Societal Inequality and individual subjective well-being: Results from 68 societies and over 200,000 individuals, 1981-2008

A new subjective well-being index using anchored best-worst scaling

Subjective well-being (SWB) describes an individual's life evaluation. Direct elicitation methods for SWB via rating scales do not force individuals to trade-off among life domains, whilst best-worst scaling (BWS) approaches only provide relative measures. This paper instead offers a dual-response BWS task, where respondents nominate areas of most and least importance and satisfaction with respect to 11 SWB domains, whilst also eliciting anchoring points to obtain an absolute measure of domain satisfaction. Combining domain satisfaction and importance produces a robust measure of individual SWB, but statistically unique relative to other life satisfaction measures utilizing single- and multi-item ratings, including global satisfaction and those aggregated over SWB domains, as well as eudemonia. Surveying 2500 Australians reveals anchored-BWS improves discrimination amongst domains in terms of importance and satisfaction, illustrating its value as a diagnostic tool for SWB measurement to focus services, policy, and initiatives in areas to most impact wellbeing. This includes highlighting a major discrepancy between health satisfaction and importance, whilst also reporting that SWB is significantly lower for Indigenous, unemployed, middle-aged, males and lower income groups.

Subjective economic inequality is associated with lower well-being through more upward comparison and lower trust

Individuals often misconstrue the actual degree of economic inequality, which might account for the ambiguity in the literature about the role that inequality plays in well-being. Instead of focusing on objective inequality, we propose a subjective inequality approach by investigating the long-term association between subjective economic inequality and well-being (N = 613). We found that subjective inequality predicted lower life satisfaction and higher depression one year later, which were accounted for by more upward socioeconomic comparison and lower trust. Furthermore, the negative association between subjective inequality and well-being remained constant, regardless of individuals' objective socioeconomic status (SES), subjective SES, and mindset of SES. The long-term association between subjective inequality and well-being remained robust after controlling for prior levels of well-being and multiple covariates. Our findings revealed that subjective inequality is detrimental to well-being and opens a new window into psychological research on economic inequality.

Happily Distant or Bitter Medicine? The Impact of Social Distancing Preferences, Behavior, and Emotional Costs on Subjective Wellbeing During the Epidemic

To inhibit the spread of COVID-19 Public health officials stress, and governments often require, restrictions on social interaction ("social distancing"). While the medical benefits are clear, important questions remain about these measures' downsides: How bitter is this medicine? Ten large non-probability internet-based surveys between April and November 2020, weighted statistically to reflect the US population in age, education, and religious background and excluding respondents who even occasionally role-played rather than giving their own true views; N = 6,223. Pre-epidemic data from 2017-2019, N = 4,032. Reliable multiple-item scales including subjective wellbeing (2 European Quality of Life Survey items, Cronbach's alpha = .85); distancing attitudes (5 items, alpha = .87); distancing behavior e.g., standing 6' apart in public (5 items, alpha = .80); emotional cost of distancing and restrictions on social interaction (8-12 items, alpha = .94); and an extensive suite of controls (19 variables). Descriptive statistics, OLS regression, structural equation models. Subjective wellbeing is greater for those who approve of distancing, for those who practice distancing, and particularly for those whose distancing attitudes and behavior are congruent, either both in favor or both opposed (multiplicative interaction). The emotional cost of distancing is strongly tied to wellbeing and is heterogeneous, with some disliking distancing much more than others. An SEM model suggests causality: that emotional costs strongly reduce wellbeing but not vice-versa. During the epidemic, COVID issues constitute two of the top 5 influences on wellbeing, behind only subjective health and religious belief and tied with income. All this is net of family background, religious origins, age, ethnicity, race, gender, rural residence, education, occupational status, marriage, unemployment, income, health, religion, and political party.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11482-023-10149-0.

How living in economically unequal societies shapes our minds and our social lives

In recent decades, the economies of many countries have produced increasingly unequal outcomes for the rich and poor. This economic trend has attracted interest from members of the media, public and political classes as well as researchers who are interested in its societal implications. While this research has traditionally been the purview of economists and sociologists, there has been a burgeoning growth in research that has sought to understand the psychology of economic inequality. In this review, we summarize this work, focusing on two major themes: (1) how people perceive the scale of economic inequality and appraise its significance, and (2) how living in an economically unequal environment shapes people's social lives. Together, this work affirms claims that economic inequality is 'the defining issue of our time' (Obama, 2013) with a great deal of destructive potential. We identify important questions that await further research attention.

