Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches

Consciousness Under the Spotlight: The Problem of Measuring Subjective Experience

The study of consciousness is considered by many one of the most difficult contemporary scientific endeavors and confronts several methodological and theoretical challenges. A central issue that makes the study of consciousness so challenging is that, while the rest of science is concerned with problems that can be verified from a "third person" view (i.e., objectively), the study of consciousness deals with the phenomenon of subjective experience, only accessible from a "first person" view. In the present article, we review early (starting during the late 19th century) and later efforts on measuring consciousness and its absence, focusing on the two main approaches used by researchers within the field: objective (i.e., performance based) and subjective (i.e., report based) measures of awareness. In addition, we compare the advantages and disadvantages of both types of awareness measures, evaluate them according to different methodological considerations, and discuss, among other issues, the possibility of comparing them by transforming them to a common sensitivity measure (d'). Finally, we explore several new approaches-such as Bayesian models to support the absence of awareness or new machine-learning based decoding models-as well as future challenges-such as measuring the qualia, the qualitative contents of awareness-in consciousness research.

Measuring the dynamic balance of integration and segregation underlying consciousness, anesthesia, and sleep in humans

Consciousness requires a dynamic balance of integration and segregation in brain networks. We report an fMRI-based metric, the integration-segregation difference (ISD), which captures two key network properties: network efficiency (integration) and clustering (segregation). With this metric, we quantify brain state transitions from conscious wakefulness to unresponsiveness induced by the anesthetic propofol. The observed changes in ISD suggest a profound shift towards the segregation of brain networks during anesthesia. A common unimodal-transmodal sequence of disintegration and reintegration occurs in brain networks during, respectively, loss and return of responsiveness. Machine learning models using integration and segregation data accurately identify awake vs. unresponsive states and their transitions. Metastability (dynamic recurrence of non-equilibrium transient states) is more effectively explained by integration, while complexity (diversity of neural activity) is more closely linked with segregation. A parallel analysis of sleep states produces similar findings. Our results demonstrate that the ISD reliably indexes states of consciousness.

Markers of consciousness in infants: Towards a 'cluster-based' approach

As recently as the 1980s, it was not uncommon for paediatric surgeons to operate on infants without anaesthesia. Today, the same omission would be considered criminal malpractice, and there is an increased concern with the possibility of consciousness in the earliest stage of human infancy. This concern reflects a more general trend that has characterised science since the early 1990s of taking consciousness seriously. While this attitude shift has opened minds towards the possibility that our earliest experiences predate our first memories, convincing demonstrations of infant consciousness remain challenging given that infants cannot report on their experiences. Furthermore, while many behavioural and neural markers of consciousness that do not rely on language have been validated in adults, no one specific marker can be confidently translated to infancy. For this reason, we have proposed the 'cluster-based' approach, in which a consensus of evidence across many markers, all pointing towards the same developmental period, could be used to argue convincingly for the presence of consciousness. CONCLUSION: We review the most promising markers for early consciousness, arguing that consciousness is likely to be in place by 5 months of age if not earlier.

Electroencephalographic Features of Elderly Patients during Anesthesia Induction with Remimazolam: A Substudy of a Randomized Controlled Trial

BACKGROUND

Although remimazolam is used as a general anesthetic in elderly patients due to its hemodynamic stability, the electroencephalogram characteristics of remimazolam are not well known. The purpose of this study was to identify the electroencephalographic features of remimazolam-induced unconsciousness in elderly patients and compare them with propofol.

METHODS

Remimazolam (n = 26) or propofol (n = 26) were randomly administered for anesthesia induction in surgical patients. The hypnotic agent was blinded only to the patients. During the induction of anesthesia, remimazolam was administered at a rate of 6 mg · kg-1 · h-1, and propofol was administered at a target effect-site concentration of 3.5 μg/ml. The electroencephalogram signals from eight channels (Fp1, Fp2, Fz, F3, F4, Pz, P3, and P4, referenced to A2, using the 10 to 20 system) were acquired during the induction of anesthesia and in the postoperative care unit. Power spectrum analysis was performed, and directed functional connectivity between frontal and parietal regions was evaluated using normalized symbolic transfer entropy. Functional connectivity in unconscious processes induced by remimazolam or propofol was compared with baseline. To compare each power of frequency over time of the two hypnotic agents, a permutation test with t statistic was conducted.

RESULTS

Compared to the baseline in the alpha band, the feedback connectivity decreased by averages of 46% and 43%, respectively, after the loss of consciousness induced by remimazolam and propofol (95% CI for the mean difference: -0.073 to -0.044 for remimazolam [P < 0.001] and -0.068 to -0.042 for propofol [P < 0.001]). Asymmetry in the feedback and feedforward connectivity in the alpha band was suppressed after the loss of consciousness induced by remimazolam and propofol. There were no significant differences in the power of each frequency over time between the two hypnotic agents (minimum q value = 0.4235).

CONCLUSIONS

Both regimens showed a greater decrease in feedback connectivity compared to a decrease in feedforward connectivity after loss of consciousness, leading to a disruption of asymmetry between the frontoparietal connectivity.

EDITOR’S PERSPECTIVE

The Relation Between Subjective and Objective Measures of Visual Awareness: Current Evidence, Attempt of a Synthesis and Future Research Directions

Within the realm of consciousness research, different methods of measuring the content of visual awareness are used: On the one hand, subjective measures require a report of sensory experiences related to a stimulus. On the other hand, objective measures rely on the observer's performance to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus. The most appropriate measure of awareness is currently debated. To contribute to this debate, we review findings on the relation between subjective and objective measures of awareness. Although subjective measures sometimes lag behind objective measures, a substantial number of studies demonstrates a convergence of measures. Based on the reviewed studies, we identify five aspects relevant for achieving a convergence of measures. Future research could then identify and empirically test the boundary conditions, under which a convergence or divergence of subjective and measures of awareness is observed.

