5,7-Dihydroxytryptamine lesions in the fornix-fimbria attenuate latent inhibition

Paradoxical effects of low dose MDMA on latent inhibition in the rat

The cognitive effects of MDMA (‘Ecstasy’) are controversial, particularly in the case of acute administration of low doses. Latent inhibition (LI) refers to the reduction in conditioning to a stimulus that has received non-reinforced pre-exposure, an effect typically abolished by amphetamines and enhanced by antipsychotics. LI enhancement has also been shown using the 5-HT reuptake blocker sertraline. In the present study, the effects of MDMA (6 mg/kg, known to increase 5-HT release) were tested using 10 and 40 pre-exposures to produce weak and strong LI in controls, respectively. MDMA (injected twice, prior to pre-exposure and conditioning) significantly enhanced LI in that the effect was clearly demonstrated after only 10 pre-exposures, when it was absent in the saline controls. On its own such a profile of action would be consistent with a procognitive effect of MDMA mediated by increased availability of 5-HT. However, paradoxically the same MDMA treatment reduced LI in the 40 pre-exposures condition. This component of action is likely attributable to MDMA's actions on catecholaminergic systems and is consistent with other evidence of its adverse effects. Moreover, there were small but significant reductions in 5-HT in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and amygdala assayed 7 days post MDMA administration (2 × 6 mg/kg, 24 h apart).

Reduced activity at the 5-HT(2C) receptor enhances reversal learning by decreasing the influence of previously non-rewarded associations

RATIONALE

Reversal learning deficits are a feature of many human psychopathologies and their associated animal models and have recently been shown to involve the 5-HT(2C) receptor (5-HT(2C)R). Successful reversal learning can be reduced to two dissociable cognitive mechanisms, to dissipate associations of previous positive (opposed by perseverance) and negative (opposed by learned non-reward) valence.

OBJECTIVES

This study aims to explore the effect of reducing activity at the 5-HT(2C)R on the cognitive mechanisms underlying spatial reversal learning in the mouse.

METHODS

Experiment 1 used the 5-HT(2C)R antagonist SB242084 (0.5 mg/kg) in a between-groups serial design, experiment 2 used 5-HT(2C)R KO mice in a repeated measures design. Animals initially learned to discriminate between two lit nosepoke holes. This was followed by three conditions; (1) full reversal, where contingencies reversed; (2) perseverance, where the previous CS+ became CS- and the previous CS- was replaced by a novel CS+; (3) learned non-reward, where the previous CS- became CS+ and the previous CS+ was replaced by a novel CS-.

RESULTS

SB242084 treated and 5-HT(2C)R KO mice showed enhanced reversal learning seen as a decrease in trials, correct responses, and omissions to criterion in the full reversal condition. Similar effects were observed in the learned non-reward condition but SB242084 treated and 5-HT(2C)R KO mice did not differ from controls in the perseverance condition. SB242084 treated, but not 5-HT(2C)R KO mice, showed decreases in all latency indices in every condition.

CONCLUSION

Reducing activity at the 5-HT(2C)R facilitates reversal learning in the mouse by reducing the influence of previously non-rewarded associations.

Opposing effects of 5,7-DHT lesions to the core and shell of the nucleus accumbens on the processing of irrelevant stimuli

There is good evidence that forebrain serotonergic systems modulate cognitive flexibility. Latent inhibition (LI) is a cross-species phenomenon which manifests as poor conditioning to a stimulus that has previously been experienced without consequence and is widely considered an index of the ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli. While much research has focused on dopaminergic mechanisms underlying LI, there is also considerable evidence of serotonergic modulation. However, the neuroanatomical locus of these effects remains poorly understood. Previous work has identified the nucleus accumbens (NAc) as a key component of the neural circuit underpinning LI and furthermore, this work has shown that the core and shell subregions of the NAc contribute differentially to the expression of LI. To examine the role of the serotonergic input to NAc in LI, we tested animals with 5,7-dihydroxytryptamine (5,7-DHT) lesions to the core and shell subregions on LI assessed under experimental conditions that produce LI in shams and subsequently with weak stimulus pre-exposure designed to prevent the emergence of LI in shams. We found that serotonergic deafferentation of the core disrupted LI whereas 5,7-DHT lesions to the shell produced the opposite effect and potentiated LI.

