Implicit sequence learning and conscious awareness

The Visual Advantage Effect in Comparing Uni-Modal and Cross-Modal Probabilistic Category Learning

People rely on multiple learning systems to complete weather prediction (WP) tasks with visual cues. However, how people perform in audio and audiovisual modalities remains elusive. The present research investigated how the cue modality influences performance in probabilistic category learning and conscious awareness about the category knowledge acquired. A modified weather prediction task was adopted, in which the cues included two dimensions from visual, auditory, or audiovisual modalities. The results of all three experiments revealed better performances in the visual modality relative to the audio and audiovisual modalities. Moreover, participants primarily acquired unconscious knowledge in the audio and audiovisual modalities, while conscious knowledge was acquired in the visual modality. Interestingly, factors such as the amount of training, the complexity of visual stimuli, and the number of objects to which the two cues belonged influenced the amount of conscious knowledge acquired but did not change the visual advantage effect. These findings suggest that individuals can learn probabilistic cues and category associations across different modalities, but a robust visual advantage persists. Specifically, visual associations can be learned more effectively, and are more likely to become conscious. The possible causes and implications of these effects are discussed.

The benefit of assessing implicit sequence learning in pianists with an eye-tracked serial reaction time task

Playing piano professionally has been shown to benefit implicit motor sequence learning. The aim of the current study was to determine whether this advantage reflects generally enhanced implicit sequence learning unrelated to pianists' higher motor and/or visual-motor coordination abilities. We examined implicit sequence learning using the ocular serial reaction time (O-SRT) task, a manual-free eye-tracked version of the standard SRT, in 29 pianists and 31 controls. Reaction times (RT) and correct anticipations (CA) of several phases describing implicit sequence learning were analyzed. Furthermore, explicit sequence knowledge was compared between the groups, and relationships between implicit sequence learning with explicit sequence knowledge or demographic measures were evaluated. Pianists demonstrated superiority in all critical phases of implicit sequence learning (RT and CA). Moreover, pianists acquired higher explicit sequence knowledge, and only in pianists was explicit sequence knowledge related to implicit sequence learning. Our results demonstrate that pianists' superiority in implicit sequence learning is due to a higher general implicit sequence learning ability. Hence, we can exclude that higher motor and/or visual-motor coordination abilities are related to pianists' higher implicit sequence learning. Furthermore, the significant relationship of implicit sequence learning and explicit sequence knowledge suggests that pianists either used explicit strategies to support implicit sequence learning, had better explicit access to sequence knowledge, or both.

The gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation in implicit sequence learning and its relevant brain activity

Existing studies have investigated gradual subjective consciousnesses, guess, intuition, fluency, rule, and memory, and their fluctuation behavioral characteristics in implicit learning, but they did not investigate or elucidate the underlying brain mechanisms. Therefore, the current study asked participants to report subjective consciousnesses in each trial of inclusion and exclusion tasks after implicit sequence learning and used the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting-states' fMRI to examine the relevant brain areas of the five gradual subjective consciousnesses and their fluctuation. The results showed that: (1) There were many relevant resting-state brain areas of the five gradual subjective consciousnesses to reveal their brain mechanisms. In the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states, as the participants' consciousness level was gradually increasing from guess to intuition, to fluency, to rule, and to memory, the positively-relevant brain areas correspondingly changed from somatic motor to a mixture of somatic motor, consciousness, emotion feeling, and implicit learning; and then to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, and consciousness; and then to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, and consciousness; and then to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, and consciousness. The negatively-relevant brain areas correspondingly changed from a mixture of visual, consciousness, somatic sensory, and implicit learning to a mixture of visual, somatic motor, somatic sensory, and other consciousness; and then to memory; and then to a mixture of other somatic motors; and then to a mixture of other consciousness and other somatic motors. However, in the amplitude of low frequency fluctuations (ALFFs)-difference, the relative directions of the guess and intuition were almost opposite to those in the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states. But the relative directions of the fluency, rule, and memory were consistent with those in the eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states. (2) There were significant gradual subjective consciousness fluctuations, including the gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation-all M and SD. There were many relevant resting-state brain areas of gradual subjective consciousness fluctuations to reveal their brain mechanisms. The gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation M was positively related to Calcarine_R, Lingual_R, Lingual_R, Temporal_Pole_Mid_L, ParaHippocampal_L, Vermis_1_2, and Vermis_7; but was negatively related to Calcarine_R. The gradual subjective consciousness fluctuation-all SD was positively related to Parietal_Inf_L, Thalamus_L, Temporal_Mid_L, Vermis_9, Parietal_Inf_L, and Thalamus_L and Thalamus_R; but was negatively related to Rolandic_Oper_R, Rolandic_Oper_R, Insula_L, Insula_R, Cingulum_Post_L, and Temporal_Mid_L. The detailed function of the relevant brain areas of consciousness fluctuations needs further investigation. (3) ALFFs in eyes-closed and eyes-opened resting states and their ALFFs-difference could differently predict the five gradual subjective consciousnesses and their fluctuations, indicating that using the two resting states was necessary, and the ALFFs-difference was a new quantitative sensitivity index of the gradual subjective consciousnesses and their fluctuations.

