The first prior: From co-embodiment to co-homeostasis in early life

Synchrony perception across senses: A systematic review of temporal binding window changes from infancy to adolescence in typical and atypical development

Sensory integration is increasingly acknowledged as being crucial for the development of cognitive and social abilities. However, its developmental trajectory is still little understood. This systematic review delves into the topic by investigating the literature about the developmental changes from infancy through adolescence of the Temporal Binding Window (TBW) - the epoch of time within which sensory inputs are perceived as simultaneous and therefore integrated. Following comprehensive searches across PubMed, Elsevier, and PsycInfo databases, only experimental, behavioral, English-language, peer-reviewed studies on multisensory temporal processing in 0-17-year-olds have been included. Non-behavioral, non-multisensory, and non-human studies have been excluded as those that did not directly focus on the TBW. The selection process was independently performed by two Authors. The 39 selected studies involved 2859 participants in total. Findings indicate a predisposition towards cross-modal asynchrony sensitivity and a composite, still unclear, developmental trajectory, with atypical development associated to increased asynchrony tolerance. These results highlight the need for consistent and thorough research into TBW development to inform potential interventions.

Developmental Roots of Human Self-consciousness

Human consciousness is considered in the perspective of early development. Infants and young children remind us that at its core, the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of identity, in particular a problem of self-identity with others in mind. It is about how we feel and construe ourselves as an entity among other entities. It is about becoming co-conscious: Aware of oneself through the evaluative eyes of others. This development unfolds in the first 18 months of life, following major steps that are described, and arguably considered as a human trademark.

Ketamine reduces the neural distinction between self- and other-produced affective touch: a randomized double-blind placebo-controlled study

A coherent sense of self is crucial for social functioning and mental health. The N-methyl-D-aspartate antagonist ketamine induces short-term dissociative experiences and has therefore been used to model an altered state of self-perception. This randomized double-blind placebo-controlled cross-over study investigated the mechanisms for ketamine's effects on the bodily sense of self in the context of affective touch. Thirty healthy participants (15 females/15 males, age 19-39) received intravenous ketamine or placebo while performing self-touch and receiving touch by someone else during functional MRI - a previously established neural measure of tactile self-other-differentiation. Afterwards, tactile detection thresholds during self- and other-touch were assessed, as well as dissociative states, interoceptive awareness, and social touch attitudes. Compared to placebo, ketamine administration elicited dissociation and reduced neural activity associated with self-other-differentiation in the right temporoparietal cortex, which was most pronounced during other-touch. This reduction correlated with ketamine-induced reductions in interoceptive awareness. The temporoparietal cortex showed higher connectivity to somatosensory cortex and insula during other- compared to self-touch. This difference was augmented by ketamine, and correlated with dissociation strength for somatosensory cortex. These results demonstrate that disrupting the self-experience through ketamine administration affects neural activity associated with self-other-differentiation in a region involved in touch perception and social cognition, especially with regard to social touch by someone else. This process may be driven by ketamine-induced effects on top-down signaling, rendering the processing of predictable self-generated and unpredictable other-generated touch more similar. These findings provide further evidence for the intricate relationship of the bodily self with the tactile sense.

A perspective-based analysis of attachment from prenatal period to second year postnatal life

Attachment is one of the foundational themes in the history of the psychological development of human beings. For this reason, we assume that it must be approached by taking into account multiple scientific perspectives. The present review aims at analyzing the state of the art regarding the genetic, neurobiological and cognitive mechanisms underlying the development of attachment bonding, considering the child as the frame of reference. We hypothesize that attachment may be present in prototypical forms even in the prenatal period, thus our analysis has a temporal origin in the intrauterine period preceding birth. The intrauterine period is assumed to be a period of maximum sensitivity to stimuli and in particular to those coming from a potential primary caregiver: the biological mother. We conclude with a reframing of the state of the art and propose that future research work would benefit from a superordinate model of attachment, capable of containing and regulating all its components and variables.

