finger use and social pointing increased with infants' age, such that social pointing became more dominant than non-social index-finger use with age. Whereas social pointing was reported across countries, its reported frequency differed between cultures with significantly greater social pointing frequency in infants from Türkiye, China, and Germany compared to Japanese infants. Our study supports theoretical proposals of the dominance of non-social index-finger use during early infancy with social pointing becoming more prominent as infants get older. These findings contribute to our understanding of infants' use of their index finger for social and non-social purposes during the first two years of life.

Better Together: 14-Month-Old Infants Expect Agents to Cooperate

Humans engage in cooperative activities from early on and the breadth of human cooperation is unparalleled. Human preference for cooperation might reflect cognitive and motivational mechanisms that drive engagement in cooperative activities. Here we investigate early indices of humans' cooperative abilities and test whether 14-month-old infants expect agents to prefer cooperative over individual goal achievement. Three groups of infants saw videos of agents facing a choice between two actions that led to identical rewards but differed in the individual costs. Our results show that, in line with prior research, infants expect agents to make instrumentally rational choices and prefer the less costly of two individual action alternatives. In contrast, when one of the action alternatives is cooperative, infants expect agents to choose cooperation over individual action, even though the cooperative action demands more effort from each agent to achieve the same outcome. Finally, we do not find evidence that infants expect agents to choose the less costly alternative when both options entail cooperative action. Combined, these results indicate an ontogenetically early expectation of cooperation, and raise interesting implications and questions regarding the nature of infants' representations of cooperative actions and their utility.

Children are eager to take credit for prosocial acts, and cost affects this tendency

We report two experiments on children's tendency to enhance their reputations through communicative acts. In the experiments, 4-year-olds (N = 120) had the opportunity to inform a social partner that they had helped him in his absence. In a first experiment, we pitted a prosocial act ("Let's help clean up for Doggie!") against an instrumental act ("Let's move these out of our way"). Children in the prosocial condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to protest when another individual was given credit for it. In a second experiment, we replicated the prosocial condition but with a new manipulation: high-cost versus low-cost helping. We manipulated both the language surrounding cost (i.e., "This will be pretty tough to clean up" vs. "It will be really easy to clean this up") and how difficult the task itself was. As predicted, children in the high-cost condition were quicker to inform their partner of the act and more likely to take back credit for it. These results suggest that even 4-year-old children make active attempts to elicit positive reputational judgments for their prosocial acts, with cost as a moderating factor.

What is cooperative breeding in mammals and birds? Removing definitional barriers for comparative research

Cooperative breeding (i.e. when alloparents care for the offspring of other group members) has been studied for nearly a century. Yet, inconsistent definitions of this breeding system still hamper comparative research. Here, we identify two major inconsistencies, discuss their consequences and propose a way forward. First, some researchers restrict the term 'cooperative breeding' to species with non-breeding alloparents. We show that such restrictive definitions lack distinct quantitative criteria to define non-breeding alloparents. This ambiguity, we argue, reflects the reproductive-sharing continuum among cooperatively breeding species. We therefore suggest that cooperative breeding should not be restricted to the few species with extreme reproductive skew and should be defined independent of the reproductive status of alloparents. Second, definitions rarely specify the type, extent and prevalence of alloparental care required to classify species as cooperative breeders. We thus analysed published data to propose qualitative and quantitative criteria for alloparental care. We conclude by proposing the following operational definition: cooperative breeding is a reproductive system where >5% of broods/litters in at least one population receive species-typical parental care and conspecifics provide proactive alloparental care that fulfils >5% of at least one type of the offspring's needs. This operational definition is designed to increase comparability across species and disciplines while allowing to study the intriguing phenomenon of cooperative breeding as a behaviour with multiple dimensions.