On giving a more active and selective role to consciousness

An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.

The control of consciousness via a neuropsychological feedback loop

Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.

Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”

Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.

Consciousness is for other people

Gray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds (and brains) in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.

Comparators, functions, and experiences

The comparator model is insufficient for three reasons. First, consciousness is involved in the process of comparison as well as in the output. Second, we still do not have enough neurophysiological information to match the events of consciousness, although such knowledge is growing. Third, the anatomical localisation proposed can be damaged bilaterally but consciousness will persist.

Possible roles for a predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory and imitative learning

This commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. (1994) to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.

Consciousness does not seem to be linked to a single neural mechanism

On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model (or conjecture) of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.

Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings

Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.

On seeking the mythical fountain of consciousness

Because consciousness has an organizational, or functional, center, Gray supposes that there must be a corresponding physical center in the brain. He proposes further that since this center generates consciousness, ablating it would eliminate consciousness, while leaving behavior intact. But the center of consciousness is simply the product of the functional linkages among sensory input, memory, inner speech, and so on, and behavior.

Prospects for a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness

In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.

Septohippocampal comparator: Consciousness generator or attention feedback loop?

As Gray insists, his comparator model proposes a brute correlation only – of consciousness with septohippocampal output. I suggest that the comparator straddles a feedback loop that boosts the activation ofnovelrepresentations, thus helping them feature in present or recollected experience. Such a role in organizing conscious contents would transcend correlation and help explain how consciousness emerges from brain function.

Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds

Perspective and reflection (whether involving conceptual or nonconceptual content) have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.

Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience

It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.

Consciousness, memory, and the hippocampal system: What kind of connections can we make?

Gray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.

Communication and consciousness: A neural network conjecture

The communicative aspects of the contents of consciousness are analyzed in the framework of a neural network model of animal communication. We discuss some issues raised by Gray, such as the control of the contents of consciousness, the adaptive value of consciousness, conscious and unconscious behaviors, and the nature of a model's consciousness.

Overworking the hippocampus

The postulated hippocampal comparator, like any other subsystem, must rely on “syntactic” patterns in its “input,” and hence could not have the extraordinary powers Gray supposes. It may play a more modest role, but it is not the place “where it all comes together” for consciousness.

Consciousness and its (dis)contents

The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the contents of consciousness, to widen the description of the neural machinery instantiating the comparator system, and to clarify the relationship between the contents of consciousness in the here-and-now and episodic memory.

The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture

Drawing on previous models of anxiety, intermediate memory, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and goal-directed behaviour, a neuropsychological hypothesis is proposed for the generation of the contents of consciousness. It is suggested that these correspond to the outputs of a comparator that, on a moment-by-moment basis, compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. An outline is given of the information-processing functions of the comparator system and of the neural systems which mediate them. The hypothesis appears to be able to account for a number of key features of the contents of consciousness. However, it is argued that neitherthis nor any existing comparable hypothesis is yet able to explain why the brain should generate conscious experience of any kind at all.

The elusive quale

If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements (qualia) within the brain or as internal products of the brain.

Information synthesis in cortical areas as an important link in brain mechanisms of mind

To explore the mechanism of sensation correlations between EP (evoked potential) component amplitude and signal detection indices (d' and criterion) were studied. The time of sensation coincided with the peak latency of those EP components that showed a correlation with both indices. The components presumably reflected information synthesis in projection cortical neurons. A mechanism providing the synthesis process is proposed.

The limits of neurophysiological models of consciousness

This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other thirdperson perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.

