Attention need not always apply: Mind wandering impedes explicit but not implicit sequence learning

How Do You Know If You Were Mind Wandering? Dissociating Explicit Memories of Off Task Thought From Subjective Feelings of Inattention

Mind wandering is a common experience in which your attention drifts away from the task at hand and toward task-unrelated thoughts. To measure mind wandering we typically use experience sampling and retrospective self-reports, which require participants to make metacognitive judgments about their immediately preceding attentional states. In the current study, we aimed to better understand how people come to make such judgments by introducing a novel distinction between explicit memories of off task thought and subjective feelings of inattention. Across two preregistered experiments, we found that participants often indicated they were "off task" and yet had no memory of the content of their thoughts-though, they were less common than remembered experiences. Critically, remembered experiences of mind wandering and subjective feelings of inattention differed in their behavioral correlates. In Experiment 1, we found that only the frequency of remembered mind wandering varied with task demands. In contrast, only subjective feelings of inattention were associated with poor performance (Experiments 1 and 2) and individual differences in executive functioning (Experiment 2). These results suggest that the phenomenology of mind wandering may differ depending on how the experiences are brought about (e.g., executive functioning errors versus excess attentional resources), and provide preliminary evidence of the importance of measuring subjective feelings of inattention when assessing mind wandering.

A dual process model of spontaneous conscious thought

In the present article, I review theory and evidence on the psychological mechanisms of mind wandering, paying special attention to its relation with executive control. I then suggest applying a dual-process framework (i.e., automatic vs. controlled processing) to mind wandering and goal-directed thought. I present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of the view that mind wandering is based on automatic processing, also considering its relation to the concept of working memory. After that, I outline three scenarios for an interplay between mind wandering and goal-directed thought during task performance (parallel automatic processing, off-task thought substituting on-task thought, and non-disruptive mind wandering during controlled processing) and address the ways in which the mind-wandering and focused-attention spells can terminate. Throughout the article, I formulate empirical predictions. In conclusion, I discuss how automatic and controlled processing may be balanced in human conscious cognition.

Task integration in complex, bimanual sequence learning tasks

Sequence learning and multitasking studies have largely focused on simple motor skills, which cannot be directly transferred to the plethora of complex skills found outside of laboratory conditions. Established theories e.g. for bimanual tasks and task integration thus have to be reassessed in the context of complex motor skills. We hypothesize that under more complex conditions, task integration facilitates motor learning, impedes or suppresses effector-specific learning and can still be observed despite partial secondary task interference. We used the Ξ-apparatus to assess the learning success of six groups in a bimanual dual-task, in which we manipulated the degree of possible integration between the right-hand and the left-hand sequences. We could show that task integration positively influences the learning of these complex, bimanual skills. However, the integration impedes but not fully suppresses effector-specific learning, as we could measure reduced hand-specific learning. Task integration improves learning despite the disruptive effect of partial secondary task interference, but its mitigating effect is only effective to some extent. Overall, the results suggest that previous insights on sequential motor learning and task integration can largely also be applied to complex motor skills.

In sight, out of mind? Disengagement at encoding gradually reduces recall of location

Disengaging from the external world-a phenomenon referred to as mind wandering-is a common experience that has been shown to be associated with detriments in cognitive performance across a large range of tasks. In the current web-based study, we used a continuous delayed estimation paradigm to investigate the impact of task disengagement at encoding on subsequent recall of location. Task disengagement was assessed with thought probes on a dichotomous (off- vs. on-task) and a continuous response scale (from 0% to 100% on-task). This approach allowed us to consider perceptual decoupling in both a dichotomous and a graded manner. In the first study (n = 54), we found a negative relationship between levels of task disengagement at encoding and subsequent recall of location measured in degrees. This finding supports a graded perceptual decoupling process rather than a decoupling that happens in an all-or-none manner. In the second study (n = 104), we replicated this finding. An analysis of 22 participants showing enough off-task trials to fit the data with the standard mixture model revealed that in this particular subsample, being disengaged from the task at encoding was related to worse long-term memory performance in terms of likelihood to recall but not in terms of precision with which information is recalled. Overall, the findings suggest a graded nature of task disengagement that covaries with fine-grained differences in subsequent recall of location. Going forwards, it will be important to test the validity of continuous measures of mind-wandering.