Life history impacts on infancy and the evolution of human social cognition

Greater longevity, slower maturation and shorter birth intervals are life history features that distinguish humans from the other living members of our hominid family, the great apes. Theory and evidence synthesized here suggest the evolution of those features can explain both our bigger brains and our cooperative sociality. I rely on Sarah Hrdy's hypothesis that survival challenges for ancestral infants propelled the evolution of distinctly human socioemotional appetites and Barbara Finlay and colleagues' findings that mammalian brain size is determined by developmental duration. Similar responsiveness to varying developmental contexts in chimpanzee and human one-year-olds suggests similar infant responsiveness in our nearest common ancestor. Those ancestral infants likely began to acquire solid food while still nursing and fed themselves at weaning as chimpanzees and other great apes do now. When human ancestors colonized habitats lacking foods that infants could handle, dependents' survival became contingent on subsidies. Competition to engage subsidizers selected for capacities and tendencies to enlist and maintain social connections during the early wiring of expanding infant brains with lifelong consequences that Hrdy labeled "emotionally modern" social cognition.

Evidence for a reproductive sharing continuum in cooperatively breeding mammals and birds: consequences for comparative research

Extreme reproductive skew occurs when a dominant female/male almost monopolizes reproduction within a group of multiple sexually mature females/males, respectively. It is sometimes considered an additional, restrictive criterion to define cooperative breeding. However, datasets that use this restrictive definition to classify species as cooperative breeders systematically overestimate reproductive skew by including groups in which reproduction cannot be shared by definition (e.g. groups with a single female/male). Here, we review the extent of reproductive sharing in 41 mammal and 37 bird species previously classified as exhibiting alloparental care and extreme reproductive skew, while only considering multi-female or multi-male groups. We demonstrate that in groups where unequal reproduction sharing is possible, extreme reproductive skew occurs in a few species only (11/41 mammal species and 12/37 bird species). These results call for significant changes in datasets that classify species' caring and mating system. To facilitate these changes, we provide an updated dataset on reproductive sharing in 63 cooperatively breeding species. At the conceptual level, our findings suggest that reproductive skew should not be a defining criterion of cooperative breeding and support the definition of cooperative breeding as a care system in which alloparents provide systematic care to other group members' offspring.

The central problem is still evolutionary stability

We applaud Heintz & Scott-Phillips's guiding metaphor of "unleashing leashed expression," and we value the unified explanation for the emergence of not only language, but also other forms of unleashed expression, such as multimodal communication. We are more critical of the authors' discussion of the selection pressures acting towards unleashed expression, which are proposed to hinge on partner choice ecology.

A lineage explanation of human normative guidance: the coadaptive model of instrumental rationality and shared intentionality

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance.

What makes us act together? On the cognitive models supporting humans’ decisions for joint action

We face tasks every day that we can solve alone but decide to solve together with others. When do we choose to act together vs. alone? How long do we persist in working together when doing so is difficult? Do we prefer to act together when times are uncertain? An open question in joint action research is under what conditions humans prefer to act together or alone to achieve a certain goal, and whether their preference is based on a utility calculus that takes into account the costs and benefits associated with individual and joint action alternatives. Research on cooperation reveals that frequent engagement in joint activities provides high survival benefits, as it allows individuals to achieve goals together that are otherwise unavailable. Yet, survival advantage does not wholly explain the reasons for human cooperative behavior. In fact, humans are motivated to cooperate even when it is not necessary to achieve an outcome. Research in cognitive science suggests that navigating the potential costs of joint actions is a challenge for humans, and that joint actions might provide individuals with rewards that go beyond the achievement of instrumental goals. We here address the influence of key factors on the decision to engage in joint action, such as the coordination costs arising when acting together compared to alone and the social and instrumental rewards expected when acting together compared to alone. Addressing these questions will provide critical insight for the design of cognitive models of human decisions for cooperation.

