Ambiguity aversion in schizophrenia: An fMRI study of decision-making under risk and ambiguity

Effort Expenditure Increases Risk-Taking for Improbable Rewards

Previous studies have found that exerting effort can lead people to engage in risk-taking behaviors. While effort can be either cognitive or physical, risk-taking can take place in either a risky context with known outcome probabilities or an ambiguous context with unknown outcome probabilities. The goal of the current research is to investigate how effort type and decision context influence risk-taking after effort exertion. Across three experiments, we find evidence that investing effort increases risk-taking at a short timescale. Importantly, this effect is particularly noticeable when the chance of winning is low, rather than when it is uncertain. Furthermore, the increase in risk-taking happens regardless of whether the effort is cognitive or physical. These findings suggest the existence of a cost-invariant but decision context-variant mechanism for the risk-taking after-effect of effort expenditure, which helps to bring the negative emotions caused by effort exertion back to a state of emotional homeostasis.

Insular and Striatal Correlates of Uncertain Risky Reward Pursuit in Schizophrenia

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Risk-taking in specific contexts can be beneficial, leading to rewarding outcomes. Schizophrenia is associated with disadvantageous decision-making, as subjects pursue uncertain risky rewards less than controls. However, it is unclear whether this behavior is associated with more risk sensitivity or less reward incentivization. Matching on demographics and intelligence quotient (IQ), we determined whether risk-taking was more associated with brain activation in regions affiliated with risk evaluation or reward processing.

STUDY DESIGN

Subjects (30 schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder, 30 controls) completed a modified, fMRI Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Brain activation was modeled during decisions to pursue risky rewards and parametrically modeled according to risk level.

STUDY RESULTS

The schizophrenia group exhibited less risky-reward pursuit despite previous adverse outcomes (Average Explosions; F(1,59) = 4.06, P = .048) but the comparable point at which risk-taking was volitionally discontinued (Adjusted Pumps; F(1,59) = 2.65, P = .11). Less activation was found in schizophrenia via whole brain and region of interest (ROI) analyses in the right (F(1,59) = 14.91, P < 0.001) and left (F(1,59) = 16.34, P < 0.001) nucleus accumbens (NAcc) during decisions to pursue rewards relative to riskiness. Risk-taking correlated with IQ in schizophrenia, but not controls. Path analyses of average ROI activation revealed less statistically determined influence of anterior insula upon dorsal anterior cingulate bilaterally (left: χ2 = 12.73, P < .001; right: χ2 = 9.54, P = .002) during risky reward pursuit in schizophrenia.

CONCLUSIONS

NAcc activation in schizophrenia varied less according to the relative riskiness of uncertain rewards compared to controls, suggesting aberrations in reward processing. The lack of activation differences in other regions suggests similar risk evaluation. Less insular influence on the anterior cingulate may relate to attenuated salience attribution or inability for risk-related brain region collaboration to sufficiently perceive situational risk.

Maladaptive explore/exploit trade-offs in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is a complex disorder that remains poorly understood, particularly at the systems level. In this opinion article we argue that the explore/exploit trade-off concept provides a holistic and ecologically valid framework to resolve some of the apparent paradoxes that have emerged within schizophrenia research. We review recent evidence suggesting that fundamental explore/exploit behaviors may be maladaptive in schizophrenia during physical, visual, and cognitive foraging. We also describe how theories from the broader optimal foraging literature, such as the marginal value theorem (MVT), could provide valuable insight into how aberrant processing of reward, context, and cost/effort evaluations interact to produce maladaptive responses.

Distinct neural dynamics underlying risk and ambiguity during valued-based decision making

Uncertainty can be fractioned into risk and ambiguity psychologically and neurobiologically. However, whether and how risk and ambiguity are dissociated in terms of neural dynamics during value-based decision making remain elusive. The present event-related potential (ERP) study addressed these issues by asking participants to perform a wheel-of-fortune task either during a risky context (Experiment 1; N = 30) where outcome probability was known or during an ambiguous context (Experiment 2; N = 30) where outcome probability was unknown. Results revealed that the cue-P3 was more enhanced for risk versus ambiguity during the anticipatory phase, whereas the RewP was more increased for ambiguity than risk during the consummatory phase. Moreover, the SPN and the fb-P3 components were further modulated by the levels of risk and ambiguity, respectively. These findings demonstrate a neural dissociation between risk and ambiguity, which unfolds from the anticipatory phase to the consummatory phase.