Updating beliefs about pain following advice: Trustworthiness of social advice predicts pain expectations and experience

Prior expectations influence pain experience. These expectations, in turn, rely on prior pain experience, but they may also be socially influenced. Yet, most research has focused on self rather than social expectations about pain, and hardly any studies examined their combined effects on pain. Here, we adopted a Bayesian learning perspective to investigate how explicitly communicated social expectations ('advice about pain tolerance') affect own pain expectations, and ultimately pain tolerance, under varying conditions of social epistemic uncertainty (trustworthiness of the advice). N = 72 female participants took part in a coldpressor (cold water) task before (self-learning baseline) and after (socially-influenced learning) receiving advice about their likely pain tolerance from a confederate, the trustworthiness of whom was experimentally manipulated. We used path analysis to test the hypothesis that social advice from a highly trustworthy confederate would influence participants' expectations about pain more than advice from a less trustworthy source, and that the degree of this social influence would in turn predict pain tolerance. We further used a simplified, Bayesian learning, computational approach for explicit belief updating to examine the role of latent parameters of precision optimisation in how participants subsequently changed their future pain expectations (prospective posterior beliefs) based on the combined effect of the confederate's advice on their own pain expectations, and their own task experience. Results confirmed that participants adjusted their pain expectations towards the confederate's advice more in the high- vs. low-trustworthiness condition, and this advice taking predicted their pain tolerance. Furthermore, the confederate's trustworthiness influenced how participants weighted the confederate's advice in relation to their own expectations and task experience in forming prospective posterior beliefs. When participants received advice from a less trustworthy confederate, their own sensory experience was weighted more highly than their socially-influenced prior expectations. Thus, explicit social advice appears to impact pain by influencing one's own pain expectations, but low social trustworthiness leads to these expectations becoming more malleable to novel, sensory learning.

Artificial cognition vs. artificial intelligence for next-generation autonomous robotic agents

The trend in industrial/service robotics is to develop robots that can cooperate with people, interacting with them in an autonomous, safe and purposive way. These are the fundamental elements characterizing the fourth and the fifth industrial revolutions (4IR, 5IR): the crucial innovation is the adoption of intelligent technologies that can allow the development of cyber-physical systems, similar if not superior to humans. The common wisdom is that intelligence might be provided by AI (Artificial Intelligence), a claim that is supported more by media coverage and commercial interests than by solid scientific evidence. AI is currently conceived in a quite broad sense, encompassing LLMs and a lot of other things, without any unifying principle, but self-motivating for the success in various areas. The current view of AI robotics mostly follows a purely disembodied approach that is consistent with the old-fashioned, Cartesian mind-body dualism, reflected in the software-hardware distinction inherent to the von Neumann computing architecture. The working hypothesis of this position paper is that the road to the next generation of autonomous robotic agents with cognitive capabilities requires a fully brain-inspired, embodied cognitive approach that avoids the trap of mind-body dualism and aims at the full integration of Bodyware and Cogniware. We name this approach Artificial Cognition (ACo) and ground it in Cognitive Neuroscience. It is specifically focused on proactive knowledge acquisition based on bidirectional human-robot interaction: the practical advantage is to enhance generalization and explainability. Moreover, we believe that a brain-inspired network of interactions is necessary for allowing humans to cooperate with artificial cognitive agents, building a growing level of personal trust and reciprocal accountability: this is clearly missing, although actively sought, in current AI. The ACo approach is a work in progress that can take advantage of a number of research threads, some of them antecedent the early attempts to define AI concepts and methods. In the rest of the paper we will consider some of the building blocks that need to be re-visited in a unitary framework: the principles of developmental robotics, the methods of action representation with prospection capabilities, and the crucial role of social interaction.

Nested Selves: Self-Organization and Shared Markov Blankets in Prenatal Development in Humans

The immune system is a central component of organismic function in humans. This paper addresses self-organization of biological systems in relation to-and nested within-other biological systems in pregnancy. Pregnancy constitutes a fundamental state for human embodiment and a key step in the evolution and conservation of our species. While not all humans can be pregnant, our initial state of emerging and growing within another person's body is universal. Hence, the pregnant state does not concern some individuals but all individuals. Indeed, the hierarchical relationship in pregnancy reflects an even earlier autopoietic process in the embryo by which the number of individuals in a single blastoderm is dynamically determined by cell- interactions. The relationship and the interactions between the two self-organizing systems during pregnancy may play a pivotal role in understanding the nature of biological self-organization per se in humans. Specifically, we consider the role of the immune system in biological self-organization in addition to neural/brain systems that furnish us with a sense of self. We examine the complex case of pregnancy, whereby two immune systems need to negotiate the exchange of resources and information in order to maintain viable self-regulation of nested systems. We conclude with a proposal for the mechanisms-that scaffold the complex relationship between two self-organising systems in pregnancy-through the lens of the Active Inference, with a focus on shared Markov blankets.

