What is dopamine doing in model-based reinforcement learning?

Biomarker discovery using machine learning in the psychosis spectrum

The past decade witnessed substantial discoveries related to the psychosis spectrum. Many of these discoveries resulted from pursuits of objective and quantifiable biomarkers in tandem with the application of analytical tools such as machine learning. These approaches provided exciting new insights that significantly helped improve precision in diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. This article provides an overview of how machine learning has been employed in recent biomarker discovery research in the psychosis spectrum, which includes schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorders, bipolar disorder with psychosis, first episode psychosis, and clinical high risk for psychosis. It highlights both human and animal model studies and explores a varying range of the most impactful biomarkers including cognition, neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and digital markers. We specifically highlight new applications and opportunities for machine learning to impact noninvasive symptom monitoring, prediction of future diagnosis and treatment outcomes, integration of new methods with traditional clinical research and practice, and personalized medicine approaches.

Dopamine Release in the Nucleus Accumbens Core Encodes the General Excitatory Components of Learning

Dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens core (NAcC) is generally considered to be a proxy for phasic firing of the ventral tegmental area dopamine (VTADA) neurons. Thus, dopamine release in NAcC is hypothesized to reflect a unitary role in reward prediction error signaling. However, recent studies reveal more diverse roles of dopamine neurons, which support an emerging idea that dopamine regulates learning differently in distinct circuits. To understand whether the NAcC might regulate a unique component of learning, we recorded dopamine release in NAcC while male rats performed a backward conditioning task where a reward is followed by a neutral cue. We used this task because we can delineate different components of learning, which include sensory-specific inhibitory and general excitatory components. Furthermore, we have shown that VTADA neurons are necessary for both the specific and general components of backward associations. Here, we found that dopamine release in NAcC increased to the reward across learning while reducing to the cue that followed as it became more expected. This mirrors the dopamine prediction error signal seen during forward conditioning and cannot be accounted for temporal-difference reinforcement learning. Subsequent tests allowed us to dissociate these learning components and revealed that dopamine release in NAcC reflects the general excitatory component of backward associations, but not their sensory-specific component. These results emphasize the importance of examining distinct functions of different dopamine projections in reinforcement learning.

Dopamine-independent effect of rewards on choices through hidden-state inference

Dopamine is implicated in adaptive behavior through reward prediction error (RPE) signals that update value estimates. There is also accumulating evidence that animals in structured environments can use inference processes to facilitate behavioral flexibility. However, it is unclear how these two accounts of reward-guided decision-making should be integrated. Using a two-step task for mice, we show that dopamine reports RPEs using value information inferred from task structure knowledge, alongside information about reward rate and movement. Nonetheless, although rewards strongly influenced choices and dopamine activity, neither activating nor inhibiting dopamine neurons at trial outcome affected future choice. These data were recapitulated by a neural network model where cortex learned to track hidden task states by predicting observations, while basal ganglia learned values and actions via RPEs. This shows that the influence of rewards on choices can stem from dopamine-independent information they convey about the world's state, not the dopaminergic RPEs they produce.

Dopamine Increases Accuracy and Lengthens Deliberation Time in Explicit Motor Skill Learning

Although animal research implicates a central role for dopamine in motor skill learning, a direct causal link has yet to be established in neurotypical humans. Here, we tested if a pharmacological manipulation of dopamine alters motor learning, using a paradigm which engaged explicit, goal-directed strategies. Participants (27 females; 11 males; aged 18-29 years) first consumed either 100 mg of levodopa (n = 19), a dopamine precursor that increases dopamine availability, or placebo (n = 19). Then, during training, participants learnt the explicit strategy of aiming away from presented targets by instructed angles of varying sizes. Targets jumped mid-movement by the instructed aiming angle. Task success was thus contingent upon aiming accuracy and not speed. The effect of the dopamine manipulations on skill learning was assessed during training and after an overnight follow-up. Increasing dopamine availability at training improved aiming accuracy and lengthened reaction times, particularly for larger, more difficult aiming angles, both at training and, importantly, at follow-up, despite prominent session-by-session performance improvements in both accuracy and speed. Exogenous dopamine thus seems to result in a learnt, persistent propensity to better adhere to task goals. Results support the proposal that dopamine is important in engagement of instrumental motivation to optimize adherence to task goals, particularly when learning to execute goal-directed strategies in motor skill learning.

Dissociable feedback valence effects on frontal midline theta during reward gain versus threat avoidance learning

While frontal midline theta (FMθ) has been associated with threat processing, with cognitive control in the context of anxiety, and with reinforcement learning, most reinforcement learning studies on FMθ have used reward rather than threat-related stimuli as reinforcer. Accordingly, the role of FMθ in threat-related reinforcement learning is largely unknown. Here, n = 23 human participants underwent one reward-, and one punishment-, based reversal learning task, which differed only with regard to the kind of reinforcers that feedback was tied to (i.e., monetary gain vs. loud noise burst, respectively). In addition to single-trial EEG, we assessed single-trial feedback expectations based on both a reinforcement learning computational model and trial-by-trial subjective feedback expectation ratings. While participants' performance and feedback expectations were comparable between the reward and punishment tasks, FMθ was more reliably amplified to negative vs. positive feedback in the reward vs. punishment task. Regressions with feedback valence, computationally derived, and self-reported expectations as predictors and FMθ as criterion further revealed that trial-by-trial variations in FMθ specifically relate to reward-related feedback-valence and not to threat-related feedback or to violated expectations/prediction errors. These findings suggest that FMθ as measured in reinforcement learning tasks may be less sensitive to the processing of events with direct relevance for fear and anxiety.