Reward produces learning of a consciously inaccessible feature

Reward has a significant impact on behaviour and perception. Most past work in associative reward learning has used perceptually distinct visual cues to associate with different reward values. Thus, it remains unknown to what extent the learned bias towards reward-associated stimuli depends on consciousness of the apparent differences between stimuli. Here, we resolved this issue by using an inter-ocular suppression paradigm with the monetary rewarding and non-rewarding cues identical to each other except for their eye-of-origin information. Thus, the reward coding system cannot rely on consciousness to select the reward-associated cue. Surprisingly, the targets in the rewarded eye broke into awareness faster than those in the non-rewarded eye. We further revealed that producing this effect required both top-down attention and inter-ocular suppression. These findings suggest that the human's reward coding system can produce two different types of reward-based learning. One is independent of consciousness yet fairly consuming attentional resources. The other one results from volitional selection of stimuli of behavioural significance.

Insect Consciousness

The question of consciousness in other species, not least species very physically different from humans such as insects, is highly challenging for a number of reasons. One reason is that we do not have any available empirical method to answer the question. Another reason is that current theories of consciousness disagree about the relation between physical structure and consciousness, i.e., whether consciousness requires specific, say, neural structures or whether consciousness can be realized in different ways. This article sets out to analyze if and how there could be an empirical and/or a theoretical approach to the topic on the basis of current consciousness research in humans.

A Dual Simple Recurrent Network Model for Chunking and Abstract Processes in Sequence Learning

Although many studies have provided evidence that abstract knowledge can be acquired in artificial grammar learning, it remains unclear how abstract knowledge can be attained in sequence learning. To address this issue, we proposed a dual simple recurrent network (DSRN) model that includes a surface SRN encoding and predicting the surface properties of stimuli and an abstract SRN encoding and predicting the abstract properties of stimuli. The results of Simulations 1 and 2 showed that the DSRN model can account for learning effects in the serial reaction time (SRT) task under different conditions, and the manipulation of the contribution weight of each SRN accounted for the contribution of conscious and unconscious processes in inclusion and exclusion tests in previous studies. The results of human performance in Simulation 3 provided further evidence that people can implicitly learn both chunking and abstract knowledge in sequence learning, and the results of Simulation 3 confirmed that the DSRN model can account for how people implicitly acquire the two types of knowledge in sequence learning. These findings extend the learning ability of the SRN model and help understand how different types of knowledge can be acquired implicitly in sequence learning.

Implicit sequence learning of chunking and abstract structures

The current study investigated whether people can simultaneously acquire knowledge about concrete chunks and abstract structures in implicit sequence learning; and whether the degree of abstraction determines the conscious status of the acquired knowledge. We adopted three types of stimuli in a serial reaction time task in three experiments. The RT results indicated that people could simultaneously acquire knowledge about concrete chunks and abstract structures of the temporal sequence. Generation performance revealed that ability to control was mainly based on abstract structures rather than concrete chunks. Moreover, ability to control was not generally accompanied with awareness of knowing or knowledge, as measured by confidence ratings and attribution tests, confirming that people could control the use of unconscious knowledge of abstract structures. The results present a challenge to computational models and theories of implicit learning.

Spontaneous eyeblinks are sensitive to sequential learning

Although sequential learning and spontaneous eyeblink rate (EBR) have both been shown to be tightly related to cerebral dopaminergic activity, they have never been investigated at the same time. In the present study, EBR, taken as an indirect marker of dopaminergic activity, was investigated in two resting state conditions, both before and after visuomotor sequence learning in a serial reaction time task (SRT) and during task practice. Participants' abilities to produce and manipulate their knowledge about the sequential material were probed in a generation task. We hypothesized that the time course of spontaneous EBR might follow the progressive decrease of RTs during the SRT session. Additionally, we manipulated the structure of the transfer blocks as well as their respective order, assuming that (1) fully random trials might generate a larger psychophysiological response than an unlearned but structured material, and (2) a second (final) block of transfer might give rise to larger effects given that the sequential material was better consolidated after further practice. Finally, we tentatively hypothesized that, in addition to their online version, spontaneous EBR recorded during the pre- and post-learning resting sessions might be predictive of (1) the SRT learning curve, (2) the magnitude of the transfer effects, and (3) performance in the generation task. Results showed successful sequence learning with decreased accuracy and increased reaction times (RTs) in transfer blocks featuring a different material (random trials or a structured, novel sequence). In line with our hypothesis that EBR reflects dopaminergic activity associated with sequential learning, we observed increased EBR in random trials as well as when the second transfer block occurred at the end of the learning session. There was a positive relationship between the learning curve (RTs) and the slope of EBR during the SRT session. Additionally, inter-individual differences in resting and real-time EBR predicted the magnitude of accuracy and RTs transfer effects, respectively, but they were not related to participants' performances during the generation task. Notwithstanding, our results suggest that the degree of explicit sequential knowledge modulates the association between the magnitude of the transfer effect in EBR and SRT performance. Overall, the present study provides evidence that EBR may represent a valid indirect psychophysiological correlate of dopaminergic activity coupled to sequential learning.