Intersubjectivity and the Emergence of Words

Intersubjectivity refers to two non-verbal intersubjective relations infants experience during their first year that are precursors to the emergence of words. Trevarthen, a pioneer in the study of intersubjectivity, referred to those relations as primary and secondary intersubjectivity. The former, a dyadic coordination between the infant and her caregiver, begins at birth. The latter, a triadic coordination that develops around 9 months, allows the infant and a caregiver to share attention to particular features of the environment. Secondary intersubjectivity is crucial for an infant’s ability to begin to produce words, at around 12 months. Much research on the social and cognitive origins of language has focused on secondary intersubjectivity. That is unfortunate because it neglects the fact that secondary intersubjectivity and the emergence of words are built on a foundation of primary intersubjectivity. It also ignores the evolutionary origins of intersubjectivity and its uniquely human status. That unique status explains why only humans learn words. This article seeks to address these issues by relating the literature on primary intersubjectivity, particularly research on bi-directional and contingent communication between infants and mothers, to joint attention and ultimately to words. In that context, we also discuss Hrdy’s hypothesis about the influence of alloparents on the evolution of intersubjectivity.

Human adults prefer to cooperate even when it is costly

Joint actions are cooperative activities where humans coordinate their actions to achieve individual and shared goals. While the motivation to engage in joint action is clear when a goal cannot be achieved by individuals alone, we asked whether humans are motivated to act together even when acting together is not necessary and implies incurring additional costs compared to individual goal achievement. Using a utility-based empirical approach, we investigated the extent of humans' preference for joint action over individual action, when the instrumental costs of performing joint actions outweigh the benefits. The results of five experiments showed that human adults have a stable preference for joint action, even if individual action is more effective to achieve a certain goal. We propose that such preferences can be understood as ascribing additional reward value to performing actions together.

Language, Childhood, and Fire: How We Learned to Love Sharing Stories

Stories do not fossilize. Thus, exploring tales shared during prehistory, the longest part of human history inevitably becomes speculative. Nevertheless, various attempts have been made to find a more scientifically valid way into our deep human past of storytelling. Following the social brain hypothesis, we suggest including into the theory of human storytelling more fine-grained and evidence-based findings (from archaeology, the cognitive sciences, and evolutionary psychology) about the manifold exaptation and adaptation, genetic changes, and phenotypic plasticity in the deep human past, which all shaped the emergence of storytelling in hominins. We identify three preconditions for humans sharing stories: first, the long evolution of language in the different taxa as one of the preconditions of ostensive signaling; second, the pivotal role of childhood in the evolution of collaborative intentionality; and third, the role of fireside chats in the rise of elaborative (i.e., narrative) sharing of stories. We propose that humans, albeit perhaps no other hominins learned to understand others through sharing stories, not only as intentional agents, but also as mental ones.

Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality

We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or "primary intersubjectivity." According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9-12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch the outlines of an account that unifies their strengths. This unified account endorses the PIT's recognition of the fundamental importance of primary intersubjectivity. Any act of sharing experiences is founded on the communicative capacity that is already displayed by young infants in primary intersubjectivity. At the same time, we question the PIT's interpretation that dyadic encounters have the triadic structure of joint attention. Lastly, we draw on empirical work on the development of joint attention, imitation, and social referencing that serves as evidence that primary intersubjectivity continuously unfolds into the capacity for triadic joint attention.

Young children conform more to norms than to preferences

As members of cultural groups, humans continually adhere to social norms and conventions. Researchers have hypothesized that even young children are motivated to act conventionally, but support for this hypothesis has been indirect and open to other interpretations. To further test this hypothesis, we invited 3.5-year-old children (N = 104) to help set up items for a tea party. Children first indicated which items they preferred but then heard an informant (either an adult or another child) endorse other items in terms of either conventional norms or personal preferences. Children conformed (i.e., overrode their own preference to follow the endorsement) more when the endorsements were framed as norms than when they were framed as preferences, and this was the case whether the informant was an adult or another child. The priority of norms even when stated by another child opposes the interpretation that children only conformed in deference to adult authority. These findings suggest that children are motivated to act conventionally, possibly as an adaptation for living in cultural groups.

