Belief formation - A driving force for brain evolution

Stochastic pairwise preference convergence in Bayesian agents

Beliefs inform the behavior of forward-thinking agents in complex environments. Recently, sequential Bayesian inference has emerged as a mechanism to study belief formation among agents adapting to dynamical conditions. However, we lack critical theory to explain how preferences evolve in cases of simple agent interactions. In this paper, we derive a Gaussian, pairwise agent interaction model to study how preferences converge when driven by observation of each other's behaviors. We show that the dynamics of convergence resemble an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, a common model in nonequilibrium stochastic dynamics. Using standard analytical and computational techniques, we find that the hyperprior magnitudes, representing the learning time, determine the convergence value and the asymptotic entropy of the preferences across pairs of agents. We also show that the dynamical variance in preferences is characterized by a relaxation time t^{★} and compute its asymptotic upper bound. This formulation enhances the existing toolkit for modeling stochastic, interactive agents by formalizing leading theories in learning theory, and builds towards more comprehensive models of open problems in principal-agent and market theory.

Manifestations, social impact, and decay of conceptual beliefs: A cultural perspective

INTRODUCTION

Believing comprises multifaceted processes that integrate information from the outside world through meaning-making processes with personal relevance.

METHODS

Qualitative Review of the current literature in social cognitive neuroscience.

RESULTS

Although believing develops rapidly outside an individual's conscious awareness, it results in the formation of beliefs that are stored in memory and play an important role in determining an individual's behavior. Primal beliefs reflect an individual's experience of objects and events, whereas conceptual beliefs are based on narratives that are held in social groups. Conceptual beliefs can be about autobiographical, political, religious, and other aspects of life and may be encouraged by participation in group rituals. We hypothesize that assertions of future gains and rewards that transcend but are inherent in these codices provide incentives to follow the norms and rules of social groups.

CONCLUSION

The power of conceptual beliefs to provide cultural orientation is likely to fade when circumstances and evidence make it clear that what was asserted no longer applies.

The mindful leader: a review of leadership qualities derived from mindfulness meditation

Mindfulness has been practiced by global leaders and companies as an efficient way to build effective leadership. Because of its popularity, plus the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework that explains it in a leadership context, the research literature has called for a coherent account of the qualities that is derived by those leaders that practice mindfulness. Here, we aim to answer that call, by clarifying what leadership qualities can develop from practicing mindfulness. We report on a semi-systematic literature review of extant research, covering 19 research articles published between 2000 and 2021, plus other relevant supporting literature from the disciplines of leadership and neuropsychology. Our proposed framework consists of three main qualities of the mindful leader: attention, awareness, and authenticity. We call them the "three pillars of mindful leaders." We also propose that mindfulness meditation must be integrated into our proposed framework, as we are convinced that leaders who hope to benefit from these qualities must integrate a regular mindfulness meditation practice into their daily leadership life.

Emotion beliefs: conceptual review and compendium

Laypeople hold richly divergent beliefs about emotion, and these beliefs are consequential. Specific forms of belief that have been investigated include the usefulness, contagiousness, duration, dependence upon intersubjective experience, cognitively mediated properties, malleability, and hindering properties of emotion, just to name a few. Progress in this emerging sub-field of research has been hampered by the lack of a widely accepted definition of emotion belief able to capture all of these dimensions. Correspondingly, there has been a proliferation of different terminologies, constructs, and measures. The present review aims to address these obstacles by defining emotion belief, and subsequently re-considering existing constructs and measures that align with this definition. The latter is presented in the form of a comprehensive compendium of 21 different constructs and associated self-report measures that assess varying components of one's beliefs about emotions in general and/or about their own emotions, and an additional 5 scales that were designed to measure one's beliefs about another's emotions. From the more unified conceptualization of emotion belief presented here, critical areas of future research are highlighted.

