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Van de Cruys S, Bervoets J, Gadsby S, Gijbels D, Poels K. Insight in the Conspiracist's Mind. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 2024; 28:302-324. [PMID: 37776304 DOI: 10.1177/10888683231203145] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/02/2023]
Abstract
Academic AbstractThe motto of the conspiracist, "Do your own research," may seem ludicrous to scientists. Indeed, it is often dismissed as a mere rhetorical device that conspiracists use to give themselves the semblance of science. In this perspective paper, we explore the information-seeking activities ("research") that conspiracists do engage in. Drawing on the experimental psychology of aha experiences, we explain how these activities, as well as the epistemic experiences that precede (curiosity) or follow (insight or "aha" experiences) them, may play a crucial role in the appeal and development of conspiracy beliefs. Aha moments have properties that can be exploited by conspiracy theories, such as the potential for false but seemingly grounded conclusions. Finally, we hypothesize that the need for autonomous epistemic agency and discovery is universal but increases as people experience more uncertainty and/or feel epistemically excluded in society, hence linking it to existing literature on explaining conspiracy theories.
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2
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Özen-Akın G, Cinan S. The lack of Aha! experience can be dependent on the problem difficulty. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2024; 88:1522-1539. [PMID: 38630293 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-024-01960-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/27/2022] [Accepted: 03/22/2024] [Indexed: 07/28/2024]
Abstract
Previous research on how problem-difficulty affects solution-types of insight-problems has yielded contradictory findings. Thus, we aimed to examine the impact of problem-difficulty on solution-types in both inter- and intra-problem-difficulty contexts. For this, we employed the original 8-coin, and 9-dot problems and four hinted-versions of those that were manipulated by using hints-to-remove-sources-of-difficulty to alter their difficulty level. Those manipulations were executed based on the assumptions of constraint-relaxation and chunk-decomposition as posited by representational change theory. The study involved a total of 165 participants who were tested in five groups (33 per se), with each group receiving an original or hinted problem. Following their correct solutions, problem-solvers classified their solution-types (insight or non-insight solutions) by whether they had an Aha!-experience during the solution. Across all groups, 56.1% of correctly solved insight problems were solved with Aha!-experience, based on participants' self-reports, implying that correct solutions should not be equated with insight. Subsequently, the solution-type rates were compared for both original problems (inter-problem-difficulty) and hinted versions of those at each difficulty level (intra-problem-difficulty). Inter-problem-difficulty comparisons demonstrated that the easier 8-coin problem was more likely to be solved with insight than the harder 9-dot problem. In contrast, intra-problem-difficulty comparisons revealed that harder problems were more likely to be solved with insight. These findings suggest that problem-difficulty should be considered in future studies of insight. Finally, separate analyses on the predictive values of the cognitive-affective-dimensions on solution-types revealed that, after adjusting for problem-difficulty, problem-solvers with higher suddenness scores in both problems exhibited a significantly higher probability of generating insight solutions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gaye Özen-Akın
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Science and Letters, Kırklareli University, 39100, Kayalı, Kırklareli, Türkiye.
| | - Sevtap Cinan
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Letters, Istanbul University, 34134, Fatih, Istanbul, Türkiye
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3
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Stuyck H, Demeyer F, Bratanov C, Cleeremans A, Van den Bussche E. Insight and non-insight problem solving: A heart rate variability study. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2024; 77:1462-1484. [PMID: 37688497 DOI: 10.1177/17470218231202519] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 09/11/2023]
Abstract
Occasionally, problems are solved with a sudden Aha! moment (insight), while the mundane approach to solving problems is analytical (non-insight). At first glance, non-insight appears to depend on the availability and taxation of cognitive resources to execute the step-by-step approach, whereas insight does not, or to a lesser extent. However, this remains debated. To investigate the reliance of both solution types on cognitive resources, we assessed the involvement of the prefrontal cortex using vagally mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) as an index. Participants (N = 68) solved 70 compound remote associates word puzzles solvable with insight and non-insight. Before, during, and after solving the word puzzles, we measured the vmHRV. Our results showed that resting-state vmHRV (trait) showed a negative association with behavioural performance for both solution types. This might reflect inter-individual differences in inhibitory control. As the solution search requires one to think of remote associations, inhibitory control might hamper rather than aid this process. Furthermore, we observed, for both solution types, a vmHRV increase from resting-state to solution search (state), lingering on in the post-task recovery period. This could mark the increase of prefrontal resources to promote an open-minded stance, essential for divergent thinking, which arguably is crucial for this task. Our findings suggest that, at a general level, both solution types share common aspects. However, a closer analysis of early and late solutions and puzzle difficulty suggested that metacognitive differentiation between insight and non-insight improved with higher trait vmHRV, and that a unique association between trait vmHRV and puzzle difficulty was present for each solution type.