Schoolchildren cooperate more successfully with non-kin than with siblings

Cooperation plays a key role in the development of advanced societies and can be stabilized through shared genes (kinship) or reciprocation. In humans, cooperation among kin occurs more readily than cooperation among non-kin. In many organisms, cooperation can shift with age (e.g. helpers at the nest); however, little is known about developmental shifts between kin and non-kin cooperation in humans. Using a cooperative game, we show that 3- to 10-year-old French schoolchildren cooperated less successfully with siblings than with non-kin children, whether or not non-kin partners were friends. Furthermore, children with larger social networks cooperated better and the perception of friendship among non-friends improved after cooperating. These results contrast with the well-established preference for kin cooperation among adults and indicate that non-kin cooperation in humans might serve to forge and extend non-kin social relationships during middle childhood and create opportunities for future collaboration beyond kin. Our results suggest that the current view of cooperation in humans may only apply to adults and that future studies should focus on how and why cooperation with different classes of partners might change during development in humans across cultures as well as other long-lived organisms.

The Centrality of Ancestral Grandmothering in Human Evolution

When Fisher, Williams, and Hamilton laid the foundations of evolutionary life history theory, they recognized elements of what became a grandmother hypothesis to explain the evolution of human postmenopausal longevity. Subsequent study of modern hunter-gatherers, great apes, and the wider mammalian radiation has revealed strong regularities in development and behavior that show additional unexpected consequences that ancestral grandmothering likely had on human evolution, challenging the hypothesis that ancestral males propelled the evolution of our radiation by hunting to provision mates and offspring. Ancestral grandmothering has become a serious contender to explain not only the large fraction of post-fertile years women live and children's prolonged maturation yet early weaning; it also promises to help account for the pair bonding that distinguishes humans from our closest living evolutionary cousins, the great apes (and most other mammals), the evolution of our big human brains, and our distinctive preoccupation with reputations, shared intentionality and persistent cultural learning that begins in infancy.

Exploring how harming and helping behaviors drive prediction and explanation during anthropomorphism

Cacioppo and colleagues advanced the study of anthropomorphism by positing three motives that moderated the occurrence of this phenomenon; belonging, effectance, and explanation. Here, we further this literature by exploring the extent to which the valence of a target's behavior influences its anthropomorphism when perceivers attempt to explain and predict that target's behavior, and the involvement of brain regions associated with explanation and prediction in such anthropomorphism. Participants viewed videos of varying visually complex agents - geometric shapes, computer generated (CG) faces, and greebles - in nonrandom motion performing harming and helping behaviors. Across two studies, participants reported a narrative that explained the observed behavior (both studies) while we recorded brain activity (study one), and participants predicted future behavior of the protagonist shapes (study two). Brain regions implicated in prediction error (striatum), not language generation (inferior frontal gyrus; IFG) engaged more to harming than helping behaviors during the anthropomorphism of such stimuli. Behaviorally, we found greater anthropomorphism in explanations of harming rather than helping behaviors, but the opposite pattern when participants predicted the agents' behavior. Together, these studies build upon the anthropomorphism literature by exploring how the valence of behavior drives explanation and prediction.

The adaptive origins of uniquely human sociality

Humans possess some unique social-cognitive skills and motivations, involving such things as joint attention, cooperative communication, dual-level collaboration and cultural learning. These are almost certainly adaptations for humans' especially complex sociocultural lives. The common assumption has been that these unique skills and motivations emerge in human infancy and early childhood as preparations for the challenges of adult life, for example, in collaborative foraging. In the current paper, I propose that the curiously early emergence of these skills in infancy--well before they are needed in adulthood--along with other pieces of evidence (such as almost exclusive use with adults not peers) suggests that aspects of the evolution of these skills represent ontogenetic adaptations to the unique socio-ecological challenges human infants face in the context of a regime of cooperative breeding and childcare. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.