Minimal self-consciousness and the flying man argument

The concept of minimal self-consciousness or "minimal self" is equivalent to a very basic form of first-person, pre-reflective self-awareness, which includes bodily self-awareness, and is related to phenomenal experience (qualia) and sentience. This phenomenological concept plays a role in characterizations of the senses of ownership and agency; in recent debates about Buddhist conceptions of the no-self; in explanations of illusions such as the Rubber Hand Illusion; as well as in characterizations of schizophrenia as a self-disorder. Despite its relevance to these complex investigations, a number of theorists have recently pointed out that the concept is not well defined. In order to provide some clarification about the notion of minimal self and how it relates to bodily and sensory processes this paper reaches back to the ideas expressed in a famous medieval thought experiment proposed in the 11th century: Avicenna's Flying Man argument. The paper then provides a review of some of the contemporary debates about the minimal self, pointing especially to questions about the role of bodily and social processes.

Modeling and controlling the body in maladaptive ways: an active inference perspective on non-suicidal self-injury behaviors

A significant number of persons engage in paradoxical behaviors, such as extreme food restriction (up to starvation) and non-suicidal self-injuries, especially during periods of rapid changes, such as adolescence. Here, we contextualize these and related paradoxical behavior within an active inference view of brain functions, which assumes that the brain forms predictive models of bodily variables, emotional experiences, and the embodied self and continuously strives to reduce the uncertainty of such models. We propose that not only in conditions of excessive or prolonged uncertainty, such as in clinical conditions, but also during pivotal periods of developmental transition, paradoxical behaviors might emerge as maladaptive strategies to reduce uncertainty-by "acting on the body"- soliciting salient perceptual and interoceptive sensations, such as pain or excessive levels of hunger. Although such strategies are maladaptive and run against our basic homeostatic imperatives, they might be functional not only to provide some short-term reward (e.g. relief from emotional distress)-as previously proposed-but also to reduce uncertainty and possibly to restore a coherent model of one's bodily experience and the self, affording greater confidence in who we are and what course of actions we should pursue.

The self and our perception of its synchrony - Beyond internal and external cognition

The self is the core of our mental life which connects one's inner mental life with the external perception. Since synchrony is a key feature of the biological world and its various species, what role does it play for humans? We conducted a large-scale psychological study (n = 1072) combining newly developed visual analogue scales (VAS) for the perception of synchrony and internal and external cognition complemented by several psychological questionnaires. Overall, our findings showed close connection of the perception of synchrony of the self with both internal (i.e., body and cognition) and external (i.e., others, environment/nature) synchrony being associated positively with adaptive and negatively with maladaptive traits of self. Moreover, we have demonstrated how external (i.e., life events like the COVID-19 pandemic) variables modulate the perception of the self's internal-external synchrony. These findings suggest how synchrony with self plays a central role during times of uncertainty.

The osteopath-parent-child triad in osteopathic care in the first 2 years of life: a qualitative study

Background

Enactivism and active inference are two important concepts in the field of osteopathy. While enactivism emphasizes the role of the body and the environment in shaping our experiences and understanding of the world, active inference emphasizes the role of action and perception in shaping our experiences and understanding of the world. Together, these frameworks provide a unique perspective on the practice of osteopathy, and how it can be used to facilitate positive change in patients. Since the neonatal period is a crucial time for development, osteopaths should aim to create a therapeutic relationship. Arguably, through participatory sense-making, osteopaths can help the baby build a generative model (with positive priors) to deal with stress and needs throughout their life.

Aim

Since the literature considers that interactions with the environment, which enact the patients' experiences, depending on contextual factors and communication between patient and caregiver, this research explored whether there is a correspondence between the indications in the literature and clinical practice in the management of the mother/parent-child dyad during osteopathic care on children aged 0 to 2 years old.