Task-related and task-unrelated thoughts in runners and equestrians: Measurement issues in evaluations of thought content

Much of the thought content and mind-wandering literature examines self-reported thought content's relationship with performance criteria in limited ways. Furthermore, retrospective reports about thought content may be influenced by the quality of one's performance. We explored these method issues in a cross-sectional study of individuals competing in a trail race and an equestrian event. Our results demonstrated that self-reports of thought content differed based on the performance context: whereas runners' task-related and task-unrelated thoughts were negatively correlated, equestrians' thought content showed no relationship. Moreover, equestrians in general reported fewer task-related and task-unrelated thoughts than runners. Finally, objective performance predicted task-unrelated thought (but not task-related thought) among runners, and an exploratory mediation test suggested the effect was partially mediated by performance awareness. We discuss the applied implications of this research for human performance practitioners.

Reconceptualizing mind wandering from a switching perspective

Mind wandering is a universal phenomenon in which our attention shifts away from the task at hand toward task-unrelated thoughts. Despite it inherently involving a shift in mental set, little is known about the role of cognitive flexibility in mind wandering. In this article we consider the potential of cognitive flexibility as a mechanism for mediating and/or regulating the occurrence of mind wandering. Our review begins with a brief introduction to the prominent theories of mind wandering-the executive failure hypothesis, the decoupling hypothesis, the process-occurrence framework, and the resource-control account of sustained attention. Then, after discussing their respective merits and weaknesses, we put forward a new perspective of mind wandering focused on cognitive flexibility, which provides an account more in line with the data to date, including why older populations experience a reduction in mind wandering. After summarizing initial evidence prompting this new perspective, drawn from several mind-wandering and task-switching studies, we recommend avenues for future research aimed at further understanding the importance of cognitive flexibility in mind wandering.

Prior exposure increases judged truth even during periods of mind wandering

Much of our day is spent mind-wandering-periods of inattention characterized by a lack of awareness of external stimuli and information. Whether we are paying attention or not, information surrounds us constantly-some true and some false. The proliferation of false information in news and social media highlights the critical need to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying our beliefs about what is true. People often rely on heuristics to judge the truth of information. For example, repeated information is more likely to be judged as true than new information (i.e., the illusory truth effect). However, despite the prevalence of mind wandering in our daily lives, current research on the contributing factors to the illusory truth effect have largely ignored periods of inattention as experimentally informative. Here, we aim to address this gap in our knowledge, investigating whether mind wandering during initial exposure to information has an effect on later belief in the truth of that information. That is, does the illusory truth effect occur even when people report not paying attention to the information at hand. Across three studies we demonstrate that even during periods of mind wandering, the repetition of information increases truth judgments. Further, our results suggest that the severity of mind wandering moderated truth ratings, such that greater levels of mind wandering decreased truth judgements for previously presented information.

Optimization of the Cognitive Processes in a Virtual Classroom: A Multi-objective Integer Linear Programming Approach

A fundamental problem in the design of a classroom is to identify what characteristics it should have in order to optimize learning. This is a complex problem because learning is a construct related to several cognitive processes. The aim of this study is to maximize learning, represented by the processes of attention, memory, and preference, depending on six classroom parameters: height, width, color hue, color saturation, color temperature, and illuminance. Multi-objective integer linear programming with three objective functions and 56 binary variables was used to solve this optimization problem. Virtual reality tools were used to gather the data; novel software was used to create variations of virtual classrooms for a sample of 112 students. Using an interactive method, more than 4700 integer linear programming problems were optimally solved to obtain 13 efficient solutions to the multi-objective problem, which allowed the decision maker to analyze all the information and make a final choice. The results showed that achieving the best cognitive processing performance involves using different classroom configurations. The use of a multi-objective interactive approach is interesting because in human behavioral studies, it is important to consider the judgement of an expert in order to make decisions.

