Children’s skepticism: Developmental and individual differences in children’s ability to detect and explain distorted claims

School-age children are more skeptical of inaccurate robots than adults

We expect children to learn new words, skills, and ideas from various technologies. When learning from humans, children prefer people who are reliable and trustworthy, yet children also forgive people's occasional mistakes. Are the dynamics of children learning from technologies, which can also be unreliable, similar to learning from humans? We tackle this question by focusing on early childhood, an age at which children are expected to master foundational academic skills. In this project, 168 4-7-year-old children (Study 1) and 168 adults (Study 2) played a word-guessing game with either a human or robot. The partner first gave a sequence of correct answers, but then followed this with a sequence of wrong answers, with a reaction following each one. Reactions varied by condition, either expressing an accident, an accident marked with an apology, or an unhelpful intention. We found that older children were less trusting than both younger children and adults and were even more skeptical after errors. Trust decreased most rapidly when errors were intentional, but only children (and especially older children) outright rejected help from intentionally unhelpful partners. As an exception to this general trend, older children maintained their trust for longer when a robot (but not a human) apologized for its mistake. Our work suggests that educational technology design cannot be one size fits all but rather must account for developmental changes in children's learning goals.

Detecting lies through others' eyes: Children use perceptual access cues to evaluate listeners' beliefs about informants' deception

Children are often third-party observers of conversations between informants and receivers. Although 5- and 6-year-olds can identify and reject informants' false testimony, it remains unclear whether they expect others to do the same. Accurately assessing others' impressions of informants and their testimony in a conversational setting is essential for children's navigation of the social world. Using a novel second-order lie detection task, the current study examined whether 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 74; Mage = 69 months) take receivers' epistemic states into account when predicting whether a receiver would think an informant is truthful or deceptive. We pitted children's firsthand observations of reality against informants' false testimony while manipulating receivers' perceptual access to a sticker-hiding event. Results showed that when the receiver had perceptual access and was knowledgeable, children predicted that the receiver would think the informant is lying. Critically, when the receiver lacked perceptual access and was ignorant, children were significantly more likely to predict that the receiver would think the informant is telling the truth. Second-order theory of mind and executive function strengthened this effect. Findings are interpreted using a dual-process framework and provide new insights into children's understanding of others' selective trust and susceptibility to deception.

Evaluations of epistemic and practical reasons for belief in a predominantly White U.S. sample of preschoolers

Parents and educators commonly seek to influence children's behavior by providing them with practical incentives, but how should we understand the influence of such incentives on children's beliefs? Are children capable of distinguishing between speech acts that provide practical reasons for believing, such as requests and offers, from speech acts that provide straightforward epistemic reasons, such as simple acts of telling? To investigate these questions, we randomly assigned 3- to 6-year-old children (N = 97) to one of two conditions (Request or Offer) in which two speakers each commented on a series of four exotic animals. In each condition, an agent who stated what an object was called with a simple telling ("This is a tanzer") was contrasted with an agent who made either a doxastic request ("I want you to think that this is a tanzer") or a doxastic offer ("If you think that this is a tanzer, I'll let you play with this new toy"). We then measured children's endorsement of and semantic memory for the claims as well as their knowledge attributions and resource allocation decisions. Our results suggest that children appreciate the epistemic reasons inherent in acts of telling when contrasted with doxastic requests, as evidenced by their general preference to learn from, attribute knowledge to, and share with the teller in the Request condition. When tellings were contrasted with doxastic offers, children were less systematic in their preferences. We discuss various interpretations of this finding and offer suggestions for future research.

The better to fool you with: Deception and self-deception

Deception is used by plants, animals, and humans to increase their fitness by persuading others of false beliefs that benefit the self, thereby creating evolutionary pressure to detect deception and avoid providing such unearned benefits to others. Self-deception can disrupt detection efforts by eliminating cognitive load and idiosyncratic deceptive cues, raising the possibility that persuading others of a false belief might be more achievable after first persuading oneself. If people self-deceive in service of their persuasive goals, self-deception should emerge whenever persuasion is paramount and hence should be evident in information sharing, generalized beliefs about the self, and intergroup relations. The mechanism, costs, and benefits of self-deceptive biases are explored from this evolutionary perspective.

