Transitive inference in free-living greylag geese, Anser anser

Aggressiveness predicts dominance rank in greylag geese: mirror tests and agonistic interactions

Individual differences in aggressiveness, if consistent across time and contexts, may contribute to the long-term maintenance of social hierarchies in complex animal societies. Although agonistic interactions have previously been used to calculate individuals' positions within a dominance hierarchy, to date the repeatability of agonistic behaviour has not been tested when calculating social rank. Here, we examined the consistency and social relevance of aggressiveness as a personality trait in a free-flying population of greylag geese (Anser anser). For each individual, we quantified (i) aggressiveness using a standardized mirror stimulation test and (ii) dominance ranking based on the number of agonistic interactions won and lost in a feeding context. We found that individual differences in aggressiveness were significantly repeatable and that individuals' aggressiveness predicted their dominance rank position. The flock showed a robust and intermediately steep dominance hierarchy. Social rank was higher in paired birds, males and older birds, and most agonistic interactions occurred between individuals with moderate rank differences. We suggest that selection favours aggressiveness as a personality trait associated with resource acquisition and social rank, whereby a dominance hierarchy may increase the benefits of group living and reduce costs over conflict within dyads.

Why are ravens smart? Exploring the social intelligence hypothesis

Ravens and other corvids are renowned for their 'intelligence'. For long, this reputation has been based primarily on anecdotes but in the last decades experimental evidence for impressive cognitive skills has accumulated within and across species. While we begin to understand the building blocks of corvid cognition, the question remains why these birds have evolved such skills. Focusing on Northern Ravens Corvus corax, I here try to tackle this question by relating current hypotheses on brain evolution to recent empirical data on challenges faced in the birds' daily life. Results show that foraging ravens meet several assumptions for applying social intelligence: (1) they meet repeatedly at foraging sites, albeit individuals have different site preferences and vary in grouping dynamics; (1) foraging groups are structured by dominance rank hierarchies and social bonds; (3) individual ravens memorize former group members and their relationship valence over years, deduce third-party relationships and use their social knowledge in daily life by supporting others in conflicts and intervening in others' affiliations. Hence, ravens' socio-cognitive skills may be strongly shaped by the 'complex' social environment experienced as non-breeders.

In the absence of extensive initial training, cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus fail a transitive inference task

Transitive inference (TI) is a reasoning capacity that allows individuals to deduce unknown pair relationships from previous knowledge of other pair relationships. Its occurrence in a wide range of animals, including insects, has been linked to their ecological needs. Thus, TI should be absent in species that do not rely on such inferences in their natural lives. We hypothesized that the latter applies to the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus and tested this with 19 individuals using a five-term series (A > B > C > D > E) experiment. Cleaners first learned to prefer a food-rewarding plate (+) over a non-rewarding plate (-) in four plate pairs that imply a hierarchy from plate A to plate E (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-), with the learning order counterbalanced between subjects. We then tested for spontaneous preferences in the unknown pairs BD (transitive inference task) and AE (as a control for anchors), interspersed between trials involving a mix of all known adjacent pairs. The cleaners systematically preferred A over E and showed good performance for A+B- and D+E- trials. Conversely, cleaners did not prefer B over D. These results were unaffected by the reinforcement history, but the order of learning of the different pairs of plates had a main impact on the remembrance of the initial training pairs. Overall, cleaners performed randomly in B+C- and C+D- trials. Thus, a memory constraint may have prevented subjects from applying TI. Indeed, a parallel study on cleaner wrasse provided positive evidence for TI but was achieved following extensive training on the non-adjacent pairs which may have over-ridden the ecological relevance of the task.

Probabilistic reinforcement precludes transitive inference: A preliminary study

In the basic verbal task from Piaget, when a relation of the form if A > B and B > C is given, a logical inference A > C is expected. This process is called transitive inference (TI). The adapted version for animals involves the presentation of a simultaneous discrimination between stimuli pairs. In this way, when A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E- is trained, a B>D preference is expected, assuming that if A>B>C>D>E, then B>D. This effect has been widely reported using several procedures and different species. In the current experiment TI was evaluated employing probabilistic reinforcement. Thus, for the positive stimuli a .7 probability was administered and for the negative stimuli a .3 probability was administered. Under this arrangement the relation A>B>C>D>E is still allowed, but TI becomes more difficult. Five pigeons (Columba Livia) were exposed to the mentioned arrangement. Only one pigeon reached the criterion in C+D- discrimination, whereas the remaining did not. Only the one who successfully solved C+D- was capable of learning TI, whereas the others were not. Additionally, it was found that correct response ratios did not predict BD performance. Consequently, probabilistic reinforcement disrupted TI, but some positional ordering was retained in the test. The results suggest that TI might be affected by associative strength but also by the positional ordering of the stimuli. The discussion addresses the two main accounts of TI: the associative account and the ordinal representation account.