Methods

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of nine osteopaths with experience in the field of pediatrics. Interviews were transcribed verbatim, and constructivist grounded theory was used to conceptualize, collect and analyze data. Codes and categories were actively constructed through an interpretive/constructionist paradigm.

Results

The core category was the idea of the pediatric osteopath as a support for the family, not only for the child. Four additional categories were identified: (1) Preparing a safe environment for both children and parents, (2) Communication, (3) Attachment and synchrony, and (4) Synchronization.

Conclusion

Through participatory sense-making, osteopaths manage contextual factors to establish an effective therapeutic alliance through the osteopath-parent-child triad to facilitate the construction of the child's internal generative model to promote healthy development. The therapeutic encounter is considered an encounter between embodied subjects, occurring within a field of affordances (ecological niche) that allows the interlocutors to actively participate in creating new meanings through interpersonal synchronization. Participatory sense-making and the establishment of a therapeutic alliance through the osteopath-parent-child triad are crucial to promote healthy development in the child.

Multisensory decisions from self to world

Classic Bayesian models of perceptual inference describe how an ideal observer would integrate 'unisensory' measurements (multisensory integration) and attribute sensory signals to their origin(s) (causal inference). However, in the brain, sensory signals are always received in the context of a multisensory bodily state-namely, in combination with other senses. Moreover, sensory signals from both interoceptive sensing of one's own body and exteroceptive sensing of the world are highly interdependent and never occur in isolation. Thus, the observer must fundamentally determine whether each sensory observation is from an external (versus internal, self-generated) source to even be considered for integration. Critically, solving this primary causal inference problem requires knowledge of multisensory and sensorimotor dependencies. Thus, multisensory processing is needed to separate sensory signals. These multisensory processes enable us to simultaneously form a sense of self and form distinct perceptual decisions about the external world. In this opinion paper, we review and discuss the similarities and distinctions between multisensory decisions underlying the sense of self and those directed at acquiring information about the world. We call attention to the fact that heterogeneous multisensory processes take place all along the neural hierarchy (even in forming 'unisensory' observations) and argue that more integration of these aspects, in theory and experiment, is required to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of multisensory brain function. This article is part of the theme issue 'Decision and control processes in multisensory perception'.

Body as First Teacher: The Role of Rhythmic Visceral Dynamics in Early Cognitive Development

Embodied cognition-the idea that mental states and processes should be understood in relation to one's bodily constitution and interactions with the world-remains a controversial topic within cognitive science. Recently, however, increasing interest in predictive processing theories among proponents and critics of embodiment alike has raised hopes of a reconciliation. This article sets out to appraise the unificatory potential of predictive processing, focusing in particular on embodied formulations of active inference. Our analysis suggests that most active-inference accounts invoke weak, potentially trivial conceptions of embodiment; those making stronger claims do so independently of the theoretical commitments of the active-inference framework. We argue that a more compelling version of embodied active inference can be motivated by adopting a diachronic perspective on the way rhythmic physiological activity shapes neural development in utero. According to this visceral afferent training hypothesis, early-emerging physiological processes are essential not only for supporting the biophysical development of neural structures but also for configuring the cognitive architecture those structures entail. Focusing in particular on the cardiovascular system, we propose three candidate mechanisms through which visceral afferent training might operate: (a) activity-dependent neuronal development, (b) periodic signal modeling, and (c) oscillatory network coordination.

The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in human organisms

Significant efforts have been made in the past decades to understand how mental and cognitive processes are underpinned by neural mechanisms in the brain. This paper argues that a promising way forward in understanding the nature of human cognition is to zoom out from the prevailing picture focusing on its neural basis. It considers instead how neurons work in tandem with other type of cells (e.g., immune) to subserve biological self-organization and adaptive behavior of the human organism as a whole. We focus specifically on the immune cellular processing as key actor in complementing neuronal processing in achieving successful self-organization and adaptation of the human body in an ever-changing environment. We overview theoretical work and empirical evidence on "basal cognition" challenging the idea that only the neuronal cells in the brain have the exclusive ability to "learn" or "cognize." The focus on cellular rather than neural, brain processing underscores the idea that flexible responses to fluctuations in the environment require a carefully crafted orchestration of multiple cellular and bodily systems at multiple organizational levels of the biological organism. Hence cognition can be seen as a multiscale web of dynamic information processing distributed across a vast array of complex cellular (e.g., neuronal, immune, and others) and network systems, operating across the entire body, and not just in the brain. Ultimately, this paper builds up toward the radical claim that cognition should not be confined to one system alone, namely, the neural system in the brain, no matter how sophisticated the latter notoriously is.