Development of emergent processes and threshold of consciousness with levels of processing

Introduction

The transition of experience from unconscious to conscious, the emergent process, is a crucial topic in consciousness studies. Three frameworks exist to explain the process: (1) consciousness arises in an all-or-none manner; (2) consciousness arises gradually; (3) consciousness arises either all at once or gradually, depending on the level of stimulus processing (low- vs. high-level). However, the development of emergent processes of consciousness remains unclear. This study examines the development of emergent processes of consciousness based on the level of stimulus processing framework.

Methods

Ninety-nine children (5-12 year-olds) and adults participated in two online discrimination tasks. These tasks involved color discrimination as lower-level processing and number magnitude discrimination as higher-level processing, as well as backward masking with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) varying from 16.7 to 266.7 ms. We measured objective discrimination accuracy and used a 4-scale Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) to assess subjective awareness. We fit the data to a four-parameter nonlinear function to estimate the center of the slope (threshold) and the range of the slope (gradualness, the measure of emergent process of consciousness) of the model.

Results

The results showed the threshold of objective discrimination was significantly higher in 5-6 year-olds than in 7-12 year-olds, but not of subjective awareness. The emergent process of objective discrimination in the number task was more gradual than in the color task.

Discussion

The findings suggest that the thresholds of subjective awareness in 5-6 year-olds and objective discrimination in 7-9 year-olds are similar to those in adults. Moreover, the emergent processes of subjective awareness and objective discrimination in 5-6 year-olds are also similar to those in adults. Our results support the level of processing hypothesis but suggest that its effects may differ across developmental stages.

The influence of spatial and temporal attention on visual awareness-a behavioral and ERP study

Whether attention is a prerequisite of perceptual awareness or an independent and dissociable process remains a matter of debate. Importantly, understanding the relation between attention and awareness is probably not possible without taking into account the fact that both are heterogeneous and multifaceted mechanisms. Therefore, the present study tested the impact on visual awareness of two attentional mechanisms proposed by the Posner model: temporal alerting and spatio-temporal orienting. Specifically, we evaluated the effects of attention on the perceptual level, by measuring objective and subjective awareness of a threshold-level stimulus; and on the neural level, by investigating how attention affects two postulated event-related potential correlates of awareness. We found that alerting and orienting mechanisms additively facilitate perceptual consciousness, with activation of the latter resulting in the most vivid awareness. Furthermore, we found that late positivity is unlikely to constitute a neural correlate of consciousness as its amplitude was modulated by both attentional mechanisms, but early visual awareness negativity was independent of the alerting and orienting mechanisms. In conclusion, our study reveals a nuanced relationship between attention and awareness; moreover, by investigating the effect of the alerting mechanism, this study provides insights into the role of temporal attention in perceptual consciousness.

A general theory of consciousness III the human catastrophe

It is generally assumed that verbal communication can articulate concepts like 'fact' and 'truth' accurately. However, language is fundamentally inaccurate and ambiguous and it is not possible to express exact propositions accurately in an ambiguous medium. Whether truth exists or not, language cannot express it in any exact way. A major problem for verbal communication is that words are fundamentally differently interpreted by the sender and the receiver. In addition, intrapersonal verbal communication - the voice in our head - is a useless extension to the thought process and results in misunderstanding our own thoughts. The evolvement of language has had a profound impact on human life. Most consequential has been that it allowed people to question the old human rules of behavior - the pre-language way of living. As language could not accurately express the old rules, they lost their authority and disappeared. A long period without any rules of how to live together must have followed, probably accompanied by complete chaos. Later, new rules were devised in language, but the new rules were also questioned and had to be enforced by punishment. Language changed the peaceful human way of living under the old rules into violent and aggressive forms of living under punitive control. Religion then tried to incorporate the old rules into the harsh verbal world. The rules were expressed in language through parables: imaginary beings - the gods - who possessed the power of the old rules, but who could be related to through their human appearance and behavior.

Revealing the mechanisms of semantic satiation with deep learning models

The phenomenon of semantic satiation, which refers to the loss of meaning of a word or phrase after being repeated many times, is a well-known psychological phenomenon. However, the microscopic neural computational principles responsible for these mechanisms remain unknown. In this study, we use a deep learning model of continuous coupled neural networks to investigate the mechanism underlying semantic satiation and precisely describe this process with neuronal components. Our results suggest that, from a mesoscopic perspective, semantic satiation may be a bottom-up process. Unlike existing macroscopic psychological studies that suggest that semantic satiation is a top-down process, our simulations use a similar experimental paradigm as classical psychology experiments and observe similar results. Satiation of semantic objectives, similar to the learning process of our network model used for object recognition, relies on continuous learning and switching between objects. The underlying neural coupling strengthens or weakens satiation. Taken together, both neural and network mechanisms play a role in controlling semantic satiation.

Measuring the dynamic balance of integration and segregation underlying consciousness, anesthesia, and sleep

Consciousness requires a dynamic balance of integration and segregation in functional brain networks. An optimal integration-segregation balance depends on two key aspects of functional connectivity: global efficiency (i.e., integration) and clustering (i.e., segregation). We developed a new fMRI-based measure, termed the integration-segregation difference (ISD), which captures both aspects. We used this metric to quantify changes in brain state from conscious wakefulness to loss of responsiveness induced by the anesthetic propofol. The observed changes in ISD suggest a profound shift to segregation in both whole brain and all brain subnetworks during anesthesia. Moreover, brain networks displayed similar sequences of disintegration and subsequent reintegration during, respectively, loss and return of responsiveness. Random forest machine learning models, trained with the integration and segregation of brain networks, identified the awake vs. unresponsive states and their transitions with accuracy up to 93%. We found that metastability (i.e., the dynamic recurrence of non-equilibrium transient states) is more effectively explained by integration, while complexity (i.e., diversity and intricacy of neural activity) is more closely linked with segregation. The analysis of a sleep dataset revealed similar findings. Our results demonstrate that the integration-segregation balance is a useful index that can differentiate among various conscious and unconscious states.