Reticular-thalamic activation of the cortex generates conscious contents

Gray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.

Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?

Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.

Mind – your head!

Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own model – ending up dealing with the unknowable.

The homunculus at home

In Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator (needing problem resolution) and matches (during appetitive approach) have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty (i.e., information-processing mismatches) especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.

Brain-behaviour relationships in latent inhibition: a computational model

In a series of studies, we applied a neural network to study the neural bases of latent inhibition. We first designed a model able to handle behavioral data and then we investigated whether structures and neural elements in the brain were able to carry out the operations described by network. We demonstrated that the network was able to describe many of the behavioral properties of LI, and elucidate the effects of several manipulations of the dopaminergic system, the hippocampus, and the nucleus accumbens on LI, as well as some of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. The results support the idea that a 'conceptual nervous system' can be successfully used to relate brain and behavior.

The "two-headed" latent inhibition model of schizophrenia: modeling positive and negative symptoms and their treatment

RATIONALE

Latent inhibition (LI), namely, poorer performance on a learning task involving a previously pre-exposed non-reinforced stimulus, is disrupted in the rat by the dopamine (DA) releaser amphetamine which produces and exacerbates psychotic (positive) symptoms, and this is reversed by treatment with typical and atypical antipsychotic drugs (APDs) which on their own potentiate LI. These phenomena are paralleled by disrupted LI in normal amphetamine-treated humans, in high schizotypal humans, and in schizophrenia patients in the acute stages of the disorder, as well as by potentiated LI in normal humans treated with APDs. Consequently, disrupted LI is considered to provide an animal model of positive symptoms of schizophrenia with face, construct and predictive validity.

OBJECTIVES

To review most of the rodent data on the neural substrates of LI as well as on the effects of APDs on this phenomenon with an attempt to interpret and integrate these data within the framework of the switching model of LI; to show that there are two distinct LI models, disrupted and abnormally persistent LI; to relate these findings to the clinical condition.

RESULTS

The nucleus accumbens (NAC) and its DA innervation form a crucial component of the neural circuitry of LI, and are involved at the conditioning stage. There is a clear functional differentiation between the NAC shell and core subregions whereby damage to the shell disrupts LI and damage to the core renders LI abnormally persistent under conditions that disrupt LI in normal rats. The effects of shell and core lesions parallel those produced by lesions to the major sources of input to the NAC: entorhinal cortex lesion, like shell lesion, disrupts LI, whereas hippocampal lesion, like core lesion, produces persistent LI with changes in context, and basolateral amygdala (BLA) lesion, like core lesion, produces persistent LI with extended conditioning. Systemically induced blockade of glutamatergic as well as DA transmission produce persistent LI via effects exerted at the conditioning stage, whereas enhancement of DA transmission disrupts LI via effects at the conditioning stage. Serotonergic manipulations can disrupt or potentiate LI via effects at the pre-exposure stage. Both typical and atypical APDs potentiate LI via effects at conditioning whereas atypical APDs in addition disrupt LI via effects at pre-exposure. Schizophrenia patients can exhibit disrupted or normal LI as a function of the state of the disorder (acute versus chronic), as well as persistent LI.

CONCLUSIONS

Different drug and lesion manipulations produce two poles of abnormality in LI, namely, disrupted LI under conditions which lead to LI in normal rats, and abnormally persistent LI under conditions which disrupt it in normal rats. Disrupted and persistent LI are differentially responsive to APDs, with the former reversed by both typical and atypical APDs and the latter selectively reversed by atypical APDs. It is suggested that this "two-headed LI model" mimics two extremes of deficient cognitive switching seen in schizophrenia, excessive and retarded switching between associations, mediated by dysfunction of different brain circuitries, and can serve to model positive symptoms of schizophrenia and typical antipsychotic action, as well as negative symptoms of schizophrenia and atypical antipsychotic action.