Modulations of one's sense of agency during human-machine interactions: A behavioural study using a full humanoid robot

Although previous investigations reported a reduced sense of agency when individuals act with traditional machines, little is known about the mechanisms underpinning interactions with human-like automata. The aim of this study was twofold: (1) to investigate the effect of the machine's physical appearance on the individuals' sense of agency and (2) to explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individuals' sense of agency when they are engaged in a joint task. Twenty-eight participants performed a joint Simon task together with another human or an automated artificial system as a co-agent. The physical appearance of the automated artificial system was manipulated so that participants could cooperate either with a servomotor or a full humanoid robot during the joint task. Both participants' response times and temporal estimations of action-output delays (i.e., an implicit measure of agency) were collected. Results showed that participants' sense of agency for self- and other-generated actions sharply declined during interactions with the servomotor compared with the human-human interactions. Interestingly, participants' sense of agency for self- and other-generated actions was reinforced when participants interacted with the humanoid robot compared with the servomotor. These results are discussed further.

Disembodiment and Language in Schizophrenia: An Integrated Psychopathological and Evolutionary Perspective

Different hypotheses have flourished to explain the evolutionary paradox of schizophrenia. In this contribution, we sought to illustrate how, in the schizophrenia spectrum, the concept of embodiment may underpin the phylogenetic and developmental pathways linking sensorimotor processes, the origin of human language, and the construction of a basic sense of the self. In particular, according to an embodied model of language, we suggest that the reuse of basic sensorimotor loops for language, while enabling the development of fully symbolic thought, has pushed the human brain close to the threshold of a severe disruption of self-embodiment processes, which are at the core of schizophrenia psychopathology. We adopted an inter-disciplinary approach (psychopathology, neuroscience, developmental biology) within an evolutionary framework, to gain an integrated, multi-perspectival model on the origin of schizophrenia vulnerability. A maladaptive over-expression of evolutionary-developmental trajectories toward language at the expense of embodiment processes would have led to the evolutionary "trade-off" of a hyper-symbolic activity to the detriment of a disembodied self. Therefore, schizophrenia psychopathology might be the cost of long-term co-evolutive interactions between brain and language.

The brain-body disconnect: A somatic sensory basis for trauma-related disorders

Although the manifestation of trauma in the body is a phenomenon well-endorsed by clinicians and traumatized individuals, the neurobiological underpinnings of this manifestation remain unclear. The notion of somatic sensory processing, which encompasses vestibular and somatosensory processing and relates to the sensory systems concerned with how the physical body exists in and relates to physical space, is introduced as a major contributor to overall regulatory, social-emotional, and self-referential functioning. From a phylogenetically and ontogenetically informed perspective, trauma-related symptomology is conceptualized to be grounded in brainstem-level somatic sensory processing dysfunction and its cascading influences on physiological arousal modulation, affect regulation, and higher-order capacities. Lastly, we introduce a novel hierarchical model bridging somatic sensory processes with limbic and neocortical mechanisms regulating an individual's emotional experience and sense of a relational, agentive self. This model provides a working framework for the neurobiologically informed assessment and treatment of trauma-related conditions from a somatic sensory processing perspective.

Making life and mind as clear as possible, but not clearer

Neuroscience needs theory. Ideas without data are blind, and yet mechanisms without concepts are empty. Friston's free energy principle paradigmatically illustrates the power and pitfalls of current theoretical biology. Mighty metaphors, turned into mathematical models, can become mindless metaphysics. Then, seeking to understand everything in principle, we may explain nothing in practice. Life can't live in a map.

