How many hindsight biases are there?

The function of REM and NREM sleep on memory distortion and consolidation

During rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, newly consolidated memories can be distorted to adjust the existing memory base in memory integration. However, only a few studies have demonstrated the role of REM sleep in memory distortion. The present study aims to clarify the role of REM sleep in the facilitation of memory distortion, that is, hindsight bias, compared to non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep and wake states. The split-night paradigm was used to segregate REM and NREM sleep. The hypotheses are (1) hindsight bias-memory distortion-is more substantial during REM-rich sleep (late-night sleep) than during NREM-rich sleep (early-night sleep); (2) memory stabilization is more substantial during NREM-rich sleep (early-night sleep) than during REM-rich sleep (late-night sleep); and (3) memory distortion takes longer time than memory stabilization. The results of the hindsight bias test show that more memory distortions were observed after the REM condition in comparison to the NREM condition. Contrary to the hindsight bias, the correct response in the word-pair association test was observed more in the NREM than in the REM condition. The difference in the hindsight bias index between the REM and NREM conditions was identified only one week later. Comparatively, the difference in correct responses in the word-pair association task between the conditions appeared three hours later and one week later. The present study found that (1) memory distortion occurs more during REM-rich sleep than during NREM-rich sleep, while memory stabilization occurs more during NREM-rich sleep than during REM-rich sleep. Moreover, (2) the newly encoded memory could be stabilized immediately after encoding, but memory distortion occurs over several days. These results suggest that the roles of NREM and REM sleep in memory processes could be different.

Pragmatic, constructive, and reconstructive memory influences on the hindsight bias

In hindsight, when the outcome of an uncertain scenario is already known, we typically feel that this outcome was always likely; hindsight judgments of outcome probabilities exceed foresight judgments of the same probabilities without outcome knowledge. We extend prior accounts of hindsight bias with the influence of pragmatic communication inherent in the task and the consolidation of self-generated responses across time. In a novel 3 × 2 within-participants design, with three sequential judgments of outcome probabilities in two scenarios, we replicated the within-participants hindsight bias observed in the classic memory design and the between-participants hindsight bias in a hypothetical design simultaneously. Moreover, we reversed the classic memory design and showed that subjective probabilities also decreased when participants encountered foresight instructions after hindsight instructions, demonstrating that previously induced outcome knowledge did not prevent unbiased judgments. The constructive impact of self-generated and communicated judgments ("saying is believing") was apparent after a 2-week consolidation period: Not outcome knowledge, but rather the last pragmatic response (either biased or unbiased) determined judgments at the third measurement. These findings highlight the short-term malleability of hindsight influences in response to task pragmatics and has major implications for debiasing.

Memory load of information encoded amplifies the magnitude of hindsight bias

Our recollections tend to become more similar to the correct information when we recollect an initial response using the correct information, known as the hindsight bias. This study investigated the effect of memory load of information encoded on the hindsight bias's magnitude. We assigned participants (N = 63) to either LOW or HIGH conditions, in which they answered 20 or 50 questions, which were their initial responses. Then, they memorized and remembered the correct information. They finally recollected the initial responses. Twenty of the fifty questions in the HIGH condition were identical to those in the LOW condition. We used the answers to these 20 common questions in LOW and HIGH conditions to examine the effect of the memory load of information encoded, defined as the number of correct answers to remember (i.e., 20 or 50) on the hindsight bias. Results indicated that the magnitude of the hindsight bias was more prominent in the HIGH than the LOW condition, suggesting that the memory load amplifies the hindsight bias's magnitude. This finding also implies that controlling the memory load of information encoded when learning correct information could mitigate the hindsight bias. We expect these findings to have practical implications in occupational settings where hindsight bias could lead to critical errors such as financial losses or medical problems.

