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Forys BJ, Winstanley CA, Kingstone A, Todd RM. Short-Term Memory Capacity Predicts Willingness to Expend Cognitive Effort for Reward. eNeuro 2024; 11:ENEURO.0068-24.2024. [PMID: 38866500 PMCID: PMC11218033 DOI: 10.1523/eneuro.0068-24.2024] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/13/2024] [Revised: 05/26/2024] [Accepted: 05/31/2024] [Indexed: 06/14/2024] Open
Abstract
We must often decide whether the effort required for a task is worth the reward. Past rodent work suggests that willingness to deploy cognitive effort can be driven by individual differences in perceived reward value, depression, or chronic stress. However, many factors driving cognitive effort deployment-such as short-term memory ability-cannot easily be captured in rodents. Furthermore, we do not fully understand how individual differences in short-term memory ability, depression, chronic stress, and reward anticipation impact cognitive effort deployment for reward. Here, we examined whether these factors predict cognitive effort deployment for higher reward in an online visual short-term memory task. Undergraduate participants were grouped into high and low effort groups (n HighEffort = 348, n LowEffort = 81; n Female = 332, n Male = 92, M Age = 20.37, Range Age = 16-42) based on decisions in this task. After completing a monetary incentive task to measure reward anticipation, participants completed short-term memory task trials where they could choose to encode either fewer (low effort/reward) or more (high effort/reward) squares before reporting whether or not the color of a target square matched the square previously in that location. We found that only greater short-term memory ability predicted whether participants chose a much higher proportion of high versus low effort trials. Drift diffusion modeling showed that high effort group participants were more biased than low effort group participants toward selecting high effort trials. Our findings highlight the role of individual differences in cognitive effort ability in explaining cognitive effort deployment choices.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brandon J Forys
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Catharine A Winstanley
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
- Djavad Mowafaghian Centre for Brain Health, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z3, Canada
| | - Alan Kingstone
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
| | - Rebecca M Todd
- Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
- Djavad Mowafaghian Centre for Brain Health, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z3, Canada
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Poli F, O'Reilly JX, Mars RB, Hunnius S. Curiosity and the dynamics of optimal exploration. Trends Cogn Sci 2024; 28:441-453. [PMID: 38413257 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/28/2023] [Revised: 02/01/2024] [Accepted: 02/01/2024] [Indexed: 02/29/2024]
Abstract
What drives our curiosity remains an elusive and hotly debated issue, with multiple hypotheses proposed but a cohesive account yet to be established. This review discusses traditional and emergent theories that frame curiosity as a desire to know and a drive to learn, respectively. We adopt a model-based approach that maps the temporal dynamics of various factors underlying curiosity-based exploration, such as uncertainty, information gain, and learning progress. In so doing, we identify the limitations of past theories and posit an integrated account that harnesses their strengths in describing curiosity as a tool for optimal environmental exploration. In our unified account, curiosity serves as a 'common currency' for exploration, which must be balanced with other drives such as safety and hunger to achieve efficient action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Francesco Poli
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
| | - Jill X O'Reilly
- Wellcome Centre for Integrative Neuroimaging, Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain (FMRIB), Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences, John Radcliffe Hospital, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | - Rogier B Mars
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands; Wellcome Centre for Integrative Neuroimaging, Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain (FMRIB), Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences, John Radcliffe Hospital, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
| | - Sabine Hunnius
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, and Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
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Pavlova MK. A dual process model of spontaneous conscious thought. Conscious Cogn 2024; 118:103631. [PMID: 38157770 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103631] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/23/2023] [Revised: 12/19/2023] [Accepted: 12/23/2023] [Indexed: 01/03/2024]
Abstract
In the present article, I review theory and evidence on the psychological mechanisms of mind wandering, paying special attention to its relation with executive control. I then suggest applying a dual-process framework (i.e., automatic vs. controlled processing) to mind wandering and goal-directed thought. I present theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of the view that mind wandering is based on automatic processing, also considering its relation to the concept of working memory. After that, I outline three scenarios for an interplay between mind wandering and goal-directed thought during task performance (parallel automatic processing, off-task thought substituting on-task thought, and non-disruptive mind wandering during controlled processing) and address the ways in which the mind-wandering and focused-attention spells can terminate. Throughout the article, I formulate empirical predictions. In conclusion, I discuss how automatic and controlled processing may be balanced in human conscious cognition.
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Bustamante LA, Oshinowo T, Lee JR, Tong E, Burton AR, Shenhav A, Cohen JD, Daw ND. Effort Foraging Task reveals positive correlation between individual differences in the cost of cognitive and physical effort in humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2023; 120:e2221510120. [PMID: 38064507 PMCID: PMC10723129 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.2221510120] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/14/2023] [Accepted: 10/26/2023] [Indexed: 12/17/2023] Open
Abstract
Effort-based decisions, in which people weigh potential future rewards against effort costs required to achieve those rewards involve both cognitive and physical effort, though the mechanistic relationship between them is not yet understood. Here, we use an individual differences approach to isolate and measure the computational processes underlying effort-based decisions and test the association between cognitive and physical domains. Patch foraging is an ecologically valid reward rate maximization problem with well-developed theoretical tools. We developed the Effort Foraging Task, which embedded cognitive or physical effort into patch foraging, to quantify the cost of both cognitive and physical effort indirectly, by their effects on foraging choices. Participants chose between harvesting a depleting patch, or traveling to a new patch that was costly in time and effort. Participants' exit thresholds (reflecting the reward they expected to receive by harvesting when they chose to travel to a new patch) were sensitive to cognitive and physical effort demands, allowing us to quantify the perceived effort cost in monetary terms. The indirect sequential choice style revealed effort-seeking behavior in a minority of participants (preferring high over low effort) that has apparently been missed by many previous approaches. Individual differences in cognitive and physical effort costs were positively correlated, suggesting that these are perceived and processed in common. We used canonical correlation analysis to probe the relationship of task measures to self-reported affect and motivation, and found correlations of cognitive effort with anxiety, cognitive function, behavioral activation, and self-efficacy, but no similar correlations with physical effort.
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Affiliation(s)
- Laura A. Bustamante
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Washington University in Saint Louis, Saint Louis, MO63130
| | - Temitope Oshinowo
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
| | - Jeremy R. Lee
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
| | - Elizabeth Tong
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
| | - Allison R. Burton
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
| | - Amitai Shenhav
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI02912
- Carney Institute for Brain Science, Brown University, Providence, RI02906
| | - Jonathan D. Cohen
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
| | - Nathaniel D. Daw
- Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544
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Molinaro G, Collins AGE. A goal-centric outlook on learning. Trends Cogn Sci 2023; 27:1150-1164. [PMID: 37696690 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.011] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/13/2023] [Revised: 08/11/2023] [Accepted: 08/14/2023] [Indexed: 09/13/2023]
Abstract
Goals play a central role in human cognition. However, computational theories of learning and decision-making often take goals as given. Here, we review key empirical findings showing that goals shape the representations of inputs, responses, and outcomes, such that setting a goal crucially influences the central aspects of any learning process: states, actions, and rewards. We thus argue that studying goal selection is essential to advance our understanding of learning. By following existing literature in framing goal selection within a hierarchy of decision-making problems, we synthesize important findings on the principles underlying goal value attribution and exploration strategies. Ultimately, we propose that a goal-centric perspective will help develop more complete accounts of learning in both biological and artificial agents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gaia Molinaro
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA.
| | - Anne G E Collins
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA; Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA
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