Conceptualisation of Uncertainty in Decision Neuroscience Research: Do We Really Know What Types of Uncertainties The Measured Neural Correlates Relate To?

In the article "What are neural correlates neural correlates of?" published in the journal BioSocieties, Gabriel Abend points out that neuroscientists cannot avoid philosophical questions concerning the conceptualization and operationalization of social-psychological phenomena they deal with at the physiological level. In this article, we build on Abend's thesis and, through a systematic literature review of decision neuroscience studies, test it with the example of the social-psychological phenomenon of uncertainty in decision making. In this paper, we provide an overview of studies that appropriately attempt to conceptualise uncertainty, and then use these studies to analyse papers looking for neural correlates of uncertainty. Based on a systematic review of studies, we investigate what types of uncertainty authors in the field of decision neuroscience address and define, what criteria they use to distinguish between these types, what problems are associated with their conceptualization, and whether the neural correlates of different types of uncertainty can be accurately identified. The paper concludes that, particularly in the economic context, a collaboration between the natural and social sciences works well, and neuroscience studies use economic conceptualizations of uncertainty that are further developed by sophisticated decision tasks. However, the paper also highlights problematic aspects that obscure the understanding of the phenomena under study. These include the lack of criteria for distinguishing between different types of phenomena, the unclear use of the general concept of uncertainty, and the confusion of phenomena or their erroneous synonymous use.

A review of risky decision-making in psychosis-spectrum disorders

The investigation of risky decision-making has a prominent place in clinical science, with sundry behavioral tasks aimed at empirically quantifying the psychological construct of risk-taking. However, use of differing behavioral tasks has resulted in lack of agreement on risky decision-making within psychosis-spectrum disorders, as findings fail to converge upon the typical, binary conceptualization of increased risk-seeking or risk-aversion. The current review synthesizes the behavioral, risky decision-making literature to elucidate how specific task parameters may contribute to differences in task performance, and their associations with psychosis symptomatology and cognitive functioning. A paring of the literature suggests that: 1) Explicit risk-taking may be characterized by risk imperception, evidenced by less discrimination between choices of varying degrees of risk, potentially secondary to cognitive deficits. 2) Ambiguous risk-taking findings are inconclusive with few published studies. 3) Uncertain risk-taking findings, consistently interpreted as more risk-averse, have not parsed risk attitudes from confounding processes that may impact decision-making (e.g. risk imperception, reward processing, motivation). Thus, overgeneralized interpretations of task-specific risk-seeking/aversion should be curtailed, as they may fail to appropriately characterize decision-making phenomena. Future research in psychosis-spectrum disorders would benefit from empirically isolating contributions of specific processes during risky decision-making, including the newly hypothesized risk imperception.

Decision Making under Risk in Patients Suffering from Schizophrenia or Depression

Studies have reported difficulties in decision making for patients with schizophrenia or depression. Here, we investigated whether there are differences between schizophrenia patients, depressed patients, and healthy individuals (HC) when decisions are to be made under risk and cognitive flexibility is required. We were also interested in the relationships between decision making, cognitive functioning, and disease severity. Thirty HC, 28 schizophrenia patients, and 28 depressed patients underwent structured clinical assessments and were assessed by the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale or Hamilton Rating Scale. They performed the Probability-Associated Gambling (PAG) Task and a neuropsychological test battery. Both patient groups obtained lower scores than HC in memory and executive function measures. In the PAG task, relative to HC, depressed patients made slower decisions but showed a comparable number of advantageous decisions or strategy flexibility. Schizophrenia patients were slower, riskier, and less flexible compared to HC. For them, the decision making behavior correlated with the symptom severity. In both groups, decision making scores correlated with memory and executive function scores. Patients with schizophrenia or depression may have difficulties under risk when quick and flexible decisions are required. These difficulties may be more pronounced in patients who have marked cognitive deficits or severe clinical symptoms.

