Creativity: linchpin in the quest for a viable theory of cultural evolution

Lessons for Theory from Scientific Domains Where Evidence is Sparse or Indirect

In many scientific fields, sparseness and indirectness of empirical evidence pose fundamental challenges to theory development. Theories of the evolution of human cognition provide a guiding example, where the targets of study are evolutionary processes that occurred in the ancestors of present-day humans. In many cases, the evidence is both very sparse and very indirect (e.g., archaeological findings regarding anatomical changes that might be related to the evolution of language capabilities); in other cases, the evidence is less sparse but still very indirect (e.g., data on cultural transmission in groups of contemporary humans and non-human primates). From examples of theoretical and empirical work in this domain, we distill five virtuous practices that scientists could aim to satisfy when evidence is sparse or indirect: (i) making assumptions explicit, (ii) making alternative theories explicit, (iii) pursuing computational and formal modelling, (iv) seeking external consistency with theories of related phenomena, and (v) triangulating across different forms and sources of evidence. Thus, rather than inhibiting theory development, sparseness or indirectness of evidence can catalyze it. To the extent that there are continua of sparseness and indirectness that vary across domains and that the principles identified here always apply to some degree, the solutions and advantages proposed here may generalise to other scientific domains.

Brainstorming: Interbrain coupling in groups forms the basis of group creativity

Although the impact of group dynamics on creativity is widely recognized, prior research has primarily concentrated on individuals in isolation from social context. To address this lacuna, we focus on groups as the fundamental unit of analysis. We used functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to examine brain activity in groups of four during brainstorming discussions. We assessed interbrain coupling in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a brain region linked to flexibility, and in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), a region associated with imitation. Our findings demonstrate that creativity-focused discussions induced interbrain coupling both in regions related to flexibility and herding. Notably, interbrain coupling in the IFG was associated with more imitation of responses. Critically, while interbrain coupling in the DLPFC positively predicted group creativity, in the IFG it negatively predicted creativity. These findings suggest that increase in group mindsets of flexibility relative to herding is important for enhancing group creativity.

On the connection between creativity and aesthetics

Within cognitive psychology, there are separate experimental fields devoted to the study of creativity, on the one hand, and aesthetics, on the other, with virtually no cross-talk between them. In this article, I propose a means of uniting creativity and aesthetics via a consideration of the mechanisms of cultural evolution. I call this the creativity/aesthetics cycle. The basic tenet of the model is that creativity and aesthetics mediate, respectively, the processes of variation (production) and selection (perception or consumption) in evolutionary models of culture. By means of this cycle, creators produce works that they hope will be evaluated positively by consumers, where such appraisals ultimately feed back to influence the subsequent decision-making processes of creators. I discuss the implications of this model for the fields of creativity and aesthetics.

Biological evolution and human cognition are analogous information processing systems

The mechanisms that govern biological evolution and human cognition are analogous, as both follow the same principles of natural information processing systems. In this article, we describe the following five principles that provide an analogy between biological evolution and human cognition: (a) Randomness as Genesis Principle and (b) Borrowing and Reorganizing Principle, which indicate how natural information processing systems obtain information; (c) Narrow Limits of Change Principle and (d) Information Store Principle, which indicate how information is processed and stored; and (e) Environmental Organizing and Linking Principle, which indicate how stored information is used to generate actions appropriate to an environment. In human cognition, these analogs only apply to cognitive processes associated with biologically secondary knowledge, the knowledge typically taught in educational institutions. Based on these five principles, cognitive load theory researchers have provided diverse prescriptions to optimize instructional activities and materials. We conclude by discussing general instructional implications and future research directions based on this analogy.

A Dynamic Autocatalytic Network Model of Therapeutic Change

Psychotherapy involves the modification of a client's worldview to reduce distress and enhance well-being. We take a human dynamical systems approach to modeling this process, using Reflexively Autocatalytic foodset-derived (RAF) networks. RAFs have been used to model the self-organization of adaptive networks associated with the origin and early evolution of both biological life, as well as the evolution and development of the kind of cognitive structure necessary for cultural evolution. The RAF approach is applicable in these seemingly disparate cases because it provides a theoretical framework for formally describing under what conditions systems composed of elements that interact and 'catalyze' the formation of new elements collectively become integrated wholes. In our application, the elements are mental representations, and the whole is a conceptual network. The initial components-referred to as foodset items-are mental representations that are innate, or were acquired through social learning or individual learning (of pre-existing information). The new elements-referred to as foodset-derived items-are mental representations that result from creative thought (resulting in new information). In clinical psychology, a client's distress may be due to, or exacerbated by, one or more beliefs that diminish self-esteem. Such beliefs may be formed and sustained through distorted thinking, and the tendency to interpret ambiguous events as confirmation of these beliefs. We view psychotherapy as a creative collaborative process between therapist and client, in which the output is not an artwork or invention but a more well-adapted worldview and approach to life on the part of the client. In this paper, we model a hypothetical albeit representative example of the formation and dissolution of such beliefs over the course of a therapist-client interaction using RAF networks. We show how the therapist is able to elicit this worldview from the client and create a conceptualization of the client's concerns. We then formally demonstrate four distinct ways in which the therapist is able to facilitate change in the client's worldview: (1) challenging the client's negative interpretations of events, (2) providing direct evidence that runs contrary to and counteracts the client's distressing beliefs, (3) using self-disclosure to provide examples of strategies one can use to diffuse a negative conclusion, and (4) reinforcing the client's attempts to assimilate such strategies into their own ways of thinking. We then discuss the implications of such an approach to expanding our knowledge of the development of mental health concerns and the trajectory of the therapeutic change.