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Affiliation(s)
- Hans Stuyck
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
- Center for Research in Cognition and Neurosciences, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussel, Belgium
| | - Febe Demeyer
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Christo Bratanov
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
| | - Axel Cleeremans
- Center for Research in Cognition and Neurosciences, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussel, Belgium
| | - Eva Van den Bussche
- Brain and Cognition, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
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4
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Zhang Z, Li Y, Zeng Y, Deng J, Xing Q, Luo J. The involvement of decomposition and composition processes in restructuring during problem solving. Conscious Cogn 2024; 121:103685. [PMID: 38598896 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2024.103685] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2023] [Revised: 03/19/2024] [Accepted: 04/01/2024] [Indexed: 04/12/2024]
Abstract
Decomposition of chunks has been widely accepted as a critical proxy of restructuring, but the role of composition in forming new representations has been largely neglected. This study aims to investigate the roles of both decomposition and composition processes in chunk restructuring, as well as their relationships with "aha" experiences during problem-solving. Participants were asked to move a part of a character to another character to create two new characters. Across three experiments, the characters to be decomposed or composed were varied in terms of tight or loose chunks. The results showed that decomposition or composition of tight chunks led to lower success rates, longer response times, and significantly stronger "Aha!" emotional experiences (mainly in terms of surprise and suddenness). This study provides evidence for the contribution of both decomposition and composition processes to restructuring in creative insight.
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Affiliation(s)
- Zhonglu Zhang
- Department of Psychology, School of Education, Guangzhou University, China.
| | - Yizhu Li
- Department of Psychology, School of Education, Guangzhou University, China.
| | - Yuxin Zeng
- Department of Psychology, School of Education, Guangzhou University, China.
| | - Jiamin Deng
- Department of Psychology, School of Education, Guangzhou University, China.
| | - Qiang Xing
- Department of Psychology, School of Education, Guangzhou University, China.
| | - Jing Luo
- School of Psychology, Capital Normal University, China.
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5
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Shupe E. The irreconcilability of insight. Anim Cogn 2024; 27:16. [PMID: 38429535 PMCID: PMC10907412 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-024-01844-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/06/2023] [Revised: 09/02/2023] [Accepted: 11/19/2023] [Indexed: 03/03/2024]
Abstract
We are said to experience insight when we suddenly and unexpectedly become aware of the solution to a problem that we previously took ourselves to be unable to solve. In the field of comparative cognition, there is rising interest in the question of whether non-human animals are capable of insightful problem-solving. Putative cases of animals demonstrating insight have generally attracted two types of criticism: first, that insight is being conflated with other cognitive capacities (e.g., causal cognition, or mental trial and error); and, second, that the relevant performances merely reflect associative learning-and on the received understanding of insight within comparative cognition, insight necessarily involves non-associative processes. I argue that even if we grant that some cases of animal insight do withstand these two criticisms, these cases of purported animal insight cannot shed light on the nature of insightful problem-solving in humans. For the phenomenon studied by cognitive psychologists under the heading of insight is fundamentally different from that studied in comparative cognition. In light of this impasse, I argue that the reinterpretation of the extant research on animal insight in terms of other high-level cognitive capacities (means-end reasoning in particular) can improve the prospect of a successful comparative research program.
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Affiliation(s)
- Eli Shupe
- University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, USA.