Extrapolating animal consciousness

I argue that the question of animal consciousness is an extrapolation problem and, as such, is best tackled by deploying currently accepted methodology for validating experimental models of a phenomenon of interest. This methodology relies on an assessment of similarities and dissimilarities between experimental models, the partial replication of findings across complementary models, and evidence from the successes and failures of explanations, technologies and medical applications developed by extrapolating and aggregating findings from multiple models. Crucially important, this methodology does not require a commitment to any particular theory or construct of consciousness, thus avoiding theory-biased reinterpretations of empirical findings rampant in the literature.

Using virtual reality to induce multi-trial inattentional blindness despite trial-by-trial measures of awareness

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

A theory of visibility measures in the dissociation paradigm

Research on perception without awareness primarily relies on the dissociation paradigm, which compares a measure of awareness of a critical stimulus (direct measure) with a measure indicating that the stimulus has been processed at all (indirect measure). We argue that dissociations between direct and indirect measures can only be demonstrated with respect to the critical stimulus feature that generates the indirect effect, and the observer's awareness of that feature, the critical cue. We expand Kahneman's (Psychological Bulletin, 70, 404-425, 1968) concept of criterion content to comprise the set of all cues that an observer actually uses to perform the direct task. Different direct measures can then be compared by studying the overlap of their criterion contents and their containment of the critical cue. Because objective and subjective measures may integrate different sets of cues, one measure generally cannot replace the other without sacrificing important information. Using a simple mathematical formalization, we redefine and clarify the concepts of validity, exclusiveness, and exhaustiveness in the dissociation paradigm, show how dissociations among different awareness measures falsify both single-valued measures and monocausal theories of "consciousness," and formulate the demand that theories of visual awareness should be sufficiently specific to explain dissociations among different facets of awareness.

Modelling human vision needs to account for subjective experience

Vision is inseparably connected to perceptual awareness which can be seen as the culmination of sensory processing. Studies on conscious vision reveal that object recognition is just one of the means through which our representation of the world is built. We propose an operationalization of subjective experience in the context of deep neural networks (DNNs) that could encourage a more thorough comparison of human and artificial vision.

Subjective and objective measures of visual awareness converge

Within consciousness research, the most appropriate assessment of visual awareness is matter of a controversial debate: Subjective measures rely on introspections of the observer related to perceptual experiences, whereas objective measures are based on performance of the observer to accurately detect or discriminate the stimulus in question across a series of trials. In the present study, we compared subjective and objective awareness measurements across different stimulus feature and contrast levels using a temporal two-alternative forced choice task. This task has the advantage to provide an objective psychophysical performance measurement, while minimizing biases from unconscious processing. Thresholds based on subjective ratings with the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) and on performance accuracy were determined for detection (stimulus presence) and discrimination (letter case) tasks at high and low stimulus contrast. We found a comparable pattern of thresholds across tasks and contrasts for objective and subjective measurements of awareness. These findings suggest that objective performance measures based on accuracy and subjective ratings of the visual experience can provide similar information on the feature-content of a percept. The observed similarity of thresholds validates psychophysical and subjective approaches to awareness as providing converging and thus most likely veridical measures of awareness.

Method for quantifying arousal and consciousness in healthy states and severe brain injury via EEG-based measures of corticothalamic physiology

BACKGROUND

Characterization of normal arousal states has been achieved by fitting predictions of corticothalamic neural field theory (NFT) to electroencephalographic (EEG) spectra to yield relevant physiological parameters.

NEW METHOD

A prior fitting method is extended to distinguish conscious and unconscious states in healthy and brain injured subjects by identifying additional parameters and clusters in parameter space.

RESULTS

Fits of NFT predictions to EEG spectra are used to estimate neurophysiological parameters in healthy and brain injured subjects. Spectra are used from healthy subjects in wake and sleep and from patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, in a minimally conscious state (MCS), and emerged from MCS. Subjects cluster into three groups in parameter space: conscious healthy (wake and REM), sleep, and brain injured. These are distinguished by the difference X-Y between corticocortical (X) and corticothalamic (Y) feedbacks, and by mean neural response rates α and β to incoming spikes. X-Y tracks consciousness in healthy individuals, with smaller values in wake/REM than sleep, but cannot distinguish between brain injuries. Parameters α and β differentiate deep sleep from wake/REM and brain injury.

COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS

Other methods typically rely on laborious clinical assessment, manual EEG scoring, or evaluation of measures like Φ from integrated information theory, for which no efficient method exists. In contrast, the present method can be automated on a personal computer.

CONCLUSION

The method provides a means to quantify consciousness and arousal in healthy and brain injured subjects, but does not distinguish subtypes of brain injury.

Fronto-parietal networks shape human conscious report through attention gain and reorienting

How do attention and consciousness interact in the human brain? Rival theories of consciousness disagree on the role of fronto-parietal attentional networks in conscious perception. We recorded neural activity from 727 intracerebral contacts in 13 epileptic patients, while they detected near-threshold targets preceded by attentional cues. Clustering revealed three neural patterns: first, attention-enhanced conscious report accompanied sustained right-hemisphere fronto-temporal activity in networks connected by the superior longitudinal fasciculus (SLF) II-III, and late accumulation of activity (>300 ms post-target) in bilateral dorso-prefrontal and right-hemisphere orbitofrontal cortex (SLF I-III). Second, attentional reorienting affected conscious report through early, sustained activity in a right-hemisphere network (SLF III). Third, conscious report accompanied left-hemisphere dorsolateral-prefrontal activity. Task modeling with recurrent neural networks revealed multiple clusters matching the identified brain clusters, elucidating the causal relationship between clusters in conscious perception of near-threshold targets. Thus, distinct, hemisphere-asymmetric fronto-parietal networks support attentional gain and reorienting in shaping human conscious experience.