Abusive advertising of food and drink products on Brazilian television

In Brazil, any advertising strategies that take advantage of the child's judgment or induce consumers to make harmful health choices are considered abusive. However, the efficacy of restrictions on their use on television (TV) food advertising remains poorly understood. This study analysed the extent and nature of abusive techniques according to national regulations and patterns in their use in food-related ads. Cross-sectional studyrecorded the programming of the three most popular TV channels (6 am-12 am), during eight non-consecutive days, in April 2018. Data collection was based on the INFORMAS protocol and two national regulations. Descriptive analyses were used to describe the types of food ads and abusive techniques used in ultra-processed products (UPP) ads. Principal component analysis was applied to identify patterns of abusive marketing techniques and to relate them to specific food groups. More than 90% of food ads included at least one UPP. Overall, 10.1% of UPP ads targeted children and 57.7% used some kind of abusive technique directed to children and adolescents. Most ads contained messages inducing harmful health choices did not present adequate and clear information about the product and contained more than one type of abusive technique. Four out of five patterns in the use of abusive techniques in UPP ads were specifically directed to children, and fast-food meals were associated with three out of five patterns. The high abusiveness of food advertising in UPP ads should be considered a public health concern given their impact on children's food choices and health.

Specifying links between infants' theory of mind, associative learning, and selective trust

The psychological mechanisms underlying infants' selective social learning are currently a subject of controversy. The main goal of the present study was to contribute data to this debate by investigating whether domain-specific or domain-general abilities guide infants' selectivity. Eighteen-month-olds observed a reliable and an unreliable speaker, and then completed a forced-choice word learning paradigm, two theory of mind tasks, and an associative learning task. Results revealed that infants showed sensitivity to the verbal competence of the speaker. Additionally, infants with superior knowledge inference abilities were less likely to learn from the unreliable speaker. No link was observed between selective social learning and associative learning skills. These results replicate and extend previous findings demonstrating that socio-cognitive abilities are linked to infants' selective social learning.

Interpretive theory of mind and empathic prosocial moral reasoning

Theory of mind (ToM) is seen as fundamental in development of social understanding. The study proposes that interpretive theory of mind (iToM), which follows ToM attainment, underlies important shifts towards mature social understanding. With ToM found to predict the needs orientation in prosocial moral reasoning (PMR), we hypothesized that iToM, unlike ToM, would account for PMR orientations requiring empathic reasoning. Those with iToM recognize the role of subjective processes, such as interpretation, in knowing. They can invoke others' subjective processes, not just their physical perspectives, in explaining others' decisions. A study with 225 7- to 11-year-old children (M_age  = 9.04, SD = 0.91) found that iToM, but not ToM, predicted empathic and internalized values PMR orientations when controlling for age, emotion understanding and inhibitory control. These findings show that iToM attainment plays a unique role in developing social understanding such as reflected in empathic reasoning-based PMR orientations.

Infants' Ability to Detect Emotional Incongruency: Deep or Shallow?

Infants can detect individuals who demonstrate emotions that are incongruent with an event and are less likely to trust them. However, the nature of the mechanisms underlying this selectivity is currently subject to controversy. The objective of this study was to examine whether infants' socio-cognitive and associative learning skills are linked to their selective trust. A total of 102 14-month-olds were exposed to a person who demonstrated congruent or incongruent emotional referencing (e.g., happy when looking inside an empty box), and were tested on their willingness to follow the emoter's gaze. Knowledge inference and associative learning tasks were also administered. It was hypothesized that infants would be less likely to trust the incongruent emoter and that this selectivity would be related to their associative learning skills, and not their socio-cognitive skills. The results revealed that infants were not only able to detect the incongruent emoter, but were subsequently less likely to follow her gaze toward an object invisible to them. More importantly, infants who demonstrated superior performance on the knowledge inference task, but not the associative learning task, were better able to detect the person's emotional incongruency. These findings provide additional support for the rich interpretation of infants' selective trust.