How Will the Occupation End? A Real-World Exploration of Hindsight Bias and Retroactive Pessimism Concerning Antigovernment Protests in Bulgaria

We explored hindsight bias and retroactive pessimism related to the occupation of Sofia University in 2013–2014, using a memory design. We found partial evidence for hindsight bias for predictions of whether the occupation would achieve its goal (the government's resignation) but not for specific events related to the occupation, which were deemed unlikely from the start and later perceived not to have occurred. We did not find evidence for retroactive pessimism: Hindsight bias indices for the prediction of the government's resignation were not reliably associated with support for the occupation and disappointment with its outcome. We propose using a recall/reconstruct measure as a more rigorous test for retroactive pessimism, which has so far been demonstrated through reassessment.

Perspective-taking and hindsight bias: When the target is oneself and/or a peer

President Trump reacted to a reporter's query about the coronavirus outbreak by stating that the reporter was a "lousy journalist", underscoring the importance of perspective-taking in social exchanges. Egocentrism is the belief that others share the same perspective as your own and hampers the perspective-taking of another naive person. An issue is whether it is seen in hindsight bias where we overestimate what we knew beforehand. Via a foreseeability-inevitability platform, participants were randomly assigned to make self-judgments for problem-solving from a foresight (no answers) or three hindsight (answers) conditions. In two hindsight conditions, participants were asked to ignore or not to ignore the answers. In the last condition, participants predicted for an unfamiliar peer asked to ignore the answers. Next, all participants made judgments again from the perspective of the peer. Predominately in hindsight, participants showed significant changes responding but with an appropriate baseline comparison showed essentially the same hindsight bias in judgments for themselves and the peer. Ignoring or not ignoring the answers produced the same outcome. This sharing of perspective-taking dovetails with individuals' believing their hindsight knowledge is commonly present among others. Although participants in hindsight believed their foreseeable predictions for the peer were more accurate or realistic, it was more challenging to predict for the peer than themselves. Implications for individuals' judgments about Donald Trump 's decision-making for COVID-19 are discussed. Researchers should examine perspective-taking in hindsight bias as everyday social interaction involves reasoning about others.

Clinicians' Cognitive and Affective Biases and the Practice of Psychotherapy

OBJECTIVE

Cognitive and affective biases are essentially connected to heuristic shortcuts in thinking. These biases ordinarily function outside of conscious awareness and potentially affect clinical assessment, reasoning, and decision making in general medicine. However, little consideration has been given to how they may affect clinicians in the conduct of psychotherapy. This article aims to illustrate how such biases may affect assessment, formulation, and conduct of psychotherapy; describe strategies to mitigate these influences; and draw attention to the need for systematic research in this area.

METHODS

Cognitive and affective biases potentially influencing clinical assessment, reasoning, and decision making in medicine were identified in a selective literature review. The authors drew from their experiences as psychotherapists and psychotherapy supervisors to consider how key biases may influence psychotherapists' conduct of psychotherapy sessions.

RESULTS

The authors reached consensus in selecting illustrative biases pertinent to psychotherapy. Included biases related to anchoring, ascertainment, availability, base-rate neglect, commission, confirmation, framing, fundamental attribution error, omission, overconfidence, premature closure, sunk costs, and visceral reactions. Vignettes based on the authors' combined experiences are provided to illustrate how these biases could influence the conduct of psychotherapy.

CONCLUSIONS

Cognitive and affective biases are likely to play important roles in psychotherapy. Clinicians may reduce the potentially deleterious effects of biases by using a variety of mitigating strategies, including education about biases, reflective review, supervision, and feedback. How extensively these biases appear among psychotherapists and across types of psychotherapy and how their adverse effects may be most effectively alleviated to minimize harm deserve systematic study.

Older and younger adults' hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes

After learning about facts or outcomes of events, people overestimate in hindsight what they knew in foresight. Prior research has shown that this hindsight bias is more pronounced in older than in younger adults. However, this robust finding is based primarily on a specific paradigm that requires generating and recalling numerical judgments to general knowledge questions that deal with emotionally neutral content. As older and younger adults tend to process positive and negative information differently, they might also show differences in hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes. Furthermore, hindsight bias can manifest itself as a bias in memory for prior given judgments, but also as retrospective impressions of inevitability and foreseeability. Currently, there is no research on age differences in all three manifestations of hindsight bias. In this study, younger (N = 46, 18-30 years) and older adults (N = 45, 64-90 years) listened to everyday-life scenarios that ended positively or negatively, recalled the expectation they previously held about the outcome (to measure the memory component of hindsight bias), and rated each outcome's foreseeability and inevitability. Compared with younger adults, older adults recalled their prior expectations as closer to the actual outcomes (i.e., they showed a larger memory component of hindsight bias), and this age difference was more pronounced for negative than for positive outcomes. Inevitability and foreseeability impressions, however, did not differ between the age groups. Thus, there are age differences in hindsight bias after positive and negative outcomes, but only with regard to memory for prior judgments.