Does Income Class Affect Life Satisfaction? New Evidence from Cross-Country Microdata

This paper analyzes the impact of income class on subjective wellbeing. Using rich data from the Gallup World Poll, we investigate whether belonging to locally (both country- and time-specific) defined income classes influences individuals’ life satisfaction. We rely on a latent class analysis estimation method, using individual income proxied by household income divided by household size, as an observable characteristic to hypothesize the income classes. We fit a model with one categorical latent variable with three unobserved groupings, here: income classes, which we interpret as lower, middle and upper classes. Our estimates suggest that individuals in the low and middle income classes are, respectively, about 30 and 17 percent of a standard deviation less likely to report a higher life satisfaction in comparison to individuals belonging to the upper income class. The effect of income classes remains robust to the inclusion of standard explanatory variables in this literature.

Proxyeconomics, a theory and model of proxy-based competition and cultural evolution

Competitive societal systems by necessity rely on imperfect proxy measures. For instance, profit is used to measure value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital performance, or the journal impact factor to measure scientific value. While there are numerous reasons why proxies will deviate from the underlying societal goals, they will nevertheless determine the selection of cultural practices and guide individual decisions. These considerations suggest that the study of proxy-based competition requires the integration of cultural evolution theory and economics or decision theory. Here, we attempt such an integration in two ways. First, we describe an agent-based simulation model, combining methods and insights from these disciplines. The model suggests that an individual intrinsic incentive can constrain a cultural evolutionary pressure, which would otherwise enforce fully proxy-oriented practices. The emergent outcome is distinct from that with either the isolated economic or evolutionary mechanism. It reflects what we term lock-in, where competitive pressure can undermine the ability of agents to pursue the shared social goal. Second, we elaborate the broader context, outlining the system-theoretic foundations as well as some philosophical and practical implications, towards a broader theory. Overall, we suggest such a theory may offer an explanatory and predictive framework for diverse subjects, ranging from scientific replicability to climate inaction, and outlining strategies for diagnosis and mitigation.

Determinants of Job-Finding Intentions Among Young Adults from 11 European Countries

In this study we investigate the impact of individual, parental and social factors on young adults' job-finding intentions across countries and overall. We test our hypotheses by conducting binary logistic regressions on the basis of an original dataset that comprises responses from more than 5200 young adults and their parents from 11 European countries. Our findings show that individual factors are most decisive in shaping the job-finding intentions of young adults. Most importantly, being enrolled in education does not prevent young adults from lowering their aspirations with respect to anticipated earnings or finding more sophisticated jobs. Social factors, in terms of being socially involved or having more friends in employment, lead to stronger mobility intentions as well as to stronger intentions to improve skills or develop new ones. At the country level, and compared to Italian participants, who go through a longer school-to-work transition, participants from Northern or Central European countries, as well as from the United Kingdom, show weaker mobility intentions. In many of these countries, young adults are also more willing than their Italian counterparts to lower income aspirations, while being less inclined to lower their aspirations in terms of finding more sophisticated jobs. In a last step, we reflect on education as a means of improving professional aspirations and the need to offer adequate on-the-ground services to help young people through the school-to-work transition, especially in Southern European countries.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11205-022-02941-6.

The Relationship Between Income Inequality and the Palliative Function of Meritocracy Belief: The Micro- and the Macro-Levels Both Count

In the current paper, we report the analysis of the relationship between meritocracy belief and subjective well-being using two large international databases, the European Social Survey Program (N = 44,387) and the European Values Study Program (N = 51,752), involving data gathered from 36 countries in total. We investigated whether low status individuals are more likely to psychologically benefit from endorsing meritocratic beliefs, and the same benefits are more pronounced in more unequal societies. Since meritocracy belief can function as a justification for income differences, we assumed that the harsher the objective reality is, the higher level of subjective well-being can be maintained by justifying this harsh reality. Therefore, we hypothesized that the palliative function of meritocracy belief is stronger for both low social status (low income) individuals, and for those living in an unequal social environment (in countries with larger income differences). Our multilevel models showed a positive relationship between meritocracy belief and subjective well-being, which relationship was moderated by both individual-level income status and country-level income differences in both studies. Based on these results, we concluded that the emotional payoff of justifying income inequalities is larger if one is more strongly affected by these inequalities.

