Paranoia and conspiracy thinking

Conspiracy beliefs and perceptual inference in times of political uncertainty

Sociopolitical crises causing uncertainty have accumulated in recent years, providing fertile ground for the emergence of conspiracy ideations. Computational models constitute valuable tools for understanding the mechanisms at play in the formation and rigidification of these unshakeable beliefs. Here, the Circular Inference model was used to capture associations between changes in perceptual inference and the dynamics of conspiracy ideations in times of uncertainty. A bistable perception task and conspiracy belief assessment focused on major sociopolitical events were administered to large populations from three polarized countries. We show that when uncertainty peaks, an overweighting of sensory information is associated with conspiracy ideations. Progressively, this exploration strategy gives way to an exploitation strategy in which increased adherence to conspiracy theories is associated with the amplification of prior information. Overall, the Circular Inference model sheds new light on the possible mechanisms underlying the progressive strengthening of conspiracy theories when individuals face highly uncertain situations.

The effects of paranoia and dopamine on perception of cohesion and conspiracy: a pre-registered, double-blind, placebo-controlled experiment

Paranoia is a common symptom of psychotic disorders but is also present on a spectrum of severity in the general population. Although paranoia is associated with an increased tendency to perceive cohesion and conspiracy within groups, the mechanistic basis of this variation remains unclear. One potential avenue involves the brain's dopaminergic system, which is known to be altered in psychosis. In this study, we used large-N online samples to establish the association between trait paranoia and perceptions of cohesion and conspiracy. We further evaluated the role of dopamine on perceptions of cohesion and conspiracy using a double-blind, placebo-controlled laboratory experiment where participants received levodopa or a placebo control. Our results were mixed: group perceptions and perceptions of cohesion were higher among more paranoid individuals but were not altered under dopamine administration. We outline the potential reasons for these discrepancies and the broader implications for understanding paranoia in terms of dopamine dysregulation.

Differentiating paranoia and conspiracy mentality using a network approach

Although mostly considered distinct, conspiracy mentality and paranoia share conceptual similarities (e.g., persecutory content, resistance to disconfirming evidence). Using self-report data from a large and multinational online sample (N = 2510; from the UK, the US, Hong Kong, Germany, and Australia), we examined whether paranoia and conspiracy mentality represent distinct latent constructs in exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Utilising network analysis, we then explored common and unique correlates of paranoia and conspiracy mentality while accounting for their shared variance. Across sites, paranoia and conspiracy mentality presented distinct, yet weakly correlated (r = 0.26), constructs. Both were associated with past traumatic experiences, holding negative beliefs about the self and other people, sleep problems, and a tendency to worry. However, paranoia was related to increased negative affect (i.e., anxiety) and decreased social support, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for conspiracy mentality (i.e., decreased anxiety and depression, increased social support). Paranoia and conspiracy mentality are related but not the same constructs. Their similar and distinct correlates point to common and unique risk factors and underlying mechanisms.

Conspiracy mentality, subclinical paranoia, and political conservatism are associated with perceived status threat

Status threat (i.e., concern that one's dominant social group will be undermined by outsiders) is a significant factor in current United States politics. While demographic factors such as race (e.g., Whiteness) and political affiliation (e.g., conservatism) tend to be associated with heightened levels of status threat, its psychological facets have yet to be fully characterized. Informed by a "paranoid" model of American politics, we explored a suite of possible psychological and demographic associates of perceived status threat, including race/ethnicity, political conservatism, analytic thinking, magical ideation, subclinical paranoia, and conspiracy mentality. In a small, quota sample drawn from the United States (N = 300), we found that conspiracy mentality, subclinical paranoia, conservatism, and age were each positively (and uniquely) associated with status threat. In addition to replicating past work linking conservatism to status threat, this study identifies subclinical paranoia and conspiracy mentality as novel psychological associates of status threat. These findings pave the way for future research regarding how and why status threat concerns may become exaggerated in certain individuals, possibly to the detriment of personal and societal wellbeing.

[Anton Bruckner: the Linz cathedral organist, university teacher, symphonic musician : Could modern intensive care medicine have helped him and his illnesses?]