A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†

In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as "intuitive statisticians" while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as "probing organisms." We first highlight how ecological rationality's focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: (a) the problem of cue salience, and (b) the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies ecological rationality, which originate from the misapplication of concepts in psychophysics (e.g., signal detection, just-noticeable-differences). We then work through the most popular experimental task in the ecological rationality literature-the city size task-to illustrate how psychophysical assumptions have informally been linked to ecological rationality. After highlighting these problems, we contrast ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Generative rationality builds on biology-in contrast to ecological rationality's focus on statistics. We argue that in uncertain environments cues are rarely given or available for statistical processing. Therefore we focus on the psychogenesis of awareness rather than psychophysics of cues. For any agent or organism, environments "teem" with indefinite cues, meanings and potential objects, the salience or relevance of which is scarcely obvious based on their statistical or physical properties. We focus on organism-specificity and the organism-directed probing that shapes awareness and perception. Cues in teeming environments are noticed when they serve as cues-for-something, requiring what might be called a "cue-to-clue" transformation. In this sense, awareness toward a cue or cues is actively "grown." We thus argue that perception might more productively be seen as the presentation of cues and objects rather than their representation. This generative approach not only applies to relatively mundane organism (including human) interactions with their environments-as well as organism-object relationships and their embodied nature-but also has significant implications for understanding the emergence of novelty in economic settings. We conclude with a discussion of how our arguments link with-but modify-Herbert Simon's popular "scissors" metaphor, as it applies to bounded rationality and its implications for decision making in uncertain, teeming environments.

Modeling Discontinuous Cultural Evolution: The Impact of Cross-Domain Transfer

This paper uses autocatalytic networks to model discontinuous cultural transitions involving cross-domain transfer, using as an illustrative example, artworks inspired by the oldest-known uncontested example of figurative art: the carving of the Hohlenstein-Stadel Löwenmensch, or lion-human. Autocatalytic networks provide a general modeling setting in which nodes are not just passive transmitters of activation; they actively galvanize, or "catalyze" the synthesis of novel ("foodset-derived") nodes from existing ones (the "foodset.") This makes them uniquely suited to model how new structure grows out of earlier structure, i.e., cumulative, generative network growth. They have been used to model the origin and early evolution of biological life, and the emergence of cognitive structures capable of undergoing cultural evolution. We conducted a study in which six individual creators and one group generated music, prose, poetry, and visual art inspired by the Hohlenstein-Stadel Löwenmensch, and answered questions about the process. The data revealed four through-lines by which they expressed the Löwenmensch in an alternative art form: (1) lion-human hybrid, (2) subtracting from the whole to reveal the form within, (3) deterioration, and (4) waiting to be found with a story to tell. Autocatalytic networks were used to model how these four spontaneously derived through-lines form a cultural lineage from Löwenmensch to artist to audience. We used the resulting data from three creators to model the cross-domain transfer from inspirational source (sculpted figurine) to creative product (music, poetry, prose, visual art). These four spontaneously-generated threads of cultural continuity formed the backbone of this Löwenmensch-inspired cultural lineage, enabling culture to evolve even in the face of discontinuity at the level conventional categories or domains. We know of no other theory of cultural evolution that accommodates cross-domain transfer or other forms of discontinuity. The approach paves the way for a broad scientific framework for the origins of evolutionary processes.

The allure of the unknown in a tamed, mapped, and homogenized world

As the physical world becomes tamed and mapped out, opportunities to experience the unknown become rarer; imaginary worlds provide a much-needed sense of potentiality. Potentiality is central to the Self-Other Re-organization theory of cultural evolution, which postulates that creativity fuels cumulative cultural change. We point to evidence that fear affects, not the magnitude of exploration, but how cautiously it proceeds.

The neural basis of creative production: A cross-modal ALE meta-analysis

One of the central questions about the cognitive neuroscience of creativity is the extent to which creativity depends on either domain-specific or domain-general mechanisms. To address this question, we carried out two parallel activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses of creativity: 1) a motoric analysis that combined studies across five domains of creative production (verbalizing, music, movement, writing, and drawing), and 2) an analysis of the standard ideational task used to study divergent thinking, the Alternate Uses task. All experiments contained a contrast between a creative task and a matched non-creative or less-creative task that controlled for the sensorimotor demands of task performance. The activation profiles of the two meta-analyses were non-overlapping, but both pointed to a domain-specific interpretation in which creative production is, at least in part, an enhancement of sensorimotor brain areas involved in non-creative production. The most concordant areas of activation in the motoric meta-analysis were high-level motor areas such as the pre-supplementary motor area and inferior frontal gyrus that interface motor planning and executive control, suggesting a means of uniting domain-specificity and -generality in creative production.