Disruption and potentiation of latent inhibition by risperidone: the latent inhibition model of atypical antipsychotic action

Latent inhibition (LI), that is, retarded conditioning to a stimulus following its nonreinforced pre-exposure, is impaired in some subsets of schizophrenia patients and in amphetamine-treated rats. Potentiation of LI by antipsychotic drugs (APDs) given in conditioning, under conditions that do not lead to LI in controls, is a well-established index of antipsychotic activity. Recently, we have shown that the atypical APD, clozapine, in addition disrupts LI if administered in pre-exposure, under conditions that lead to LI in controls. This study demonstrates the same behavioral profile for the atypical APD risperidone. LI was measured in a thirst-motivated conditioned emotional response procedure by comparing suppression of drinking in response to a tone previously paired with a foot shock in rats that received nonreinforced exposure to the tone prior to conditioning (pre-exposed (PE)) and rats for whom the tone was novel (non-pre-exposed (NPE)). We show that under conditions that did not yield LI in vehicle controls (40 pre-exposures and five conditioning trials), risperidone (0.25, 0.5, and 1.2 mg/kg) led to LI when administered in conditioning. Under conditions that led to LI in vehicle controls (40 pre-exposures and two conditioning trials), risperidone (0.25, 0.5, and 2.5 mg/kg) abolished LI when administered in pre-exposure; the latter effect was not evident with haloperidol. In addition, the effects of risperidone administered in both the pre-exposure and conditioning stages were dose-dependent so that the pre-exposure-based action was manifested at lower but not at higher doses. It is concluded that atypical APDs exert in the LI model a dual pattern of effects, which enables detection of their 'typical' action (conditioning-based LI potentiation) as well as a dissociation from typical APDs by their 'atypical' action (pre-exposure-based LI disruption). It is suggested that the former and latter effects are subserved by D2 and 5HT2A antagonism, respectively.

Latent inhibition is attenuated by noise and partially restored by a 5-HT2A receptor antagonist

Latent inhibition (LI) is a model of attention, which is a cognitive process that can be modulated by stressors such as chronic intermittent broadband noise, e.g. caused by building work, which is particularly stressful to rats. The aim of this study was to analyse the effect of chronic noise stress, caused by a building project, on LI, and its interaction with SR 46,349B, a 5-HT2A receptor antagonist. Control groups from LI experiments conducted during periods of chronic intermittent noise were compared with control groups from LI experiments conducted in normal quiet conditions. The interaction of SR 46,349B with the effects of chronic noise stress was then tested. Chronic intermittent noise attenuated LI, an effect which was partially reversed by SR 46,349B, 2.4 mg/kg i.p. Attenuation of LI by chronic intermittent noise and reversal of this effect by SR 46,349B support suggestions that stress can modulate attention and that 5-HT2A receptors are involved in mediating the effects of chronic stress.

Serotonergic depletion increases conditioned suppression to background stimuli in the rat

Dark Agouti rats were lesioned by intra-ventricular injection of 5,7-dihydroxytryptamine (DHT) and, 2 weeks later, learning was tested in a conditioned suppression of drinking procedure. Lesioned and vehicle-injected control rats were conditioned with a discrete stimulus (tone or light conditioned stimulus, CS) twice paired with footshock (unconditioned stimulus), with or without a 30-s trace interval between these events to produce strong and weak learning conditions (a trace conditioning effect). During this conditioning session, the alternate stimulus (light or tone) was presented continuously in the background. Since the 5,7-DHT lesion also reduced the baseline licking response in the experimental chambers, we used drinking during the first minute, when this non-specific effect was minimal, as the dependent variable. We tested conditioning to target CS and to the alternative experimental background stimulus in exactly the same way in the same rats. We found that a level of serotonergic depletion without any intrinsic action on the trace conditioning effect nevertheless increased conditioning to the alternative background stimulus, irrespective of trace interval or stimulus modality. Thus, for both light and tone stimuli, the effect of serotonergic depletion depended only on the discrete target versus diffuse background role of the stimulus in use. These findings have implications for the modification of human cognition by serotonergic drugs.

The effects of a serotoninergic substrate of the nucleus accumbens on latent inhibition

Latent inhibition is an effect consisting of a delay in the acquisition of a stimulus in response to quenching of its significance by repeated presentation (pre-exposure) before combination with the reinforcement. This phenomenon is used for studies of the mechanisms of attention. Experiments were performed on rats to determine whether latent inhibition could be formed in a passive avoidance response in conditions of blockade of serotoninergic terminals in the nucleus accumbens. After pre-exposure, sham-operated animals demonstrated a delay in acquisition of the stimulus as compared with animals not subjected to pre-exposure. Bilateral injection of the neurotoxin 5,7-dihydroxytryptamine into the nucleus accumbens led to disruption of latent inhibition, which could in turn be prevented by systemic administration of haloperidol before training. The importance of serotoninergic terminals in the nucleus accumbens for latent inhibition is discussed, along with the mechanism of their interaction with the dopaminergic system during the formation of this effect.

The pharmacology of latent inhibition as an animal model of schizophrenia

The nature of the primary symptoms of schizophrenia and our lack of knowledge of its underlying cause both contribute to the difficulty of generating convincing animal models of schizophrenia. A more recent approach to investigating the biological basis of schizophrenia has been to use information processing models of the disease to link psychotic phenomena to their neural basis. Schizophrenics are impaired in a number of experimental cognitive tasks that support this approach, including sensory gating tasks and models of selective attention such as latent inhibition (LI). LI refers to a process in which noncontingent presentation of a stimulus attenuates its ability to enter into subsequent associations, and it has received much attention because it is widely considered to relate to the cognitive abnormalities that characterise acute schizophrenia. Several claims have been made for LI having face and construct validity for schizophrenia. In this review of the pharmacological studies carried out with LI we examine its claim to predictive validity and the role of methodological considerations in drug effects. The data reviewed demonstrate that facilitation of low levels of LI is strongly related to demonstrated antipsychotic activity in man and all major antipsychotic drugs, both typical and atypical, have been shown to potentiate LI using a variety of protocols. Very few compounds without antipsychotic activity are active in this model. In contrast, disruption of LI occurs with a wide range of drugs and the relationship with psychotomimetic potential is less clear. Although reversal of disrupted LI has also been used as a model for antipsychotic acticity, mostly using amphetamine-induced disruption, insufficient studies have been carried out to evaluate its claim to predictive validity. However, like facilitation, it is sensitive to both typical and atypical antipsychotic agents. The data we have reviewed here demonstrate that facilitation of LI and, perhaps to a lesser extent, reversal of disrupted LI fulfil the criteria for predictive validity.

A neurotoxic lesion of serotonergic neurones using 5,7-dihydroxytryptamine does not disrupt latent inhibition in paradigms sensitive to low doses of amphetamine

Testing the effects of low doses of d-amphetamine on latent inhibition (LI) in two different conditioning paradigms, passive avoidance and conditioned taste aversion, provided evidence of their pharmacological equivalence. For passive avoidance, LI was expressed by the decreased latency to enter a shock compartment in preexposed rats placed 5 min in the compartment during 3 consecutive days before conditioning. In the conditioned taste aversion paradigm, a group of rats was preexposed to a solution of sucrose also for 3 consecutive days prior to the establishment of an association between sucrose and sickness elicited by an injection of LiCl. On the following day, the preexposed rats drunk more sucrose when allowed to choose between one tube containing water and an other containing sucrose. In both paradigms, 0.25 mg/kg d-amphetamine, injected daily on the 3 preexposure days and on the conditioning day, decreased LI. A dose of 0.5 mg/kg suppressed LI in the passive avoidance paradigm. The effect of a serotonergic lesion induced by i.c.v. injection of 5,7-dihydroxytryptamine (5,7-DHT) was evaluated in the same paradigms. The lesion procedure that lowered hippocampal serotonin and 5 HIAA levels by more than 80% did not affect LI. Taken together, the present results lessens the hypothesis that LI is prone to an opposing influence of the two monoaminergic systems considered in this work.

WAY100635 and latent inhibition in the rat: selective effects at preexposure

The influence of the selective, silent 5HT1a antagonist WAY100635 (Wyeth Research Ltd) on the latent inhibition effect was examined in a within-subject, on-baseline conditioned suppression procedure in rats. WAY100635 was found to enhance the latent inhibition effect, producing a retardation in the acquisition of conditioned suppression following a level of stimulus preexposure known to be insufficient to produce a latent inhibition effect in control animals. This influence of the drug was restricted to its actions during the preexposure phase of the experiment, and the drug also abolished the unconditioned suppression of lever pressing that occurs on the first presentation of a novel auditory stimulus. These findings are discussed in terms of the possible influence of serotonergic manipulations on contextual processing, and also have important implications for current animal models of schizophrenia which stress the role of dopaminergic mechanisms in latent inhibition.

Disruption of latent inhibition in the rat by the 5-HT2 agonist DOI: effects of MDL 100,907, clozapine, risperidone and haloperidol

Latent inhibition (LI), a measure of the ability to learn to ignore irrelevant stimuli, is disrupted in acute schizophrenics and in rats treated with amphetamine; antipsychotics prevent amphetamine disruption of LI in rats. The 5-HT2A/C agonist 1-(2,5-dimethoxy-4-iodophenyl)-2-aminopropane (DOI) has hallucinogenic properties in humans, and evidence suggests that 5-HT2 antagonism is an important component of atypical antipsychotic activity. Therefore, the ability of DOI to disrupt LI in rats was tested, and the ability of clinically-used and putative antipsychotics to reverse DOI disruption of LI was assessed. The method consisted of four phases. After habituation to the apparatus, thirsty rats underwent preexposure to a tone stimulus 24 h prior to two tone-shock conditioning trials. LI was demonstrated at testing (an additional 24 h later) by reduced lick suppression during tone presentation. When administered at the preexposure phase only, DOI disrupted LI. However, when administered at both preexposure and conditioning phases, DOI did not disrupt LI except at the highest dose, where lick suppression itself was also disrupted. Therefore, disruptive effects of DOI on LI are not easily dissociated from state-dependent learning effects. Additional experiments demonstrated that haloperidol, clozapine, risperidone, and the selective 5-HT2A antagonist MDL 100,907 prevented the disruptive effects of DOI on LI when administered at preexposure only. These results agree with findings that these compounds can also prevent other behavioral effects of DOI. Further experiments will be required to explore the possible involvement of state-dependent learning effects in the present results. However, if the disruptive effects of DOI on LI are due to an influence on attentional processes rather than state-dependent learning, this procedure may have potential as a method for detection of antipsychotic activity.

Latent inhibition in conditioned emotional response: c-fos immunolabelling evidence for brain areas involved in the rat

Latent inhibition refers to the fact that the formation of a conditioned association between a conditioned and an unconditioned stimulus is delayed by prior exposure to the conditioned stimulus. Latent inhibition is often investigated in the context of the conditioned emotional response, in which a tone serves as the conditioned and a footshock as the unconditioned stimulus. Such a paradigm was used for the present experiments in which some rats had been pre-exposed to the tone. Two hours after a subsequent exposure to the tone, c-fos immunocytochemistry was used to map activated brain areas. The density of immunoreactive neurones was measured in brain areas involved in audition, fear, stress and memory. For the basic conditioning group, pre-exposure to the tone decreased the density of labelled cells in the auditory system, areas involved in fear and stress and a number of limbic areas, namely the amygdala, the Ammon's horn of the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex. In contrast, the density increased in three limbic areas: the dentate gyrus, the subiculum and the nucleus accumbens. Taken together, these data suggest that latent inhibition corresponds to alterations of sensory processing which renders difficult to state about the alteration of the transfers of the sensory information to structures involved in the control of emotional responses. As some brain areas show a specific increase of activity in cases of latent inhibition, further studies will investigate how the latter brain areas contribute to the other cell density alterations reported in this study and to the latent inhibition phenomenon itself.