Better the devil you know than the devil you don't: Neural processing of risk and ambiguity

Risk and ambiguity are inherent in virtually all human decision-making. Risk refers to a situation in which we know the precise probability of potential outcomes of each option, whereas ambiguity refers to a situation in which outcome probabilities are not known. A large body of research has shown that individuals prefer known risks to ambiguity, a phenomenon known as ambiguity aversion. One heated debate concerns whether risky and ambiguous decisions rely on the same or distinct neural circuits. In the current meta-analyses, we integrated the results of neuroimaging research on decision-making under risk (n = 69) and ambiguity (n = 31). Our results showed that both processing of risk and ambiguity showed convergence in anterior insula, indicating a key role of anterior insula in encoding uncertainty. Risk additionally engaged dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and ventral striatum, whereas ambiguity specifically recruited the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and right anterior insula. Our findings demonstrate overlapping and distinct neural substrates underlying different types of uncertainty, guiding future neuroimaging research on risk-taking and ambiguity aversion.

Transcranial direct current stimulation over the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has distinct effects on choices involving risk and ambiguity

Human's uncertain decision-making involves choices of risk (with known probabilities) and ambiguity (with unknown probabilities). For risky and ambiguous decision-making processes, neural differences are rarely exhibited. To clarify the causal role of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in uncertain situations, we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to demonstrate the involvement of the right DLPFC in decisions involving risk and ambiguity. Participants received either anodal or cathodal tDCS at 1.5 mA or sham stimulation over the right DLPFC and subsequently undertook tasks of risk and ambiguity. The results revealed that a preference for ambiguity could be measurably increased in individuals through anodal stimulation, but no significant differences were observed in the preferences for risky choices among groups. These findings suggest that different neural mechanisms underlie risky and ambiguous decisions because the right DLPFC primarily affects ambiguous behavior.

Impact of past experiences on decision-making in autism spectrum disorder

People are often influenced by past costs in their current decision-making, thus succumbing to a well-known bias recognized as the sunk cost effect. A recent study showed that the sunk cost effect is attenuated in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, the study only addressed one situation of utilization decision by focusing on the choice between similar attractive alternatives with different levels of sunk costs. Thus, it remains unclear how individuals with ASD behave under sunk costs in different types of decision situations, particularly progress decisions, in which the decision-maker allocates additional resources to an initially chosen alternative. The sunk cost effect in progress decisions was estimated using an economic task designed to assess the effect of the past investments on current decision-making. Twenty-four individuals with ASD and 21 age-, sex-, smoking status-, education-, and intelligence quotient-level-matched typical development (TD) subjects were evaluated. The TD participants were more willing to make the second incremental investment if a previous investment was made, indicating that their decisions were influenced by sunk costs. However, unlike the TD group, the rates of investments were not significantly increased after prior investments in the ASD group. The results agree with the previous evidence of a reduced sensitivity to context stimuli in individuals with ASD and help us obtain a broader picture of the impact of sunk costs on their decision-making. Our findings will contribute to a better understanding of ASD and may be useful in addressing practical implications of their socioeconomic behavior.

Common and distinct brain activity associated with risky and ambiguous decision-making

Two often-studied forms of uncertain decision-making (DM) are risky-DM (outcome probabilities known) and ambiguous-DM (outcome probabilities unknown). While DM in general is associated with activation of several brain regions, previous neuroimaging efforts suggest a dissociation between activity linked with risky and ambiguous choices. However, the common and distinct neurobiological correlates associated with risky- and ambiguous-DM, as well as their specificity when compared to perceptual-DM (as a 'control condition'), remains to be clarified. We conducted multiple meta-analyses on neuroimaging results from 151 studies to characterize common and domain-specific brain activity during risky-, ambiguous-, and perceptual-DM. When considering all DM tasks, convergent activity was observed in brain regions considered to be consituents of the canonical salience, valuation, and executive control networks. When considering subgroups of studies, risky-DM (vs. perceptual-DM) was linked with convergent activity in the striatum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), regions associated with reward-related processes (determined by objective functional decoding). When considering ambiguous-DM (vs. perceptual-DM), activity convergence was observed in the lateral prefrontal cortex and insula, regions implicated in affectively-neutral mental processes (e.g., cognitive control and behavioral responding; determined by functional decoding). An exploratory meta-analysis comparing brain activity between substance users and non-users during risky-DM identified reduced convergent activity among users in the striatum, cingulate, and thalamus. Taken together, these findings suggest a dissociation of brain regions linked with risky- and ambiguous-DM reflecting possible differential functionality and highlight brain alterations potentially contributing to poor decision-making in the context of substance use disorders.

