Children’s descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency replicates (and varies) cross-culturally: Evidence from China

Why wearing a yellow hat is impossible: Chinese and U.S. children's possibility judgments

When thinking about possibility, one can consider both epistemic and deontic principles (i.e., physical possibility and permissibility). Cultural influences may lead individuals to weigh epistemic and deontic obligations differently; developing possibility conceptions are therefore positioned to be affected by cultural surroundings. Across two studies, 251 U.S. and Chinese 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds sampled from major metropolitan areas in Texas and the Hubei, Sichuan, Gansu, and Guangdong Provinces judged the possibility of impossible, improbable, and ordinary events. Across cultures and ages, children judged ordinary events as possible and impossible events as impossible; cultural differences emerged in developing conceptions of improbable events. Whereas U.S. children became more likely to judge these events possible with age, Chinese children's judgments remained consistent with age: Chinese 4- to 8-year-olds judged these events to be possible ∼25% of the time. In Study 2, to test whether this difference was attributable to differential prioritization of epistemic versus deontic constraints, children also judged whether each event was an epistemic violation (i.e., required magic to happen) and a deontic violation (i.e., would result in someone getting in trouble). With age, epistemic judgments were increasingly predictive of possibility judgments for improbable events for U.S. children, and decreasingly so for Chinese children. Contrary to our predictions, deontic judgments were not predictive. We propose that cultural valuation of norms might shape children's developing intuitions about possibility. We discuss our findings in light of three accounts of possibility conceptions, suggesting ways to integrate cultural context into each.

Social-cognitive biases underlying the development of ableism

Disabled people are the largest minority group in the world. Like members of many minority groups, they face considerable prejudice and discrimination-known as ableism. Ableism reflects entrenched beliefs about what human bodies and minds should be like and a devaluation of individuals who deviate from that ideal. There is surprisingly little psychological science about ableism, and even less about its development. This chapter considers how social-cognitive biases evident in early childhood could contribute to its development. The chapter is structured around four biases: Prescriptive reasoning, promiscuous teleology, psychological essentialism, and the positivity bias. For each bias, we review foundational research about how it manifests in early childhood, speculate about its connection to ableism, and outline avenues for additional research. Understanding how social-cognitive biases contribute to the development of ableism is an important first step in efforts to equip children (and adults) with the tools to reject it.

Act generously when others do so: Majority influence on young children's sharing behavior

Children's sharing behavior is profoundly shaped by social norms within their society, and they can learn these norms by directly observing how most others share in their immediate environment. Here we systematically investigated the impact of majority influence on the sharing behavior of young Chinese children through three studies (N = 336, 168 girls). Four- and 6-year-olds were allowed to choose 10 favorite stickers and had an opportunity to engage in anonymous sharing. Before making the sharing decision, children were assigned to one of two conditions: watching a video in which three peers all shared 8 out of 10 stickers (i.e., the majority sharing condition) or making their decisions without watching the video (i.e., the control condition). Results showed that both the 4- and 6-year-old children shared more stickers in the majority sharing condition than in the control condition (Studies 1 & 2). Moreover, the influence of the majority had a stronger effect compared to the influence of a single role model. Children shared more stickers after observing three peers sharing, compared to watching one peer sharing three times (Study 2). Furthermore, children were less likely to copy the majority's non-sharing behavior when it came to giving away stickers without prosocial outcomes, which was particularly evident among 4-year-olds (Study 3). The results reveal that majority influence uniquely shapes children's sharing behavior and that children selectively follow the majority based on whether the behavior exhibits prosocial attributes. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://youtu.be/8qNNhf9754I?si=7YfpaFpcD_IjlXjJ RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Observing a majority of three peers' unanimous generous sharing promoted sharing behavior in both 4- and 6-year-olds. The influence of three peers on children's sharing was stronger than that of one peer sharing three times. Four-year-olds, but not 6-year-olds, did not copy the non-sharing behavior of the majority as it did not lead to prosocial outcomes.

Norm Dynamics: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Social Norm Emergence, Persistence, and Change

Social norms are the glue that holds society together, yet our knowledge of them remains heavily intellectually siloed. This article provides an interdisciplinary review of the emerging field of norm dynamics by integrating research across the social sciences through a cultural-evolutionary lens. After reviewing key distinctions in theory and method, we discuss research on norm psychology-the neural and cognitive underpinnings of social norm learning and acquisition. We then overview how norms emerge and spread through intergenerational transmission, social networks, and group-level ecological and historical factors. Next, we discuss multilevel factors that lead norms to persist, change, or erode over time. We also consider cultural mismatches that can arise when a changing environment leads once-beneficial norms to become maladaptive. Finally, we discuss potential future research directions and the implications of norm dynamics for theory and policy.