Social Class—Not Income Inequality—Predicts Social and Institutional Trust

Trust is the social glue that holds society together. The academic consensus is that trust is weaker among lower-class individuals and in unequal regions/countries, which is often considered a threat to a healthy society. However, existing studies are inconsistent and have two limitations: (i) variability in the measurement of social class and (ii) small numbers of higher level units (regions/countries). We addressed these problems using large-scale (cross-)national representative surveys (encompassing 560,000+ participants from 1,500+ regional/national units). Multilevel analysis led to two consistent sets of findings. First, the effects of social class on social trust were systematically positive, whereas the effects on institutional trust depended on the way social class was measured. Second, the effects of income inequality on social and institutional trust were systematically nonsignificant and smaller than the smallest negative effect of interest. Our findings suggest that researchers need to update their knowledge: social class—not income inequality—predicts trust.

Legitimate earnings inequality and national welfare commitment: Correspondence between economic institutions and the pay 80,000+ people in 30 nations think legitimate for ordinary jobs and for elite jobs

In formulating views of just reward for high-status and low-status work, do ordinary citizens take cues from their nation's public stance on income inequality as institutionally embedded in their welfare state, i.e. their social welfare and labor market policies, their "welfarism"? How large a morally correct earnings gap flows from that? Our multilevel analyses (fixed effects, random intercepts) replicate prior research on the impact of individual characteristics and socioeconomic development. They open new territory with the discovery that public opinion on legitimate/just earnings of high-status occupations aligns moderately strongly with welfarism, ceteris paribus, with welfare state citizens advocating lower pay for the elite but not higher pay for working-class occupations: The welfare state is not (or no longer) a matter of helping the poor but instead of bringing down the elite, "cutting down the tall poppies". Data: World Inequality Study v2.1: 30 countries, 71 surveys, and over 88,000 individuals.

Ageism, Religiosity, and Wellbeing Among Older Adults: Evidence From the European Social Survey (ESS4)

Research shows that ageism (systemic discrimination against people because of their age) significantly undermines physical and psychological wellbeing, particularly among older adults. Our aim is to contribute to the literature by investigating whether this negative association varies across national religious context. We estimate multilevel models by drawing on a subset of data (ages 55 and above) from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008/2009). We find that ageism is negatively related to measures of wellbeing (happiness, life satisfaction, self-rated health). More importantly, the relationship is less pronounced in countries with higher levels of religiosity. These findings suggest that the country's religious environment serves as a buffer against deleterious health consequences of ageism for the older population. Our study thus provides additional evidence on ageism as a critical risk factor and sheds novel light on the moderating role of country-level religiosity as a protective factor.

Human-centric infrastructure resilience: Uncovering well-being risk disparity due to infrastructure disruptions in disasters

The objective of this paper is to empirically examine the impacts of infrastructure service disruptions on the well-being of vulnerable populations during disasters. There are limited studies that empirically evaluate the extent to which disruptions in infrastructure system services impact subpopulation groups differently and how these impacts relate to the wellbeing of households. Being able to systematically capture the differential experiences of sub-populations in a community due to infrastructure disruptions is necessary to highlight the differential needs and inequities that households have. In order to address this knowledge gap, this study derives an empirical relationship between sociodemographic factors of households and their subjective well-being impacts due to disruptions in various infrastructure services during and immediately after Hurricane Harvey. Statistical analysis driven by spearman-rank order correlations and fisher-z tests indicated significant disparities in well-being due to service disruptions among vulnerable population groups. The characterization of subjective well-being is used to explain to what extent infrastructure service disruptions influence different subpopulations. The results show that: (1) disruptions in transportation, solid waste, food, and water infrastructure services resulted in more significant well-being impact disparities as compared to electricity and communication services; (2) households identifying as Black and African American experienced well-being impact due to disruptions in food, transportation, and solid waste services; and (3) households were more likely to feel helpless, difficulty doing daily tasks and feeling distance from their community as a result of service disruptions. The findings present novel insights into understanding the role of infrastructure resilience in household well-being and highlights why it is so important to use approaches that consider various factors. Infrastructure resilience models tend to be monolithic. The results provide empirical and quantitative evidence of the inequalities in well-being impacts across various sub-populations. The research approach and findings enable a paradigm shift towards a more human-centric approach to infrastructure resilience.