Internally Triggered Experiences of Hedonic Valence in Nonhuman Animals: Cognitive and Welfare Considerations

Do any nonhuman animals have hedonically valenced experiences not directly caused by stimuli in their current environment? Do they, like us humans, experience anticipated or previously experienced pains and pleasures as respectively painful and pleasurable? We review evidence from comparative neuroscience about hippocampus-dependent simulation in relation to this question. Hippocampal sharp-wave ripples and theta oscillations have been found to instantiate previous and anticipated experiences. These hippocampal activations coordinate with neural reward and fear centers as well as sensory and cortical areas in ways that are associated with conscious episodic mental imagery in humans. Moreover, such hippocampal “re- and preplay” has been found to contribute to instrumental decision making, the learning of value representations, and the delay of rewards in rats. The functional and structural features of hippocampal simulation are highly conserved across mammals. This evidence makes it reasonable to assume that internally triggered experiences of hedonic valence (IHVs) are pervasive across (at least) all mammals. This conclusion has important welfare implications. Most prominently, IHVs act as a kind of “welfare multiplier” through which the welfare impacts of any given experience of pain or pleasure are increased through each future retrieval. However, IHVs also have practical implications for welfare assessment and cause prioritization.

Reinforcement learning and its connections with neuroscience and psychology

Reinforcement learning methods have recently been very successful at performing complex sequential tasks like playing Atari games, Go and Poker. These algorithms have outperformed humans in several tasks by learning from scratch, using only scalar rewards obtained through interaction with their environment. While there certainly has been considerable independent innovation to produce such results, many core ideas in reinforcement learning are inspired by phenomena in animal learning, psychology and neuroscience. In this paper, we comprehensively review a large number of findings in both neuroscience and psychology that evidence reinforcement learning as a promising candidate for modeling learning and decision making in the brain. In doing so, we construct a mapping between various classes of modern RL algorithms and specific findings in both neurophysiological and behavioral literature. We then discuss the implications of this observed relationship between RL, neuroscience and psychology and its role in advancing research in both AI and brain science.

Meta-learning, social cognition and consciousness in brains and machines

The intersection between neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) research has created synergistic effects in both fields. While neuroscientific discoveries have inspired the development of AI architectures, new ideas and algorithms from AI research have produced new ways to study brain mechanisms. A well-known example is the case of reinforcement learning (RL), which has stimulated neuroscience research on how animals learn to adjust their behavior to maximize reward. In this review article, we cover recent collaborative work between the two fields in the context of meta-learning and its extension to social cognition and consciousness. Meta-learning refers to the ability to learn how to learn, such as learning to adjust hyperparameters of existing learning algorithms and how to use existing models and knowledge to efficiently solve new tasks. This meta-learning capability is important for making existing AI systems more adaptive and flexible to efficiently solve new tasks. Since this is one of the areas where there is a gap between human performance and current AI systems, successful collaboration should produce new ideas and progress. Starting from the role of RL algorithms in driving neuroscience, we discuss recent developments in deep RL applied to modeling prefrontal cortex functions. Even from a broader perspective, we discuss the similarities and differences between social cognition and meta-learning, and finally conclude with speculations on the potential links between intelligence as endowed by model-based RL and consciousness. For future work we highlight data efficiency, autonomy and intrinsic motivation as key research areas for advancing both fields.

Neural Representation of Costs and Rewards in Decision Making

Decision making is crucial for animal survival because the choices they make based on their current situation could influence their future rewards and could have potential costs. This review summarises recent developments in decision making, discusses how rewards and costs could be encoded in the brain, and how different options are compared such that the most optimal one is chosen. The reward and cost are mainly encoded by the forebrain structures (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex), and their value is updated through learning. The recent development on dopamine and the lateral habenula's role in reporting prediction errors and instructing learning will be emphasised. The importance of dopamine in powering the choice and accounting for the internal state will also be discussed. While the orbitofrontal cortex is the place where the state values are stored, the anterior cingulate cortex is more important when the environment is volatile. All of these structures compare different attributes of the task simultaneously, and the local competition of different neuronal networks allows for the selection of the most appropriate one. Therefore, the total value of the task is not encoded as a scalar quantity in the brain but, instead, as an emergent phenomenon, arising from the computation at different brain regions.

Distinct temporal difference error signals in dopamine axons in three regions of the striatum in a decision-making task

Different regions of the striatum regulate different types of behavior. However, how dopamine signals differ across striatal regions and how dopamine regulates different behaviors remain unclear. Here, we compared dopamine axon activity in the ventral, dorsomedial, and dorsolateral striatum, while mice performed a perceptual and value-based decision task. Surprisingly, dopamine axon activity was similar across all three areas. At a glance, the activity multiplexed different variables such as stimulus-associated values, confidence, and reward feedback at different phases of the task. Our modeling demonstrates, however, that these modulations can be inclusively explained by moment-by-moment changes in the expected reward, that is the temporal difference error. A major difference between areas was the overall activity level of reward responses: reward responses in dorsolateral striatum were positively shifted, lacking inhibitory responses to negative prediction errors. The differences in dopamine signals put specific constraints on the properties of behaviors controlled by dopamine in these regions.