The Nepean Belief Scale (NBS) as a tool to investigate the intensity of beliefs in anorexia nervosa: psychometric properties of the Italian version

BACKGROUND

People with anorexia nervosa (AN) show a peculiar impairment of insight regarding their condition, often manifesting a denial of extreme emaciation and sometimes hiding or underreporting socially undesirable abnormal eating patterns. Sometimes the intensity of the beliefs held by patients with AN reach a delusional intensity.

OBJECTIVES

In this study, the Italian version of the Nepean Belief Scale was applied to a sample of patients diagnosed with AN to investigate the intensity of their beliefs and convictions and its clinical correlates.

METHODS

The Nepean Belief Scale (NBS) was translated and adapted to Italian and applied to a sample of patients diagnosed with AN based on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5 (SCID-5).

RESULTS

The Italian version of the 5-item NBS showed excellent reliability. Convergent validity was proved by negative association with levels of insight measured with the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight in Eating Disorders. Beliefs of delusional intensity were reported by 10% of participants. Those with a greater intensity of beliefs, either overvalued or delusional ideas, were more likely to report poorer general cognitive performances on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment. No association was observed between NBS score and age, body mass index, symptoms of eating disorders, body dissatisfaction, or levels of depression. Fear of weight gain and control seeking were the most often reported themes at the NBS.

CONCLUSIONS

The Italian version of the NBS is a reasonably reliable, valid, and usable tool for the multidimensional assessment of insight in AN. Level of evidence Level III, Evidence obtained from well-designed cohort or case-control analytic studies.

Bridging the gap between believing and memory functions

Believing has recently been recognized as a fundamental brain function linking a person’s experience with his or her attitude, actions and predictions. In general, believing results from the integration of ambient information with emotions and can be reinforced or modulated in a probabilistic fashion by new experiences. Although these processes occur in the subliminal realm, humans can become aware of what they believe and express it verbally. We explain how believing is interwoven with memory functions in a multifaceted fashion. Linking the typically rapid and adequate reactions of a subject to what he/she believes is enabled by working memory. Perceptions are stored in episodic memory as beneficial or aversive events, while the corresponding verbal descriptions of what somebody believes are stored in semantic memory. After recall from memory of what someone believes, personally relevant information can be communicated to other people. Thus, memory is essential for maintaining what people believe.

Human interaction with the divine, the sacred, and the deceased: topics that warrant increased attention by psychologists

Humans have likely been attempting to communicate with entities believed to exist, such as the divine, sacred beings, and deceased people, since the dawn of time. Across cultures and countries, many believe that interaction with the immaterial world is not only possible but a frequent experience. Most religious traditions across the globe focus many rituals and activities around prayer to an entity deemed divine or sacred. Additionally, many people–religious, agnostic, and atheists alike–report communication with their departed loved ones. During highly stressful times associated with natural disasters, war, pandemics, and other threats to human life, the frequency and intensity of these activities and associated experiences substantially increase. Although this very human phenomenon seems to be universal, the empirical literature on the topic within psychology is thin. This paper discussed the topic and reviews what we know from the professional literature about how people perceive communication with these unseen entities. It highlights the perceptual and social cognition evidence and discussed the role of attribution theory, which might help us understand the beliefs, motivations, and practices of those engaged with communication with the unseen. Empirical laboratory research with mediums is discussed as well, examining the evidence for communication with the deceased. Final reflections and suggestions for future research are also offered.

Believing and social interactions: effects on bodily expressions and personal narratives

The processes of believing integrate external perceptual information from the environment with internal emotional states and prior experience to generate probabilistic neural representations of events, i.e., beliefs. As these neural representations manifest mostly below the level of a person's conscious awareness, they may inadvertently affect the spontaneous person's bodily expressions and prospective behavior. By yet to be understood mechanisms people can become aware of these representations and reflect upon them. Typically, people can communicate the content of their beliefs as personal statements and can summarize the narratives of others to themselves or to other people. Here, we describe that social interactions may benefit from the consistency between a person's bodily expressions and verbal statements because the person appears authentic and ultimately trustworthy. The transmission of narratives can thus lay the groundwork for social cooperation within and between groups and, ultimately, between communities and nations. Conversely, a discrepancy between bodily expressions and narratives may cause distrust in the addressee(s) and eventually may destroy social bonds.