Inequality and Social Rank: Income Increases Buy More Life Satisfaction in More Equal Countries

How do income and income inequality combine to influence subjective well-being? We examined the relation between income and life satisfaction in different societies, and found large effects of income inequality within a society on the relationship between individuals’ incomes and their life satisfaction. The income–satisfaction gradient is steeper in countries with more equal income distributions, such that the positive effect of a 10% increase in income on life satisfaction is more than twice as large in a country with low income inequality as it is in a country with high income inequality. These findings are predicted by an income rank hypothesis according to which life satisfaction is derived from social rank. A fixed increment in income confers a greater increment in social position in a more equal society. Income inequality may influence people’s preferences, such that in unequal countries people’s life satisfaction is determined more strongly by their income.

In Search of the Missing Links Between Economic Insecurity and Political Protest: Why Does Neoliberalism Evoke Identity Politics Instead of Class Interests?

The prospect of the social backsliding of middle-class groups in western countries has not benefited the left but fueled right-wing populism. This article examines mediating and moderating factors between economic threat and political choices. The shift of liberals toward conservatism and the activation of passive authoritarians explain sudden changes more than dispositional factors. Attachment to groups under stress activates coalitional mindsets, and coalitional competition for scarce resources matches the conservative propensity to detect threats from outgroups. Risk-averse right-wing authoritarians should recoil from social-dominance oriented risk-takers but they follow winners despite their mutual differences concerning family values. Authoritarian aggression unites RWA and SDO, but politically passive right-wing authoritarians can also follow their economic interests, when these are not entangled with cultural values. Right-wing populists have been able to compensate economic insecurity with epistemic security. Identity politics supports the coherence of right-wing populist parties but divides leftist/liberal groups due to intersectional competition for victimhood.

Higher economic inequality intensifies the financial hardship of people living in poverty by fraying the community buffer

The current research investigates whether higher economic inequality disproportionately intensifies the financial hardship of low-income individuals. We propose that higher economic inequality increases financial hardship for low-income individuals by reducing their ability to rely on their community as a buffer against financial difficulties. This may occur, in part, because a frayed community buffer reduces low-income individuals' propensity to seek informal financial support from others. We provide empirical support across eight studies (sample size N = 1,029,900) from the United States, Australia and rural Uganda, through correlational and experimental data, as well as an instrumental variable analysis. On average across our studies, a 1 s.d. increase in economic inequality is associated with an increase of financial hardship among low-income individuals of 0.10 s.d. We discuss the implications of these results for policies aimed to help people living in poverty buffer against the adverse effects higher economic inequality imposes on them.

Comparing indices of relative deprivation using behavioural evidence

What measure of relative deprivation best predicts health? While numerous indices of relative deprivation exist, few studies have compared how well different measures account for empirical data. Hounkpatin et al. (2016) demonstrated that the relative ranked position of an individual i's income within a comparison group (their relative rank) was a better predictor of i's health than i's relative deprivation as assessed by the widely-used Yitzhaki index. In their commentary, Stark and Jakubek (2020) argue that both relative rank and relative deprivation may matter, and they develop a composite index. Here we identify some issues with their composite index, develop an alternative based on behavioural evidence, and test the various indices against data. Although almost all existing indices assume that the significance of an income y_j to an individual with income y_i (y_j>y_i) will be some increasing function of the difference between y_j and y_i, we find that the influence of j's income on i's health is actually a reducing function of (y_j-y_i). This finding - that less significance is assigned to distant higher incomes than to near higher incomes - is consistent with the well-established idea that we compare ourselves primarily to similar others.