Thinking about order: a review of common processing of magnitude and learned orders in animals

Rich behavioral and neurobiological evidence suggests cognitive and neural overlap in how quantitatively comparable dimensions such as quantity, time, and space are processed in humans and animals. While magnitude domains such as physical magnitude, time, and space represent information that can be quantitatively compared (4 "is half of" 8), they also represent information that can be organized ordinally (1→2→3→4). Recent evidence suggests that the common representations seen across physical magnitude, time, and space domains in humans may be due to their common ordinal features rather than their common quantitative features, as these common representations appear to extend beyond magnitude domains to include learned orders. In this review, we bring together separate lines of research on multiple ordinal domains including magnitude-based and learned orders in animals to explore the extent to which there is support for a common cognitive process underlying ordinal processing. Animals show similarities in performance patterns across natural quantitatively comparable ordered domains (physical magnitude, time, space, dominance) and learned orders (acquired through transitive inference or simultaneous chaining). Additionally, they show transfer and interference across tasks within and between ordinal domains that support the theory of a common ordinal representation across domains. This review provides some support for the development of a unified theory of ordinality and suggests areas for future research to better characterize the extent to which there are commonalities in cognitive processing of ordinal information generally.

Fish can infer relations between colour cues in a non-social learning task

Transitive inference (TI) describes the ability to infer relationships between stimuli that have never been seen together before. Social cichlids can use TI in a social setting where observers assess dominance status after witnessing contests between different dyads of conspecifics. If cognitive processes are domain-general, animals should use abilities evolved in a social context also in a non-social context. Therefore, if TI is domain-general in fish, social fish should also be able to use TI in non-social tasks. Here we tested whether the cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher can infer transitive relationships between artificial stimuli in a non-social context. We used an associative learning paradigm where the fish received a food reward when correctly solving a colour discrimination task. Eleven of 12 subjects chose the predicted outcome for TI in the first test trial and five subjects performed with 100% accuracy in six successive test trials. We found no evidence that the fish solved the TI task by value transfer. Our findings show that fish also use TI in non-social tasks with artificial stimuli, thus generalizing past results reported in a social context and hinting toward a domain-general cognitive mechanism.

Low-rank Gallus gallus domesticus chicks are better at transitive inference reasoning

A form of deductive reasoning, transitive inference, is thought to allow animals to infer relationships between members of a social group without having to remember all the interactions that occur. Such an ability means that animals can avoid direct confrontations which could be costly. Here we show that chicks perform a transitive inference task differently according to sex and rank. In female chicks, low-ranking birds performed better than did the highest ranked. Male chicks, however, showed an inverted U-shape of ability across rank, with the middle ranked chicks best able to perform the task. These results are explained according to the roles the sexes take within the group. This research directly links the abilities of transitive inference learning and social hierarchy formation and prompts further investigation into the role of both sex and rank within the dynamics of group living.

Transitive inference in cleaner wrasses (Labroides dimidiatus)

Transitive inference (TI) is the ability to infer unknown relationships from previous information. To test TI in non-human animals, transitive responding has been examined in a TI task where non-adjacent pairs were presented after premise pair training. Some mammals, birds and paper wasps can pass TI tasks. Although previous studies showed that some fish are capable of TI in the social context, it remains unclear whether fish can pass TI task. Here, we conducted a TI task in cleaner wrasses (Labroides dimidiatus), which interact with various client fishes and conspecifics. Because they make decisions based on previous direct and indirect interactions in the context of cleaning interactions, we predicted that the ability of TI is beneficial for cleaner fish. Four tested fish were trained with four pairs of visual stimuli in a 5-term series: A-B+, B-C+, C-D+, and D-E+ (plus and minus denote rewards and non-rewards, respectively). After training, a novel pair, BD (BD test), was presented wherein the fish chose D more frequently than B. In contrast, reinforcement history did not predict the choice D. Our results suggest that cleaner fish passed the TI task, similar to mammals and birds. Although the mechanism underlying transitive responding in cleaner fish remains unclear, this work contributes to understanding cognitive abilities in fish.