Evaluative Deflation, Social Expectations, and the Zone of Moral Indifference

Acts that are considered undesirable standardly violate our expectations. In contrast, acts that count as morally desirable can either meet our expectations or exceed them. The zone in which an act can be morally desirable yet not exceed our expectations is what we call the zone of moral indifference, and it has so far been neglected. In this paper, we show that people can use positive terms in a deflated manner to refer to actions in the zone of moral indifference, whereas negative terms cannot be so interpreted.

Rethinking Norm Psychology

Norms permeate human life. Most of people's activities can be characterized by rules about what is appropriate, allowed, required, or forbidden-rules that are crucial in making people hyper-cooperative animals. In this article, I examine the current cognitive-evolutionary account of "norm psychology" and propose an alternative that is better supported by evidence and better placed to promote interdisciplinary dialogue. The incumbent theory focuses on rules and claims that humans genetically inherit cognitive and motivational mechanisms specialized for processing these rules. The cultural-evolutionary alternative defines normativity in relation to behavior-compliance, enforcement, and commentary-and suggests that it depends on implicit and explicit processes. The implicit processes are genetically inherited and domain-general; rather than being specialized for normativity, they do many jobs in many species. The explicit processes are culturally inherited and domain-specific; they are constructed from mentalizing and reasoning by social interaction in childhood. The cultural-evolutionary, or "cognitive gadget," perspective suggests that people alive today-parents, educators, elders, politicians, lawyers-have more responsibility for sustaining normativity than the nativist view implies. People's actions not only shape and transmit the rules, but they also create in each new generation mental processes that can grasp the rules and put them into action.

Condemned or valued: Young children evaluate nonconformity based on nonconformists' group orientations

Nonconformity--the act of deviating from established norms and expectations of one's group--is often evaluated negatively, despite its potential benefits for society. Three preregistered studies (N = 153) examined how nonconformists' group orientations (attitudes and intentions toward ingroup and outgroups) might affect 4-6-year-olds' evaluations of nonconformity in intergroup situations. Study 1 examined children's default beliefs of nonconformists' group attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup. We found that children expected nonconformists to hold more positive attitudes toward their outgroup than toward their ingroup, and this expectation predicted their disapproval of nonconformity. In Study 2, however, when nonconformity was explicitly motivated by positive intentions toward the ingroup rather than toward the outgroup, children were more accepting of nonconformity. Study 3 found that among nonconformists with different types of group orientations (positive toward the outgroup, ingroup or both group), young children evaluated the most positively nonconformists who bring the ingroup and the outgroup together. Collectively, these findings suggest that children evaluate nonconformity based on nonconformists' group orientations, illuminating one mechanism for how nonconformity could be more socially accepted and valued.

A systemic approach to the psychology of racial bias within individuals and society

Historically, the field of psychology has focused on racial biases at an individual level, considering the effects of various stimuli on individual racial attitudes and biases. This approach has provided valuable information, but not enough focus has been placed on the systemic nature of racial biases. In this Review, we examine the bidirectional relation between individual-level racial biases and broader societal systems through a systemic lens. We argue that systemic factors operating across levels - from the interpersonal to the cultural - contribute to the production and reinforcement of racial biases in children and adults. We consider the effects of five systemic factors on racial biases in the USA: power and privilege disparities, cultural narratives and values, segregated communities, shared stereotypes and nonverbal messages. We discuss evidence that these factors shape individual-level racial biases, and that individual-level biases shape systems and institutions to reproduce systemic racial biases and inequalities. We conclude with suggestions for interventions that could limit the effects of these influences and discuss future directions for the field.

Rational learners and parochial norms

Parochial norms are narrow in social scope, meaning they apply to certain groups but not to others. Accounts of norm acquisition typically invoke tribal biases: from an early age, people assume a group's behavioral regularities are prescribed and bounded by mere group membership. However, another possibility is rational learning: given the available evidence, people infer the social scope of norms in statistically appropriate ways. With this paper, we introduce a rational learning account of parochial norm acquisition and test a unique prediction that it makes. In one study with adults (N = 480) and one study with children ages 5- to 8-years-old (N = 120), participants viewed violations of a novel rule sampled from one of two unfamiliar social groups. We found that adults judgments of social scope - whether the rule applied only to the sampled group (parochial scope), or other groups (inclusive scope) - were appropriately sensitive to the relevant features of their statistical evidence (Study 1). In children (Study 2) we found an age difference: 7- to 8-year-olds used statistical evidence to infer that norms were parochial or inclusive, whereas 5- to 6-year olds were overall inclusive regardless of statistical evidence. A Bayesian analysis shows a possible inclusivity bias: adults and children inferred inclusive rules more frequently than predicted by a naïve Bayesian model with unbiased priors. This work highlights that tribalist biases in social cognition are not necessary to explain the acquisition of parochial norms.