Reversible second-order conditional sequences in incidental sequence learning tasks

In sequence learning tasks, participants' sensitivity to the sequential structure of a series of events often overshoots their ability to express relevant knowledge intentionally, as in generation tasks that require participants to produce either the next element of a sequence (inclusion) or a different element (exclusion). Comparing generation performance under inclusion and exclusion conditions makes it possible to assess the respective influences of conscious and unconscious learning. Recently, two main concerns have been expressed concerning such tasks. First, it is often difficult to design control sequences in such a way that they enable clear comparisons with the training material. Second, it is challenging to ask participants to perform appropriately under exclusion instructions, for the requirement to exclude familiar responses often leads them to adopt degenerate strategies (e.g., pushing on the same key all the time), which then need to be specifically singled out as invalid. To overcome both concerns, we introduce reversible second-order conditional (RSOC) sequences and show (a) that they elicit particularly strong transfer effects, (b) that dissociation of implicit and explicit influences becomes possible thanks to the removal of salient transitions in RSOCs, and (c) that exclusion instructions can be greatly simplified without losing sensitivity.

Predictive Movements and Human Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Action

Sequential action makes up the bulk of human daily activity, and yet much remains unknown about how people learn such actions. In one motor learning paradigm, the serial reaction time (SRT) task, people are taught a consistent sequence of button presses by cueing them with the next target response. However, the SRT task only records keypress response times to a cued target, and thus it cannot reveal the full time‐course of motion, including predictive movements. This paper describes a mouse movement trajectory SRT task in which the cursor must be moved to a cued location. We replicated keypress SRT results, but also found that predictive movement—before the next cue appears—increased during the experiment. Moreover, trajectory analyses revealed that people developed a centering strategy under uncertainty. In a second experiment, we made prediction explicit, no longer cueing targets. Thus, participants had to explore the response alternatives and learn via reinforcement, receiving rewards and penalties for correct and incorrect actions, respectively. Participants were not told whether the sequence of stimuli was deterministic, nor if it would repeat, nor how long it was. Given the difficulty of the task, it is unsurprising that some learners performed poorly. However, many learners performed remarkably well, and some acquired the full 10‐item sequence within 10 repetitions. Comparing the high‐ and low‐performers’ detailed results in this reinforcement learning (RL) task with the first experiment's cued trajectory SRT task, we found similarities between the two tasks, suggesting that the effects in Experiment 1 are due to predictive, rather than reactive processes. Finally, we found that two standard model‐free reinforcement learning models fit the high‐performing participants, while the four low‐performing participants provide better fit with a simple negative recency bias model.

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

Does sleep facilitate the consolidation of allocentric or egocentric representations of implicitly learned visual-motor sequence learning?

Sleep facilitates the consolidation (i.e., enhancement) of simple, explicit (i.e., conscious) motor sequence learning (MSL). MSL can be dissociated into egocentric (i.e., motor) or allocentric (i.e., spatial) frames of reference. The consolidation of the allocentric memory representation is sleep-dependent, whereas the egocentric consolidation process is independent of sleep or wake for explicit MSL. However, it remains unclear the extent to which sleep contributes to the consolidation of implicit (i.e., unconscious) MSL, nor is it known what aspects of the memory representation (egocentric, allocentric) are consolidated by sleep. Here, we investigated the extent to which sleep is involved in consolidating implicit MSL, specifically, whether the egocentric or the allocentric cognitive representations of a learned sequence are enhanced by sleep, and whether these changes support the development of explicit sequence knowledge across sleep but not wake. Our results indicate that egocentric and allocentric representations can be behaviorally dissociated for implicit MSL. Neither representation was preferentially enhanced across sleep nor were developments of explicit awareness observed. However, after a 1-wk interval performance enhancement was observed in the egocentric representation. Taken together, these results suggest that like explicit MSL, implicit MSL has dissociable allocentric and egocentric representations, but unlike explicit sequence learning, implicit egocentric and allocentric memory consolidation is independent of sleep, and the time-course of consolidation differs significantly.