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6
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Moroshkina NV, Pavliuchik EI, Ammalainen AV, Gershkovich VA, Lvova OV. The Aha! experience is associated with a drop in the perceived difficulty of the problem. Front Psychol 2024; 15:1314531. [PMID: 38323161 PMCID: PMC10844378 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1314531] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/10/2023] [Accepted: 01/09/2024] [Indexed: 02/08/2024] Open
Abstract
The study investigated the correlation between the intensity of the Aha! experience and participants' subjective difficulty ratings of problems before and after finding their solutions. We assumed that the Aha! experience arises from a shift in processing fluency triggered by changing from an initially incoherent problem representation to a coherent one, which ultimately leads to the retrieval of a solution with unexpected ease and speed. First, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would indicate more sudden solutions, manifesting in a reduced correlation between the initial difficulty ratings and solution times. Second, we hypothesized that higher Aha! experience ratings would correspond to a greater shift in the subjective difficulty ratings between the initial and retrospective assessments. To test our hypotheses, we developed a novel set of rebus puzzles. A total of 160 participants solved rebuses and provided initial (within 5 s of problem presentation) and retrospective difficulty ratings (following the generation or presentation of a correct solution). They also rated their Aha! experience (after solution generation or presentation), confidence in solutions, and the likability of each rebus. Our findings revealed that the initial ratings of the problem's subjective difficulty were positively correlated with the solution time and that this correlation decreased in the case of a stronger Aha! experience. Aha! experience ratings were positively correlated with the differences between initial and retrospective difficulty ratings, confidence, solution accuracy, and rebus likability. We interpreted our results to be in line with the processing fluency and metacognitive prediction error accounts.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Elena I. Pavliuchik
- Institute for Cognitive Studies, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia
| | - Artur V. Ammalainen
- Institute for Cognitive Studies, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia
- Institute of Psychology, University of Greifswald, Greifswald, Germany
| | | | - Olga V. Lvova
- Institute for Cognitive Studies, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia
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7
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Laukkonen RE, Webb M, Salvi C, Tangen JM, Slagter HA, Schooler JW. Insight and the selection of ideas. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2023; 153:105363. [PMID: 37598874 DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105363] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/02/2023] [Revised: 06/19/2023] [Accepted: 08/15/2023] [Indexed: 08/22/2023]
Abstract
Perhaps it is no accident that insight moments accompany some of humanity's most important discoveries in science, medicine, and art. Here we propose that feelings of insight play a central role in (heuristically) selecting an idea from the stream of consciousness by capturing attention and eliciting a sense of intuitive confidence permitting fast action under uncertainty. The mechanisms underlying this Eureka heuristic are explained within an active inference framework. First, implicit restructuring via Bayesian reduction leads to a higher-order prediction error (i.e., the content of insight). Second, dopaminergic precision-weighting of the prediction error accounts for the intuitive confidence, pleasure, and attentional capture (i.e., the feeling of insight). This insight as precision account is consistent with the phenomenology, accuracy, and neural unfolding of insight, as well as its effects on belief and decision-making. We conclude by reflecting on dangers of the Eureka Heuristic, including the arising and entrenchment of false beliefs and the vulnerability of insights under psychoactive substances and misinformation.
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Tulver K, Kaup KK, Laukkonen R, Aru J. Restructuring insight: An integrative review of insight in problem-solving, meditation, psychotherapy, delusions and psychedelics. Conscious Cogn 2023; 110:103494. [PMID: 36913839 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2023.103494] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/26/2022] [Revised: 02/03/2023] [Accepted: 02/26/2023] [Indexed: 03/13/2023]
Abstract
Occasionally, a solution or idea arrives as a sudden understanding - an insight. Insight has been considered an "extra" ingredient of creative thinking and problem-solving. Here we propose that insight is central in seemingly distinct areas of research. Drawing on literature from a variety of fields, we show that besides being commonly studied in problem-solving literature, insight is also a core component in psychotherapy and meditation, a key process underlying the emergence of delusions in schizophrenia, and a factor in the therapeutic effects of psychedelics. In each case, we discuss the event of insight and its prerequisites and consequences. We review evidence for the commonalities and differences between the fields and discuss their relevance for capturing the essence of the insight phenomenon. The goal of this integrative review is to bridge the gap between the different views and inspire interdisciplinary research efforts for understanding this central process of human cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kadi Tulver
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Estonia.
| | | | | | - Jaan Aru
- Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Estonia.
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9
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Insight problem solving is not that special, but business is not quite 'as usual': typical versus exceptional problem-solving strategies. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 2023:10.1007/s00426-022-01786-5. [PMID: 36617345 PMCID: PMC10366031 DOI: 10.1007/s00426-022-01786-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/20/2022] [Accepted: 12/22/2022] [Indexed: 01/09/2023]
Abstract
The intriguing phenomenon of insight (also known as the "Aha!" moment) has provoked a long-standing conflict over its cognitive mechanism. The special-process theory posits insight as a unique, unconscious mechanism. Conversely, the business-as-usual theory conceptualizes insight processing as ordinary and similar to non-insight, i.e., analytic, incremental, and attention demanding. To resolve this conflict, participants completed cognitive tests and solved four types of problems: verbal insight, spatial insight, verbal non-insight, and spatial non-insight. These problems were solved under three conditions: silence (control), inner speech suppression (articulatory suppression), and non-verbal attentional demands (spatial tapping). Interestingly, insight problem solving differed from verbal non-insight, but resembled spatial non-insight problem solving. Solving insight and spatial non-insight problems substantially benefitted from spatial and near verbal analogical thinking and convergent thinking, and little from divergent thinking. Both were unaffected by secondary tasks. Analogical thinking was associated more strongly with the generation of new solution procedures than with the retrieval of known procedures from memory, as in verbal non-insight problem solving. Analogical and convergent thinking seem to be key skills for the creation of new solutions, whether or not they are insight based. The results indicate a typical, analytic solution method consistent with the business-as-usual theory. Yet, there is also evidence for an exceptional solving method that includes rare attributes of the insightful process delineated by the special-process theory. Thus, we endorse an unequally integrated assertion that each theory reflects a different mode of thinking, the common versus the uncommon, by which insightful solutions can be produced.