Hindsight Bias and Electoral Outcomes: Satisfaction Counts More Than Winner-Loser Status

The tendency to perceive outcomes as more foreseeable once they are available is a well-known phenomenon. However, research on the cognitive and motivational factors that induce individuals to overestimate the foreseeability of an electoral outcome has yielded inconsistent findings. In three studies based on large-scale electoral surveys (ITANES, Italian National Election Studies), we argued that the tendency to perceive an electoral outcome as foreseeable is positively and consistently associated with satisfaction with the outcome. Across all studies, satisfaction with the outcome was significantly and positively associated with retrospective foreseeability, above and beyond voters’ preference for a “winning” or “losing” party. In Study 3, a measure of memory distortion of pre-electoral forecasts was included, which was only weakly associated with retrospective foreseeability, but not with satisfaction for the outcome, supporting the notion of different levels of hindsight bias associated with different cognitive and motivational factors.

Only Familiar Information is a "Curse": Children's Ability to Predict What Their Peers Know

The ability to make inferences about what one's peers know is critical for social interaction and communication. Three experiments (n = 309) examined the curse of knowledge, the tendency to be biased by one's knowledge when reasoning about others' knowledge, in children's estimates of their peers' knowledge. Four- to 7-year-olds were taught the answers to factual questions and estimated how many peers would know the answers. When children learned familiar answers, they showed a curse of knowledge in their peer estimates. But, when children learned unfamiliar answers to the same questions, they did not show a curse of knowledge. These data shed light on the mechanisms underlying perspective taking, supporting a fluency misattribution account of the curse of knowledge.

Metacognitive hindsight bias

Hindsight bias (HB) is the tendency to see known information as obvious. We studied metacognitive hindsight bias (MC-HB)-a shift away from one's original confidence regarding answers provided before learning the actual facts. In two experiments, participants answered general-knowledge questions in social scenarios and provided their confidence in each answer. Subsequently, they learned answers to half the questions and then recalled their initial answers and confidence. Finally, they reanswered, as a learning check. We measured confidence accuracy by calibration (over/underconfidence) and resolution (discrimination between incorrect and correct answers), expecting them to improve in hindsight. In both experiments, participants displayed robust HB and MC-HB for resolution despite attempts to recall the initial confidence in one's answer. In Experiment 2, promising anonymity to participants eliminated MC-HB, while social scenarios produced MC-HB for both resolution and calibration-indicative of overconfidence. Overall, our findings highlight that in social contexts, recall of confidence in hindsight is more consistent with answers' accuracy than confidence initially was. Social scenarios differently affect HB and MC-HB, thus dissociating these two biases.

Can knowledge of election results change recall of our predictions? Neural correlates of political hindsight bias

Hindsight bias (HB) is the tendency to retrospectively exaggerate one’s foresight knowledge about the outcome of an event. Cognitive processes influenced by newly obtained outcome information are used to explain the HB phenomenon, but the neural correlates remain unknown. This study investigated HB in the context of election results using a memory design and functional magnetic resonance imaging for the first time. Participants were asked to predict and recall the percentage of votes obtained by (pairs of) candidates before and after an election. The results revealed that 88% of participants showed HB by recalling that their predictions were closer to the actual outcomes than they really were; and participants had HB for 38% of the events. The HB effect was associated with activation in the medial superior frontal gyrus and bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which have been implicated in updating an old belief due to new information and is similar to the process of reconstruction bias. Furthermore, participants with a greater HB effect showed greater activation of the left IFG. In conclusion, we successfully observed the HB phenomenon in election results, and our imaging results suggested that the HB phenomenon might involve reconstruction bias.