An integrative perspective on the role of touch in the development of intersubjectivity

Touch concerns a fundamental component of sociality. In this review, we examine the hypothesis that somatomotor development constitutes a crucial psychophysiological element in the ontogeny of intersubjectivity. An interdisciplinary perspective is provided on how the communication channel of touch contributes to the sense of self and extends to the social self. During gestation, the transformation of random movements into organized sequences of actions with sensory consequences parallels the development of the brain's functional architecture. Brain subsystems shaped by the coordinated activity of somatomotor circuits to support these first body-environment interactions are the first brain functional arrangements to develop. We propose that tactile self-referring behaviour during gestation constitutes a prototypic mode of interpersonal exchange that supports the subsequent development of intersubjective exchange. The reviewed research suggests that touch constitutes a pivotal bodily experience that in early stages builds and later filters self-other interactions. This view is corroborated by the fact that aberrant social-affective touch experiences appear fundamentally associated with attachment anomalies, interpersonal trauma, and personality disorders. Given the centrality of touch for the development of intersubjectivity and for psychopathological conditions in the social domain, dedicated research is urged to elucidate the role of touch in the evolution of subjective self-other coding.

I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder

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This paper examines potential mechanisms behind atypical sense of self and agency in Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD).

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Using Active Inference, we argue that aberrant somatosensory attenuation and precision weighting underlies DPD.

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Failures of somatosensory attenuation may disrupt the sense of agency and control over one’s perceptions and actions.

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In DPD, individuals may believe ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions.

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Unlike psychosis however, in DPD the individual maintains the full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self).

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘other agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Synchrony

Recognizing and aligning individuals' unique adaptive beliefs or "priors" through cooperative communication is critical to establishing a therapeutic relationship and alliance. Using active inference, we present an empirical integrative account of the biobehavioral mechanisms that underwrite therapeutic relationships. A significant mode of establishing cooperative alliances-and potential synchrony relationships-is through ostensive cues generated by repetitive coupling during dynamic touch. Established models speak to the unique role of affectionate touch in developing communication, interpersonal interactions, and a wide variety of therapeutic benefits for patients of all ages; both neurophysiologically and behaviorally. The purpose of this article is to argue for the importance of therapeutic touch in establishing a therapeutic alliance and, ultimately, synchrony between practitioner and patient. We briefly overview the importance and role of therapeutic alliance in prosocial and clinical interactions. We then discuss how cooperative communication and mental state alignment-in intentional communication-are accomplished using active inference. We argue that alignment through active inference facilitates synchrony and communication. The ensuing account is extended to include the role of (C-) tactile afferents in realizing the beneficial effect of therapeutic synchrony. We conclude by proposing a method for synchronizing the effects of touch using the concept of active inference.

Affective regulation through touch: homeostatic and allostatic mechanisms

We focus on social touch as a paradigmatic case of the embodied, cognitive, and metacognitive processes involved in social, affective regulation. Social touch appears to contribute three interrelated but distinct functions to affective regulation. First, it regulates affects by fulfilling embodied predictions about social proximity and attachment. Second, caregiving touch, such as warming an infant, regulates affect by socially enacting homeostatic control and co-regulation of physiological states. Third, affective touch such as gentle stroking or tickling regulates affect by allostatic regulation of the salience and epistemic gain of particular experiences in given contexts and timescales. These three functions of affective touch are most likely mediated, at least partly, by different neurobiological processes, including convergent hedonic, dopaminergic and analgesic, opioidergic pathways for the attachment function, 'calming' autonomic and endocrine pathways for the homeostatic function, while the allostatic function may be mediated by oxytocin release and related 'salience' neuromodulators and circuits.

Back to square one: the bodily roots of conscious experiences in early life

Most theoretical and empirical discussions about the nature of consciousness are typically couched in a way that endorses a tacit adult-centric and vision-based perspective. This paper defends the idea that consciousness science may be put on a fruitful track for its next phase by examining the nature of subjective experiences through a bottom-up developmental lens. We draw attention to the intrinsic link between consciousness, experiences and experiencing subjects, which are first and foremost embodied and situated organisms essentially concerned with self-preservation within a precarious environment. Our paper suggests that in order to understand what consciousness 'is', one should first tackle the fundamental question: how do embodied experiences 'arise' from square one? We then highlight one key yet overlooked aspect of human consciousness studies, namely that the earliest and closest environment of an embodied experiencing subject is the body of another human experiencing subject. We present evidence speaking in favour of fairly sophisticated forms of early sensorimotor integration of bodily signals and self-generated actions already being established in utero. We conclude that these primitive and fundamentally relational and co-embodied roots of our early experiences may have a crucial impact on the way human beings consciously experience the self, body and the world across their lifespan.