Appealing to the cognitive miser: Using demand avoidance to modulate cognitive flexibility in cued and voluntary task switching

Current cognitive control accounts view goal-directed behavior as striking a balance between two antagonistic control demands: Stability, on the one hand, reflects a rigid, focused state of control and flexibility, while on the other, reflects a relaxed, distractible state, whereby goals can be rapidly updated to meet unexpected changes in demands. In the current study, we sought to test whether the avoidance of cognitive demand could motivate people to dynamically regulate control along the stability-flexibility continuum. In both cued (Experiment 1) and voluntary (Experiment 2) task-switching paradigms, we selectively associated either task-switches or task-repetitions with high cognitive demand (independent of task identity), and measured changes in performance in a following phase after the demand manipulation was removed. Contrasting performance with a control group, across both experiments, we found that selectively associating cognitive demand with task repetitions increased flexibility, but selectively associating cognitive demand with task switches failed to increase stability. The results of the current study provide novel evidence for avoidance-driven modulations of control regulation along the stability-flexibility continuum, while also highlighting some limitations in using task-switching paradigms to examine motivational influences on control adaptation. Data, analysis code, experiment code, and preprint available at osf.io/7rct9/. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Straying Off Course: The Negative Impact of Mind Wandering on Fine Motor Movements

The goal of this study was to examine how various degrees of perceptual decoupling during mind wandering affect fine motor control. We hypothesized that while under normal circumstances attention ensures an optimal control strategy that leads to accurate motor performance, during mind wandering the process becomes disrupted. In this study, we conducted a computer-based experiment with a tracking task. During mind wandering, motor movements were more erratic and less variable, indicative of reduced attentiveness to the continuous demands of the external task. Importantly, the deeper the reported mind wandering, the less accurate and less variable were the mouse movements, suggesting that perceptual decoupling may take place in a graded rather than in an all or nothing manner. Greater movement intermittency was associated with higher tracking accuracy, suggesting that more corrective movements toward a moving target were functional to task performance. Moreover, greater variance in velocity was negatively correlated with tracking accuracy. These findings suggest that periods of inattention to the task have a negative impact on fine motor movement control by making behavior unpredictable, providing support for the idea that there is a decoupling of sensory-motor processes during mind wandering.

Mind wandering at encoding, but not at retrieval, disrupts one-shot stimulus-control learning

The one-shot pairing of a stimulus with a specific cognitive control process, such as task switching, can bind the two together in memory. The episodic control-binding hypothesis posits that the formation of temporary stimulus-control bindings, which are held in event-files supported by episodic memory, can guide the contextually appropriate application of cognitive control. Across two experiments, we sought to examine the role of task-focused attention in the encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings in episodic event-files. In Experiment 1, we obtained self-reports of mind wandering during encoding and implementation of stimulus-control bindings. Results indicated that, whereas mind wandering during the implementation of stimulus-control bindings does not decrease their efficacy, mind wandering during the encoding of these control-state associations interferes with their successful deployment at a later point. In Experiment 2, we complemented these results by using trial-by-trial pupillometry to measure attention, again demonstrating that attention levels at encoding predict the subsequent implementation of stimulus-control bindings better than attention levels at implementation. These results suggest that, although encoding stimulus-control bindings in episodic memory requires active attention and engagement, once encoded, these bindings are automatically deployed to guide behavior when the stimulus recurs. These findings expand our understanding of how cognitive control processes are integrated into episodic event files.

Testing the construct validity of competing measurement approaches to probed mind-wandering reports

Psychology faces a measurement crisis, and mind-wandering research is not immune. The present study explored the construct validity of probed mind-wandering reports (i.e., reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) with a combined experimental and individual-differences approach. We examined laboratory data from over 1000 undergraduates at two U.S. institutions, who responded to one of four different thought-probe types across two cognitive tasks. We asked a fundamental measurement question: Do different probe types yield different results, either in terms of average reports (average TUT rates, TUT-report confidence ratings), or in terms of TUT-report associations, such as TUT rate or confidence stability across tasks, or between TUT reports and other consciousness-related constructs (retrospective mind-wandering ratings, executive-control performance, and broad questionnaire trait assessments of distractibility–restlessness and positive-constructive daydreaming)? Our primary analyses compared probes that asked subjects to report on different dimensions of experience: TUT-content probes asked about what they’d been mind-wandering about, TUT-intentionality probes asked about why they were mind-wandering, and TUT-depth probes asked about the extent (on a rating scale) of their mind-wandering. Our secondary analyses compared thought-content probes that did versus didn’t offer an option to report performance-evaluative thoughts. Our findings provide some “good news”—that some mind-wandering findings are robust across probing methods—and some “bad news”—that some findings are not robust across methods and that some commonly used probing methods may not tell us what we think they do. Our results lead us to provisionally recommend content-report probes rather than intentionality- or depth-report probes for most mind-wandering research.