Modeling a Cognitive Transition at the Origin of Cultural Evolution Using Autocatalytic Networks

Autocatalytic networks have been used to model the emergence of self-organizing structure capable of sustaining life and undergoing biological evolution. Here, we model the emergence of cognitive structure capable of undergoing cultural evolution. Mental representations (MRs) of knowledge and experiences play the role of catalytic molecules, and interactions among them (e.g., the forging of new associations) play the role of reactions and result in representational redescription. The approach tags MRs with their source, that is, whether they were acquired through social learning, individual learning (of pre-existing information), or creative thought (resulting in the generation of new information). This makes it possible to model how cognitive structure emerges and to trace lineages of cumulative culture step by step. We develop a formal representation of the cultural transition from Oldowan to Acheulean tool technology using Reflexively Autocatalytic and Food set generated (RAF) networks. Unlike more primitive Oldowan stone tools, the Acheulean hand axe required not only the capacity to envision and bring into being something that did not yet exist, but hierarchically structured thought and action, and the generation of new MRs: the concepts EDGING, THINNING, SHAPING, and a meta-concept, HAND AXE. We show how this constituted a key transition toward the emergence of semantic networks that were self-organizing, self-sustaining, and autocatalytic, and we discuss how such networks replicated through social interaction. The model provides a promising approach to unraveling one of the greatest anthropological mysteries: that of why development of the Acheulean hand axe was followed by over a million years of cultural stasis.

An evolutionary process without variation and selection

Natural selection successfully explains how organisms accumulate adaptive change despite that traits acquired over a lifetime are eliminated at the end of each generation. However, in some domains that exhibit cumulative, adaptive change-e.g. cultural evolution, and earliest life-acquired traits are retained; these domains do not face the problem that Darwin's theory was designed to solve. Lack of transmission of acquired traits occurs when germ cells are protected from environmental change, due to a self-assembly code used in two distinct ways: (i) actively interpreted during development to generate a soma, and (ii) passively copied without interpretation during reproduction to generate germ cells. Early life and cultural evolution appear not to involve a self-assembly code used in these two ways. We suggest that cumulative, adaptive change in these domains is due to a lower-fidelity evolutionary process, and model it using reflexively autocatalytic and foodset-generated networks. We refer to this more primitive evolutionary process as self-other reorganization (SOR) because it involves internal self-organizing and self-maintaining processes within entities, as well as interaction between entities. SOR encompasses learning but in general operates across groups. We discuss the relationship between SOR and Lamarckism, and illustrate a special case of SOR without variation.

A minimal model of the interaction of social and individual learning

Learning is thought to be achieved by the selective, activity dependent, adjustment of synaptic connections. Individual learning can also be very hard and/or slow. Social, supervised, learning from others might amplify individual, possibly mainly unsupervised, learning by individuals, and might underlie the development and evolution of culture. We studied a minimal neural network model of the interaction of individual, unsupervised, and social supervised learning by communicating "agents". Individual agents attempted to learn to track a hidden fluctuating "source", which, linearly mixed with other masking fluctuations, generated observable input vectors. In this model data are generated linearly, facilitating mathematical analysis. Learning was driven either solely by direct observation of input data (unsupervised, Hebbian) or, in addition, by observation of another agent's output (supervised, Delta rule). To make learning more difficult, and to enhance biological realism, the learning rules were made slightly connection-inspecific, so that incorrect individual learning sometimes occurs. We found that social interaction can foster both correct and incorrect learning. Useful social learning therefore presumably involves additional factors some of which we outline.

A cognitive transition underlying both technological and social aspects of cumulative culture

The argument that cumulative technological culture originates in technical-reasoning skills is not the only alternative to social accounts; another possibility is that accumulation of both technical-reasoning skills and enhanced social skills stemmed from the onset of a more basic cognitive ability such as recursive representational redescription. The paper confuses individual learning of pre-existing information with creative generation of new information.

The form of a 'half-baked' creative idea: Empirical explorations into the structure of ill-defined mental representations

Creative thought is conventionally believed to involve searching memory and generating multiple independent candidate ideas followed by selection and refinement of the most promising. Honing theory, which grew out of the quantum approach to describing how concepts interact, posits that what appears to be discrete, separate ideas are actually different projections of the same underlying mental representation, which can be described as a superposition state, and which may take different outward forms when reflected upon from different perspectives. As creative thought proceeds, this representation loses potentiality to be viewed from different perspectives and manifest as different outcomes. Honing theory yields different predictions from conventional theories about the mental representation of an idea midway through the creative process. These predictions were pitted against one another in two studies: one closed-ended and one open-ended. In the first study, participants were interrupted midway through solving an analogy problem and wrote down what they were thinking in terms of a solution. In the second, participants were instructed to create a painting that expressed their true essence and describe how they conceived of the painting. For both studies, naïve judges categorized these responses as supportive of either the conventional view or the honing theory view. The results of both studies were significantly more consistent with the predictions of honing theory. Some implications for creative cognition, and cognition in general, are discussed.