EEG Lempel-Ziv complexity varies with sleep stage, but does not seem to track dream experience

In a recent electroencephalography (EEG) sleep study inspired by complexity theories of consciousness, we found that multi-channel signal diversity progressively decreased from wakefulness to slow wave sleep, but failed to find any significant difference between dreaming and non-dreaming awakenings within the same sleep stage (NREM2). However, we did find that multi-channel Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) measured over the posterior cortex increased with more perceptual ratings of NREM2 dream experience along a thought-perceptual axis. In this follow-up study, we re-tested our previous findings, using a slightly different approach. Partial sleep-deprivation was followed by evening sleep experiments, with repeated awakenings and immediate dream reports. Participants reported whether they had been dreaming, and were asked to rate how diverse, vivid, perceptual, and thought-like the contents of their dreams were. High density (64 channel) EEG was recorded throughout the experiment, and mean single-channel LZC was calculated for each 30 s sleep epoch. LZC progressively decreased with depth of non-REM sleep. Surprisingly, estimated marginal mean LZC was slightly higher for NREM1 than for wakefulness, but the difference did not remain significant after adjusting for multiple comparisons. We found no significant difference in LZC between dream and non-dream awakenings, nor any significant relationship between LZC and subjective ratings of dream experience, within the same sleep stage (NREM2). The failure to reproduce our own previous finding of a positive correlation between posterior LZC and more perceptual dream experiences, or to find any other correlation between brain signal complexity and subjective experience within NREM2 sleep, raises the question of whether EEG LZC is really a reliable correlate of richness of experience as such, within the same sleep stage.

Role of visual awareness on semantic integration of sequentially presented words: An fMRI study

Reading comprehension requires the semantic integration of words across space and time. However, it remains unclear whether comprehension requires visual awareness for such semantic integration. Compared to earlier studies that investigated semantic integration indirectly from its priming effect, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to directly examine the processes of semantic integration with or without visual awareness. Specifically, we manipulated participants' visual awareness by continuous flash suppression (CFS) while they viewed a meaningful sequence of four Chinese words (i.e., an idiom) or its meaningless counterpart (i.e., a random sequence). Behaviorally, participants had better recognition memory for idioms than random sequences only when their visual awareness was interfered rather than blocked by CFS. Neurally, semantics-processing areas, such as the superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, were significantly activated only when participants were aware of word sequences, be they meaningful or meaningless. By contrast, orthography-processing areas, such as the fusiform gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus, were significantly activated regardless of visual awareness or word sequence. Taken together, these results suggest that visual awareness modules the functioning of the semantic neural network in the brain and facilitates reading comprehension.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Functional network antagonism and consciousness

Spontaneous brain activity changes across states of consciousness. A particular consciousness-mediated configuration is the anticorrelations between the default mode network and other brain regions. What this antagonistic organization implies about consciousness to date remains inconclusive. In this Perspective Article, we propose that anticorrelations are the physiological expression of the concept of segregation, namely the brain's capacity to show selectivity in the way areas will be functionally connected. We postulate that this effect is mediated by the process of neural inhibition, by regulating global and local inhibitory activity. While recognizing that this effect can also result from other mechanisms, neural inhibition helps the understanding of how network metastability is affected after disrupting local and global neural balance. In combination with relevant theories of consciousness, we suggest that anticorrelations are a physiological prior that can work as a marker of preserved consciousness. We predict that if the brain is not in a state to host anticorrelations, then most likely the individual does not entertain subjective experience. We believe that this link between anticorrelations and the underlying physiology will help not only to comprehend how consciousness happens, but also conceptualize effective interventions for treating consciousness disorders in which anticorrelations seem particularly affected.

Thalamic deep brain stimulation paradigm to reduce consciousness: Cortico-striatal dynamics implicated in mechanisms of consciousness

Anesthetic manipulations provide much-needed causal evidence for neural correlates of consciousness, but non-specific drug effects complicate their interpretation. Evidence suggests that thalamic deep brain stimulation (DBS) can either increase or decrease consciousness, depending on the stimulation target and parameters. The putative role of the central lateral thalamus (CL) in consciousness makes it an ideal DBS target to manipulate circuit-level mechanisms in cortico-striato-thalamic (CST) systems, thereby influencing consciousness and related processes. We used multi-microelectrode DBS targeted to CL in macaques while recording from frontal, parietal, and striatal regions. DBS induced episodes of abnormally long, vacant staring with low-frequency oscillations here termed vacant, perturbed consciousness (VPC). DBS modulated VPC likelihood in a frequency-specific manner. VPC events corresponded to decreases in measures of neural complexity (entropy) and integration (Φ*), proposed indices of consciousness, and substantial changes to communication in CST circuits. During VPC, power spectral density and coherence at low frequencies increased across CST circuits, especially in thalamo-parietal and cortico-striatal pathways. Decreased consciousness and neural integration corresponded to shifts in cortico-striatal network configurations that dissociated parietal and subcortical structures. Overall, the features of VPC and implicated networks were similar to those of absence epilepsy. As this same multi-microelectrode DBS method-but at different stimulation frequencies-can also increase consciousness in anesthetized macaques, it can be used to flexibly address questions of consciousness with limited confounds, as well as inform clinical investigations of other consciousness disorders.

Theories of consciousness

Recent years have seen a blossoming of theories about the biological and physical basis of consciousness. Good theories guide empirical research, allowing us to interpret data, develop new experimental techniques and expand our capacity to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. Indeed, it is only when couched in terms of a theory that empirical discoveries can ultimately deliver a satisfying understanding of a phenomenon. However, in the case of consciousness, it is unclear how current theories relate to each other, or whether they can be empirically distinguished. To clarify this complicated landscape, we review four prominent theoretical approaches to consciousness: higher-order theories, global workspace theories, re-entry and predictive processing theories and integrated information theory. We describe the key characteristics of each approach by identifying which aspects of consciousness they propose to explain, what their neurobiological commitments are and what empirical data are adduced in their support. We consider how some prominent empirical debates might distinguish among these theories, and we outline three ways in which theories need to be developed to deliver a mature regimen of theory-testing in the neuroscience of consciousness. There are good reasons to think that the iterative development, testing and comparison of theories of consciousness will lead to a deeper understanding of this most profound of mysteries.