Cognitive consequences of our grandmothering life history: cultural learning begins in infancy

Postmenopausal longevity distinguishes humans from our closest living evolutionary cousins, the great apes, and may have evolved in our lineage when the economic productivity of grandmothers allowed mothers to wean earlier and overlap dependents. Since increased longevity retards development and expands brain size across the mammals, this hypothesis links our slower developing, bigger brains to ancestral grandmothering. If foraging interdependence favoured postmenopausal longevity because grandmothers' subsidies reduced weaning ages, then ancestral infants lost full maternal engagement while their slower developing brains were notably immature. With survival dependent on social relationships, sensitivity to reputations is wired very early in neural ontogeny, beginning our lifelong preoccupation with shared intentionality. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.

The social nature of mitochondria: Implications for human health

Sociality has profound evolutionary roots and is observed from unicellular organisms to multicellular animals. In line with the view that social principles apply across levels of biological complexity, a growing body of data highlights the remarkable social nature of mitochondria - life-sustaining endosymbiotic organelles with their own genome that populate the cell cytoplasm. Here, we draw from organizing principles of behavior in social organisms to reveal that similar to individuals among social networks, mitochondria communicate with each other and with the cell nucleus, exhibit group formation and interdependence, synchronize their behaviors, and functionally specialize to accomplish specific functions within the organism. Mitochondria are social organelles. The extension of social principles across levels of biological complexity is a theoretical shift that emphasizes the role of communication and interdependence in cell biology, physiology, and neuroscience. With the help of emerging computational methods capable of capturing complex dynamic behavioral patterns, the implementation of social concepts in mitochondrial biology may facilitate cross-talk across disciplines towards increasingly holistic and accurate models of human health.

The emergence of emotionally modern humans: implications for language and learning

According to the Cooperative Breeding Hypothesis, apes with the life-history attributes of those in the line leading to the genus Homo could not have evolved unless male and female allomothers had begun to help mothers care for and provision offspring. As proposed elsewhere, the unusual way hominins reared their young generated novel phenotypes subsequently subjected to Darwinian social selection favouring those young apes best at monitoring the intentions, mental states and preferences of others and most motivated to attract and appeal to caretakers. Not only were youngsters acquiring information in social contexts different from those of other apes, but they would also have been emotionally and neurophysiologically different from them in ways that are relevant to how humans learn. Contingently delivered rewards to dependents who attracted and ingratiated themselves with allomothers shaped their behaviours and vocalizations and transformed the way developing youngsters learned from others and internalized their preferences. This article is part of the theme issue 'Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals'.

Wealth-relative effects in cooperation games

This paper investigates cooperation games in which poor agents do not benefit from cooperation with wealthy agents. They instead benefit from considering wealth relative to decision payoffs of fitness or wealth. Of concern is the effect of cooperation on participants, their rational self-interest and choices, and not the evolution of cooperation directly. The accumulation of fitness or wealth has been shown in the literature to lead to different optimal strategies for wealthy and poor players in Chicken games. The effect could have important explanatory power if it were more broadly applicable. First we empirically compare two published results, one involving the temptation parameter vs. degree of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma, and the other a surprising result from a public goods game with participants from different cultures, networks and wealth in which a fixed rather than relative payoff scheme was used. Using the temptation data to calibrate the public goods behavior suggests wealth factors can provide an explanation for the results. Second we show using simulation that adding a survival threshold to a wealth or fitness accumulating Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma produces a wealth relative effect. We clarify previous results to show the poor must avoid survival risk, regardless of whether this is associated with cooperation or defection. We do this by introducing the Farmer's Game, a simulation of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with wealth accumulation and a survival threshold. This is used to evaluate the Tit-for-Tat strategy and four variants. Equilibrium payoffs keep the game scaled to social relevance, with a fraction of all payoffs externalized as a turn cost parameter. Findings include poor performance of Tit-for-Tat near the survival threshold, superior performance of low risk strategies for both poor and wealthy players, dependence of survival of the poor near the threshold on Tit-for-Tat forgiveness, unexpected optimization of forgiveness without encountering a social dilemma, improved performance of a diverse mix of strategies, and a more abrupt threshold of social catastrophe for the better performing mix. Lastly we compare cooperating and non-cooperating societies using the simulation and discover disturbing connections between cooperation and familiar non-egalitarian wealth distribution patterns.