Superior non-specific motor learning in the blind

It is well established that blindness induces changes in cerebral function and structure, namely affecting the somatomotor regions. However, the behavioural significance of these changes on the motor system, and on motor learning in particular, remains elusive. In this study, we used a modified version of the serial reaction time task (SRTT) with auditory cues to assess sequence specific and non-specific motor learning in blind adults and sighted controls, and compare them with sighted controls performing the classic visual SRTT. Our results show that the auditory SRTT faithfully replicates the typical learning pattern obtained with the visual SRTT. On the auditory SRTT, blind individuals consistently showed faster reaction times than sighted controls, being at par with sighted individuals performing the visual SRTT. On the other hand, blind participants displayed a particular pattern of motor learning in comparison to both sighted groups; while controls improved prominently on sequence specific learning, blind individuals displayed comparable performance on both specific and non-specific learning, markedly outperforming the control groups on non-specific learning. These results show that blindness, in addition to causing long-term changes in cortical organisation, can also influence dynamic neuroplastic mechanisms in systems beyond those typically associated with compensatory sensory processing.

Neural Correlates of Subjective Awareness for Natural Scene Categorization of Color Photographs and Line-Drawings

It remains controversial whether visual awareness is correlated with early activation indicated by VAN (visual awareness negativity), as the recurrent process hypothesis theory proposes, or with later activation indicated by P3 or LP (late positive), as suggested by global workspace theories. To address this issue, a backward masking task was adopted, in which participants were first asked to categorize natural scenes of color photographs and line-drawings and then to rate the clarity of their visual experience on a Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). The interstimulus interval between the scene and the mask was manipulated. The behavioral results showed that categorization accuracy increased with PAS ratings for both color photographs and line-drawings, with no difference in accuracy between the two types of images for each rating, indicating that the experience rating reflected visibility. Importantly, the event-related potential (ERP) results revealed that for correct trials, the early posterior N1 and anterior P2 components changed with the PAS ratings for color photographs, but did not vary with the PAS ratings for line-drawings, indicating that the N1 and P2 do not always correlate with subjective visual awareness. Moreover, for both types of images, the anterior N2 and posterior VAN changed with the PAS ratings in a linear way, while the LP changed with the PAS ratings in a non-linear way, suggesting that these components relate to different types of subjective awareness. The results reconcile the apparently contradictory predictions of different theories and help to resolve the current debate on neural correlates of visual awareness.

Paired-Associate and Feedback-Based Weather Prediction Tasks Support Multiple Category Learning Systems

It remains unclear whether probabilistic category learning in the feedback-based weather prediction task (FB-WPT) can be mediated by a non-declarative or procedural learning system. To address this issue, we compared the effects of training time and verbal working memory, which influence the declarative learning system but not the non-declarative learning system, in the FB and paired-associate (PA) WPTs, as the PA task recruits a declarative learning system. The results of Experiment 1 showed that the optimal accuracy in the PA condition was significantly decreased when the training time was reduced from 7 to 3 s, but this did not occur in the FB condition, although shortened training time impaired the acquisition of explicit knowledge in both conditions. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the concurrent working memory task impaired the optimal accuracy and the acquisition of explicit knowledge in the PA condition but did not influence the optimal accuracy or the acquisition of self-insight knowledge in the FB condition. The apparent dissociation results between the FB and PA conditions suggested that a non-declarative or procedural learning system is involved in the FB-WPT and provided new evidence for the multiple-systems theory of human category learning.

Objective and subjective measures of cross-situational learning

Statistical learning is often considered to be automatic and implicit, but little is known about the extent to which the resulting representations are available to conscious awareness. In the present study, we focus on whether the knowledge acquired in statistical learning of word-referent pairs is available to conscious control. Using a cross-situational learning paradigm, adult participants were first exposed to a set of pictures associated with auditorily presented words. Immediately thereafter, they were exposed to a second set of word-picture pairs. After the exposure phase, learning and conscious accessibility to the acquired knowledge were measured by using an adaptation of the Process Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991): two recognition tasks that only differed by instructions. In the Inclusion task, participants were instructed to accept all the correct associations (either from the first or the second set) and reject all the incorrect associations. In the Exclusion task, they had to accept all the correct associations from one of the sets and reject both the correct associations from the other set as well as all incorrect associations. Moreover, binary confidence judgments were recorded after each trial. Results show that participants were able to control the acquired knowledge. However, confidence judgments revealed that participants correctly identified the learned associations even when they claimed to guess, suggesting that cross-situational learning involves a mixture of both conscious and unconscious influences.

Measuring strategic control in implicit learning: how and why?