Unconscious Visual Working Memory: A critical review and Bayesian meta-analysis

The relationship between consciousness and working memory (WM) has been recently debated both at the theoretical and methodological levels (Persuh et al., 2018; Velichkovsky, 2017). While there is behavioral and neural evidence that argues for the existence of unconscious WM, several methodological concerns have been raised, rendering this issue highly controversial. To address the robustness of the previous findings, here we adopt a meta-analytic approach to estimate the effect size and heterogeneity of the previously reported unconscious WM results, also including unpublished results. We used meta-regression to isolate relevant experimental variables, in particular, consciousness manipulation and the WM paradigm to identify the source of the heterogeneity in the reported effect size of the unconscious WM. Our meta-analysis supports the existence of the unconscious WM effect and critically reveals several experimental variables that contribute to relevant heterogeneity. Our analysis clarifies several theoretical and methodological issues. We recommend that future studies explicitly operationalize the definition of consciousness, standardize the methodology and systematically explore the role of critical variables for the unconscious WM effect.

Meta-criteria to formulate criteria of consciousness

Any neurobiological model claiming explanation of a complex human phenomenon should start with an explicit definition of the explanandum. If a classical intensional definition is impossible, we can use a descriptive definition by listing necessary criteria (e.g., of consciousness). This commentary suggests four meta-criteria that different proposed criteria of consciousness should fulfill: phenomenological consensus, empirical evidence, domain specificity, and non-circularity.

The neural hierarchy of consciousness

The chief undertaking in the studies of consciousness is that of unravelling "the minimal set of neural processes that are together sufficient for the conscious experience of a particular content - the neural correlates of consciousness". To this day, this crusade remains at an impasse, with a clash of two main theories: consciousness may arise either in a graded and cortically-localised fashion, or in an all-or-none and widespread one. In spite of the long-lasting theoretical debates, neurophysiological theories of consciousness have been mostly dissociated from them. Herein, a theoretical review will be put forth with the aim to change that. In its first half, we will cover the hard available evidence on the neurophysiology of consciousness, whereas in its second half we will weave a series of considerations on both theories and substantiate a novel take on conscious awareness: the levels of processing approach, partitioning the conscious architecture into lower- and higher-order, graded and nonlinear.

A tentative I/O curve with consciousness: Effects of multiple simultaneous ambiguous figures presentation on perceptual reversals and time estimation

This study was aimed at investigating mechanisms of consciousness using bistable perception. In 4 experimental conditions, 1, 2, 4 or 8 Rubin's face-vase ambiguous figures were presented for 3 min.In Experiment 1, 40 subjects looked at the center of the screen and pressed a specific key correspondent to the figure where they perceived a reversal. In Experiment 2, 32 subjects controlled with eye-tracker performed a similar task in which they pressed the spacebar whenever they perceived a reversal in any of the figures.At the end of each condition subjects estimated its duration. Results showed that changing the number of figures does not alter the number of reversals, producing a flat I/O curve between the two parameters. Estimated time lapse showed a negative correlation with the number of reversals. These findings are discussed considering the relationships between bistable perception, attention, and consciousness, as well as the time perception literature.

What can we experience and report on a rapidly presented image? Intersubjective measures of specificity of freely reported contents of consciousness

Background: A majority of previous studies appear to support a view that human observers can only perceive coarse information from a natural scene image when it is presented rapidly (<100ms, masked). In these studies, participants were often forced to choose an answer from options that experimenters preselected. These options can underestimate what participants experience and can report on it. The current study aims to introduce a novel methodology to investigate how detailed information participants can report after briefly seeing a natural scene image.     Methods: We used a novel free-report paradigm to examine what people can freely report following a rapidly presented natural scene image (67/133/267ms, masked). N = 600 online participants typed up to five words to report what they saw in the image together with confidence of the respective responses. We developed a novel index, Intersubjective Agreement (IA). IA quantifies how specifically the response words were used to describe the target image, with a high value meaning the word is not often reported for other images. Importantly, IA eliminates the need for experimenters to preselect response options. Results: The words with high IA values are often something detailed (e.g., a small object) in a particular image. With IA, unlike commonly believed, we demonstrated that participants reported highly specific and detailed aspects of the briefly (even at 67ms, masked) shown image. Further, IA is positively correlated with confidence, indicating metacognitive conscious access to the reported aspects of the image. Conclusion: These new findings challenge the dominant view that the content of rapid scene experience is limited to global and coarse gist. Our novel paradigm opens a door to investigate various contents of consciousness with a free-report paradigm.

What can we experience and report on a rapidly presented image? Intersubjective measures of specificity of freely reported contents of consciousness

Background: A majority of previous studies appear to support a view that human observers can only perceive coarse information from a natural scene image when it is presented rapidly (<100ms, masked). In these studies, participants were often forced to choose an answer from options that experimenters preselected. These options can underestimate what participants experience and can report on it. The current study aims to introduce a novel methodology to investigate how detailed information participants can report after briefly seeing a natural scene image.     Methods: We used a novel free-report paradigm to examine what people can freely report following a rapidly presented natural scene image (67/133/267ms, masked). N = 670 online participants typed up to five words to report what they saw in the image together with confidence of the respective responses. We developed a novel index, Intersubjective Agreement (IA). IA quantifies how specifically the response words were used to describe the target image, with a high value meaning the word is not often reported for other images. Importantly, IA eliminates the need for experimenters to preselect response options. Results: The words with high IA values are often something detailed (e.g., a small object) in a particular image. With IA, unlike commonly believed, we demonstrated that participants reported highly specific and detailed aspects of the briefly (even at 67ms, masked) shown image. Further, IA is positively correlated with confidence, indicating metacognitive conscious access to the reported aspects of the image. Conclusion: These new findings challenge the dominant view that the content of rapid scene experience is limited to global and coarse gist. Our novel paradigm opens a door to investigate various contents of consciousness with a free-report paradigm.