Animal cognition and the evolution of human language: why we cannot focus solely on communication

Studies of animal communication are often assumed to provide the 'royal road' to understanding the evolution of human language. After all, language is the pre-eminent system of human communication: doesn't it make sense to search for its precursors in animal communication systems? From this viewpoint, if some characteristic feature of human language is lacking in systems of animal communication, it represents a crucial gap in evolution, and evidence for an evolutionary discontinuity. Here I argue that we should reverse this logic: because a defining feature of human language is its ability to flexibly represent and recombine concepts, precursors for many important components of language should be sought in animal cognition rather than animal communication. Animal communication systems typically only permit expression of a small subset of the concepts that can be represented and manipulated by that species. Thus, if a particular concept is not expressed in a species' communication system this is not evidence that it lacks that concept. I conclude that if we focus exclusively on communicative signals, we sell the comparative analysis of language evolution short. Therefore, animal cognition provides a crucial (and often neglected) source of evidence regarding the biology and evolution of human language. This article is part of the theme issue 'What can animal communication teach us about human language?'

Transitive Inference Remains Despite Overtraining on Premise Pair C+D-

Transitive inference (TI) has been studied in humans and several animals such as rats, pigeons and fishes. Using different methods for training premises it has been shown that a non-trained relation between stimuli can be stablished, so that if A > B > C > D > E, then B > D. Despite the widely reported cases of TI, the specific mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain under discussion. In the present experiment pigeons were trained in a TI procedure with four premises. After being exposed to all premises, the pigeons showed a consistent preference for B over D during the test. After overtraining C+D- alone, B was still preferred over D. However, the expected pattern of training performance (referred to as serial position effect) was distorted, whereas TI remained unaltered. The results are discussed regarding value transfer and reinforcement contingencies as possible mechanisms. We conclude that reinforcement contingencies can affect training performance without altering TI.

Thinking chickens: a review of cognition, emotion, and behavior in the domestic chicken

Domestic chickens are members of an order, Aves, which has been the focus of a revolution in our understanding of neuroanatomical, cognitive, and social complexity. At least some birds are now known to be on par with many mammals in terms of their level of intelligence, emotional sophistication, and social interaction. Yet, views of chickens have largely remained unrevised by this new evidence. In this paper, I examine the peer-reviewed scientific data on the leading edge of cognition, emotions, personality, and sociality in chickens, exploring such areas as self-awareness, cognitive bias, social learning and self-control, and comparing their abilities in these areas with other birds and other vertebrates, particularly mammals. My overall conclusion is that chickens are just as cognitively, emotionally and socially complex as most other birds and mammals in many areas, and that there is a need for further noninvasive comparative behavioral research with chickens as well as a re-framing of current views about their intelligence.

The importance of the altricial - precocial spectrum for social complexity in mammals and birds - a review

Various types of long-term stable relationships that individuals uphold, including cooperation and competition between group members, define social complexity in vertebrates. Numerous life history, physiological and cognitive traits have been shown to affect, or to be affected by, such social relationships. As such, differences in developmental modes, i.e. the ‘altricial-precocial’ spectrum, may play an important role in understanding the interspecific variation in occurrence of social interactions, but to what extent this is the case is unclear because the role of the developmental mode has not been studied directly in across-species studies of sociality. In other words, although there are studies on the effects of developmental mode on brain size, on the effects of brain size on cognition, and on the effects of cognition on social complexity, there are no studies directly investigating the link between developmental mode and social complexity. This is surprising because developmental differences play a significant role in the evolution of, for example, brain size, which is in turn considered an essential building block with respect to social complexity. Here, we compiled an overview of studies on various aspects of the complexity of social systems in altricial and precocial mammals and birds. Although systematic studies are scarce and do not allow for a quantitative comparison, we show that several forms of social relationships and cognitive abilities occur in species along the entire developmental spectrum. Based on the existing evidence it seems that differences in developmental modes play a minor role in whether or not individuals or species are able to meet the cognitive capabilities and requirements for maintaining complex social relationships. Given the scarcity of comparative studies and potential subtle differences, however, we suggest that future studies should consider developmental differences to determine whether our finding is general or whether some of the vast variation in social complexity across species can be explained by developmental mode. This would allow a more detailed assessment of the relative importance of developmental mode in the evolution of vertebrate social systems.