Fluency misattribution and auditory hindsight bias

We conducted three experiments to test the fluency-misattribution account of auditory hindsight bias. According to this account, prior exposure to a clearly presented auditory stimulus produces fluent (improved) processing of a distorted version of that stimulus, which results in participants mistakenly rating that item as easy to identify. In all experiments, participants in an exposure phase heard clearly spoken words zero, one, three, or six times. In the test phase, we examined auditory hindsight bias by manipulating whether participants heard a clear version of a target word just prior to hearing the distorted version of that word. Participants then estimated the ability of naïve peers to identify the distorted word. Auditory hindsight bias and the number of priming presentations during the exposure phase interacted underadditively in their prediction of participants' estimates: When no clear version of the target word appeared prior to the distorted version of that word in the test phase, participants identified target words more often the more frequently they heard the clear word in the exposure phase. Conversely, hearing a clear version of the target word at test produced similar estimates, regardless of the number of times participants heard clear versions of those words during the exposure phase. As per Roberts and Sternberg's (Attention and Performance XIV, pp. 611-653, 1993) additive factors logic, this finding suggests that both auditory hindsight bias and repetition priming contribute to a common process, which we propose involves a misattribution of processing fluency. We conclude that misattribution of fluency accounts for auditory hindsight bias.

Hindsight Bias and Law

Abstract. Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate the foreseeability of an outcome once it is known. This bias has implications for decisions made within the legal system, ranging from judgments made during investigations to those in court proceedings. Legal decision makers should only consider what was known at the time an investigation was conducted or an offense was committed; however, they often review cases with full knowledge of a negative outcome, which can affect their judgments about what was knowable in the past. We conducted a systematic review of the literature on hindsight bias and law. We present five areas of law that hindsight bias affects (medical malpractice, forensic investigation, negligence, patent, criminal), two types of evidence that may lead to hindsight bias (visual and auditory evidence), and hindsight bias in experts and judges. Finally, we discuss strategies for reducing hindsight bias in legal decisions and recommend future research.

A retrieval-based approach to eliminating hindsight bias

Individuals exhibit hindsight bias when they are unable to recall their original responses to novel questions after correct answers are provided to them. Prior studies have eliminated hindsight bias by modifying the conditions under which original judgments or correct answers are encoded. Here, we explored whether hindsight bias can be eliminated by manipulating the conditions that hold at retrieval. Our retrieval-based approach predicts that if the conditions at retrieval enable sufficient discrimination of memory representations of original judgments from memory representations of correct answers, then hindsight bias will be reduced or eliminated. Experiment 1 used the standard memory design to replicate the hindsight bias effect in middle-school students. Experiments 2 and 3 modified the retrieval phase of this design, instructing participants beforehand that they would be recalling both their original judgments and the correct answers. As predicted, this enabled participants to form compound retrieval cues that discriminated original judgment traces from correct answer traces, and eliminated hindsight bias. Experiment 4 found that when participants were not instructed beforehand that they would be making both recalls, they did not form discriminating retrieval cues, and hindsight bias returned. These experiments delineate the retrieval conditions that produce-and fail to produce-hindsight bias.

Hindsight Bias

Hindsight bias occurs when people feel that they "knew it all along," that is, when they believe that an event is more predictable after it becomes known than it was before it became known. Hindsight bias embodies any combination of three aspects: memory distortion, beliefs about events' objective likelihoods, or subjective beliefs about one's own prediction abilities. Hindsight bias stems from (a) cognitive inputs (people selectively recall information consistent with what they now know to be true and engage in sensemaking to impose meaning on their own knowledge), (b) metacognitive inputs (the ease with which a past outcome is understood may be misattributed to its assumed prior likelihood), and (c) motivational inputs (people have a need to see the world as orderly and predictable and to avoid being blamed for problems). Consequences of hindsight bias include myopic attention to a single causal understanding of the past (to the neglect of other reasonable explanations) as well as general overconfidence in the certainty of one's judgments. New technologies for visualizing and understanding data sets may have the unintended consequence of heightening hindsight bias, but an intervention that encourages people to consider alternative causal explanations for a given outcome can reduce hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age

Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function.