Trait or testimony? Children's preferences for positive informants

Research indicates that children often show a positivity bias, or a tendency to favor positive information over negative information, in assessments of informant credibility in social and nonsocial situations. The current study investigated whether young children prioritize positive informant traits (i.e., nice vs. mean informant) as compared with positive speech content (i.e., positive vs. negative evaluation) in conflicting assessments of a work product. A total of 123 4- to 8-year-olds heard stories about a nice informant who gave a negative evaluation of a painting and a mean informant who gave a positive evaluation of the painting. Participants were asked who they would endorse, who they would ask about a future painting, and their friendship preferences. Children endorsed and asked the mean informant who provided positive testimony, but they chose to befriend the nice informant who provided negative testimony. Endorsements of positive testimony increased with age. Findings are considered in the context of the broader literature on selective social learning and trait understanding.

An eye-tracking study of selective trust development in children with and without autism spectrum disorder

The purpose of this study was to explore whether children with autism display selectivity in social learning. We investigated the processing of word mappings provided by speakers who differed on previously demonstrated accuracy and on potential degree of reliability in three groups of children (children with autism spectrum disorder, children with developmental language disorder, and typically developing children) aged 4-9 years. In Task 1, one speaker consistently misnamed familiar objects and the second speaker consistently gave correct names. In Task 2, both speakers provided correct information but differed on how they could achieve this accuracy. We analyzed how the speakers' profiles influenced children's decisions to rely on them in order to learn novel words. We also examined how children attended to the speakers' testimony by tracking their eye movements and comparing children' gaze distribution across speakers' faces and objects of their choice. Results show that children rely on associative trait attribution heuristics to selectively learn from accurate speakers. In Task 1, children in all groups preferred the novel object selected by accurate speakers and directly avoided information provided by previously inaccurate speakers, as revealed by the eye-tracking data. In Task 2, where more sophisticated reasoning about speakers' reliability was required, only children in the typically developing group performed above chance. Nonverbal intelligence score emerged as a predictor of children's preference for more reliable informational sources. In addition, children with autism exhibited reduced attention to speakers' faces compared with children in the comparison groups.

"Is it worth my time and effort?": How children selectively gather information from experts when faced with different kinds of costs

Gathering good-quality information is important for effective learning, but children may often need to expend time or energy (i.e., costs) in order to do so. In this study, we examined how 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 91) gather information from others when one source of information comes at a cost. Children were given three types of question cards (doctor-related, mechanic-related, and neutral questions) and could assign each question to either a doctor or car mechanic puppet. One puppet (either the doctor or the car mechanic, counterbalanced) could be accessed immediately, but the other puppet required either waiting 30 s or completing a tedious sorting task first. Children's verbal intelligence and executive function skills were also assessed. Results showed that cost influenced how children sought information from each of the expert puppets; children selected the costly expert for domain-relevant questions at chance levels and otherwise strongly preferred to question the non-costly puppet. In addition, executive function skills (but not verbal intelligence) related to how frequently children were willing to direct questions to the costly puppet. Overall, these results indicate that children are influenced by costs when gathering information from others and that their ability to expend a cost to gather good-quality information may relate to their inhibition skills. Implications for encouraging effective learning are discussed.