Efficacy of the Cooperative Assessment Method (COOPAS) to Improve the Psychiatric Care of Help-Seeking Adolescents

Objective

Effective treatment of adolescents with psychopathological disorders is essential to reduce later morbidity and disability.

To evaluate the clinical value of a new adolescent Cooperative Assessment scheme (COOPAS) as indicated by establishing therapeutic alliance, improving symptoms, and particularly by reducing dropouts.

Method

Consecutive help-seeking adolescents (N=136) were recruited, evaluated with an 8-week COOPAS protocol and followed for 6 months to document dropouts during treatment. Clinical rating scales [Hamilton Depression and Anxiety scales (HAM-D, HAM-A), Global Functioning Role and Social Scales (GF-RS, GF-SS), Structured Interview for Prodromal Symptoms (SIPS), Clinical Global Impression (CGI), Working Alliance Inventory-Therapist version (WAI-T), Therapist Response Questionnaire (TRQ), Psychotherapy Relationship Questionnaire (PRQ)] were administered at intake, 4 weeks later, and at the end of COOPAS evaluation (8 weeks).

Results

Final HAM-A and HAM-D scores improved by 25%; CGI, GF-SS and GF-RS also improved significantly. Similarly, WAI-T showed significant improvements in all three subscales, and patient-clinician relationships (PRQ) showed decreases in Anxious/Preoccupied and Avoidant/Counterdependent dimensions with increases of the Secure/Engaged measure. After 6 months, dropout rate was 8.82%.

Conclusions

COOPAS assessment was followed by reduced depressive and anxiety symptoms, good therapeutic alliance, and low dropout in adolescents.

Mills made of grist, and other interesting ideas in need of clarification

Heyes' book is an important contribution that rightly integrates cognitive development and cultural evolution. However, understanding the cultural evolution of cognitive gadgets requires a deeper appreciation of complexity, feedback, and self-organization than her book exhibits.

What are the benefits of having a village? Effects of allomaternal care on communicative skills in early infancy

This study investigates whether exposure to allomaternal care (AMC-care for infants from individuals other than the mother) improves rates of communicative behaviors during late infancy by providing more opportunities to practice communicating with varied caregivers. Data were collected from 102 typically-developing infants aged 13-18 months and their mothers. AMC variables were collected using a current care questionnaire, structured 14-day diary, and longitudinal interview. Communicative behaviors were assessed through post hoc microcoding of in-lab administrations of the Early Social Communication Scales (ESCS), as well as additional microcoding of the Bayley III Screening Cognitive Subtest. Demographic covariates were also included. For each communicative behavior, backward model selection was used to determine the best fitting linear regression model. Results suggested that rates of turn-taking decreased with Household AMC (p < 0.008), but increased with two or more siblings present at home (p < 0.01). Conversely, rates of spontaneous giving increased with Household AMC (p < 0.003) regardless of the presence of siblings. Notably, exposure to more AMC was neither helpful nor harmful for many of the tested communicative behaviors, although the number of siblings present was significantly related to rates of following commands, as well as pointing and reaching. Ultimately, this study suggests that household level experiences with AMC, rather than formalized care, impact the development of some communicative behaviors during late infancy.