An Embodied Cognition Perspective on the Role of Interoception in the Development of the Minimal Self

Interoception is an often neglected but crucial aspect of the human minimal self. In this perspective, we extend the embodiment account of interoceptive inference to explain the development of the minimal self in humans. To do so, we first provide a comparative overview of the central accounts addressing the link between interoception and the minimal self. Grounding our arguments on the embodiment framework, we propose a bidirectional relationship between motor and interoceptive states, which jointly contribute to the development of the minimal self. We present empirical findings on interoception in development and discuss the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self. Moreover, we make theoretical predictions that can be tested in future experiments. Our goal is to provide a comprehensive view on the mechanisms underlying the minimal self by explaining the role of interoception in the development of the minimal self.

The Radically Embodied Conscious Cybernetic Bayesian Brain: From Free Energy to Free Will and Back Again

Drawing from both enactivist and cognitivist perspectives on mind, I propose that explaining teleological phenomena may require reappraising both "Cartesian theaters" and mental homunculi in terms of embodied self-models (ESMs), understood as body maps with agentic properties, functioning as predictive-memory systems and cybernetic controllers. Quasi-homuncular ESMs are suggested to constitute a major organizing principle for neural architectures due to their initial and ongoing significance for solutions to inference problems in cognitive (and affective) development. Embodied experiences provide foundational lessons in learning curriculums in which agents explore increasingly challenging problem spaces, so answering an unresolved question in Bayesian cognitive science: what are biologically plausible mechanisms for equipping learners with sufficiently powerful inductive biases to adequately constrain inference spaces? Drawing on models from neurophysiology, psychology, and developmental robotics, I describe how embodiment provides fundamental sources of empirical priors (as reliably learnable posterior expectations). If ESMs play this kind of foundational role in cognitive development, then bidirectional linkages will be found between all sensory modalities and frontal-parietal control hierarchies, so infusing all senses with somatic-motoric properties, thereby structuring all perception by relevant affordances, so solving frame problems for embodied agents. Drawing upon the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, I describe a particular mechanism for intentional action selection via consciously imagined (and explicitly represented) goal realization, where contrasts between desired and present states influence ongoing policy selection via predictive coding mechanisms and backward-chained imaginings (as self-realizing predictions). This embodied developmental legacy suggests a mechanism by which imaginings can be intentionally shaped by (internalized) partially-expressed motor acts, so providing means of agentic control for attention, working memory, imagination, and behavior. I further describe the nature(s) of mental causation and self-control, and also provide an account of readiness potentials in Libet paradigms wherein conscious intentions shape causal streams leading to enaction. Finally, I provide neurophenomenological handlings of prototypical qualia including pleasure, pain, and desire in terms of self-annihilating free energy gradients via quasi-synesthetic interoceptive active inference. In brief, this manuscript is intended to illustrate how radically embodied minds may create foundations for intelligence (as capacity for learning and inference), consciousness (as somatically-grounded self-world modeling), and will (as deployment of predictive models for enacting valued goals).

Whatever Next and Close to My Self-The Transparent Senses and the "Second Skin": Implications for the Case of Depersonalization

In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not only the temporal dimension (i.e., what is perceived now) but also the spatial dimension (i.e., what is perceived here or next-to-my-body). In this paper, we propose to focus on perceptual experiences that happen “next,” i.e., close-to-my-body. This is because perceptual processing of proximal sensory inputs has a key impact on the organism's survival. Specifically, we focus on tactile experiences mediated by the skin and what we will call the “extended skin” or “second skin,” that is, immediate objects/materials that envelop closely to our skin, namely, clothes. We propose that the skin and tactile experiences are not a mere border separating the self and world. Rather, they simultaneously and inherently distinguish and connect the bodily self to its environment. Hence, these proximal and pervasive tactile experiences can be viewed as a “transparent bridge” intrinsically relating and facilitating exchanges between the self and the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of this observation for the case of Depersonalization Disorder, a condition that makes people feel estranged and detached from their self, body, and the world.