What can we experience and report on a rapidly presented image? Intersubjective measures of specificity of freely reported contents of consciousness

Background: A majority of previous studies appear to support a view that human observers can only perceive coarse information from a natural scene image when it is presented rapidly (<100ms, masked). In these studies, participants were often forced to choose an answer from options that experimenters preselected. These options can underestimate what participants experience and can report on it. The current study aims to introduce a novel methodology to investigate how detailed information participants can report after briefly seeing a natural scene image. Methods: We used a novel free-report paradigm to examine what people can freely report following a rapidly presented natural scene image (67/133/267ms, masked). N = 670 online participants typed up to five words to report what they saw in the image together with confidence of the respective responses. We developed a novel index, Intersubjective Agreement (IA). IA quantifies how specifically the response words were used to describe the target image, with a high value meaning the word is not often reported for other images. Importantly, IA eliminates the need for experimenters to preselect response options. Results: The words with high IA values are often something detailed (e.g., a small object) in a particular image. With IA, unlike commonly believed, we demonstrated that participants reported highly specific and detailed aspects of the briefly (even at 67ms, masked) shown image. Further, IA is positively correlated with confidence, indicating metacognitive conscious access to the reported aspects of the image. Conclusion: These new findings challenge the dominant view that the content of rapid scene experience is limited to global and coarse gist. Our novel paradigm opens a door to investigate various contents of consciousness with a free-report paradigm.

Dynamic development of intuitions and explicit knowledge during implicit learning

Implicit learning refers to learning without conscious awareness of the content acquired. Theoretical frameworks of human cognition suggest that intuitions develop based on incomplete perceptions of regularity during implicit learning and, in turn, lead to the development of more explicit, consciously-accessible knowledge. Surprisingly, however, this putative information processing pathway (i.e., implicit learning ➔ intuition ➔ explicit knowledge) has yet to be empirically demonstrated. The present study investigated the relationship between implicit learning, intuitions, and explicit knowledge using a modified Serial Reaction Time Task. Results indicate that intuitions of implicitly-learned patterns emerge prior to the development of explicit knowledge. Moreover, intuition timing and accuracy were significantly associated with accuracy of explicit reports. We did not, however, find that stronger implicit learners developed more accurate intuitions. Our findings suggest a crucial role of intuition in the formation of explicit knowledge from implicit learning.

Expanding the discussion: Revision of the fundamental assumptions framing the study of the neural correlates of consciousness

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models, and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by Crick and Koch's seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process, and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover, it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing more aspects of the phenomenon.

Modelling visibility judgments using models of decision confidence

How can we explain the regularities in subjective reports of human observers about their subjective visual experience of a stimulus? The present study tests whether a recent model of confidence in perceptual decisions, the weighted evidence and visibility model, can be generalized from confidence to subjective visibility. In a postmasked orientation identification task, observers reported the subjective visibility of the stimulus after each single identification response. Cognitive modelling revealed that the weighted evidence and visibility model provided a superior fit to the data compared with the standard signal detection model, the signal detection model with unsystematic noise superimposed on ratings, the postdecisional accumulation model, the two-channel model, the response-congruent evidence model, the two-dimensional Bayesian model, and the constant noise and decay model. A comparison between subjective visibility and decisional confidence revealed that visibility relied more on the strength of sensory evidence about features of the stimulus irrelevant to the identification judgment and less on evidence for the identification judgment. It is argued that at least two types of evidence are required to account for subjective visibility, one related to the identification judgment, and one related to the strength of stimulation.

No validity without a theory-a critical look at subjective measures of consciousness

Michel (The mismeasure of consciousness: a problem of coordination for the perceptual awareness scale. Philos Sci 2019;86:1239–49) claims that the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) faces the problem of coordination (also known as validity). We argue that his claim holds only under certain theoretical assumptions which need to be made explicit as these are likely not in line with the PAS proponents’ standpoint. We also call for terminological clarity, an example being the usage of ‘levels’ of consciousness. Precise terminology combined with an explicit reference to the chosen theoretical perspective is necessary conditions for making progress in consciousness research and the development of consciousness theories.

Toward Studying Cognition in a Dish

Bioengineered neural tissues help advance our understanding of neurodevelopment, regeneration, and neural disease; however, it remains unclear whether they can replicate higher-order functions including cognition. Building upon technical achievements in the fields of biomaterials, tissue engineering, and cell biology, investigators have generated an assortment of artificial brain structures and cocultured circuits. Though they have displayed basic electrochemical signaling, their capacities to generate minimal patterns of information processing suggestive of high-order cognitive analogues have not yet been explored. Here, we review the current state of neural tissue engineering and consider the possibility of a study of cognition in vitro. We adopt a practical definition of minimal cognition, anticipate problems of measurement, and discuss solutions toward a study of cognition in a dish.