Several methods have been developed for measuring the extent to which implicitly learned knowledge can be applied in a strategic, flexible manner. Examples include generation exclusion tasks in Serial Reaction Time (SRT) learning (Goschke, 1998; Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2001) and 2-grammar classification tasks in Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL; Dienes et al., 1995; Norman et al., 2011). Strategic control has traditionally been used as a criterion for determining whether acquired knowledge is conscious or unconscious, or which properties of knowledge are consciously available. In this paper I first summarize existing methods that have been developed for measuring strategic control in the SRT and AGL tasks. I then address some methodological and theoretical questions. Methodological questions concern choice of task, whether the measurement reflects inhibitory control or task switching, and whether or not strategic control should be measured on a trial-by-trial basis. Theoretical questions concern the rationale for including measurement of strategic control, what form of knowledge is strategically controlled, and how strategic control can be combined with subjective awareness measures.

Procedural Learning and Individual Differences in Language

The aim of the current study was to examine different aspects of procedural memory in young adults who varied with regard to their language abilities. We selected a sample of procedural memory tasks, each of which represented a unique type of procedural learning, and has been linked, at least partially, to the functionality of the corticostriatal system. The findings showed that variance in language abilities is associated with performance on different domains of procedural memory, including the motor domain (as shown in the pursuit rotor task), the cognitive domain (as shown in the weather prediction task), and the linguistic domain (as shown in the nonword repetition priming task). These results implicate the corticostriatal system in individual differences in language.

Awareness of sensorimotor adaptation to visual rotations of different size

Previous studies on sensorimotor adaptation revealed no awareness of the nature of the perturbation after adaptation to an abrupt 30° rotation of visual feedback or after adaptation to gradually introduced perturbations. Whether the degree of awareness depends on the magnitude of the perturbation, though, has as yet not been tested. Instead of using questionnaires, as was often done in previous work, the present study used a process dissociation procedure to measure awareness and unawareness. A naïve, implicit group and a group of subjects using explicit strategies adapted to 20°, 40° and 60° cursor rotations in different adaptation blocks that were each followed by determination of awareness and unawareness indices. The awareness index differed between groups and increased from 20° to 60° adaptation. In contrast, there was no group difference for the unawareness index, but it also depended on the size of the rotation. Early adaptation varied between groups and correlated with awareness: The more awareness a participant had developed the more the person adapted in the beginning of the adaptation block. In addition, there was a significant group difference for savings but it did not correlate with awareness. Our findings suggest that awareness depends on perturbation size and that aware and strategic processes are differentially involved during adaptation and savings. Moreover, the use of the process dissociation procedure opens the opportunity to determine awareness and unawareness indices in future sensorimotor adaptation research.

Visual statistical learning in children and young adults: how implicit?

Visual statistical learning (VSL) is the ability to extract the joint and conditional probabilities of shapes co-occurring during passive viewing of complex visual configurations. Evidence indicates that even infants are sensitive to these regularities (e.g., Kirkham et al., 2002). However, there is continuing debate as to whether VSL is accompanied by conscious awareness of the statistical regularities between sequence elements. Bertels et al. (2012) addressed this question in young adults. Here, we adapted their paradigm to investigate VSL and conscious awareness in children. Using the same version of the paradigm, we also tested young adults so as to directly compare results from both age groups. Fifth graders and undergraduates were exposed to a stream of visual shapes arranged in triplets. Learning of these sequences was then assessed using both direct and indirect measures. In order to assess the extent to which learning occurred explicitly, we also measured confidence through subjective measures in the direct task (i.e., binary confidence judgments). Results revealed that both children and young adults learned the statistical regularities between shapes. In both age groups, participants who performed above chance in the completion task had conscious access to their knowledge. Nevertheless, although adults performed above chance even when they claimed to guess, there was no evidence of implicit knowledge in children. These results suggest that the role of implicit and explicit influences in VSL may follow a developmental trajectory.

Tools for thinking applied to nature: an inclusive pedagogical framework for environmental education

An effective educational framework is necessary to develop the engagement of children and adults with nature. Here we show how the tools for thinking framework can be applied to this end. The tools comprise 13 sensory-based cognitive skills that form the basis for formalized expressions of knowledge and understanding in the sciences and arts. These skills are explicitly taught in some curricula. We review evidence of specific tools for thinking in the self-reported thinking processes and influential childhood experiences of prominent biologists, conservationists and naturalists. Tools such as imaging, abstracting, pattern recognition, dimensional thinking, empathizing, modelling and synthesizing play key roles in practical ecology, biogeography and animal behaviour studies and in environmental education. Ethnographic evidence shows that people engage with nature by using many of the same tools for thinking. These tools can be applied in conservation education programmes at all levels by actively emphasizing the role of the tools in developing understanding, and using them to design effective educational initiatives and assess existing environmental education.