BACKGROUND

Anton Bruckner was a famous cathedral organist, university teacher, and symphonic composer, but his life, illnesses, death and dying are little or not known to many.

OBJECTIVES

Which illnesses determined Bruckner's life and did lifestyle and illnesses influence his compositional work? From today's perspective, could modern intensive care medicine have helped him?

MATERIALS AND METHODS

A detailed analysis of Bruckner's diseases was carried out using the scientific databases PubMed® and MEDLINE®. All published articles were evaluated and examined in detail. In addition, data from a concert tour of the author to Linz and the St. Florian Abbey Basilica were collected.

RESULTS

Anton Bruckner was born on 4 September 1824 in Ansfelden, Austria. As a child he received piano and organ lessons. After his father's death, he devoted himself to playing the organ and became in 1855 cathedral organist in Linz. His further career took him to Vienna, where he became a professor at the conservatory and turned to composition. His symphonies, his masses, and his Te Deum are his most famous works. During the first 40 years of his life, Bruckner suffered from psychopathological illnesses, including depression, delusions of persecution, and neuroses. Later, he suffered from chronic heart failure with recurrent right and left heart decompensation up to the development of cardiac cachexia, possibly caused by dilated cardiomyopathy due to alcohol toxicity. He died on 11 October 1896 in Vienna.

CONCLUSION

Bruckners life was marked by a wide variety of illnesses. His penchant for death and the dead was also striking. Modern medicine would probably have improved his quality of life through consequent heart failure therapy; an implantable automatic defibrillator with resynchronization therapy would probably have prolonged his life.

Assumed shared belief about conspiracy theories in social networks protects paranoid individuals against distress

Paranoia is the belief that others intend you harm. It is related to conspiracy theories, wherein those others represent an organized faction, coordinating the harm against self and others, and violating societal norms. Current psychological studies of paranoid conspiracy theorizing focus either on the individual or their broader social network. Likewise, theories of belief formation and updating often contain individual level processes as well as broader interpersonal and organizational factors. Here we examine paranoia and conspiracy theorizing in terms of individual behavioral predictors (performance on a probabilistic reversal learning task which assays belief updating) as well as social sensing: we ask participants to report the features of their social network, including whether their friends and acquaintances share their paranoid conspiratorial beliefs. We find that people who believe paranoid conspiracy theories expect more volatility during the task. They also assume that members of their social network share their paranoid beliefs. Critically, those participants with larger social networks and greater assumed shared belief tend to harbor their conspiratorial beliefs with less emotional distress and expect less volatility in the task. This is evidence that, like political and religious beliefs, conspiracy theories may flourish under a sacred canopy of belief consensus. These data suggest that friends and acquaintances may serve as sources of credulity and moving between them may sustain conspiracy beliefs when there is detraction. This hybrid individual/social account may shed light on clinical paranoia and persecutory delusion, wherein disability is defined normatively, and social supports are fewer.

Paranoid beliefs and conspiracy mentality are associated with different forms of mistrust: A three-nation study

Paranoia and conspiracy are terms typically used interchangeably. However, although the underlying content of these types of beliefs might be similar (e.g., seeing others as powerful and threatening), recent research suggests that these constructs differ in important ways. One important feature shared by both constructs is excessive mistrust but this aspect might play different roles in each belief system. In this study we explored the strength of associations of different trust predictors (i.e., trust in institutions, trust in sources of information, perceptual trust, and interpersonal trust) between conspiracy mentality and paranoid beliefs. We tested this association in a large representative multinational sample (United Kingdom n = 2025; Spain n = 1951; and Ireland n = 1041). Confirmatory factor analysis supported a two-factor model of conspiracy and paranoid beliefs in each nation sample. Path and equality of constraints analysis revealed that paranoia was more strongly associated with perceptual mistrust (bias towards mistrusting unfamiliar faces) whereas conspiracy was more strongly associated with mistrust in political institutions. Although interpersonal mistrust and trust in social sources of information were associated significantly with conspiracy their association with paranoid beliefs was stronger. These findings clarify the role of different trust processes in both belief systems. Limitations of this study are discussed.