Challenging the White = Neutral Framework in Psychology

In the United States, White samples are often portrayed as if their racial identities were inconsequential to their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and research findings derived from White samples are often portrayed as if they were generalizable to all humans. We argue that these and other practices are rooted in a "White = neutral" framework (i.e., the conceptualization of White samples as nonracial). First, we review existing data and present some new data to highlight the scope of the White = neutral framework. Second, we integrate research from across psychological science to argue that the continued use of the White = neutral framework will prevent psychology from becoming a truly objective and inclusive science for at least three reasons: (a) Research with White samples will be valued over research with samples of color, (b) norms that maintain White neutrality will remain unchallenged, and (c) the role of White identity in psychological processes will remain underspecified and underexamined. Third, we provide recommendations for how to move beyond the White = neutral framework in hopes of encouraging all psychological scientists to move toward a White ≠ neutral framework in which all samples are identified for the unique and diverse perspectives that they bring to the world.

Highlighting COVID-19 racial disparities can reduce support for safety precautions among White U.S. residents

U.S. media has extensively covered racial disparities in COVID-19 infections and deaths, which may ironically reduce public concern about COVID-19. In two preregistered studies (conducted in the fall of 2020), we examined whether perceptions of COVID-19 racial disparities predict White U.S. residents’ attitudes toward COVID-19. Utilizing a correlational design (N = 498), we found that those who perceived COVID-19 racial disparities to be greater reported reduced fear of COVID-19, which predicted reduced support for COVID-19 safety precautions. In Study 2, we manipulated exposure to information about COVID-19 racial disparities (N = 1,505). Reading about the persistent inequalities that produced COVID-19 racial disparities reduced fear of COVID-19, empathy for those vulnerable to COVID-19, and support for safety precautions. These findings suggest that publicizing racial health disparities has the potential to create a vicious cycle wherein raising awareness reduces support for the very policies that could protect public health and reduce disparities.

How Microaggressions Reinforce and Perpetuate Systemic Racism in the United States

The consequences of racial microaggressions are most often discussed at an interpersonal level. In this article, we contend that microaggressions play an important role in maintaining systems of racial oppression beyond the interpersonal context. Specifically, we illustrate how microaggressions establish White superiority in the United States by othering people of color (e.g., treating people of color as if they are not true citizens) and communicating that they are inferior (e.g., environmental exclusions and attacks, treating people of color as second-class citizens). We also present evidence that microaggressions play a role in protecting and reinforcing systemic racism. By obscuring systemic racism (e.g., false color blindness, denial of individual racism) and promoting ideas that maintain existing systemic inequalities (e.g., the myth of meritocracy, reverse-racism hostility), microaggressions provide cover and support for established systems of oppression. Overall, we find considerable evidence-from both empirical studies and real-world examples-that microaggressions contribute to the maintenance of systems of racial oppression in the United States. We conclude with a discussion of how we might begin to challenge this cycle by increasing awareness of systemic racism and the microaggressions that aid in its perpetuation.

Dichotomous thinking about social groups: Learning about one group can activate opposite beliefs about another group

Across three studies (N = 607), we examined people's use of a dichotomizing heuristic-the inference that characteristics belonging to one group do not apply to another group-when making judgments about novel social groups. Participants learned information about one group (e.g., "Zuttles like apples"), and then made inferences about another group (e.g., "Do Twiggums like apples or hate apples?"). Study 1 acted as a proof of concept: Eight-year-olds and adults (but not 5-year-olds) assumed that the two groups would have opposite characteristics. Learning about the group as a generic whole versus as specific individuals boosted the use of the heuristic. Study 2 and Study 3 (sample sizes, methods, and analyses pre-registered), examined whether the presence or absence of several factors affected the activation and scope of the dichotomizing heuristic in adults. Whereas learning about or treating the groups as separate was necessary for activating dichotomous thinking, intergroup conflict and featuring only two (versus many) groups was not required. Moreover, the heuristic occurred when participants made both binary and scaled decisions. Once triggered, adults applied this cognitive shortcut widely-not only to benign (e.g., liking apples) and novel characteristics (e.g., liking modies), but also to evaluative traits signaling the morals or virtues of a social group (e.g., meanness or intelligence). Adults did not, however, extend the heuristic to the edges of improbability: They failed to dichotomize when doing so would attribute highly unusual preferences (e.g., disliking having fun). Taken together, these studies indicate the presence of a dichotomizing heuristic with broad implications for how people make social group inferences.