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10
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Ammalainen A, Moroshkina N. Where Does Eureka Come From? The Effect of Unreportable Hints on the Phenomenology of Insight. J Intell 2022; 10:110. [PMID: 36412790 PMCID: PMC9703963 DOI: 10.3390/jintelligence10040110] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/30/2022] [Revised: 11/07/2022] [Accepted: 11/17/2022] [Indexed: 06/24/2024] Open
Abstract
Insight interests researchers given its special cognitive mechanisms and phenomenology (an Aha! experience or Eureka moment). There is a considerable amount of research on the effect of hints on performance in insight problem solving. However, only a few studies address the effect of hints on the subjective experiences of solvers, and the picture their results provide is unclear. We analyze the effect of unreportable true and false hints on different dimensions of the Aha! experience (subjective suddenness, Aha! experience as an effect, and certainty). Using the processing fluency framework, we predict that true hints lead to more insights and stronger Aha! experience and certainty, while false hints lead to the opposite results due to the controlled inhibition of the inappropriate representation. The results showed that false hints decreased the chance of finding a correct solution. The true-hint condition did not lead to more correct solutions but made solutions feel sudden more often than the control condition. The ratings of the Aha! experience and certainty were higher for solutions obtained after true hints than after false hints. We obtained partial support for the effect of unreportable hints on "Eureka!" moments.
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Affiliation(s)
- Artur Ammalainen
- Laboratory for Cognitive Research, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 119571 Moscow, Russia
| | - Nadezhda Moroshkina
- Institute for Cognitive Studies, Saint Petersburg State University, 199034 Saint Petersburg, Russia
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11
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Grimmer HJ, Laukkonen RE, Freydenzon A, von Hippel W, Tangen JM. Thinking style and psychosis proneness do not predict false insights. Conscious Cogn 2022; 104:103384. [PMID: 35933801 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103384] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2022] [Revised: 07/13/2022] [Accepted: 07/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
The FIAT paradigm (Grimmer et al., 2021) is a novel method of eliciting 'Aha' moments for incorrect solutions to anagrams in the laboratory, i.e. false insights. There exist many documented reports of psychotic symptoms accompanying strong feelings of 'Aha!' (Feyaerts, Henriksen, Vanheule, Myin-Germeys, & Sass, 2021; Mishara, 2010; Tulver, Kaup, Laukkonen, & Aru, 2021), suggesting that the newly developed FIAT could reveal whether people who have more false insights are more prone to psychosis and delusional belief. To test this possibility, we recruited 200 participants to take an adapted version of the FIAT and complete measures of thinking style and psychosis proneness. We found no association between experimentally induced false insights and measures of Schizotypy, Need for Cognition, Jumping to Conclusions, Aberrant Salience, Faith in Intuition, or the Cognitive Reflection Task. We conclude that experiencing false insights might not be constrained to any particular type of person, but rather, may arise for anyone under the right circumstances.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | - Anna Freydenzon
- Institute of Molecular Bioscience, The University of Queensland, Australia
| | | | - Jason M Tangen
- School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, Australia
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12
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Zhou L, Yan H, Ren J, Li F, Luo J, Huang F. Cognitive control of invalid predominant ideas in insight-like problem solving. Psychophysiology 2022; 59:e14133. [PMID: 35751854 DOI: 10.1111/psyp.14133] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/02/2021] [Revised: 06/05/2022] [Accepted: 06/11/2022] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
Predominant ordinary ideas are insufficient for solving insight-like problems; they interfere with subordinate original ideas and can produce a mental impasse. However, how people monitor and control invalid predominant ideas remains largely unknown. In the current study, participants were asked to solve a sequence of several similar practice problems that had the same solution to strengthen a predominant idea; the participants were then presented with an insight-like test problem that could not be solved by the predominant idea. The results showed that if the test problem was similar to the practice problems in which the predominant idea could typically be applied, it elicited greater late sustained potential (LSP) over the whole brain but no conflict-related N2 or N400 components, which suggests that the participants did not experience cognitive conflict and continued to verify the predominant but currently invalid idea. When the test problem differed from the practice problems, the items that participants reported trying to solve elicited greater N2-N400 and LSP over the whole brain, which suggests that the participants experienced cognitive conflict and exerted more reactive control over the invalid predominant idea; in contrast, the items that participants reported thinking about how to solve did not evoke greater conflict-related N2-N400 components and evoked even lower LSP, which likely indicates an ineffective state. These findings demonstrate three kinds of cognitive control toward invalid predominant ideas in situations where they are typically and not typically applied and provide empirical evidence of a mental impasse in insight-like problem-solving behaviors.