Believing Processes during the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Qualitative Analysis

Cognition, emotion, emotional regulation, and believing play a special role in psychosocial functioning, especially in times of crisis. So far, little is known about the process of believing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of this study was to examine the process of believing (using the Model of Credition) and the associated psychosocial strain/stress during the first lockdown in the COVID-19 pandemic. An online survey via LimeSurvey was conducted using the Brief Symptom Inventory-18 (BSI-18), the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), and a dedicated Believing Questionnaire, which assesses four parameters of credition (propositions, certainty, emotion, mightiness) between April and June, 2020, in Austria. In total, n = 156 mentally healthy participants completed all questionnaires. Negative credition parameters were associated with higher global symptom load (from BSI-18): narratives: r = 0.29, p < 0.001; emotions r = 0.39, p < 0.001. These findings underline the importance of credition as a link between cognition and emotion and their impact on psychosocial functioning and stress regulation in implementing novel strategies to promote mental health.

The architecture of creditions: Openness and otherness

“Creditions” are an important new idea within our contemporary understanding of the human. They potentially represent the unity of both humanistic and scientific ways of modeling the human. As such, “creditions” offer a bridge between current thinking in science and the humanities and the development of a more powerfully integrated interdisciplinary hermeneutic. It is argued in this article that the questions posed by “creditions” (as developed by Rüdiger Seitz and Hans-Ferdinand Angel) cannot be resolved through reduction but rather only through cohesive systematization. In contrast with coherence in conventional science, “credition-centered” thinking finds expression in systemic ways. The complex humanity of the reflective subject resists reduction; and calls to be analyzed in terms of sociality, the identification of “otherness” and interactive engagement. In this context then a thinking which is attuned to complexity and to otherness has an important place in the expression of the social subject as a complex and relational self, in today’s world. These are not however social realities as we find them either in large-scale social schemata, or indeed in the intimacy of the face to face. Rather credition-centered learning falls between these two categories and is best described as “the productive knowledge of community,” where community is generated by productive enhancement and the embrace of otherness over time.

Believing is seeing: A Buddhist theory of creditions

The creditions model is incredibly powerful at explaining both how beliefs are formed and how they influence our perceptions. The model contains several cognitive loops, where beliefs not only influence conscious interpretations of perceptions downstream but are active in the subconscious construction of perceptions out of sensory information upstream. This paper shows how this model is mirrored in the epistemology of two central Buddhist figures, Dignāga (480–540 CE) and Dharmakı̄rti (c. 550–650 CE). In addition to showing these parallels, the paper also demonstrates that by drawing on Dignāga and Dharmakı̄rti's theory, we can extend the explanatory power of the creditions model. Namely, while creditions explain how beliefs influence both the conscious interpretation and subconscious construction of sensory information, Dignāga and Dharmakı̄rti suggest beliefs can even be generative of sensory-like information. I recruit ancient Buddhist texts in conjunction with contemporary cognitive science scholarship to offer a hypothesis for the cognitive mechanisms responsible for this.

Postdiction in Visual Awareness and Intrinsic Religiosity

The mistiming and fusion of predictive thought and actual perception result in postdiction in awareness, a critical factor in the emergence of nonrational beliefs. Individuals with delusive thinking tend to experience a temporal reversal of prediction ("I guess the rain will fall.") and real perception ("I feel the rain falling."), incorrectly showing conviction that their predictions are correct. It is unknown how postdiction is related to religious cognition with a particular reference to intrinsic religiosity when religious beliefs and values are master motives and fundamental frameworks of life. Using a temporal decision-making task, we investigated a group of religiously committed individuals, atheists, and people from the general community. Results revealed higher postdiction at short thought-precept time intervals in the intrinsic religious group relative to the atheists. Intrinsic religiosity, but not delusive thinking, was predicted by postdiction in both religious individuals and the general population. These results indicate that people who display pronounced thought-percept reversal and fusion feel that they are close to a higher power and the sacred.