The Roles of Privacy and Trust in Children's Evaluations and Explanations of Digital Tracking

A "digital revolution" has introduced new privacy violations concerning access to information stored on electronic devices. The present two studies assessed how U.S. children ages 5-17 and adults (N = 416; 55% female; 67% white) evaluated those accessing digital information belonging to someone else, either location data (Study 1) or digital photos (Study 2). The trustworthiness of the tracker (Studies 1 and 2) and the privacy of the information (Study 2) were manipulated. At all ages, evaluations were more negative when the tracker was less trustworthy, and when information was private. However, younger children were substantially more positive overall about digital tracking than older participants. These results, yielding primarily medium-to-large effect sizes, suggest that with age, children increasingly appreciate digital privacy considerations.

Moral Psychology as a Necessary Bridge Between Social Cognition and Law

Coordinating competing interests can be difficult. Because law regulates human behavior, it is a candidate mechanism for creating coordination in the face of societal disagreement. We argue that findings from moral psychology are necessary to understand why law can effectively resolve co-occurring conflicts related to punishment and group membership. First, we discuss heterogeneity in punitive thought, focusing on punishment within the United States legal system. Though the law exerts a weak influence on punitive ideologies before punishment occurs, we argue that it effectively coordinates perceptions of individuals who have already been punished. Next, we discuss intergroup conflict, which often co-occurs with disagreements related to punishment and represents a related domain where coordination can be difficult to achieve. Here, we underscore how insights from moral psychology can promote equality via the law. These examples demonstrate how contributions from moral psychology are necessary to understand the connection between social cognition and law.

Why do preschoolers perpetuate inequalities? Theoretical perspectives on inequity preferences in the face of emerging concerns for equality

Recent research has shown that preschool children tend to preferentially allocate resources to rich than to poor others. The findings that young children tend to perpetuate inequalities are puzzling given classical developmental theories that largely focused on the emergence of equality and equity in childhood. In this review, we first sketch the early ontogeny of fairness concerns before providing an overview on studies reporting perpetuation of inequality in young children. We review four classical theories (Piaget, Kohlberg, Damon, Social Domain Theory) and discuss how they would account for this phenomenon. We then introduce four recent theoretical models that directly speak to the underlying psychological processes; the affective preference model, the reciprocity-based strategic model, the numerical matching model, and the normative model. We highlight the key tenets of each model, their relation to other developmental processes, and the strength of the empirical evidence. From each model, we derive specific hypotheses. Finally, in an integrative section we discuss how the models might relate to each other, highlight connections to other research areas, and present avenues for future research.

Should Individuals Think Like Their Group? A Descriptive-to-Prescriptive Tendency Toward Group-Based Beliefs

Across three pre-registered studies with children (ages 4-9) and adults (N = 303), we examined whether how a group is predicted evaluations of how group members should be (i.e., a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency), under conditions in which the descriptive group norms entailed beliefs that were fact-based (Study 1), opinion-based (Study 2), and ideology-based (Study 3). Overall, participants tended to disapprove of individuals with beliefs that differed from their group, but the extent of this tendency varied across development and as a function of the belief under consideration (e.g., younger children did not show a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency in the context of facts and ideologies, suggesting that they prioritized truth over group norms). Implications for normative reasoning and ideological polarization are discussed.

Racial Inequality in Psychological Research: Trends of the Past and Recommendations for the Future

Race plays an important role in how people think, develop, and behave. In the current article, we queried more than 26,000 empirical articles published between 1974 and 2018 in top-tier cognitive, developmental, and social psychology journals to document how often psychological research acknowledges this reality and to examine whether people who edit, write, and participate in the research are systematically connected. We note several findings. First, across the past five decades, psychological publications that highlight race have been rare, and although they have increased in developmental and social psychology, they have remained virtually nonexistent in cognitive psychology. Second, most publications have been edited by White editors, under which there have been significantly fewer publications that highlight race. Third, many of the publications that highlight race have been written by White authors who employed significantly fewer participants of color. In many cases, we document variation as a function of area and decade. We argue that systemic inequality exists within psychological research and that systemic changes are needed to ensure that psychological research benefits from diversity in editing, writing, and participation. To this end, and in the spirit of the field's recent emphasis on metascience, we offer recommendations for journals and authors.