Reward-related decision-making in schizophrenia: A multimodal neuroimaging study

Schizophrenia is a severe psychiatric disorder characterized by important cognitive deficits, which ultimately compromise the patients' ability to make optimal decisions. Unfortunately, the neurobiological bases of impaired reward-related decision-making in schizophrenia have rarely been studied. The objective of this study is to examine the neural mechanisms involved in reward-related decision-making in schizophrenia, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Forty-seven schizophrenia patients (DSM-IV criteria) and 23 healthy subjects with no psychiatric disorders were scanned using fMRI while performing the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). A rapid event-related fMRI paradigm was used, separating decision and outcome events. Between-group differences in grey matter volumes were assessed with voxel-based morphometry. During the reward outcomes, increased activations were observed in schizophrenia in the left anterior insula, the putamen, and frontal sub-regions. Reduced grey matter volumes were observed in the left anterior insula in schizophrenia which spatially overlapped with functional alterations. Finally, schizophrenia patients made fewer gains on the BART. The fact that schizophrenia patients had increased activations in sub-cortical regions such as the striatum and insula in response to reward events suggests that the impaired decision-making abilities of these patients are mostly driven by an overvaluation of outcome stimuli.

Sunk Cost Effect in Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder

The sunk cost effect, an interesting and well-known decision bias, is pervasive in real life and has been studied in various disciplines. In this study, we modified a task exemplifying the sunk cost effect and used it to evaluate this behavior in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The control group exhibited a typical sunk cost effect in our task. We found that the sunk cost effect was lower in the ASD group than in the control group. The results agree with previous evidence of reduced sensitivity to context stimuli in individuals with ASD and extend this finding to the context of the sunk cost effect. Our findings are useful in addressing the practical implications on their socioeconomic behavior.

Need for closure and cognitive flexibility in individuals with autism spectrum disorder: A preliminary study

The need for closure (NFC), a desire for a firm answer and less ambiguity, has a key role in cognitive flexibility in typical development (TD) populations. This study investigated this motivational construct and its relation to cognitive inflexibility in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Compared with individuals with TD, those with ASD reported higher levels in preference for predictability and closed-mindedness and lower levels in decisiveness. These NFC facets were significantly associated with cognitive flexibility in ASD as well as TD groups. The study findings provide further insights into the motivational underpinnings of flexible behavior in ASD.

An fMRI study of decision-making under sunk costs in gambling disorder

The sunk cost effect is the tendency to continue an investment, or take an action, even though it has higher future costs than benefits, if costs of time, money, or effort were previously incurred. This type of decision bias is pervasive in real life and has been studied in various disciplines. Previous studies and clinical observations suggest that decision-making under sunk costs is altered in gambling disorder (GD). However, the neural mechanisms of decision-making under sunk costs in GD remain largely unknown, and so is their association with the clinical characteristics of this patient group. Here, by combining functional magnetic resonance imaging and the task that demonstrated a clear example of the sunk cost effect, we investigated the neural correlates during decision-making under sunk costs in GD. We found no significant differences in the strength of the sunk cost effect between the GD and healthy control (HC) groups. However, the strength of the sunk cost effect in patients with GD showed a significant negative correlation with abstinence period and a marginally significant positive correlation with the duration of illness. We also found a reduction in the neural activation in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex during decision-making under sunk costs for the GD group compared with the HC group. Furthermore, in patients with GD, the levels of activation in this area negatively correlated with the duration of illness. These findings have important clinical implications. This study will contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying altered decision-making abilities in GD.

Attitudes toward risk and ambiguity in patients with autism spectrum disorder

Although the ability to make optimal decisions under uncertainty is an integral part of everyday life, individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) frequently report that they experience difficulties with this skill. In behavioral economics, researchers distinguish two types of uncertainty to understand decision-making in this setting: risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities). However, it remains unclear how individuals with ASD behave under risk and ambiguity, despite growing evidence of their altered decision-making under uncertainty. We therefore extended previous research by studying the attitudes of those with ASD toward risk and ambiguity in both positive and negative contexts (i.e., gain and loss). In gain contexts, no significant difference was observed between the groups in risk attitudes, but ambiguity aversion was attenuated in ASD. In loss contexts, ambiguity attitudes did not significantly differ between the groups, but the ASD participants were less risk-seeking compared with the controls. In addition, insensitivity to the context change under risk and ambiguity in ASD was both significantly associated with poor social skills. These results improve our understanding of altered decision-making under uncertainty by disentangling the attitudes toward risk and ambiguity in ASD individuals. Applying behavioral economic tools may provide insights into the mechanisms underlying behavioral disturbances in ASD.