Intelligence and Neurophysiological Markers of Error Monitoring Relate to Children's Intellectual Humility

This study explored developmental and individual differences in intellectual humility (IH) among 127 children ages 6-8. IH was operationalized as children's assessment of their knowledge and willingness to delegate scientific questions to experts. Children completed measures of IH, theory of mind, motivational framework, and intelligence, and neurophysiological measures indexing early (error-related negativity [ERN]) and later (error positivity [Pe]) error-monitoring processes related to cognitive control. Children's knowledge self-assessment correlated with question delegation, and older children showed greater IH than younger children. Greater IH was associated with higher intelligence but not with social cognition or motivational framework. ERN related to self-assessment, whereas Pe related to question delegation. Thus, children show separable epistemic and social components of IH that may differentially contribute to metacognition and learning.

Selective social learning in infancy: looking for mechanisms

Although there is mounting evidence that selective social learning begins in infancy, the psychological mechanisms underlying this ability are currently a controversial issue. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether theory of mind abilities and statistical learning skills are related to infants' selective social learning. Seventy-seven 18-month-olds were first exposed to a reliable or an unreliable speaker and then completed a word learning task, two theory of mind tasks, and a statistical learning task. If domain-general abilities are linked to selective social learning, then infants who demonstrate superior performance on the statistical learning task should perform better on the selective learning task, that is, should be less likely to learn words from an unreliable speaker. Alternatively, if domain-specific abilities are involved, then superior performance on theory of mind tasks should be related to selective learning performance. Findings revealed that, as expected, infants were more likely to learn a novel word from a reliable speaker. Importantly, infants who passed a theory of mind task assessing knowledge attribution were significantly less likely to learn a novel word from an unreliable speaker compared to infants who failed this task. No such effect was observed for the other tasks. These results suggest that infants who possess superior social-cognitive abilities are more apt to reject an unreliable speaker as informant. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/zuuCniHYzqo.

Developing the Bias Blind Spot: Increasing Skepticism towards Others

Two experiments with eighty-eight 7- to 10-year-olds examined the bias blind spot in children. Both younger and older children rated themselves as less likely than a specific other (Experiment 1) or an average child (Experiment 2) to commit various biases. These self-other differences were also more extreme for biased behaviors than for other behaviors. At times, older children demonstrated stronger self-other differences than younger children, which seemed primarily driven by older children’s judgments about bias in others. These findings suggest that, although the bias blind spot exists as soon as children recognize other-committed biases, what changes over development is how skeptical children are towards others.

Theory of mind selectively predicts preschoolers' knowledge-based selective word learning

Children can selectively attend to various attributes of a model, such as past accuracy or physical strength, to guide their social learning. There is a debate regarding whether a relation exists between theory-of-mind skills and selective learning. We hypothesized that high performance on theory-of-mind tasks would predict preference for learning new words from accurate informants (an epistemic attribute), but not from physically strong informants (a non-epistemic attribute). Three- and 4-year-olds (N = 65) completed two selective learning tasks, and their theory-of-mind abilities were assessed. As expected, performance on a theory-of-mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants. Results thus suggest that preschoolers with more advanced theory of mind have a better understanding of knowledge and apply that understanding to guide their selection of informants. This work has important implications for research on children's developing social cognition and early learning.

Do children trust based on group membership or prior accuracy? The role of novel group membership in children's trust decisions

Two experiments examined how an informant's group membership can influence children's trust decisions. Participants (3- to 7-year-olds, N=162) were assigned to either the red or blue group based on their selection of a red or blue apron and watched an in-group and out-group informant provide conflicting names for a set of novel objects. When asked which informant they would prefer to rely on for new information, nearly all age groups trusted the in-group informant. Children then watched as each informant varied in accuracy by labeling either all or none of four familiar items accurately and were then asked which informant's labels they preferred for learning new information. When the in-group informant had previously demonstrated accuracy, children continued to trust the in-group informant for new information. In contrast, when the in-group informant had previously demonstrated inaccuracy, children were unsure who to trust, with only 6- and 7-year-olds showing a decrease in their trust for the inaccurate in-group informant. These findings demonstrate that group membership can skew how children encode new information and can make children uncertain about whom to trust for information.