Multi-level modelling of time-series cross-sectional data reveals the dynamic interaction between ecological threats and democratic development

What is the relationship between environment and democracy? The framework of cultural evolution suggests that societal development is an adaptation to ecological threats. Pertinent theories assume that democracy emerges as societies adapt to ecological factors such as higher economic wealth, lower pathogen threats, less demanding climates and fewer natural disasters. However, previous research confused within-country processes with between-country processes and erroneously interpreted between-country findings as if they generalize to within-country mechanisms. We analyse a time-series cross-sectional dataset to study the dynamic relationship between environment and democracy (1949-2016), accounting for previous misconceptions in levels of analysis. By separating within-country processes from between-country processes, we find that the relationship between environment and democracy not only differs by country but also depends on the level of analysis. Economic wealth predicts increasing levels of democracy in between-country comparisons, but within-country comparisons show that democracy declines in years when countries become wealthier. This relationship is only prevalent among historically wealthy countries but not among historically poor countries, whose wealth also increased over time. By contrast, pathogen prevalence predicts lower levels of democracy in both between-country and within-country comparisons. Multi-level modelling also confirms that the within-country effect of pathogen prevalence remains robust even after considering a region-level analysis. Longitudinal analyses identifying temporal precedence reveal that not only reductions in pathogen prevalence drive future democracy, but also democracy reduces future pathogen prevalence and increases future wealth. These nuanced results contrast with previous analyses using narrow, cross-sectional data. Overall, our findings illuminate the dynamic process by which environment and democracy shape each other.

A multidimensional understanding of prosperity and well-being at country level: Data-driven explorations

Social scientists have been interested in measuring the prosperity, well-being, and quality of life of nations, which has resulted in a multiplicity of country-level indicators. However, little is known about the factor structure of these indicators. We explored the structure of quality of life, using country-level data on tens of subjective and objective indicators. Applying factor analysis, we identified three distinct factors that exhibited both overlap and complementarity. This structure was replicated in data from previous years and with a partially different set of variables. The first factor, 'socio-economic progress', is dominated by socio-political and economic indicators but also includes life satisfaction, which thus appears to reflect objective living conditions. The second factor, 'psycho-social functioning', consists of subjective indicators, such as eudaimonic well-being and positive affective states. The third, 'negative affectivity', comprises negatively-valenced affective states. The three macro-factors of societal quality of life demonstrated moderate intercorrelations and differential associations with cultural and ecological variables, providing support for their discriminant validity. Finally, country and regional rankings based on the three societal factors revealed a complex picture that cautions against over-reliance on any single indicator such as life satisfaction. The results underline the need for a broadly-based approach to the measurement of societal quality of life, and provide an empirically-derived multidimensional framework for conceptualizing and measuring quality of life and well-being at country level. This study is thus an initial empirical step towards systematizing the multiple approaches to societal quality of life.

A multidimensional understanding of prosperity and well-being at country level: Data-driven explorations

Social scientists have been interested in measuring the prosperity, well-being, and quality of life of nations, which has resulted in a multiplicity of country-level indicators. However, little is known about the factor structure of these indicators. We explored the structure of quality of life, using country-level data on tens of subjective and objective indicators. Applying factor analysis, we identified three distinct factors that exhibited both overlap and complementarity. This structure was replicated in data from previous years and with a partially different set of variables. The first factor, 'socio-economic progress', is dominated by socio-political and economic indicators but also includes life satisfaction, which thus appears to reflect objective living conditions. The second factor, 'psycho-social functioning', consists of subjective indicators, such as eudaimonic well-being and positive affective states. The third, 'negative affectivity', comprises negatively-valenced affective states. The three macro-factors of societal quality of life demonstrated moderate intercorrelations and differential associations with cultural and ecological variables, providing support for their discriminant validity. Finally, country and regional rankings based on the three societal factors revealed a complex picture that cautions against over-reliance on any single indicator such as life satisfaction. The results underline the need for a broadly-based approach to the measurement of societal quality of life, and provide an empirically-derived multidimensional framework for conceptualizing and measuring quality of life and well-being at country level. This study is thus an initial empirical step towards systematizing the multiple approaches to societal quality of life.