Psychoanalysis and Affective Neuroscience. The Motivational/Emotional System of Aggression in Human Relations

This article highlights the evolutionary biological epistemology in Freud psychoanalytic theory. The concepts of aggressive and sexual drives are cornerstones of the psychoanalytic epistemological system, concerning the motivational/emotional roots of mental functioning. These biological roots of mental functioning, especially with regard to aggressive drive, have gradually faded away from psychoanalytic epistemology, as we show in this article. Currently, however, Neurosciences, and in particular Affective Neuroscience (Panksepp, 1998), can help us to have a better understanding of the biological roots of human mental functioning. The motivational/emotional systems studied by Affective Neuroscience can give a new epistemological foundation to the aggressive drive concept in psychoanalytic theory. Over the course of human evolution, motivational/emotional systems have played a role in social relationships and also in mental functioning. In this regard, among the various types of aggression (ANGER in Panksepp taxonomy 1998) that we consider in our article, inter-male aggression, also named Dominance motivational/emotional system, is that which regulates social interactions between sexually matured adults. This type of aggression acts in complementary connection with FEAR motivational/emotional system that regulate submissive behavior and social defeat, and the latter one is of the more important stressors. The interaction between aggression and FEAR motivational/emotional systems gives rise to agonistic behavior or dominance/submission motivational/emotional system, as we propose in our article. There is now a large literature that identifies in the dynamic of Competitive behavior, which is one of the main factors of mental illness. When social interactions activate the competitive behavior, the subject can perceive himself as "destined to victory" or "destined to defeat," activating either behaviors or emotions connected to the Involuntary Defeat Strategy or Involuntary Dominant Strategy (Sloman, 2002), which we can find in many types of mental disorders, for example, mood disorders or anxiety disorders.

The Developmental Origins of the Social Brain: Empathy, Morality, and Justice

The social brain is the cornerstone that effectively negotiates and navigates complex social environments and relationships. When mature, these social abilities facilitate the interaction and cooperation with others. Empathy, morality, and justice, among others, are all closely intertwined, yet the relationships between them are quite complex. They are fundamental components of our human nature, and shape the landscape of our social lives. The various facets of empathy, including affective arousal/emotional sharing, empathic concern, and perspective taking, have unique contributions as subcomponents of morality. This review helps understand how basic forms of empathy, morality, and justice are substantialized in early ontogeny. It provides valuable information as to gain new insights into the underlying neurobiological precursors of the social brain, enabling future translation toward therapeutic and medical interventions.

Corepresentation During Joint Action in Marmoset Monkeys ( Callithrix jacchus)

Behavioral coordination is a fundamental element of human cooperation. It is facilitated when individuals represent not only their own actions but also those of their partner. Identifying whether action corepresentation is unique to humans or also present in other species is therefore necessary to fully understand the evolution of human cooperation. We used the auditory joint Simon task to assess whether action corepresentation occurs in common marmosets, a monkey species that engages extensively in coordinated action during cooperative infant care. We found that marmosets indeed show a joint Simon effect. Furthermore, when coordinating their behavior in the joint task, they were more likely to look at their partner than in a joint control condition. Corepresentation is thus not unique to humans but also present in the cooperatively breeding marmosets. Since marmosets are small-brained monkeys, our results suggest that routine coordination in space and time, rather than complex cognitive abilities, plays a role in the evolution of corepresentation.

J. From Cognitive Load Theory to Collaborative Cognitive Load Theory

Cognitive load theory has traditionally been associated with individual learning. Based on evolutionary educational psychology and our knowledge of human cognition, particularly the relations between working memory and long-term memory, the theory has been used to generate a variety of instructional effects. Though these instructional effects also influence the efficiency and effectiveness of collaborative learning, be it computer supported or face-to-face, they are often not considered either when designing collaborative learning situations/environments or researching collaborative learning. One reason for this omission is that cognitive load theory has only sporadically concerned itself with certain particulars of collaborative learning such as the concept of a collective working memory when collaborating along with issues associated with transactive activities and their concomitant costs which are inherent to collaboration. We illustrate how and why cognitive load theory, by adding these concepts, can throw light on collaborative learning and generate principles specific to the design and study of collaborative learning.