Belief Perseverance

Two studies tested the influence of accessibility experiences on belief perseverance when participants generated few or many reasons about how a reported outcome or an alternative outcome might have turned out. Those participants who had listed many reasons about the reported outcome rated this outcome after debriefing to be less likely – and hence exhibited no belief perseverance – than participants who had listed few reasons or subjects in a standard perseverance group (Experiment 1). In contrast, participants who had listed many reasons favoring an alternative outcome rated the reported outcome to be more likely and thus showed more belief perseverance than subjects who had listed only few reasons or participants in a standard perseverance condition (Experiment 2). Both effects are interpreted as evidence for the influence of accessibility experiences in the domain of belief perseverance.

A developmental, mentalization-based approach to the understanding and treatment of borderline personality disorder

The precise nature and etiopathogenesis of borderline personality disorder (BPD) continues to elude researchers and clinicians. Yet, increasing evidence from various strands of research converges to suggest that affect dysregulation, impulsivity, and unstable relationships constitute the core features of BPD. Over the last two decades, the mentalization-based approach to BPD has attempted to provide a theoretically consistent way of conceptualizing the interrelationship between these core features of BPD, with the aim of providing clinicians with a conceptually sound and empirically supported approach to BPD and its treatment. This paper presents an extended version of this approach to BPD based on recently accumulated data. In particular, we suggest that the core features of BPD reflect impairments in different facets of mentalization, each related to impairments in relatively distinct neural circuits underlying these facets. Hence, we provide a comprehensive account of BPD by showing how its core features are related to each other in theoretically meaningful ways. More specifically, we argue that BPD is primarily associated with a low threshold for the activation of the attachment system and deactivation of controlled mentalization, linked to impairments in the ability to differentiate mental states of self and other, which lead to hypersensitivity and increased susceptibility to contagion by other people's mental states, and poor integration of cognitive and affective aspects of mentalization. The combination of these impairments may explain BPD patients' propensity for vicious interpersonal cycles, and their high levels of affect dysregulation and impulsivity. Finally, the implications of this expanded mentalization-based approach to BPD for mentalization-based treatment and treatment of BPD more generally are discussed.

Hindsight Bias and the Activation of Counterfactual Mind-Sets

Previous research has shown that conditional counterfactuals are positively related to the magnitude of creeping determinism. Unlike previous experiments which show this increased hindsight bias to occur after exceptional antecedents, we investigated another possible factor, namely a prior activation of a counterfactual mind-set. We investigated our prediction using a hypothetical scenario. Prior to reading the hindsight scenario some participants were asked to solve a scrambled-sentence test including conditional counterfactual sentences. Results of two experiments were consistent with our predictions: Participants that solved the scrambled-sentence test perceived the outcome to be more inevitable than participants in a no-outcome control condition and participants in a no-prime control condition. Furthermore, we found that this increase in creeping determinism was mediated by the perceived causal strength of the target antecedent for the occurrence of the outcome, and that the priming-effect did not occur when an unconditional counterfactual mind-set was activated before. The results are interpreted as supporting a causal-model theory of the hindsight bias.

Hindsight Bias and Causal Attribution

Hindsight bias describes characteristic changes in the perceptions of events or facts once their outcomes are known. This article focuses on one important facet of this, named creeping determinism, denoting enhanced hindsight perceptions of the inevitability of event outcomes. We suggest a systematic link between the literatures on causal attribution and hindsight bias/creeping determinism and introduce a comprehensive causal model theory (CMT) of creeping determinism. We then distinguish between two alternative versions of CMT, which reflect recent debates in the causal attribution literature. These versions assume, respectively, that individuals make causal attributions by means of covariation analysis or via the discovery of some underlying mechanism. In order to contrast these assumptions, we introduce a new hypothesis concerning the magnitude of creeping determinism, based on the conjunction effect in causal attribution, and we present empirical evidence concerning this hypothesis.