Inequality and Life Satisfaction in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: The Role of Opportunity

This study delves into the relationship between income inequality and subjective well-being by gauging the role played by opportunities at the country level. Using data from the World Value Survey, we estimate multilevel models to explain cross-country differences in individuals’ life satisfaction. Opportunity and inequality exert a significant effect per se on life satisfaction, and their joint effect explains the puzzling positive relationship between income inequality and life satisfaction in low- and middle-income countries. Income inequalities reduce the well-being of individuals if opportunities are low, but inequality is not relevant for life satisfaction if opportunities in the country are high. Among the aspects of opportunity that really matter, we show that inclusiveness and access to advanced education play a more major role than political freedom or personal rights. Results apply for different social, income, and education groups.

No evidence that economic inequality moderates the effect of income on generosity

A landmark study published in PNAS [Côté S, House J, Willer R (2015) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112:15838-15843] showed that higher income individuals are less generous than poorer individuals only if they reside in a US state with comparatively large economic inequality. This finding might serve to reconcile inconsistent findings on the effect of social class on generosity by highlighting the moderating role of economic inequality. On the basis of the importance of replicating a major finding before readily accepting it as evidence, we analyzed the effect of the interaction between income and inequality on generosity in three large representative datasets. We analyzed the donating behavior of 27,714 US households (study 1), the generosity of 1,334 German individuals in an economic game (study 2), and volunteering to participate in charitable activities in 30,985 participants from 30 countries (study 3). We found no evidence for the postulated moderation effect in any study. This result is especially remarkable because (i) our samples were very large, leading to high power to detect effects that exist, and (ii) the cross-country analysis employed in study 3 led to much greater variability in economic inequality. These findings indicate that the moderation effect might be rather specific and cannot be easily generalized. Consequently, economic inequality might not be a plausible explanation for the heterogeneous results on the effect of social class on prosociality.

Strong Welfare States Do Not Intensify Public Support for Income Redistribution, but Even Reduce It among the Prosperous: A Multilevel Analysis of Public Opinion in 30 Countries

How tightly linked are the strength of a country’s welfare state and its residents’ support for income redistribution? Multilevel model results (with appropriate controls) show that the publics of strong welfare states recognize their egalitarian income distributions, i.e., the stronger the welfare state, the less the actual and perceived inequality; but they do not differ from their peers in liberal welfare states/market-oriented societies in their preferences for equality. Thus, desire for redistribution bears little overall relationship to welfare state activity. However, further investigation shows a stronger relationship under the surface: Poor people’s support for redistribution is nearly constant across levels of welfarism. By contrast, the stronger the welfare state, the less the support for redistribution among the prosperous, perhaps signaling “harvest fatigue” due to paying high taxes and longstanding egalitarian policies. Our findings are not consistent with structuralist/materialist theory, nor with simple dominant ideology or system justification arguments, but are partially consistent with a legitimate framing hypothesis, with an atomistic self-interest hypothesis, with a reference group solidarity hypothesis, and with the “me-and-mine” hypothesis incorporating sociotropic and egotropic elements. Database: the World Inequality Study: 30 countries, 71 surveys, and over 88,0000 individuals.

Income Inequality Affects the Psychological Health of Only the People Facing Scarcity

Following the status-anxiety hypothesis, the psychological consequences of income inequality should be particularly severe for economically vulnerable individuals. Oddly, however, income inequality is often found to affect vulnerable low-income and advantaged high-income groups equally. We argue that economic vulnerability is better captured by a financial-scarcity measure and hypothesize that income inequality primarily impairs the psychological health of people facing scarcity. First, repeated cross-sectional international data (from the World Values Survey: 146,034 participants; 105 country waves) revealed that the within-country effect of national income inequality on feelings of unhappiness was limited to individuals facing scarcity (≈25% of the World Values Survey population). Second, longitudinal national data (Swiss Household Panel: 14,790 participants; 15,595 municipality years) revealed that the within-life-course effect of local income inequality on psychological health problems was also limited to these individuals (< 10% of the Swiss population). Income inequality by itself may not be a problem for psychological health but, rather, may be a catalyst for the consequences of financial scarcity.

Inequality and inequity

Kelley and Evans (2017) found that income inequality (measured at the societal level) did not affect individual well-being in advanced societies but increased individual well-being in developing societies. This paper discusses how this empirical patterning of the inequality-well-being relationship may arise from mechanisms related to the relationship of inequality with economic development (at the macro-sociological level) and to the evolution of emotional reactions to inequality (at the individual-psychological level).