Modelling unsupervised online-learning of artificial grammars: linking implicit and statistical learning

Humans rapidly learn complex structures in various domains. Findings of above-chance performance of some untrained control groups in artificial grammar learning studies raise questions about the extent to which learning can occur in an untrained, unsupervised testing situation with both correct and incorrect structures. The plausibility of unsupervised online-learning effects was modelled with n-gram, chunking and simple recurrent network models. A novel evaluation framework was applied, which alternates forced binary grammaticality judgments and subsequent learning of the same stimulus. Our results indicate a strong online learning effect for n-gram and chunking models and a weaker effect for simple recurrent network models. Such findings suggest that online learning is a plausible effect of statistical chunk learning that is possible when ungrammatical sequences contain a large proportion of grammatical chunks. Such common effects of continuous statistical learning may underlie statistical and implicit learning paradigms and raise implications for study design and testing methodologies.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious learning with objective and subjective measures

According to functionalist theories, consciousness can be defined by the functions that it serves and by the way it contributes to cognition. For example, when trying to establish dissociations between conscious and unconscious knowledge, conscious representations would be identified by the fact that they allow cognitive control or successful identification or recollection, assessed by verbal reports or forced-choice tasks. Even though the functionalist approach has brought about important dissociation results concerning conscious and unconscious cognition, critics emphasize that it does not account for the qualitative properties of conscious experience. Phenomenal theories are precisely based on the notion that conscious representations are such that it feels like something to have these representations. Thus, one way to assess conscious knowledge is to ask people, after they have produced a forced-choice response, to identify their mental states through the use of subjective confidence ratings, in which they discriminate between a complete guess and a response based on some feeling of knowing. However, these 2 approaches are not mutually exclusive. In this article, we review a series of studies showing that the joint use of objective judgments about some external stimuli and about one's own subjective knowledge concerning these stimuli, provides new insights into the putative dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in learning.

Who learns more? Cultural differences in implicit sequence learning

Background

It is well documented that East Asians differ from Westerners in conscious perception and attention. However, few studies have explored cultural differences in unconscious processes such as implicit learning.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The global-local Navon letters were adopted in the serial reaction time (SRT) task, during which Chinese and British participants were instructed to respond to global or local letters, to investigate whether culture influences what people acquire in implicit sequence learning. Our results showed that from the beginning British expressed a greater local bias in perception than Chinese, confirming a cultural difference in perception. Further, over extended exposure, the Chinese learned the target regularity better than the British when the targets were global, indicating a global advantage for Chinese in implicit learning. Moreover, Chinese participants acquired greater unconscious knowledge of an irrelevant regularity than British participants, indicating that the Chinese were more sensitive to contextual regularities than the British.

Conclusions/Significance

The results suggest that cultural biases can profoundly influence both what people consciously perceive and unconsciously learn.

Working memory and its relation to deterministic sequence learning

Is there a relation between working memory (WM) and incidental sequence learning? Nearly all of the earlier investigations in the role of WM capacity (WMC) in sequence learning suggest no correlations in incidental learning conditions. However, the theoretical view of WM and operationalization of WMC made strong progress in recent years. The current study related performance in a coordination and transformation task to sequence knowledge in a four-choice incidental deterministic serial reaction time (SRT) task and a subsequent free generation task. The response-to-stimulus interval (RSI) was varied between 0 ms and 300 ms. Our results show correlations between WMC and error rates in condition RSI 0 ms. For condition RSI 300 ms we found relations between WMC and sequence knowledge in the SRT task as well as between WMC and generation task performance. Theoretical implications of these findings for ongoing processes during sequence learning and retrieval of sequence knowledge are discussed.

Negative affect reduces performance in implicit sequence learning

Background

It is well documented that positive rather than negative moods encourage integrative processing of conscious information. However, the extent to which implicit or unconscious learning can be influenced by affective states remains unclear.

Methodology/Principal Findings

A Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task with sequence structures requiring integration over past trials was adopted to examine the effect of affective states on implicit learning. Music was used to induce and maintain positive and negative affective states. The present study showed that participants in negative rather than positive states learned less of the regularity. Moreover, the knowledge was shown by a Bayesian analysis to be largely unconscious as participants were poor at recognizing the regularity.

Conclusions/Significance

The results demonstrated that negative rather than positive affect inhibited implicit learning of complex structures. Our findings help to understand the effects of affective states on unconscious or implicit processing.

Statistical learning of two artificial languages presented successively: how conscious?