Postdiction in Visual Awareness in Schizophrenia

Background: The mistiming of predictive thought and real perception leads to postdiction in awareness. Individuals with high delusive thinking confuse prediction and perception, which results in impaired reality testing. The present observational study investigated how antipsychotic medications and cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) modulate postdiction in schizophrenia. We hypothesized that treatment reduces postdiction, especially when antipsychotics and CBT are combined. Methods: We enrolled patients with schizophrenia treated in a natural clinical setting and not in a randomized controlled trial. We followed up two schizophrenia groups matched for age, sex, education, and illness duration: patients on antipsychotics (n = 25) or antipsychotics plus CBT (n = 25). The treating clinician assigned the patients to the two groups. Participants completed a postdiction and a temporal discrimination task at weeks 0 and 12. Results: At week 0, postdiction was enhanced in patients relative to controls at a short prediction–perception time interval, which correlated with PANSS positive symptoms and delusional conviction. At week 12, postdiction was reduced in schizophrenia, especially when they received antipsychotics plus CBT. Patients with schizophrenia were also impaired on the temporal discrimination task, which did not change during the treatment. During the 12-week observational period, all PANSS scores were significantly reduced in both clinical groups, but the positive symptoms and emotional distress exhibited a more pronounced response in the antipsychotics plus CBT group. Conclusion: Perceptual postdiction is a putative neurocognitive marker of delusive thinking. Combined treatment with antipsychotics and CBT significantly ameliorates abnormally elevated postdiction in schizophrenia.

Wired to Doubt: Why People Fear Vaccines and Climate Change and Mistrust Science

We all want to be right in our thinking. Vaccine hesitancy and global warming denial share much in common: (1) both are threats to personal, community and global health, (2) action is contingent on co-operation and social policy, and (3) public support relies on trust in science. The irony is, however, as the science has become more convincing, public opinion has become more divided. A number of early polls showed that ~70% of people supported COVID-19 vaccine use and global warming, ~20% adopted a wait-and-see approach, and ~10% were staunch objectors. Although these percentages are approximate, what factors are responsible for the differences in engagement, doubt and distrust? How can we reduce the consensus gap? One approach is to return to grass roots and provide a brief history of the issues, understand the difference between fact and opinion, truth and falsehood, the problem of certainty, and how scientific consensus is reached. To doubt is a healthy response to new information, and it too has a scientific basis. Doubt and distrust reside in that region of the brain called the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for suppressing unwanted representations. Bridging the consensus gap requires shifting human thinking patterns from doubt to belief, and belief to action. Education and improved public messaging are key, and social media providers require urgent oversight or regulation to remove false and harmful/dangerous content from our digital lives. Delays to vaccinate and failure to reduce greenhouse gases will dramatically change the way we live. The new norm may be more deadly COVID variants, strained healthcare systems, extreme weather patterns, diminished food supply, delays in goods and services, damage to world's economies and widespread global instability.

Neural mechanisms of modulations of empathy and altruism by beliefs of others' pain

Perceived cues signaling others' pain induce empathy which in turn motivates altruistic behavior toward those who appear suffering. This perception-emotion-behavior reactivity is the core of human altruism but does not always occur in real-life situations. Here, by integrating behavioral and multimodal neuroimaging measures, we investigate neural mechanisms underlying modulations of empathy and altruistic behavior by beliefs of others' pain (BOP). We show evidence that lack of BOP reduces subjective estimation of others' painful feelings and decreases monetary donations to those who show pain expressions. Moreover, lack of BOP attenuates neural responses to their pain expressions within 200 ms after face onset and modulates neural responses to others' pain in the insular, post-central, and frontal cortices. Our findings suggest that BOP provide a cognitive basis of human empathy and altruism and unravel the intermediate neural mechanisms.