Growing evidence for separate neural mechanisms for attention and consciousness

Our conscious experience of the world seems to go in lockstep with our attentional focus: We tend to see, hear, taste, and feel what we attend to, and vice versa. This tight coupling between attention and consciousness has given rise to the idea that these two phenomena are indivisible. In the late 1950s, the honoree of this special issue, Charles Eriksen, was among a small group of early pioneers that sought to investigate whether a transient increase in overall level of attention (alertness) in response to a noxious stimulus can be decoupled from conscious perception using experimental techniques. Recent years saw a similar debate regarding whether attention and consciousness are two dissociable processes. Initial evidence that attention and consciousness are two separate processes primarily rested on behavioral data. However, the past couple of years witnessed an explosion of studies aimed at testing this conjecture using neuroscientific techniques. Here we provide an overview of these and related empirical studies on the distinction between the neuronal correlates of attention and consciousness, and detail how advancements in theory and technology can bring about a more detailed understanding of the two. We argue that the most promising approach will combine ever-evolving neurophysiological and interventionist tools with quantitative, empirically testable theories of consciousness that are grounded in a mathematically formalized understanding of phenomenology.

A review of the neurobiomechanical processes underlying secure gripping in object manipulation

O'SHEA, H. and S. J. Redmond. A review of the neurobiomechanical processes underlying secure gripping in object manipulation. NEUROSCI BIOBEHAV REV 286-300, 2021. Humans display skilful control over the objects they manipulate, so much so that biomimetic systems have yet to emulate this remarkable behaviour. Two key control processes are assumed to facilitate such dexterity: predictive cognitive-motor processes that guide manipulation procedures by anticipating action outcomes; and reactive sensorimotor processes that provide important error-based information for movement adaptation. Notwithstanding increased interdisciplinary research interest in object manipulation behaviour, the complexity of the perceptual-sensorimotor-cognitive processes involved and the theoretical divide regarding the fundamentality of control mean that the essential mechanisms underlying manipulative action remain undetermined. In this paper, following a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical bases for understanding human dexterous movement, we emphasise the role of tactile-related sensory events in secure object handling, and consider the contribution of certain biophysical and biomechanical phenomena. We aim to provide an integrated account of the current state-of-art in skilled human-object interaction that bridges the literature in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and biophysics. We also propose novel directions for future research exploration in this area.

Will We Ever Have Conscious Machines?

The question of whether artificial beings or machines could become self-aware or conscious has been a philosophical question for centuries. The main problem is that self-awareness cannot be observed from an outside perspective and the distinction of being really self-aware or merely a clever imitation cannot be answered without access to knowledge about the mechanism's inner workings. We investigate common machine learning approaches with respect to their potential ability to become self-aware. We realize that many important algorithmic steps toward machines with a core consciousness have already been taken.

Can unconscious sequential integration of semantic information occur when the prime Chinese characters are displayed from left to right?

Recent studies have investigated whether conscious awareness is necessary for semantic integration. Although results have varied, simultaneous presentation of words have consistently led to greater semantic integration than sequential presentation in a single location. The current studies were designed to investigate whether the disadvantage of sequential presentation for unconscious semantic integration is specific to unfamiliar word-by-word presentation in one location or extends to the more natural reading conditions of viewing items sequentially from left to right. In Experiment 1, when the first three characters of Chinese idioms were presented simultaneously under masked conditions, performance on a separate two-alternative forced-choice recognition task was at chance level. Despite being unaware of the identity of prime characters, participants were faster to indicate that a subsequent item was a Chinese character when it was congruent with the beginning of the idiom, thus providing evidence of semantic integration. In contrast, when the three (Experiment 2) or two (Experiment 3) prime characters were presented sequentially in time from left to right, there was no evidence of semantic integration. These results indicate that unconscious semantic integration is more limited than previously reported, and may require simultaneous visual presentation.

Behavioral, Physiological and EEG Activities Associated with Conditioned Fear as Sensors for Fear and Anxiety

Anxiety disorders impose substantial costs upon public health and productivity in the USA and worldwide. At present, these conditions are quantified by self-report questionnaires that only apply to behaviors that are accessible to consciousness, or by the timing of responses to fear- and anxiety-related words that are indirect since they do not produce fear, e.g., Dot Probe Test and emotional Stroop. We now review the conditioned responses (CRs) to fear produced by a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus CS+) when it cues a painful laser unconditioned stimulus (US). These CRs include autonomic (Skin Conductance Response) and ratings of the CS+ unpleasantness, ability to command attention, and the recognition of the association of CS+ with US (expectancy). These CRs are directly related to fear, and some measure behaviors that are minimally accessible to consciousness e.g., economic scales. Fear-related CRs include non-phase-locked phase changes in oscillatory EEG power defined by frequency and time post-stimulus over baseline, and changes in phase-locked visual and laser evoked responses both of which include late potentials reflecting attention or expectancy, like the P300, or contingent negative variation. Increases (ERS) and decreases (ERD) in oscillatory power post-stimulus may be generalizable given their consistency across healthy subjects. ERS and ERD are related to the ratings above as well as to anxious personalities and clinical anxiety and can resolve activity over short time intervals like those for some moods and emotions. These results could be incorporated into an objective instrumented test that measures EEG and CRs of autonomic activity and psychological ratings related to conditioned fear, some of which are subliminal. As in the case of instrumented tests of vigilance, these results could be useful for the direct, objective measurement of multiple aspects of the risk, diagnosis, and monitoring of therapies for anxiety disorders and anxious personalities.

Predictions from masked motion with and without obstacles

Predicting the future is essential for organisms like Homo sapiens, who live in a dynamic and ever-changing world. Previous research has established that conscious stimuli can lead to non-conscious predictions. Here we examine whether masked stimuli can also induce such predictions. We use masked movement-with and without obstacles-to examine predictions from masked stimuli. In six experiments a moving object was masked using continuous flash suppression (CFS). A few hundred milliseconds after the object had disappeared, a conscious probe appeared in a location that was either consistent with the masked stimulus or not. In Experiments 1-3 the movement was linear, and reaction times (RTs) indicated predictions that were based on direction and speed of movement. In Experiment 4, the masked moving object collided with an obstacle and then disappeared. Predictions in this case should reflect deflection, and indeed reaction times revealed predictions on the deflection route. In Experiments 5 and 6 we introduce an innovative way of using eye-tracking during continuous flash suppression (CFS) and report physiological evidence-in the forms of eye-movements-for masked stimuli induced predictions. We thus conclude that humans can use dynamic masked stimuli to generate active predictions about the future, and use these predictions to guide behavior. We also discuss the possible interpretations of these findings in light of the current scientific discussion regarding the relation between masked presentation, subliminal perception and awareness measurement methods.