Statistical learning is assumed to occur automatically and implicitly, but little is known about the extent to which the representations acquired over training are available to conscious awareness. In this study, we focus on whether the knowledge acquired in a statistical learning situation is available to conscious control. Participants were first exposed to an artificial language presented auditorily. Immediately thereafter, they were exposed to a second artificial language. Both languages were composed of the same corpus of syllables and differed only in the transitional probabilities. We first determined that both languages were equally learnable (Experiment 1) and that participants could learn the two languages and differentiate between them (Experiment 2). Then, in Experiment 3, we used an adaptation of the Process-Dissociation Procedure (Jacoby, 1991) to explore whether participants could consciously manipulate the acquired knowledge. Results suggest that statistical information can be used to parse and differentiate between two different artificial languages, and that the resulting representations are available to conscious control.

Performing the unexplainable: implicit task performance reveals individually reliable sequence learning without explicit knowledge

Memory-impaired patients express intact implicit perceptual-motor sequence learning, but it has been difficult to obtain a similarly clear dissociation in healthy participants. When explicit memory is intact, participants acquire some explicit knowledge and performance improvements from implicit learning may be subtle. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether performance exceeds what could be expected on the basis of the concomitant explicit knowledge. Using a challenging new sequence-learning task, robust implicit learning was found in healthy participants with virtually no associated explicit knowledge. Participants trained on a repeating sequence that was selected randomly from a set of five. On a performance test of all five sequences, performance was best on the trained sequence, and two-thirds of the participants exhibited individually reliable improvement (by chi-square analysis). Participants could not reliably indicate which sequence had been trained by either recognition or recall. Only by expressing their knowledge via performance were participants able to indicate which sequence they had learned.

Representing serial action and perception

This article presents a review on the representational base of sequence learning in the serial reaction time task. The first part of the article addresses the major questions and challenges that underlie the debate on implicit and explicit learning. In the second part, the informational content that underlies sequence representations is reviewed. The latter issue has produced a rich and equivocal literature. A taxonomy illustrates that substantial support exists for associations between successive stimulus features, between successive response features, and between successive response-to-stimulus compounds. We suggest that sequence learning is not predetermined with respect to one particular type of information but, rather, develops according to an overall principle of activation contingent on task characteristics. Moreover, substantiating such an integrative approach is proposed by a synthesis with the dual-system model (Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003).

Implicit learning of fifth- and sixth-order sequential probabilities

Serial reaction time (SRT) task studies have established that people can implicitly learn sequential contingencies as complex as fourth-order probabilities. The present study examined people's ability to learn fifth-order (Experiment 1) and sixth-order (Experiment 2) probabilities. Remarkably, people learned fifth- and sixth-order probabilities. This suggests that the implicit sequence learning mechanism can operate over a range of at least seven sequence elements.

Detecting conscious awareness from involuntary autonomic responses

Can conscious awareness be ascertained from physiological responses alone? We evaluate a novel learning-based procedure permitting detection of conscious awareness without reliance on language comprehension or behavioural responses. The method exploits a situation whereby only consciously detected violations of an expectation alter skin conductance responses (SCRs). Thirty participants listened to sequences of piano notes that, without their being told, predicted a pleasant fanfare or an aversive noise according to an abstract rule. Stimuli were presented without distraction (attended), or while distracted by a visual task to remove awareness of the rule (unattended). A test phase included occasional violations of the rule. Only participants attending the sounds reported awareness of violations and only they showed significantly greater SCR for noise occurring in violation, vs. accordance, with the rule. Our results establish theoretically significant dissociations between conscious and unconscious processing and furnish new opportunities for clinical assessment of residual consciousness in patient populations.

Know thyself: metacognitive networks and measures of consciousness

Subjective measures of awareness rest on the assumption that conscious knowledge is knowledge that participants know they possess. Post-Decision Wagering (PDW), recently proposed as a new measure of awareness, requires participants to place a high or a low wager on their decisions. Whereas advantageous wagering indicates awareness of the knowledge on which the decisions are based, cases in which participants fail to optimize their wagers suggest performance without awareness. Here, we hypothesize that wagering and other subjective measures of awareness reflect metacognitive capacities subtended by self-developed metarepresentations that inform an agent about its own internal states. To support this idea, we present three simulations in which neural networks learn to wager on their own responses. The simulations illustrate essential properties that are required for such metarepresentations to influence PDW as a measure of awareness. Results demonstrate a good fit to human data. We discuss the implications of this modeling work for our understanding of consciousness and its measures.

Visuospatial sequence learning without seeing

BACKGROUND

The ability to detect and integrate associations between unrelated items that are close in space and time is a key feature of human learning and memory. Learning sequential associations between non-adjacent visual stimuli (higher-order visuospatial dependencies) can occur either with or without awareness (explicit vs. implicit learning) of the products of learning. Existing behavioural and neurocognitive studies of explicit and implicit sequence learning, however, are based on conscious access to the sequence of target locations and, typically, on conditions where the locations for orienting, or motor, responses coincide with the locations of the target sequence.

METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Dichoptic stimuli were presented on a novel sequence learning task using a mirror stereoscope to mask the eye-of-origin of visual input from conscious awareness. We demonstrate that conscious access to the sequence of target locations and responses that coincide with structure of the target sequence are dispensable features when learning higher-order visuospatial associations. Sequence knowledge was expressed in the ability of participants to identify the trained higher-order visuospatial sequence on a recognition test, even though the trained and untrained recognition sequences were identical when viewed at a conscious binocular level, and differed only at the level of the masked sequential associations.

CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE

These results demonstrate that unconscious processing can support perceptual learning of higher-order sequential associations through interocular integration of retinotopic-based codes stemming from monocular eye-of-origin information. Furthermore, unlike other forms of perceptual associative learning, visuospatial attention did not need to be directed to the locations of the target sequence. More generally, the results pose a challenge to neural models of learning to account for a previously unknown capacity of the human visual system to support the detection, learning and recognition of higher-order sequential associations under conditions where observers are unable to see the target sequence or perform responses that coincide with structure of the target sequence.

Dopamine D2 receptor density in the limbic striatum is related to implicit but not explicit movement sequence learning

A large body of literature suggests that motor sequence learning involves dopamine-modulated plastic processes in the basal ganglia. Sequence learning can occur both implicitly, without conscious awareness and intention to learn, and explicitly, i.e., under conscious control. Here, we investigated whether individual differences in implicit and explicit sequence learning of movement sequences in a group of 15 healthy participants are related to dopamine D2 receptor densities in functional subregions of the striatum. Sequence learning was assessed using the serial reaction time task, and measures of implicit and explicit knowledge were estimated using a process dissociation procedure. Correlation analyses were performed between these measures and D2 receptor densities, which had been measured previously with positron emission tomography. Striatal D2 densities were negatively related to measures of sequence learning. In the limbic subregion, D2 densities were specifically related to implicit but not explicit learning. These findings suggest that individual differences in striatal DA function underlie differences in sequence learning ability and support that implicit and explicit sequence learning depend on partly distinct neural circuitry. The findings are also in line with the general view that implicit learning systems are evolutionarily primitive and tend to rely more on phylogenetically old neural circuitry than does explicit learning and cognition.

Learning: from association to cognition

Since the very earliest experimental investigations of learning, tension has existed between association-based and cognitive theories. Associationism accounts for the phenomena of both conditioning and "higher" forms of learning via concepts such as excitation, inhibition, and reinforcement, whereas cognitive theories assume that learning depends on hypothesis testing, cognitive models, and propositional reasoning. Cognitive theories have received considerable impetus in regard to both human and animal learning from recent research suggesting that the key illustration of cue selection in learning, blocking, often arises from inferential reasoning. At the same time, a dichotomous view that separates noncognitive, unconscious (implicit) learning from cognitive, conscious (explicit) learning has gained favor. This review selectively describes key findings from this research, evaluates evidence for and against associative and cognitive explanatory constructs, and critically examines both the dichotomous view of learning as well as the claim that learning can occur unconsciously.

Can unconscious knowledge allow control in sequence learning?

This paper investigates the conscious status of both the knowledge that an item is legal (judgment knowledge) and the knowledge of why it is legal (structural knowledge) in sequence learning. We compared ability to control use of knowledge (Process Dissociation Procedure) with stated awareness of the knowledge (subjective measures) as measures of the conscious status of knowledge. Experiment 1 showed that when people could control use of judgment knowledge they were indeed conscious of having that knowledge according to their own statements. Yet Experiment 2 showed that people could exert such control over the use of judgment knowledge when claiming they had no structural knowledge: i.e. conscious judgment knowledge could be based on unconscious structural knowledge. Further implicit learning research should be clear over whether judgment or structural knowledge is claimed to be unconscious as the two dissociate in sequence learning.

Sensory information in perceptual-motor sequence learning: visual and/or tactile stimuli

Sequence learning in serial reaction time (SRT) tasks has been investigated mostly with unimodal stimulus presentation. This approach disregards the possibility that sequence acquisition may be guided by multiple sources of sensory information simultaneously. In the current study we trained participants in a SRT task with visual only, tactile only, or bimodal (visual and tactile) stimulus presentation. Sequence performance for the bimodal and visual only training groups was similar, while both performed better than the tactile only training group. In a subsequent transfer phase, participants from all three training groups were tested in conditions with visual, tactile, and bimodal stimulus presentation. Sequence performance between the visual only and bimodal training groups again was highly similar across these identical stimulus conditions, indicating that the addition of tactile stimuli did not benefit the bimodal training group. Additionally, comparing across identical stimulus conditions in the transfer phase showed that the lesser sequence performance from the tactile only group during training probably did not reflect a difference in sequence learning but rather just a difference in expression of the sequence knowledge.

Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches

The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications.