Economic incentives and physicians' delivery of preventive care: a systematic review

Impact of prevention in primary care on costs in primary and secondary care for people with serious mental illness

A largely unexplored part of the financial incentive for physicians to participate in preventive care is the degree to which they are the residual claimant from any resulting cost savings. We examine the impact of two preventive activities for people with serious mental illness (care plans and annual reviews of physical health) by English primary care practices on costs in these practices and in secondary care. Using panel two-part models to analyze patient-level data linked across primary and secondary care, we find that these preventive activities in the previous year are associated with cost reductions in the current quarter both in primary and secondary care. We estimate that there are large beneficial externalities for which the primary care physician is not the residual claimant: the cost savings in secondary care are 4.7 times larger than the cost savings in primary care. These activities are incentivized in the English National Health Service but the total financial incentives for primary care physicians to participate were considerably smaller than the total cost savings produced. This suggests that changes to the design of incentives to increase the marginal reward for conducting these preventive activities among patients with serious mental illness could have further increased welfare.

Dual Agency in Hospitals: What Strategies Do Managers and Physicians Apply to Reconcile Dilemmas Between Clinical and Economic Considerations?

BACKGROUND

Hospital professionals are "dual agents" who may face dilemmas between their commitment to patients' clinical needs and hospitals' financial sustainability. This study examines whether and how hospital professionals balance or reconcile clinical and economic considerations in their decision-making in two countries with activity-based payment systems.

METHODS

We conducted 46 semi-structured interviews with hospital managers, chief physicians and practicing physicians in five German and five Israeli hospitals in 2018/2019. We used thematic analysis to identify common topics and patterns of meaning.

RESULTS

Hospital professionals report many situations in which activity-based payment incentivizes proper treatment, and clinical and economic considerations are aligned. This is the case when efficiency can be improved, eg, by curbing unnecessary expenditures or specializing in certain procedures. When considerations are misaligned, hospital professionals have developed a range of strategies that may contribute to balancing competing considerations. These include 'reshaping management,' such as better planning of the entire course of treatment and improvement of the coding; and 'reframing decision-making,' which involves working with averages and developing tool-kits for decision-making.

CONCLUSION

Misalignment of economic and clinical considerations does not necessarily have negative implications, if professionals manage to balance and reconcile them. Context is important in determining if considerations can be reconciled or not. Reconciling strategies are fragile and can be easily disrupted depending on context. Creating tool-kits for better decision-making, planning the treatment course in advance, working with averages, and having interdisciplinary teams to think together about ways to improve efficiency can help mitigate dilemmas of hospital professionals.

Treating Excessive Consumers With Brief Intervention to Reduce Their Alcohol Consumption

Abstract. Background: General Practitioners’ (GP) readiness to implement screening and brief intervention to reduce alcohol consumption of excessive consumers is low. Although several barriers were identified by past research, improving these conditions has not led to improved implementation. Based on Expectancy Value Theory of Achievement Motivation we assume that low seriousness of the health problem in association with the treatment of excessive alcohol consumers may be considered as a crucial barrier too. Aims: By our study, we tested for the influence of the seriousness of the health problem on the GP’s readiness to implement brief intervention (BI) in comparison to crucial barriers such as insufficient financial reimbursement and low patient adherence. Method: In order to manipulate the seriousness of the health problem GPs were confronted with three different situations each introducing a fictitious patient with either excessive alcohol consumption, or binge drinking, or harmful alcohol consumption. Results: Questionnaires of 185 GPs were analyzed. As hypothesized GPs were less ready to treat patients with excessive consumption in comparison to patients with harmful consumption, t(184) = 5.51, p < .001, d = .40, and binge drinking, t(184) = 6.14, p < .001, d = .43. Their readiness was higher in case of high adherence, F(1, 181) = 17.35, p < .001, η2 = .09. Limitations: Recruitment of GPs was based on voluntary participation. GPs had to assess their readiness in the artificial context of case vignettes. Conclusion: GPs’ readiness to implement a BI was influenced by the seriousness of the health problem and expected patient adherence. No such effect was found for financial reimbursement.

Behavioral Economics: A Primer and Applications to the UN Sustainable Development Goal of Good Health and Well-Being

Behavioral economics (BE) is a relatively new field within economics that incorporates insights from psychology that can be harnessed to improve economic decision making with the potential to enhance good health and well-being of individuals and societies, the third of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. While some of the psychological principles of economic decision making were described as far back as the 1700s by Adam Smith, BE emerged as a discipline in the 1970s with the groundbreaking work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. We describe the basic concepts of BE, heuristics (decision-making shortcuts) and their associated biases, and the BE strategies framing, incentives, and economic nudging to overcome these biases. We survey the literature to identify how BE techniques have been employed to improve individual choice (focusing on childhood obesity), health policy, and patient and healthcare provider decision making. Additionally, we discuss how these BE-based efforts to improve health-related decision making can lead to sustaining good health and well-being and identify additional health-related areas that may benefit from including principles of BE in decision making.

Testing cost containment of future healthcare with maintained or improved quality-The COSTCARES project

BACKGROUND

Increasing healthcare costs need to be contained in order to maintain equality of access to care for all EU citizens. A cross-disciplinary consortium of experts was supported by the EU FP7 research programme, to produce a roadmap on cost containment, while maintaining or improving the quality of healthcare. The roadmap comprises two drivers: person-centred care and health promotion; five critical enablers also need to be addressed: information technology, quality measures, infrastructure, incentive systems, and contracting strategies.

METHOD

In order to develop and test the roadmap, a COST Action project was initiated: COST-CARES, with 28 participating countries. This paper provides an overview of evidence about the effects of each of the identified enablers. Intersections between the drivers and the enablers are identified as critical for the success of future cost containment, in tandem with maintained or improved quality in healthcare. This will require further exploration through testing.

CONCLUSION

Cost containment of future healthcare, with maintained or improved quality, needs to be addressed through a concerted approach of testing key factors. We propose a framework for test lab design based on these drivers and enablers in different European countries.

The effects of structure, process and outcome incentives on primary care referrals to a national prevention programme

Despite widespread use, evidence is sparse on whether financial incentives in healthcare should be linked to structure, process or outcome. We examine the impact of different incentive types on the quantity and effectiveness of referrals made by general practices to a new national prevention programme in England. We measured effectiveness by the number of referrals resulting in programme attendance. We surveyed local commissioners about their use of financial incentives and linked this information to numbers of programme referrals and attendances from 5170 general practices between April 2016 and March 2018. We used multivariate probit regressions to identify commissioner characteristics associated with the use of different incentive types and negative binomial regressions to estimate their effect on practice rates of referral and attendance. Financial incentives were offered by commissioners in the majority of areas (89%), with 38% using structure incentives, 69% using process incentives and 22% using outcome incentives. Compared to practices without financial incentives, neither structure nor process incentives were associated with statistically significant increases in referrals or attendances, but outcome incentives were associated with 84% more referrals and 93% more attendances. Outcome incentives were the only form of pay-for-performance to stimulate more participation in this national disease prevention programme.

Assuring Adequate Treatment for Persons Diagnosed With Gonorrhea in New York State

BACKGROUND

From November 2014 to May 2016, 57 local health departments in New York State (NYS) excluding New York City were offered a performance incentive (PI) to promote adherence to federally recommended treatment guidelines for gonorrhea. The rationale of the PI was to delay antibiotic resistance and disrupt transmission through attaining a high percentage of treatment adherence.

METHODS

Surveillance data from the NYS Communicable Disease Electronic Surveillance System were used for analysis. We evaluated adherence per Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sexually transmitted diseases treatment guidelines for persons 12 years and older reported with uncomplicated gonorrhea during 4 time frames: Pre-PI, PI One, PI Two, and Post-PI. We measured adherence per the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sexually transmitted disease treatment guidelines during each respective time frame and conducted χ tests to test for the association between treatment adequacy and time frame.

RESULTS

During the Pre-PI, treatment was adequate in 82.0% of persons diagnosed with gonorrhea. After program implementation, treatment adequacy increased significantly (92.1% of diagnosed persons during PI One, 90.4% during PI Two, and 90.5% during the Post-PI; P ≤ 0.0001). The most common reason for inadequate or missing treatment was patient lost to follow-up.

CONCLUSIONS

Public health intervention by the NYS Department of Health improved local health department adherence to federally recommended gonorrhea treatment guidelines, and improvements were maintained after the completion of the PI.

Financial reimbursement - irrelevant for GPs' readiness to implement brief intervention to reduce alcohol consumption? A cross-sectional vignette study

Background

General Practitioners’ (GPs) readiness to implement screening and brief intervention (SBI) to treat patients with excessive alcohol consumption is low. Several studies identified crucial barriers such as insufficient financial reimbursement. In contrast to the barriers-account, we assume that low implementation readiness of GPs may be less attributed to external barriers but rather more so to inherent characteristics of SBI. To test our assumption, we conducted a vignette study assessing the GPs’ readiness to implement SBI in comparison to a pharmacological intervention also designed for the treatment of excessive drinkers in relation to standard or above-standard financial reimbursement. According to our hypothesis GPs should be less ready to implement SBI regardless of financial reimbursement.

Methods

A convenience sample of GPs was recruited to answer the questionnaire. To assess the GPs’ implementation readiness a 4-item 6-point Likert scale was developed and pretested.

Results

One hundred forty GPs completed the questionnaire. GPs were more ready to implement the pharmacological intervention than SBI, F(1,132) = 27.58, p > .001 (main effect).

We found no effect for financial reimbursement, F(1,132) = 3.60, ns, and no interaction effect, F(1,132) = 2.20, ns.

Conclusions

Further research should investigate more thoroughly the crucial characteristics of SBI to initiate a modification process finally leading to more effective primary care dependency prevention.

Effect of financial incentives on breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening delivery rates: Results from a systematic literature review

Preventive care, such as screening, is important for reducing the risk of cancer, a leading cause of death worldwide. Indeed, some type of cancers are detected through screening programs, which in most countries run for colorectal, breast, and cervical cancers. In this context, general practitioners play a key role in increasing the participation rate in cancer screening programs. To improve cancer screening delivery rates, performance incentives have increasingly been implemented in primary care by healthcare payers and organizations in different countries. The effects of these tools are still not clear. We conducted a systematic literature review in order to answer the following research question: What is the evidence in the literature for the effects of financial incentives on the delivery rates of breast, cervical and colorectal cancer screening in general practice? We performed a literature search in Web of Science, PubMed, Cochrane Library and Google Scholar, according to the PRISMA guidelines. 18 studies were selected, classified and discussed according to the health preventive services investigated. Most of studies showed partial or no effects of financial incentives on breast and cervical cancer screening delivery rates. Few positive or partial effects were found regarding colorectal cancer screening. Ongoing monitoring of incentive programs is critical to determining the effectiveness of financial incentives and their effects on the improvement of cancer screening delivery rates.

Why Money Alone Can’t (Always) “Nudge” Physicians

Behavioral economics seeks to define how humans respond to incentives, how to maximize desired behavioral change, and how to avoid perverse negative impacts on work effort. Relatively new in their application to physician behavior, behavioral economic principles have primarily been used to construct optimized financial incentives. This review introduces and evaluates the essential components of building successful financial incentive programs for physicians, adhering to the principles of behavioral economics. Referencing conceptual publications, observational studies, and the relatively sparse controlled studies, the authors offer physician leaders, healthcare administrators, and practicing anesthesiologists the issues to consider when designing physician incentive programs to maximize effectiveness and minimize unintended consequences.

[General practitioners’ preferences towards incentive measures linked with cancer screening]

INTRODUCTION

General practitioners (GPs) play a key role in the delivery of preventive and screening services for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers. Yet, their current provision of screening services remains low and varies considerably across screening contexts and GPs. This study investigates the determinants of GPs' involvement in cancer screening activities using discrete choice experiment (DCE) methodology.

METHODS

A representative sample of 402 GPs was recruited in France between March and April 2014. The participants completed 12 choice tasks designed to elicit their preferences for 5 cancer screening attributes aimed at increasing their supply of cancer screening services.

RESULTS

GPs are sensitive to both financial and non-financial incentives, such as a compensated training and systematic transmission of information about screened patients, aimed to facilitate communication between doctors and patients. There is also evidence that the preferences differ across screening contexts: GPs appear to be relatively more sensitive to financial incentives for being involved in colorectal cancer screening, whereas they have higher preference for non-financial incentives in breast and cervical cancers.

CONCLUSION

Our study provides new findings for policymakers interested in prioritizing levers to increase the supply of cancer screening services in general practice.

Procedures performed by general practitioners and general internal medicine physicians - a comparison based on routine data from Northern Germany

Background

In response to a rising shortage of general practitioners (GPs), physicians in general internal medicine (GIM) have become part of the German primary care physician workforce. Previous studies have shown substantial differences in practice patterns between both specialties. The aim of this study was to analyse and compare the application of procedures by German GPs and GIM physicians based on routine data.

Methods

The Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians in the federal state Schleswig-Holstein (Northern Germany) provided invoicing data of the first quarters of 2013 and 2015. Differences between GPs and GIM physicians in the implementation rate of 46 selected primary care procedures were examined by means of the Pearson χ²-test. The selection of procedures was based on international and own preliminary studies on primary care procedures.

Results

In the first quarter of 2013/2015 respectively, 1228/1227 GPs and 447/484 GIM physicians provided services in Schleswig-Holstein. Significant differences were found for 20 of the 46 procedures. GPs had higher application rates of procedures concerning health screening (e.g. adolescent health examination, well-child visits) and minor surgery. GIM physicians more often applied technology-oriented procedures, such as ultrasound scans, electrocardiograms (ECG), and 24-h ambulatory blood pressure measurements. The treatment patterns of both specialities did not vary much during the study period. Cardiac stress testing was the only significantly increased GP procedure in that time.

Conclusions

Our results suggest substantial differences in the application of procedures between GPs and GIM physicians with potential consequences for the overall primary healthcare provision. The findings could foster a discussion about training needs for procedures in primary care to ensure its comprehensiveness. The results reflect scope for changes in vocational training in the future for an effective and efficient re-allocation of primary healthcare.

Community orientation of general practitioners in 34 countries

General practitioners (GPs) are frontline health workers. They should be sensitive to the health needs of the community in addition to caring for patients that visit their practice. Due to changes in demography, epidemiology, ecology and healthcare policy, a community orientation becomes more important. Our research question is: to what extent does community orientation of GPs vary between countries and GPs and how can this variation be explained? We use cross-sectional survey data from the QUALICOPC study, conducted among over 7000 GPs in 34 countries. Community orientation was measured through a scale constructed from three survey questions on whether GPs would take action when confronted with: repeated accidents in an industrial setting, frequent respiratory problems in patients living near a certain industry, and repeated cases of food poisoning in the local community. Independent variables are at healthcare system level and GP or practice level. Data were analysed using linear multilevel regression analysis. Community orientation varies between GPs and countries. Community orientation is more frequent in healthcare systems with a list system, among self-employed GPs, those using medical records to make overviews, and those more active in prevention and multidisciplinary cooperation. GPs in rural areas and areas with more people from ethnic minorities are more community oriented. Based on the variation between countries and GPs, we would like to raise awareness and underline the importance of multidisciplinary cooperation.

Can pay-for-performance to primary care providers stimulate appropriate use of antibiotics?

Antibiotic resistance is a major threat to public health worldwide. As the healthcare sector's use of antibiotics is an important contributor to the development of resistance, it is crucial that physicians only prescribe antibiotics when needed and that they choose narrow-spectrum antibiotics, which act on fewer bacteria types, when possible. Inappropriate use of antibiotics is nonetheless widespread, not least for respiratory tract infections (RTI), a common reason for antibiotics prescriptions. We examine if pay-for-performance (P4P) presents a way to influence primary care physicians' choice of antibiotics. During 2006-2013, 8 Swedish healthcare authorities adopted P4P to make physicians select narrow-spectrum antibiotics more often in the treatment of children with RTI. Exploiting register data on all purchases of RTI antibiotics in a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that P4P significantly increased the share of narrow-spectrum antibiotics. There are no signs that physicians gamed the system by issuing more prescriptions overall.

Payment incentives for community-based psychiatric care in Ontario, Canada

BACKGROUND

In September 2011, the government of Ontario implemented payment incentives to encourage the delivery of community-based psychiatric care to patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission and to those with a recent suicide attempt. We evaluated whether these incentives affected supply of psychiatric services and access to care.

METHODS

We used administrative data to capture monthly observations for all psychiatrists who practised in Ontario between September 2009 and August 2014. We conducted interrupted time-series analyses of psychiatrist-level and patient-level data to evaluate whether the incentives affected the quantity of eligible outpatient services delivered and the likelihood of receiving follow-up care.

RESULTS

Among 1921 psychiatrists evaluated, implementation of the incentive payments was not associated with increased provision of follow-up visits after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission (mean change in visits per month per psychiatrist 0.0099, 95% confidence interval [CI] -0.0989 to 0.1206; change in trend 0.0032, 95% CI -0.0035 to 0.0095) or after a suicide attempt (mean change -0.0910, 95% CI -0.1885 to 0.0026; change in trend 0.0102, 95% CI 0.0045 to 0.0159). There was also no change in the probability that patients received follow-up care after discharge (change in level -0.0079, 95% CI -0.0223 to 0.0061; change in trend 0.0007, 95% CI -0.0003 to 0.0016) or after a suicide attempt (change in level 0.0074, 95% CI -0.0094 to 0.0366; change in trend 0.0006, 95% CI -0.0007 to 0.0022).

INTERPRETATION

Our results suggest that implementation of the incentives did not increase access to follow-up care for patients after discharge from a psychiatric hospital admission or after a suicide attempt, and the incentives had no effect on supply of psychiatric services. Further research to guide design and implementation of more effective incentives is warranted.

Financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries: an overview of systematic reviews

BACKGROUND

One target of the Sustainable Development Goals is to achieve "universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all". A fundamental concern of governments in striving for this goal is how to finance such a health system. This concern is very relevant for low-income countries.

OBJECTIVES

To provide an overview of the evidence from up-to-date systematic reviews about the effects of financial arrangements for health systems in low-income countries. Secondary objectives include identifying needs and priorities for future evaluations and systematic reviews on financial arrangements, and informing refinements in the framework for financial arrangements presented in the overview.

METHODS

We searched Health Systems Evidence in November 2010 and PDQ-Evidence up to 17 December 2016 for systematic reviews. We did not apply any date, language, or publication status limitations in the searches. We included well-conducted systematic reviews of studies that assessed the effects of financial arrangements on patient outcomes (health and health behaviours), the quality or utilisation of healthcare services, resource use, healthcare provider outcomes (such as sick leave), or social outcomes (such as poverty, employment, or financial burden of patients, e.g. out-of-pocket payment, catastrophic disease expenditure) and that were published after April 2005. We excluded reviews with limitations important enough to compromise the reliability of the findings. Two overview authors independently screened reviews, extracted data, and assessed the certainty of evidence using GRADE. We prepared SUPPORT Summaries for eligible reviews, including key messages, 'Summary of findings' tables (using GRADE to assess the certainty of the evidence), and assessments of the relevance of findings to low-income countries.

MAIN RESULTS

We identified 7272 reviews and included 15 in this overview, on: collection of funds (2 reviews), insurance schemes (1 review), purchasing of services (1 review), recipient incentives (6 reviews), and provider incentives (5 reviews). The reviews were published between 2008 and 2015; focused on 13 subcategories; and reported results from 276 studies: 115 (42%) randomised trials, 11 (4%) non-randomised trials, 23 (8%) controlled before-after studies, 51 (19%) interrupted time series, 9 (3%) repeated measures, and 67 (24%) other non-randomised studies. Forty-three per cent (119/276) of the studies included in the reviews took place in low- and middle-income countries. Collection of funds: the effects of changes in user fees on utilisation and equity are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is also uncertain whether aid delivered under the Paris Principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability) improves health outcomes compared to aid delivered without conforming to those principles (very low-certainty evidence). Insurance schemes: community-based health insurance may increase service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). It is uncertain whether social health insurance improves utilisation of health services or health outcomes (very low-certainty evidence). Purchasing of services: it is uncertain whether increasing salaries of public sector healthcare workers improves the quantity or quality of their work (very low-certainty evidence). Recipient incentives: recipient incentives may improve adherence to long-term treatments (low-certainty evidence), but it is uncertain whether they improve patient outcomes. One-time recipient incentives probably improve patient return for start or continuation of treatment (moderate-certainty evidence) and may improve return for tuberculosis test readings (low-certainty evidence). However, incentives may not improve completion of tuberculosis prophylaxis, and it is uncertain whether they improve completion of treatment for active tuberculosis. Conditional cash transfer programmes probably lead to an increase in service utilisation (moderate-certainty evidence), but their effects on health outcomes are uncertain. Vouchers may improve health service utilisation (low-certainty evidence), but the effects on health outcomes are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence). Introducing a restrictive cap may decrease use of medicines for symptomatic conditions and overall use of medicines, may decrease insurers' expenditures on medicines (low-certainty evidence), and has uncertain effects on emergency department use, hospitalisations, and use of outpatient care (very low-certainty evidence). Reference pricing, maximum pricing, and index pricing for drugs have mixed effects on drug expenditures by patients and insurers as well as the use of brand and generic drugs. Provider incentives: the effects of provider incentives are uncertain (very low-certainty evidence), including: the effects of provider incentives on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians or outpatient referrals from primary to secondary care, incentives for recruiting and retaining health professionals to serve in remote areas, and the effects of pay-for-performance on provider performance, the utilisation of services, patient outcomes, or resource use in low-income countries.

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Research based on sound systematic review methods has evaluated numerous financial arrangements relevant to low-income countries, targeting different levels of the health systems and assessing diverse outcomes. However, included reviews rarely reported social outcomes, resource use, equity impacts, or undesirable effects. We also identified gaps in primary research because of uncertainty about applicability of the evidence to low-income countries. Financial arrangements for which the effects are uncertain include external funding (aid), caps and co-payments, pay-for-performance, and provider incentives. Further studies evaluating the effects of these arrangements are needed in low-income countries. Systematic reviews should include all outcomes that are relevant to decision-makers and to people affected by changes in financial arrangements.

Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data

BACKGROUND

A voluntary-based pay-for-performance (P4P) program (the CAPI) aimed at general practitioners (GPs) was implemented in France in 2009. The program targeted prevention practices, including breast cancer screening, by offering a maximal amount of €245 for achieving a target screening rate among eligible women enrolled with the GP.

OBJECTIVE

Our objective was to evaluate the impact of the French P4P program (CAPI) on the early detection of breast cancer among women between 50 and 74 years old.

METHODS

Based on an administrative database of 50,752 women aged 50-74 years followed between 2007 and 2011, we estimated a difference-in-difference model of breast cancer screening uptake as a function of visit to a CAPI signatory referral GP, while controlling for both supply-side and demand-side determinants (e.g., sociodemographics, health and healthcare use).

RESULTS

Breast cancer screening rates have not changed significantly since the P4P program implementation. Overall, visiting a CAPI signatory referral GP at least once in the pre-CAPI period increased the probability of undergoing breast cancer screening by 1.38 % [95 % CI (0.41-2.35 %)], but the effect was not significantly different following the implementation of the contract.

CONCLUSION

The French P4P program had a nonsignificant impact on breast cancer screening uptake. This result may reflect the fact that the low-powered incentives implemented in France through the CAPI might not provide sufficient leverage to generate better practices, thus inviting regulators to seek additional tools beyond P4P in the field of prevention and screening.

Brief intervention, three decades on

This paper provides an overview of brief intervention (BI) research to date and discusses future research needs as well as strategies for more widespread use of BI. Research has firmly established that significant reductions in drinking can be achieved by BI in a variety of health care settings. Despite convincing evidence, however, diffusion of BI in routine health care has been slow. Alcohol is a complex subject since it is often used moderately, without side-effects, and in a socially acceptable way. Although research on BI has accumulated rapidly during the last three decades, many important research challenges and development work remain before BI is widely implemented in routine health care.

The Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Central Line-Associated Blood Stream Infections in Pennsylvania

Healthcare associated infections have significantly contributed to the rising cost of hospital care in the United States. The implementation of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs has been one approach to improve quality at a reduced cost. We quantify the impact of Highmark's Quality Blue (QB) hospital P4P program on central line-associated blood stream infections (CLABSI) in Pennsylvania. The impact of years of participation in QB on CLABSI is also evaluated. Data from 149 Pennsylvania hospitals on CLABSI from 2008-2013 are used. Negative binomial regression and fixed effects panel regression are performed. Hospitals participating in QB have 0.727 times the CLABSI as those hospitals that do not participate. Hospitals participating for four or more years have on average 3.13 fewer CLABSI per year compared to those participating for less than four years. Highmark's P4P program has shown improved outcomes with regards to CLABSI, but further research is needed to determine if QB is cost effective.

Patient, Physician, and Practice Characteristics Associated with Cardiovascular Disease Preventive Care for Women

BACKGROUND

Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is the leading cause of death for American women. Although CVD preventive care has the potential to reduce a significant number of these deaths, the degree to which healthcare providers deliver such care is unknown. The purpose of this study was to identify patient, physician, and practice characteristics that significantly influence the provision of CVD preventive care during ambulatory care visits for female patients.

METHODS

The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey datasets from 2005 to 2010 were utilized. The study sample included female patients ≥20 years of age whose healthcare provider performed CVD preventive care and who had visits for a new health problem, a routine chronic problem, management of a chronic condition, and preventive care. Binary logistic regression models estimated the association of patient, physician, and practice characteristics and CVD preventive care; cholesterol testing, body mass index (BMI) screening, and tobacco education.

RESULTS

Of the 32,009 visits, 15.9% involved cholesterol testing, 50.3% involved BMI screening, and 3.20% involved tobacco education. Obstetricians/gynecologists were less likely to perform cholesterol testing (aOR: 0.39; 95% CI: 0.25-0.61) and tobacco education (aOR: 0.56; 95% CI: 0.32-0.98) than general/family physicians.

CONCLUSION

The delivery of CVD preventive care varied by healthcare provider type, with obstetricians/gynecologists having lower odds of providing two of the three services. The amount of time a physician spent with a patient was a significant predictor for the provision of all three services. These findings demonstrate the need to implement multifaceted approaches to address predicting characteristics of CVD preventive care.

Does enrollment in multidisciplinary team-based primary care practice improve adherence to guideline-recommended processes of care? Quebec's Family Medicine Groups, 2002-2010

BACKGROUND

We investigated whether multidisciplinary team-based primary care practice improves adherence to process of care guidelines, in the absence of financial incentives related to pay-for-performance.

METHODS

We conducted a natural experiment including 135,119 patients, enrolled with a general practitioner (GP) in a multidisciplinary team Family Medicine Group (FMG) or non-FMG practice, using longitudinal data from Quebec's universal insurer over the relevant time period (2000-2010). All study subjects had diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, or heart failure and were followed over a 7-year period, 2 years prior to enrollment and 5 years after. We constructed indicators on adherence to disease-specific guidelines and composite indicators across conditions. We evaluated the effect of FMGs using propensity score methods and Difference-in-Differences (DD) models.

RESULTS

Rates of adherence to chronic disease guidelines increased for both FMG and non-FMG patients after enrollment, but not differentially so. Adherence to prescription-related guidelines improved less for FMG patients (DD [95% CI]=-2.83% [-4.08%, -1.58%]). We found no evidence of an FMG effect on adherence to consultation-related guidelines, (DD [95% CI]=-0.24% [-2.24%; 1.75%]).

CONCLUSIONS

We found no evidence that FMGs increased adherence to the guidelines we evaluated. Future research is needed to assess why this reform did not improve performance on these quality-of-care indicators.

The influence of welfare systems on pay-for-performance programs for general practitioners: A critical review

While pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are increasingly common tools used to foster quality and efficiency in primary care, the evidence concerning their effectiveness is at best mixed. In this article, we explore the influence of welfare systems on four P4P-related dimensions: the level of healthcare funders' commitment to P4Ps (by funding and length of program operation), program design (specifically target-based vs. participation-based program), physicians' acceptance of the program and program effects. Using Esping-Andersen's typology, we examine P4P for general practitioners (GPs) in thirteen European and North American countries and find that welfare systems contribute to explain variations in P4P experiences. Overall, liberal systems exhibited the most enthusiastic adoption of P4P, with significant physician acceptance, generous incentives and positive but modest program effects. Social democratic countries showed minimal interest in P4P for GPs, with the exception of Sweden. Although corporatist systems adopted performance pay, these countries experienced mixed results, with strong physician opposition. In response to this opposition, health care funders tended to favour participation-based over target-based P4P. We demonstrate how the interaction of decommodification and social stratification in each welfare regime influences these countries' experiences with P4P for GPs, directly for funders' commitment, program design and physicians' acceptance, and indirectly for program effects, hence providing a framework for analyzing P4P in other contexts or care settings.

Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006-2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.

Heterogeneity in general practitioners' preferences for quality improvement programs: a choice experiment and policy simulation in France

Despite increasing popularity, quality improvement programs (QIP) have had modest and variable impacts on enhancing the quality of physician practice. We investigate the heterogeneity of physicians' preferences as a potential explanation of these mixed results in France, where the national voluntary QIP - the CAPI - has been cancelled due to its unpopularity. We rely on a discrete choice experiment to elicit heterogeneity in physicians' preferences for the financial and non-financial components of QIP. Using mixed and latent class logit models, results show that the two models should be used in concert to shed light on different aspects of the heterogeneity in preferences. In particular, the mixed logit demonstrates that heterogeneity in preferences is concentrated on the pay-for-performance component of the QIP, while the latent class model shows that physicians can be grouped in four homogeneous groups with specific preference patterns. Using policy simulation, we compare the French CAPI with other possible QIPs, and show that the majority of the physician subgroups modelled dislike the CAPI, while favouring a QIP using only non-financial interventions. We underline the importance of modelling preference heterogeneity in designing and implementing QIPs.

Prescriber preferences for behavioural economics interventions to improve treatment of acute respiratory infections: a discrete choice experiment

OBJECTIVE

To elicit prescribers' preferences for behavioural economics interventions designed to reduce inappropriate antibiotic prescribing, and compare these to actual behaviour.

DESIGN

Discrete choice experiment (DCE).

SETTING

47 primary care centres in Boston and Los Angeles.

PARTICIPANTS

234 primary care providers, with an average 20 years of practice.

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES

Results of a behavioural economic intervention trial were compared to prescribers' stated preferences for the same interventions relative to monetary and time rewards for improved prescribing outcomes. In the randomised controlled trial (RCT) component, the 3 computerised prescription order entry-triggered interventions studied included: Suggested Alternatives (SA), an alert that populated non-antibiotic treatment options if an inappropriate antibiotic was prescribed; Accountable Justifications (JA), which prompted the prescriber to enter a justification for an inappropriately prescribed antibiotic that would then be documented in the patient's chart; and Peer Comparison (PC), an email periodically sent to each prescriber comparing his/her antibiotic prescribing rate with those who had the lowest rates of inappropriate antibiotic prescribing. A DCE study component was administered to determine whether prescribers felt SA, JA, PC, pay-for-performance or additional clinic time would most effectively reduce their inappropriate antibiotic prescribing. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) was calculated for each intervention.

RESULTS

In the RCT, PC and JA were found to be the most effective interventions to reduce inappropriate antibiotic prescribing, whereas SA was not significantly different from controls. In the DCE however, regardless of treatment intervention received during the RCT, prescribers overwhelmingly preferred SA, followed by PC, then JA. WTP estimates indicated that each intervention would be significantly cheaper to implement than pay-for-performance incentives of $200/month.

CONCLUSIONS

Prescribing behaviour and stated preferences are not concordant, suggesting that relying on stated preferences alone to inform intervention design may eliminate effective interventions.

TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER

NCT01454947; Results.

Achieving change in primary care--effectiveness of strategies for improving implementation of complex interventions: systematic review of reviews

OBJECTIVE

To identify, summarise and synthesise available literature on the effectiveness of implementation strategies for optimising implementation of complex interventions in primary care.

DESIGN

Systematic review of reviews.

DATA SOURCES

MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Cochrane Library and PsychINFO were searched, from first publication until December 2013; the bibliographies of relevant articles were screened for additional reports.

ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SELECTING STUDIES

Eligible reviews had to (1) examine effectiveness of single or multifaceted implementation strategies, (2) measure health professional practice or process outcomes and (3) include studies from predominantly primary care in developed countries. Two reviewers independently screened titles/abstracts and full-text articles of potentially eligible reviews for inclusion.

DATA SYNTHESIS

Extracted data were synthesised using a narrative approach.

RESULTS

91 reviews were included. The most commonly evaluated strategies were those targeted at the level of individual professionals, rather than those targeting organisations or context. These strategies (eg, audit and feedback, educational meetings, educational outreach, reminders) on their own demonstrated a small to modest improvement (2-9%) in professional practice or behaviour with considerable variability in the observed effects. The effects of multifaceted strategies targeted at professionals were mixed and not necessarily more effective than single strategies alone. There was relatively little review evidence on implementation strategies at the levels of organisation and wider context. Evidence on cost-effectiveness was limited and data on costs of different strategies were scarce and/or of low quality.

CONCLUSIONS

There is a substantial literature on implementation strategies aimed at changing professional practices or behaviour. It remains unclear which implementation strategies are more likely to be effective than others and under what conditions. Future research should focus on identifying and assessing the effectiveness of strategies targeted at the wider context and organisational levels and examining the costs and cost-effectiveness of implementation strategies.

PROSPERO REGISTRATION NUMBER

CRD42014009410.

Higher Incentive Payments in Medicare Advantage's Pay-for-Performance Program Did Not Improve Quality But Did Increase Plan Offerings

OBJECTIVE

To evaluate the effects of the size of financial bonuses on quality of care and the number of plan offerings in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration.

DATA SOURCES

Publicly available data from CMS from 2009 to 2014 on Medicare Advantage plan quality ratings, the counties in the service area of each plan, and the benchmarks used to construct plan payments.

STUDY DESIGN

The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration began in 2012. Under the Demonstration, all Medicare Advantage plans were eligible to receive bonus payments based on plan-level quality scores (star ratings). In some counties, plans were eligible to receive bonus payments that were twice as large as in other counties. We used this variation in incentives to evaluate the effects of bonus size on star ratings and the number of plan offerings in the Demonstration using a differences-in-differences identification strategy. We used matching to create a comparison group of counties that did not receive double bonuses but had similar levels of the preintervention outcomes.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Results from the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the receipt of double bonuses was not associated with an increase in star ratings. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with a statistically insignificant increase of +0.034 (approximately 1 percent) in the average star rating (p > .10, 95 percent CI: -0.015, 0.083). In contrast, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an increase in the number of plans offered. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an overall increase of +0.814 plans (approximately 5.8 percent) (p < .05, 95 percent CI: 0.078, 1.549). We estimate that the double bonuses increased payments by $3.43 billion over the first 3 years of the Demonstration.

CONCLUSIONS

At great expense to Medicare, double bonuses in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration were not associated with improved quality but were associated with more plan offerings.

Financial incentive schemes in primary care

Pay-for-performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common in primary care, and this article reviews their impact. It is based primarily on existing systematic reviews. The evidence suggests that P4P schemes can change health professionals' behavior and improve recorded disease management of those clinical processes that are incentivized. P4P may narrow inequalities in performance comparing deprived with nondeprived areas. However, such schemes have unintended consequences. Whether P4P improves the patient experience, the outcomes of care or population health is less clear. These practical uncertainties mirror the ethical concerns of many clinicians that a reductionist approach to managing markers of chronic disease runs counter to the humanitarian values of family practice. The variation in P4P schemes between countries reflects different historical and organizational contexts. With so much uncertainty regarding the effects of P4P, policy makers are well advised to proceed carefully with the implementation of such schemes until and unless clearer evidence for their cost-benefit emerges.

Working under a clinic-level quality incentive: primary care clinicians' perceptions

BACKGROUND

A key consideration in designing pay-for-performance programs is determining what entity the incentive should be awarded to-individual clinicians or to groups of clinicians working in teams. Some argue that team-level incentives, in which clinicians who are part of a team receive the same incentive based on the team's performance, are most effective; others argue for the efficacy of clinician-level incentives. This study examines primary care clinicians' perceptions of a team-based quality incentive awarded at the clinic level.

METHODS

This research was conducted with Fairview Health Services, where 40% of the primary care compensation model was based on clinic-level quality performance. We conducted 48 in-depth interviews to explore clinicians' perceptions of the clinic-level incentive, as well as an online survey of 150 clinicians (response rate 56%) to investigate which entity the clinicians would consider optimal to target for quality incentives.

RESULTS

Clinicians reported the strengths of the clinic-based quality incentive were quality improvement for the team and less patient "dumping," or shifting patients with poor outcomes to other clinicians. The weaknesses were clinicians' lack of control and colleagues riding the coattails of higher performers. There were mixed reports on the model's impact on team dynamics. Although clinicians reported greater interaction with colleagues, some described an increase in tension. Most clinicians surveyed (73%) believed that there should be a mix of clinic and individual-level incentives to maintain collaboration and recognize individual performance.

CONCLUSION

The study highlights the important advantages and disadvantages of using incentives based upon clinic-level performance. Future research should test whether hybrid incentives that mix group and individual incentives can maintain some of the best elements of each design while mitigating the negative impacts.

Evidence from district level inputs to improve quality of care for maternal and newborn health: interventions and findings

District level healthcare serves as a nexus between community and district level facilities. Inputs at the district level can be broadly divided into governance and accountability mechanisms; leadership and supervision; financial platforms; and information systems. This paper aims to evaluate the effectivness of district level inputs for imporving maternal and newborn health. We considered all available systematic reviews published before May 2013 on the pre-defined district level interventions and included 47 systematic reviews.

Evidence suggests that supervision positively influenced provider’s practice, knowledge and client/provider satisfaction. Involving local opinion leaders to promote evidence-based practice improved compliance to the desired practice. Audit and feedback mechanisms and tele-medicine were found to be associated with improved immunization rates and mammogram uptake. User-directed financial schemes including maternal vouchers, user fee exemption and community based health insurance showed significant impact on maternal health service utilization with voucher schemes showing the most significant positive impact across all range of outcomes including antenatal care, skilled birth attendant, institutional delivery, complicated delivery and postnatal care. We found insufficient evidence to support or refute the use of electronic health record systems and telemedicine technology to improve maternal and newborn health specific outcomes.

There is dearth of evidence on the effectiveness of district level inputs to improve maternal newborn health outcomes. Future studies should evaluate the impact of supervision and monitoring; electronic health record and tele-communication interventions in low-middle-income countries.

Impact of state-specific Medicaid reimbursement and eligibility policies on receipt of cancer screening

BACKGROUND

Although state Medicaid programs cover cancer screening, Medicaid beneficiaries are less likely to be screened for cancer and are more likely to present with tumors of an advanced stage than are those with other insurance. The current study was performed to determine whether state Medicaid eligibility and reimbursement policies affect the receipt of breast, cervical, and colon cancer screening among Medicaid beneficiaries.

METHODS

Cross-sectional regression analyses of 2007 Medicaid data from 46 states and the District of Columbia were performed to examine associations between state-specific Medicaid reimbursement/eligibility policies and receipt of cancer screening. The study sample included individuals aged 21 years to 64 years who were enrolled in fee-for-service Medicaid for at least 4 months. Subsamples eligible for each screening test were: Papanicolaou test among 2,136,511 patients, mammography among 792,470 patients, colonoscopy among 769,729 patients, and fecal occult blood test among 753,868 patients. State-specific Medicaid variables included median screening test reimbursement, income/financial asset eligibility requirements, physician copayments, and frequency of eligibility renewal.

RESULTS

Increases in screening test reimbursement demonstrated mixed associations (positive and negative) with the likelihood of receiving screening tests among Medicaid beneficiaries. In contrast, increased reimbursements for office visits were found to be positively associated with the odds of receiving all screening tests examined, including colonoscopy (odds ratio [OR], 1.07; 95% confidence interval [95% CI], 1.06-1.08), fecal occult blood test (OR, 1.09; 95% CI, 1.08-1.10), Papanicolaou test (OR, 1.02; 95% CI, 1.02-1.03), and mammography (OR, 1.02; 95% CI, 1.02-1.03). Effects of other state-specific Medicaid policies varied across the screening tests examined.

CONCLUSIONS

Increased reimbursement for office visits was consistently associated with an increased likelihood of being screened for cancer, and may be an important policy tool for increasing screening among this vulnerable population.

Physician response to pay-for-performance: evidence from a natural experiment

This study exploits a natural experiment in the province of Ontario, Canada, to identify the impact of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives on the provision of targeted primary care services and whether physicians' responses differ by age, size of patient population, and baseline compliance level. We use administrative data that cover the full population of Ontario and nearly all the services provided by primary care physicians. We employ a difference-in-differences approach that controls for selection on observables and selection on unobservables that may cause estimation bias. We implement a set of robustness checks to control for confounding from other contemporaneous interventions of the primary care reform in Ontario. The results indicate that responses were modest and that physicians responded to the financial incentives for some services but not others. The results provide a cautionary message regarding the effectiveness of employing P4P to increase the quality of health care.

Evaluating the impact of public health initiatives on trends in fecal occult blood test participation in Ontario

BACKGROUND

Since the publication of two randomized controlled trials (RCT) in 1996 demonstrating the effectiveness of fecal occult blood test (FOBT) in reducing colorectal cancer (CRC) mortality, several public health initiatives have been introduced in Ontario to promote FOBT participation. We examined the effect of these initiatives on FOBT participation and evaluated temporal trends in participation between 1994 and 2012.

METHOD

Using administrative databases, we identified 18 annual cohorts of individuals age 50 to 74 years eligible for CRC screening and identified those who received FOBT in each quarter of a year. We used negative binomial segmented regression to examine the effect of initiatives on trends and Joinpoint regression to evaluate temporal trends in FOBT participation.

RESULTS

Quarterly FOBT participation increased from 6.5 per 1000 in quarter 1 to 41.6 per 1000 in quarter 72 (January-March 2012). Segmented regression indicated increases following the publication of the RCTs in 1996 (Δ slope = 6%, 95% CI = 4.3-7.9), the primary care physician financial incentives announcement in 2005 (Δ slope = 2.2%, 95% CI = 0.68-3.7), the launch of the ColonCancerCheck (CCC) Program (Δ intercept = 35.4%, 95% CI = 18.3 -54.9), and the CCC Program 2-year anniversary (Δ slope = 7.2%, 95% CI = 3.9 - 10.5). Joinpoint validated these findings and identified the specific points when changes occurred.

CONCLUSION

Although observed increases in FOBT participation cannot be definitively attributed to the various initiatives, the results of the two statistical approaches suggest a causal association between the observed increases in FOBT participation and most of these initiatives.

Effect of payment incentives on cancer screening in Ontario primary care

PURPOSE

There is limited evidence for the effectiveness of pay for performance despite its widespread use. We assessed whether the introduction of a pay-for-performance scheme for primary care physicians in Ontario, Canada, was associated with increased cancer screening rates and determined the amounts paid to physicians as part of the program.

METHODS

We performed a longitudinal analysis using administrative data to determine cancer screening rates and incentive costs in each fiscal year from 1999/2000 to 2009/2010. We used a segmented linear regression analysis to assess whether there was a step change or change in screening rate trends after incentives were introduced in 2006/2007. We included all Ontarians eligible for cervical, breast, and colorectal cancer screening.

RESULTS

We found no significant step change in the screening rate for any of the 3 cancers the year after incentives were introduced. Colon cancer screening was increasing at a rate of 3.0% (95% CI, 2.3% to 3.7%) per year before the incentives were introduced and 4.7% (95% CI, 3.7% to 5.7%) per year after. The cervical and breast cancer screening rates did not change significantly from year to year before or after the incentives were introduced. Between 2006/2007 and 2009/2010, $28.3 million, $31.3 million, and $50.0 million were spent on financial incentives for cervical, breast, and colorectal cancer screening, respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

The pay-for-performance scheme was associated with little or no improvement in screening rates despite substantial expenditure. Policy makers should consider other strategies for improving rates of cancer screening.

Multilateral contracting and prevention

Incentives created through contracts can be used as a means of decentralized control in healthcare systems to ensure more efficient healthcare. In this paper, we consider an insurer contracting with a consumer and a provider. We focus on the trade-off between ex ante moral hazard and insurance, and consider both consumer and provider incentives in the insurer's contracting problem in the presence of unobservable preventive efforts. We study two cases of provider efforts: those that complement consumer efforts and those that substitute for consumer efforts. In the first case, our results show that the provider must have greater incentives when the consumer is healthy to induce effort and that inducing provider effort allows an insurer to offer a more complete insurance contract relative to the bilateral benchmark. In the second case, we state conditions under which these conclusions continue to hold. On the basis of our findings, we discuss the implications and challenges of multilateral contracting in practice.

Are general dental practitioners providing best practice in prevention in everyday general practice?

AIMS

To discover whether general dental practitioners are providing best practice in prevention, as defined by the 'Delivering Better Oral Health' toolkit, in everyday general practice.

METHOD

A questionnaire was created with five scenarios describing the key findings of the examination of five hypothetical patients. Dentists attending a postgraduate meeting were asked to list all the preventive treatment and advice they would give each patient. The content of their answers was compared with the toolkit by two researchers.

RESULTS

Twenty four dentists completed the questionnaire. In general terms, they did not mention much of the specific advice or recommend the treatment listed in the toolkit except that a significant proportion would apply fluoride varnish to children's teeth and all would give smoking cessation advice where appropriate. Suitable recall intervals, defined by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, were suggested for three of the scenarios but the advice was inconsistent for the other two scenarios.

CONCLUSION

This small investigation suggests that dentists' implementation of prevention, as advised by the toolkit, is not thorough or consistent. Comprehensive adoption of prevention in dentistry will require intensive multifaceted education and organisational change such as might be provided by the new contracts being piloted at present.

Link between pay for performance incentives and physician payment mechanisms: evidence from the diabetes management incentive in Ontario

Pay for performance (P4P) incentives for physicians are generally designed as additional payments that can be paired with any existing payment mechanism such as a salary, fee-for-services and capitation. However, the link between the physician response to performance incentives and the existing payment mechanisms is still not well understood. In this article, we study this link using the recent primary care physician payment reform in Ontario as a natural experiment and the Diabetes Management Incentive as a case study. Using a comprehensive administrative data strategy and a difference-in-differences matching strategy, we find that physicians in a blended capitation model are more responsive to the Diabetes Management Incentive than physicians in an enhanced fee-for-service model. We show that this result implies that the optimal size of P4P incentives vary negatively with the degree of supply-side cost-sharing. These results have important implications for the design of P4P programs and the cost of their implementation.

Fracture Liaison Services in an open system: how was it done? what were the barriers and how were they overcome?

A fragility fracture signals the potential for the occurrence of a subsequent fracture, and it often represents the first opportunity for care of osteoporosis. It is now well accepted knowledge that fracture liaison services can close or, at the very least, narrow the care gap that exists in the management of these sentinel events in patients with osteoporosis. The challenge, however, lies in translating this knowledge into practice and to implement these programs in health care systems with varied infrastructure and delivery practices operating in varied geographical environments. A review of a functioning model of care in an open health system in an Asian country and a short account of the problems encountered and the lessons learned during the course of its implementation are provided.

What can the past of pay-for-performance tell us about the future of Value-Based Purchasing in Medicare?

The Medicare program has implemented pay-for-performance (P4P), or Value-Based Purchasing, for inpatient care and for Medicare Advantage plans, and plans to implement a program for physicians in 2015. In this paper, we review evidence on the effectiveness of P4P and identify design criteria deemed to be best practice in P4P. We then assess the extent to which Medicare's existing and planned Value-Based Purchasing programs align with these best practices. Of the seven identified best practices in P4P program design, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program is strongly aligned with two of the best practices, moderately aligned with three, weakly aligned with one, and has unclear alignment with one best practice. The Physician Value-Based Purchasing Modifier is strongly aligned with two of the best practices, moderately aligned with one, weakly aligned with three, and has unclear alignment with one of the best practices. The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Program is strongly aligned with four of the best practices, moderately aligned with two, and weakly aligned with one of the best practices. We identify enduring gaps in P4P literature as it relates to Medicare's plans for Value-Based Purchasing and discuss important issues in the future of these implementations in Medicare.

Remuneration and organization in general practice: do GPs prefer private practice or salaried positions?

OBJECTIVE

In Norway the default payment option for general practice is a patient list system based on private practice, but other options exist. This study aimed to explore whether general practitioners (GPs) prefer private practice or salaried positions.

DESIGN

Cross-sectional online survey (QuestBack).

SETTING

General practice in Norway.

INTERVENTION

Participants were asked whether their current practice was based on (1) private practice in which the GP holds office space, equipment, and employs the staff, (2) private practice in which the GPs hire office space, equipment, or staff from the municipality, (3) salary with bonus arrangements, or (4) salary without bonus arrangement. Furthermore, they were asked which of these options they would prefer if they could choose.

SUBJECTS

GPs in Norway (n = 3270).

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES

Proportion of GPs who preferred private practice.

RESULTS

Responses were obtained from 1304 GPs (40%). Among these, 75% were currently in private practice, 18% in private practice with some services provided by the municipality, 4% had a fixed salary plus a proportion of service fees, whereas 3% had salary only. Corresponding figures for the preferred option were 52%, 26%, 16%, and 6%, respectively. In multivariate logistic regression analysis, size of municipality, specialty attainment, and number of patients listed were associated with preference for private practice.

CONCLUSION

The majority of Norwegian GPs had and preferred private practice, but a significant minority would prefer a salaried position. The current private practice based system in Norway seems best suited to the preferences of experienced GPs in urban communities.

Pay-for-performance in the United Kingdom: impact of the quality and outcomes framework: a systematic review

PURPOSE

Primary care practices in the United Kingdom have received substantial financial rewards for achieving standards set out in the Quality and Outcomes Framework since April 2004. This article reviews the growing evidence for the impact of the framework on the quality of primary medical care.

METHODS

Five hundred seventy-five articles were identified by searching the MEDLINE, EMBASE, and PsycINFO databases, and from the reference lists of published reviews and articles. One hundred twenty-four relevant articles were assessed using a modified Downs and Black rating scale for 110 observational studies and a Critical Appraisal Skills Programme rating scale for 14 qualitative studies. Ninety-four studies were included in the review.

RESULTS

Quality of care for incentivized conditions during the first year of the framework improved at a faster rate than the preintervention trend and subsequently returned to prior rates of improvement. There were modest cost-effective reductions in mortality and hospital admissions in some domains. Differences in performance narrowed in deprived areas compared with nondeprived areas. Achievement for conditions outside the framework was lower initially and has worsened in relative terms since inception. Some doctors reported improved data recording and teamwork, and nurses enhanced specialist skills. Both groups believed that the person-centeredness of consultations and continuity were negatively affected. Patients' satisfaction with continuity declined, with little change in other domains of patient experience.

CONCLUSIONS

Observed improvements in quality of care for chronic diseases in the framework were modest, and the impact on costs, professional behavior, and patient experience remains uncertain. Further research is needed into how to improve quality across different domains, while minimizing costs and any unintended adverse effects of payment for performance schemes. Health care organizations should remain cautious about the benefits of similar schemes.

Effect of financial relationships on the behaviors of health care professionals: a review of the evidence

This paper explores the empirical evidence regarding the impact financial relationships on the behavior of health care providers, specifically, physicians. We identify and synthesize peer-reviewed data addressing whether financial incentives are causally related to patient outcomes and health care costs. We cover three main areas where financial conflicts of interest arise and may have an observable relationship to health care practices: (1) physicians' roles as self-referrers, (2) insurance reimbursement schemes that create incentives for certain clinical choices over others, and (3) financial relationships between physicians and the drug and device industries. We found a well-developed scientific literature consisting of dozens of empirical studies, some that allow stronger causal inferences than others, but which altogether show that such financial conflicts of interests can, and sometimes do, impact physicians' clinical decisions. Further research is warranted to document the causal relationship of such changes on health outcomes and the cost of care, but the current base of evidence is sufficiently robust to motivate policy reform.

A health insurance company-initiated practice support intervention for optimizing acid-suppressing drug prescriptions in primary care

BACKGROUND

A health insurance-initiated programme to improve cost-effectiveness of acid-suppressing drugs (ASDs).

AIM

To evaluate the effect of two different interventions of general practitioner support in reducing drug prescription.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A sequential cluster randomized controlled trial with 90 participating general practitioners in a telephone support (TS) group or practice visit (PV) group. TS group received support in phase-1 (first 6 months), but served as control group in phase-2 (6-12 months period). PV group received no intervention in phase-1, serving as the control group for the TS group, but received support in phase-2. Prescription data were extracted from Agis Health Insurance Database. Outcomes were the proportion of responders to drug reduction and the number of defined daily dose (DDD). Differences in users and DDD were analysed using multilevel regression analysis.

RESULTS

At baseline, 3424 patients used ASD chronically (211 DDDs, on average). The difference between TS and control groups among responders was 3.2% [95% confidence interval (CI): 0.8; 5.6] and relative risk was 1.26 (95% CI: 1.06; 1.51). The difference between PV and control groups was not relevant (0.4%, 95% CI: -1.99; 2.79 and relative risk: 1.01, 95% CI: 0.82; 1.20). The difference in DDD per patient was -3.0 (95% CI: -8.9; 2.9) and -5.82 (95% CI: -12.4; 0.73), respectively.

CONCLUSION

This health insurance company-initiated intervention had a moderate effect on ASD prescription. In contrast to TS, PVs did not seem to reduce ASD prescription rates.

An overview of reviews evaluating the effectiveness of financial incentives in changing healthcare professional behaviours and patient outcomes

BACKGROUND

There is considerable interest in the effectiveness of financial incentives in the delivery of health care. Incentives may be used in an attempt to increase the use of evidence-based treatments among healthcare professionals or to stimulate health professionals to change their clinical behaviour with respect to preventive, diagnostic and treatment decisions, or both. Financial incentives are an extrinsic source of motivation and exist when an individual can expect a monetary transfer which is made conditional on acting in a particular way. Since there are numerous reviews performed within the healthcare area describing the effects of various types of financial incentives, it is important to summarise the effectiveness of these in an overview to discern which are most effective in changing health professionals' behaviour and patient outcomes.

OBJECTIVES

To conduct an overview of systematic reviews that evaluates the impact of financial incentives on healthcare professional behaviour and patient outcomes.

METHODS

We searched the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library); Database of Abstracts of Reviews of Effectiveness (DARE); TRIP; MEDLINE; EMBASE; Science Citation Index; Social Science Citation Index; NHS EED; HEED; EconLit; and Program in Policy Decision-Making (PPd) (from their inception dates up to January 2010). We searched the reference lists of all included reviews and carried out a citation search of those papers which cited studies included in the review. We included both Cochrane and non-Cochrane reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), controlled clinical trials (CCTs), interrupted time series (ITSs) and controlled before and after studies (CBAs) that evaluated the effects of financial incentives on professional practice and patient outcomes, and that reported numerical results of the included individual studies. Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed the methodological quality of each review according to the AMSTAR criteria. We included systematic reviews of studies evaluating the effectiveness of any type of financial incentive. We grouped financial incentives into five groups: payment for working for a specified time period; payment for each service, episode or visit; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care; and mixed or other systems. We summarised data using vote counting.

MAIN RESULTS

We identified four reviews reporting on 32 studies. Two reviews scored 7 on the AMSTAR criteria (moderate, score 5 to 7, quality) and two scored 9 (high, score 8 to 11, quality). The reported quality of the included studies was, by a variety of methods, low to moderate. Payment for working for a specified time period was generally ineffective, improving 3/11 outcomes from one study reported in one review. Payment for each service, episode or visit was generally effective, improving 7/10 outcomes from five studies reported in three reviews; payment for providing care for a patient or specific population was generally effective, improving 48/69 outcomes from 13 studies reported in two reviews; payment for providing a pre-specified level or providing a change in activity or quality of care was generally effective, improving 17/20 reported outcomes from 10 studies reported in two reviews; and mixed and other systems were of mixed effectiveness, improving 20/31 reported outcomes from seven studies reported in three reviews. When looking at the effect of financial incentives overall across categories of outcomes, they were of mixed effectiveness on consultation or visit rates (improving 10/17 outcomes from three studies in two reviews); generally effective in improving processes of care (improving 41/57 outcomes from 19 studies in three reviews); generally effective in improving referrals and admissions (improving 11/16 outcomes from 11 studies in four reviews); generally ineffective in improving compliance with guidelines outcomes (improving 5/17 outcomes from five studies in two reviews); and generally effective in improving prescribing costs outcomes (improving 28/34 outcomes from 10 studies in one review).

AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS

Financial incentives may be effective in changing healthcare professional practice. The evidence has serious methodological limitations and is also very limited in its completeness and generalisability. We found no evidence from reviews that examined the effect of financial incentives on patient outcomes.