Implicit processing during inattentional blindness: A systematic review and meta-analysis

The occurrence of implicit processing of visual stimuli during inattentional blindness is still a matter of debate. To assess the evidence available in this debate, we conducted a systematic review of articles that explored whether unexpected visual stimuli presented during inattentional blindness are implicitly processed despite not being reported. Additionally, we employed meta-analysis to combine 59 behavioral experiments and investigate the statistical support for such implicit processing across experiments. Results showed that visual stimuli can be processed when unattended and unnoticed. Additionally, we reviewed the measures used to assess participants' awareness of the unexpected stimuli. We also employed meta-analysis to search for differences in awareness of the unexpected stimuli that may result from adopting distinct criteria to categorize participants as aware or unaware. The results showed that the overall effect of awareness changed depending on whether more demanding or less demanding measures of awareness were employed. This suggests that the choice of awareness measure may influence conclusions about whether processing of the US is implicit or explicit. We discuss the implications of these results for the study of implicit processing and the role of attention in visual cognition.

Visual awareness and the levels of processing hypothesis: A critical review

Does a visual percept emerge to consciousness in a graded manner (i.e. evolving through increasing degrees of clarity), or according to a dichotomous, "all-or-none" pattern (i.e. abruptly transitioning from unawareness to awareness)? The level of processing hypothesis (LoP; B. Windey and A. Cleeremans, 2015) recently proposed a theoretical framework where the transition from unaware to aware visual experience is graded for low-level stimulus representations (i.e. stimulus "energy" or "feature" levels) whereas it is dichotomous for high-level (i.e. the perception of "letters", "words" or "meaning") stimulus perception. Here, we will critically review current behavioral and brain-based evidence on the LoP hypothesis and discuss potential challenges (such as differences in LoP conceptualizations, awareness scale related issues, attentional confounds and divergences on experimental factors or statistical analyses) which might be of use for future research within the field. Overall, the LoP hypothesis is a recent and promising proposal that attempts to integrate divergent evidence on the graded vs. dichotomous emergence of awareness debate. Whereas current evidence validates some of the assumptions proposed by the LoP account, there is still much work to do on both methodological and experimental levels. Future neuroimaging studies might help to disentangle the current complex pattern of results found in LoP studies and, importantly, shed some light on the ongoing debate about the search for the Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC).

Channels to consciousness: a possible role of gap junctions in consciousness

The neurophysiological basis of consciousness is still unknown and one of the most challenging questions in the field of neuroscience and related disciplines. We propose that consciousness is characterized by the maintenance of mental representations of internal and external stimuli for the execution of cognitive operations. Consciousness cannot exist without working memory, and it is likely that consciousness and working memory share the same neural substrates. Here, we present a novel psychological and neurophysiological framework that explains the role of consciousness for cognition, adaptive behavior, and everyday life. A hypothetical architecture of consciousness is presented that is organized as a system of operation and storage units named platforms that are controlled by a consciousness center (central executive/online platform). Platforms maintain mental representations or contents, are entrusted with different executive functions, and operate at different levels of consciousness. The model includes conscious-mode central executive/online and mental time travel platforms and semiconscious steady-state and preconscious standby platforms. Mental representations or contents are represented by neural circuits and their support cells (astrocytes, oligodendrocytes, etc.) and become conscious when neural circuits reverberate, that is, fire sequentially and continuously with relative synchronicity. Reverberatory activity in neural circuits may be initiated and maintained by pacemaker cells/neural circuit pulsars, enhanced electronic coupling via gap junctions, and unapposed hemichannel opening. The central executive/online platform controls which mental representations or contents should become conscious by recruiting pacemaker cells/neural network pulsars, the opening of hemichannels, and promoting enhanced neural circuit coupling via gap junctions.

The temporal evolution of pre-stimulus slow cortical potentials is associated with an upcoming stimulus' access to visual consciousness

Slow cortical potentials (SCPs) have been proposed to be essential for the formation of conscious experience. To examine their temporal characteristics, we recorded electroencephalography during a visual backward-masking task, which required participants to localize the missing part of a target stimulus. A subsequent confidence rating was used as a proxy for the target's access to consciousness. Event-related potentials (ERPs) of all correct trials were determined relative to a brief period immediately before the target and then compared among consciousness levels. In an interval ranging from 2 s prior to target presentation up to this period, a negative relationship between slowly fluctuating ERP values and the level of consciousness became evident. After target presentation, high conscious awareness was characterized by an enhanced visual awareness negativity, an increased P3 component, and associated positive SCPs. Together, these findings add new evidence to the proposed role of SCPs in the emergence of visual consciousness.

Modelling effects of consciousness disorders in brainstem computational model – Preliminary findings

Objectives

Disorders of consciousness are very big medical and social problem. Their variability, problems in precise definition and proper diagnosis make difficult assessing their causes and effectiveness of the therapy. In the paper we present our point of view to a problem of consciousness and its most common disorders.

Methods

For this moment scientists do not know exactly, if these disorders can be a result of simple but general mechanism, or a complex set of mechanisms, both on neural, molecular or system level. Presented in the paper simulations using neural network models, including biologically relevant consciousness’ modelling, help assess influence of specified causes.

Results

Nonmotoric brain activity can play important role within diagnostic process as a supplementary method for motor capabilities. Simple brain sensory (e.g. visual) processing of both healthy subject and people with consciousness disorders help checking hypotheses in the area of consciousness’ disorders’ mechanisms, including associations between consciousness and its neural correlates.

Conclusions

The results are promising. Project announced herein will be developed and its next result will be presented in subsequent articles.