Conditioned blocking in patients with paranoid, non-paranoid psychosis or obsessive compulsive disorder: associations with symptoms, personality and monoamine metabolism

Conditioned blocking (CB) refers to a delay in learning that a new stimulus, added during learning, has the same consequences as the conditioned stimulus already present. In animals such "learned inattention" depends on monoaminergic and limbic function and, thus, CB performance should be informative on selective information processing impairments found in subgroups of psychotic patients. Attenuated CB in acute schizophrenia has been reported to normalize rapidly. This study examines in young patients the specificity of CB performance to illness, and its associations with symptoms, personality traits and monoaminergic metabolic status. CB was attenuated in psychotic patients with non-paranoid symptoms (NP: n = 12, mean age 17 years) with respect to obsessive-compulsive (OCD: n = 13, mean age 16 years) and healthy subjects (CON, n = 29, mean age 18 years), but only a transient attenuation was observed in paranoid hallucinatory patients (PH: n = 14, mean age 19 years). Outgoing personality traits in CON and OCD subjects correlated with CB. In NP patients attenuated CB was associated with increasing neurotic lability. In PH patients CB correlated positively with "manic" but negatively with psychotic or neurotic scores. The severity of negative symptoms in psychosis and specific negative/positive symptoms in the NP/PH groups was associated with reduced CB. Increased dopamine activity (24-h urine samples) correlated positively with CB, but relative increases of noradrenaline metabolism in NP and serotonin metabolism in OCD patients interfered. In summary, marked psychotic or neurotic traits and some symptom-states were associated with reduced CB. The particular selective processing problems of NP patients may reflect inappropriate NA activity.

Correlating mind and body

Gray's integration of the different levels of description and explanation in his theory is problematic: (1) The introduction of consciousness into his theorising consists of the mind-brain identity assumption, which tells us nothing new. (2) There need not be correlations between levels of description. (3) Gray's account does not extend beyond “brute” correlation. Integration must be achieved in a principled, mutually constraining way.

Consciousness beyond the comparator

Gray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.

Ultimate differences

Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.

Human consciousness: One of a kind

To avoid teleological interpretations, it is important to make a distinction between functions and uses of consciousness, and to address questions concerning the consequences of consciousness. Assumptions about the phylogenetic distribution of consciousness are examined. It is concluded that there is some value in identifying consciousness an exclusively human attribute.

Context and consciousness

The commentary argues (1) that we cannot be sure that human consciousness has survival value and (2) that in order to understand the origins and, perhaps, the function of consciousness, we should examine the behavioural and neural precursors to consciousness in nonhumans. An example is given of research on the role of context in decisions regarding fleeing from probable predators in the Mongolian gerbil.

The role of mesolimbic dopaminergic and retrohippocampal afferents to the nucleus accumbens in latent inhibition: implications for schizophrenia

Latent inhibition (LI) consists in a retardation of conditioning seen when the to-be-conditioned stimulus is first presented a number of times without other consequence. Disruption of LI has been proposed as a possible model of the cognitive abnormality that underlies the positive psychotic symptoms of acute schizophrenia. We review here evidence in support of the model, including experiments tending to show that: (1) disruption of LI is characteristic of acute, positively-symptomatic schizophrenia; (2) LI depends upon dopaminergic activity; (3) LI depends specifically upon dopamine release in n. accumbens; (4) LI depends upon the integrity of the hippocampal formation and the retrohippocampal region reciprocally connected to the hippocampal formation; (5) the roles of n. accumbens and the hippocampal system in LI are interconnected.