Cognitive skills and the evolution of social systems

How do animal social skills influence evolution? Complex animal social behaviors require many cognitive skills including individual recognition and observational learning. For social systems to evolve, these abilities need to be transmitted genetically or culturally and supported by the evolution of underlying neural systems. Because animal skill sets are so varied, it seems best to describe animal cognitive behaviors as being a social calculus that can change with experience, which has evolved to match and facilitate the complexity of the social system where it arose. That is, acquiring and using social information in response to a rapidly changing complex world leads to social competence enabling success in essential behavioral interactions. Here, we describe the remarkable suite of social skills discovered in the African cichlid fish Astatotilapia burtoni, including an attention hierarchy, male deception, transitive inference, the mechanistic bases of social dominance, female mate choice and the neural control of female reproductive behavior. The social calculus of this species is presented as an example of a potential causal factor in the evolution of sophisticated social behavior necessary for the evolutionary success of their social system.

Reasoning by exclusion in the kea (Nestor notabilis)

Reasoning by exclusion, i.e. the ability to understand that if there are only two possibilities and if it is not A, it must be B, has been a topic of great interest in recent comparative cognition research. Many studies have investigated this ability, employing different methods, but rarely exploring concurrent decision processes underlying choice behaviour of non-human animals encountering inconsistent or incomplete information. Here, we employed a novel training and test method in order to perform an in-depth analysis of the underlying processes. Importantly, to discourage the explorative behaviour of the kea, a highly neophilic species, the training included a large amount of novel, unrewarded stimuli. The subsequent test consisted of 30 sessions with different sequences of four test trials. In these test trials, we confronted the kea with novel stimuli that were paired with either the rewarded or unrewarded training stimuli or with the novel stimuli of previous test trials. Once habituated to novelty, eight out of fourteen kea tested responded to novel stimuli by inferring their contingency via logical exclusion of the alternative. One individual inferred predominantly in this way, while other response strategies, such as one trial learning, stimulus preferences and avoiding the negative stimulus also guided the responses of the remaining individuals. Interestingly, the difficulty of the task had no influence on the test performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the current hypotheses about the emergence of inferential reasoning in some avian species, considering causal links to brain size, feeding ecology and social complexity.

Transitive inference of social dominance by human infants

It is surprising that there are inconsistent findings of transitive inference (TI) in young infants given that non-linguistic species succeed on TI tests. To conclusively test for TI in infants, we developed a task within the social domain, with which infants are known to show sophistication. We familiarized 10- to 13-month-olds (M = 11.53 months) to a video of two dominance interactions between three puppets (bear > elephant; hippo > bear) consistent with a dominance hierarchy (hippo > bear > elephant; where '>' denotes greater dominance). Infants then viewed interactions between the two puppets that had not interacted during familiarization. These interactions were either congruent (hippo > elephant) or incongruent (elephant > hippo) with the inferred hierarchy. Consistent with TI, infants looked longer to incongruent than congruent displays. Control conditions ruled out the possibility that infants' expectations were based on stable behaviors specific to individual puppets rather than their inferred transitive dominance relations. We suggest that TI may be supported by phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of ordinal representation and visuospatial processing that come online early in human development.

Social Feedback and the Emergence of Rank in Animal Society

Dominance hierarchies are group-level properties that emerge from the aggression of individuals. Although individuals can gain critical benefits from their position in a hierarchy, we do not understand how real-world hierarchies form. Nor do we understand what signals and decision-rules individuals use to construct and maintain hierarchies in the absence of simple cues such as size or spatial location. A study of conflict in two groups of captive monk parakeets (Myiopsitta monachus) found that a transition to large-scale order in aggression occurred in newly-formed groups after one week, with individuals thereafter preferring to direct aggression more frequently against those nearby in rank. We consider two cognitive mechanisms underlying the emergence of this order: inference based on overall levels of aggression, or on subsets of the aggression network. Both mechanisms were predictive of individual decisions to aggress, but observed patterns were better explained by rank inference through subsets of the aggression network. Based on these results, we present a new theory, of a feedback loop between knowledge of rank and consequent behavior. This loop explains the transition to strategic aggression and the formation and persistence of dominance hierarchies in groups capable of both social memory and inference.

Social behaviour: can it change the brain?