Groups as moral boundaries: A developmental perspective

In this chapter we present the perspective that social groups serve as moral boundaries. Social groups establish the bounds within which people hold moral obligations toward one another. The belief that people are morally obligated toward fellow social group members, but not toward members of other groups, is an early-emerging feature of human cognition, arising out of domain-general processes in conceptual development. We review evidence that supports this account from the adult and child moral cognition literature, and we describe the developmental processes by which people come to view social groups as shaping moral obligation. We conclude with suggestions about how this account can inform the study of social cognitive development more broadly, as well as how it can be used to promote positive moral socialization.

Acquiring group bias: Observing other people's nonverbal signals can create social group biases

Evidence of group bias based on race, ethnicity, nationality, and language emerges early in the life span. Although understanding the initial acquisition of group bias has critical theoretical and practical implications, precisely how group biases are acquired has been understudied. In two preregistered experiments, we tested the hypothesis that generalized social group biases can be acquired through exposure to positive nonverbal signals directed toward a novel adult from one group and more negative nonverbal signals directed toward a novel adult from another group. We sought to determine whether children would acquire global nonverbal signal-consistent social group biases that extended beyond their explicit social preferences, by measuring children's preferences, imitation, and behavioral intentions. Supporting our preregistered hypotheses, preschool-age participants favored small and large groups whose member received positive nonverbal signals, relative to groups whose member received more negative nonverbal signals. We also replicated prior work indicating that children will acquire individual target biases from the observation of biased nonverbal signals. Here we make the case that generalized social group biases can be rapidly and unintentionally transmitted on the basis of observational learning from nonverbal signals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Normative Social Role Concepts in Early Childhood

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4-5 and adults) explore patterns of age-related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., "scientist"). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category-normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a "dual character." In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category-based induction decisions on category-normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category-normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category-normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed.

Is the most representative skunk the average or the stinkiest? Developmental changes in representations of biological categories

People often think of categories in terms of their most representative examples (e.g., robin for BIRD). Thus, determining which exemplars are most representative is a fundamental cognitive process that shapes how people use concepts to navigate the world. The present studies (N = 669; ages 5 years - adulthood) revealed developmental change in this important component of cognition. Studies 1-2 found that young children view exemplars with extreme values of characteristic features (e.g., the very fastest cheetah) as most representative of familiar biological categories; the tendency to view average exemplars in this manner (e.g., the average-speeded cheetah) emerged slowly across age. Study 3 examined the mechanisms underlying these judgments, and found that participants of all ages viewed extreme exemplars as representative of novel animal categories when they learned that the variable features fulfilled category-specific adaptive needs, but not otherwise. Implications for developmental changes in conceptual structure and biological reasoning are discussed.

Children's evaluation of verified and unverified claims

Critical to children's learning is the ability to judiciously select what information to accept-to use as the basis for learning and inference-and what information to reject. This becomes especially difficult in a world increasingly inundated with information, where children must carefully reason about the process by which claims are made in order to acquire accurate knowledge. In two experiments, we investigated whether 3- to 7-year-old children (N = 120) understand that factual claims based on verified evidence are more acceptable than claims that have not been sufficiently verified. We found that even at preschool age, children evaluated verified claims as more acceptable than insufficiently verified claims, and that the extent to which they did so was related to their explicit understanding, as evident in their explanations of why those claims were more or less acceptable. These experiments lay the groundwork for an important line of research studying the roots and development of this foundational critical thinking skill.

The early development of the normative mind

Normativity is pervasive in everyday human social interactions and perhaps even constitutive of human forms of group and societal living. During the past decade, there has been increased interest in the ontogeny of normativity and the role that norms play in early social reasoning and behavior. Given the ubiquity of normativity, it is vital to investigate the development of children's normative understanding and behavior in a variety of different contexts, ranging from prosocial behavior to rational action or from linguistic competencies to cultural norms and values. Hence, in this special issue on the early development of the normative mind, researchers from different theoretical traditions have employed a number of different methods (e.g., third-party norm enforcement, judgment and reasoning, social behavior) to address different, yet related, research questions about the ontogeny of normativity. Here, we introduce the reader to the current debate and point to important research questions for the field.