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Affiliation(s)
- Liyu Zhou
- School of Psychology, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, China
| | - Haiqiong Yan
- School of Psychology, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, China
| | - Jingyuan Ren
- Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Rodboud University Medical Center, Nijmegen, Netherlands
| | - Fuhong Li
- School of Psychology, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, China
| | - Jing Luo
- School of Psychology, Capital Normal University, Beijing, China
| | - Furong Huang
- School of Psychology, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, China
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13
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Moroshkina NV, Savina AI, Ammalainen AV, Gershkovich VA, Zverev IV, Lvova OV. How Difficult Was It? Metacognitive Judgments About Problems and Their Solutions After the Aha Moment. Front Psychol 2022; 13:911904. [PMID: 35814152 PMCID: PMC9258945 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.911904] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2022] [Accepted: 06/01/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
The insight phenomenon is thought to comprise two components: cognitive and affective (the Aha! experience). The exact nature of the Aha! experience remains unclear; however, several explanations have been put forward. Based on the processing fluency account, the source of the Aha! experience is a sudden increase in processing fluency, associated with emerging of a solution. We hypothesized that in a situation which the Aha! experience accompanies the solution in, the problem would be judged as less difficult, regardless of the objective difficulty. We also planned to confirm previously discovered associations between the Aha! experience and accuracy, confidence, and pleasure. To test the proposed hypothesis, during the preliminary stage of the study, we developed a set of 100 remote associate problems in Russian (RAT-RUS) and asked 125 participants to solve problems and indicate the Aha! moment (after solution generation or solution presentation), confidence, difficulty, and likability of each problem. As expected, the Aha! experience often accompanied correct solutions and correlated with confidence judgments. We also found a positive correlation between the Aha! experience and problem likability. As for the main hypothesis, we confirmed that the Aha! experience after the presentation of the solution was associated with a decrease in subjective difficulty. When participants could not solve a problem but experienced the Aha! moment after the solution was presented to them, the problem was perceived as easier than one without the Aha! experience. We didn’t find the same effect for the Aha! after solution generation. Thus, our study partially supports the processing fluency account and demonstrates the association between the Aha! experience and metacognitive judgments about the accuracy and difficulty of problems.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nadezhda V. Moroshkina
- The Department of Psychology, St Petersburg University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
- *Correspondence: Nadezhda V. Moroshkina,
| | - Alina I. Savina
- The Department of Psychology, St Petersburg University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
- Alina I. Savina,
| | - Artur V. Ammalainen
- The Department of Psychology, St Petersburg University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
- Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow, Russia
| | | | - Ilia V. Zverev
- HSE Lyceum, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
| | - Olga V. Lvova
- The Department of Psychology, St Petersburg University, Saint Petersburg, Russia
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14
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Osuna-Mascaró AJ, Auersperg AMI. Current Understanding of the "Insight" Phenomenon Across Disciplines. Front Psychol 2021; 12:791398. [PMID: 34975690 PMCID: PMC8715918 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.791398] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/11/2021] [Accepted: 11/15/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
- Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine, Medical University of Vienna, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
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15
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Aha! under pressure: The Aha! experience is not constrained by cognitive load. Cognition 2021; 219:104946. [PMID: 34891110 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104946] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/18/2021] [Revised: 10/14/2021] [Accepted: 10/23/2021] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
The Aha! moment- the sudden insight sometimes reached when solving a vexing problem- entails a different problem-solving experience than solution retrieval reached by an analytical, multistep strategy (i.e., non-insight). To date, the (un)conscious nature of insight remains debated. We addressed this by studying insight under cognitive load. If insight and non-insight problem solving rely on conscious, effortful processes, they should both be influenced by a concurrent cognitive load. However, if unconscious processes characterize insight, cognitive load might not affect it at all. Using a dual-task paradigm, young, healthy adults (N = 106) solved 70 word puzzles under different cognitive loads. We confirmed that insight solutions were more often correct and received higher solution confidence. Importantly, as cognitive load increased, non-insight solutions became less frequent and required more solution time, whereas insightful ones remained mostly unaffected. This implies that insight problem solving did not compete for limited cognitive resources.
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