Dominance hierarchies are ubiquitous in social species. Social status is established initially through physical conflict between individuals and then communicated directly by a variety of signals. Social interactions depend critically on the relative social status of those interacting. But how do individuals acquire the information they need to modulate their behaviour and how do they use that information to decide what to do? What brain mechanisms might underlie such animal cognition? Using a particularly suitable fish model system that depends on complex social interactions, we report how the social context of behaviour shapes the brain and, in turn, alters the behaviour of animals as they interact. Animals observe social interactions carefully to gather information vicariously that then guides their future behaviour. Social opportunities produce rapid changes in gene expression in key nuclei in the brain and these genomic responses may prepare the individual to modify its behaviour to move into a different social niche. Both social success and failure produce changes in neuronal cell size and connectivity in key nuclei. Understanding mechanisms through which social information is transduced into cellular and molecular changes will provide a deeper understanding of the brain systems responsible for animal cognition.

Inferential reasoning and egg rejection in a cooperatively breeding cuckoo

Inferential reasoning-associating a visible consequence with an imagined event-has been demonstrated in several bird species in captivity, but few studies have tested wild birds in ecologically relevant contexts. Here, we investigate inferential reasoning by the greater ani, a cooperatively breeding cuckoo in which several females lay eggs in one nest. Prior to laying her first egg, each female removes any eggs that have already been laid by other females in the shared nest. After laying her first egg, however, each female stops removing eggs, presumably in order to avoid accidentally rejecting her own. But are anis using inferential reasoning to track the fate of their eggs in the communal nest, or is egg ejection governed by non-cognitive determinants? We experimentally removed eggs from two-female nests after both females had laid at least one egg and used video recording to verify that both females viewed the empty nest. We waited until one female (A) laid an egg in the nest, and video recorded the behavior of the female that had not yet re-laid (B). We predicted that if capable of inferential reasoning, female B should infer that the new egg could not be her own and she should remove it. Five out of five females tested failed to make this inference, suggesting that egg removal is either determined by the female's reproductive status or by the amount of time elapsed between egg removal and re-laying. This apparent cognitive constraint may have implications for the evolutionary stability of the anis' unusual breeding system.

Ravens notice dominance reversals among conspecifics within and outside their social group

A core feature of social intelligence is the understanding of third-party relations, which has been experimentally demonstrated in primates. Whether other social animals also have this capacity, and whether they can use this capacity flexibly to, for example, also assess the relations of neighbouring conspecifics, remains unknown. Here we show that ravens react differently to playbacks of dominance interactions that either confirm or violate the current rank hierarchy of members in their own social group and of ravens in a neighbouring group. Therefore, ravens understand third-party relations and may deduce those not only via physical interactions but also by observation.

Social intelligence requires the understanding of third-party relations, which is known to occur in humans and primates. Here, Massen et al. show that ravens respond differently to sound recordings of dominance interactions between other ravens, suggesting that ravens also understand third-party relations.

Six-term transitive inference with pigeons: successive-pair training followed by mixed-pair training

In nonhuman animals, the transitive inference (TI) task typically involves training a series of four simultaneous discriminations involving, for example, arbitrary colors in which choice of one stimulus in each pair is reinforced [+] and choice of the other color is nonreinforced [-]. This can be represented as A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E- and can be conceptualized as a series of linear relationships: A > B > C > D > E. After training, animals are tested on the untrained non-endpoint pair, BD. Preference for B over D is taken as evidence of TI and occurs because B is greater than D in the implied series. In the present study we trained pigeons using a novel training procedure-a hybrid of successive pair training (training one pair at a time) and mixed-pair training (training all pairs at once)-designed to overcome some of the limitations of earlier procedures. Using this hybrid procedure, we trained five premise pairs (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, and E+F-) which allowed us to test three untrained non-endpoint pairs (BD, CE, and BE). A significant TI effect was found for most subjects on at least two out of three test pairs. Different theories of TI are discussed. The results suggest that this hybrid training is an efficient procedure for establishing mixed-pair acquisition and a TI effect.

Automated cognitive testing of monkeys in social groups yields results comparable to individual laboratory-based testing

Cognitive abilities likely evolved in response to specific environmental and social challenges and are therefore expected to be specialized for the life history of each species. Specialized cognitive abilities may be most readily engaged under conditions that approximate the natural environment of the species being studied. While naturalistic environments might therefore have advantages over laboratory settings for cognitive research, it is difficult to conduct certain types of cognitive tests in these settings. We implemented methods for automated cognitive testing of monkeys (Macaca mulatta) in large social groups (Field station) and compared the performance to that of laboratory-housed monkeys (Laboratory). The Field station animals shared access to four touch-screen computers in a large naturalistic social group. Each Field station subject had an RFID chip implanted in each arm for computerized identification and individualized assignment of cognitive tests. The Laboratory group was housed and tested in a typical laboratory setting, with individual access to testing computers in their home cages. Monkeys in both groups voluntarily participated at their own pace for food rewards. We evaluated performance in two visual psychophysics tests, a perceptual classification test, a transitive inference test, and a delayed matching-to-sample memory test. Despite the differences in housing, social environment, age, and sex, monkeys in the two groups performed similarly in all tests. Semi-free ranging monkeys living in complex social environments are therefore viable subjects for cognitive testing designed to take advantage of the unique affordances of naturalistic testing environments.

Transitive inference in jackdaws (Corvus monedula)

Transitive inference (TI) refers to the cognitive ability to derive relationships between items that have never been presented together before. TI could be a useful tool for individuals living in large social groups, as these are confronted with an increasing number of possible dyadic relationships between group members. Through TI, one could potentially identify rank relationships between group members and thereby avoid costly direct agonistic interactions. Jackdaws seem ideal candidates to test for the ability of TI as they live in relatively complex groups, in which such skills could be useful. We presently report the results of jackdaws in a touch screen experiment. Three individuals were trained to memorise an ordered sequence of five differently coloured squares (A-E), which were presented in four pairs consisting of two adjacent colours each (A/B, B/C, C/D, D/E). After reaching the pre-defined criteria in each single colour pair in a time comparable to other species, they were confronted with an unknown pair of two non-adjacent colours (B/D). The birds were able to identify the relationship according to the previously learned sequence by preferring B over D.

Long-term memory of hierarchical relationships in free-living greylag geese

Animals may memorise spatial and social information for many months and even years. Here, we investigated long-term memory of hierarchically ordered relationships, where the position of a reward depended on the relationship of a stimulus relative to other stimuli in the hierarchy. Seventeen greylag geese (Anser anser) had been trained on discriminations between successive pairs of five or seven implicitly ordered colours, where the higher ranking colour in each pair was rewarded. Geese were re-tested on the task 2, 6 and 12 months after learning the dyadic colour relationships. They chose the correct colour above chance at all three points in time, whereby performance was better in colour pairs at the beginning or end of the colour series. Nonetheless, they also performed above chance on internal colour pairs, which is indicative of long-term memory for quantitative differences in associative strength and/or for relational information. There were no indications for a decline in performance over time, indicating that geese may remember dyadic relationships for at least 6 months and probably well over 1 year. Furthermore, performance in the memory task was unrelated to the individuals' sex and their performance while initially learning the dyadic colour relationships. We discuss possible functions of this long-term memory in the social domain.

Brain evolution and human neuropsychology: the inferential brain hypothesis

Collaboration between human neuropsychology and comparative neuroscience has generated invaluable contributions to our understanding of human brain evolution and function. Further cross-talk between these disciplines has the potential to continue to revolutionize these fields. Modern neuroimaging methods could be applied in a comparative context, yielding exciting new data with the potential of providing insight into brain evolution. Conversely, incorporating an evolutionary base into the theoretical perspectives from which we approach human neuropsychology could lead to novel hypotheses and testable predictions. In the spirit of these objectives, we present here a new theoretical proposal, the Inferential Brain Hypothesis, whereby the human brain is thought to be characterized by a shift from perceptual processing to inferential computation, particularly within the social realm. This shift is believed to be a driving force for the evolution of the large human cortex. (JINS, 2012, 18, 394-401).

The human ventromedial prefrontal cortex is critical for transitive inference

We hypothesized that the ventromedial pFC (vmPFC) is critical for making transitive inferences (e.g., the logical operation that if A > B and B > C, then A > C). To test this, participants with focal vmPFC damage, brain-damaged comparison participants, and neurologically normal participants completed a transitive inference task consisting an ordered set of arbitrary patterns. Participants first learned through trial-and-error the relationships of the patterns (e.g., Pattern A > Pattern B, Pattern B > Pattern C). After initial learning, participants were presented with novel pairings, some of which required transitive inference (e.g., Pattern A > Pattern C from the relationship above). We observed that vmPFC damage led to a specific deficit in transitive inference, suggesting that an intact vmPFC is necessary for making normal transitive inferences. Given the usefulness of transitivity in inferring social relationships, this deficit may be one of the basic features of social conduct problems associated with vmPFC damage.