The slippery slope of fear

The influence of false interoceptive feedback on emotional state and balance responses to height-induced postural threat

Postural threat elicits a robust emotional response (e.g., fear and anxiety about falling), with concomitant modifications in balance. Recent theoretical accounts propose that emotional responses to postural threats are manifested, in part, from the conscious monitoring and appraisal of bodily signals ('interoception'). Here, we empirically probe the role of interoception in shaping emotional responses to a postural threat by experimentally manipulating interoceptive cardiac feedback. Sixty young adults completed a single 60-s trial under the following conditions: Ground (no threat) without heart rate (HR) feedback, followed by Threat (standing on the edge of a raised surface), during which participants received either false heart rate feedback (either slow [n = 20] or fast [n = 20] HR feedback) or no feedback (n = 20). Participants provided with false fast HR feedback during postural threat felt more fearful, reported feeling less stable, and rated the task more difficult than participants who did not receive HR feedback, or those who received false slow HR feedback (Cohen's d effect size = 0.79 - 1.78). However, behavioural responses did not significantly differ across the three groups. When compared to the no HR feedback group, false slow HR feedback did not significantly affect emotional or behavioural responses to the postural threat. These observations provide the first experimental evidence for emerging theoretical accounts describing the role of interoception in the generation of emotional responses to postural threats.

The Interplay between Fear Reactivity and Callous-Unemotional Traits Predicting Reactive and Proactive Aggression

Research has indicated that youths with CU traits are fearless, and this fearlessness plays a bidirectional role in both the development of CU traits and engagement in aggressive behavior. However, research specifically testing the role of fear in the association between CU traits and aggression is scarce. The goal of the current study was to test if fear reactivity, both conscious (self-report) and automatic (skin conductance reactivity; SCR), moderated the association between CU traits and aggression subtypes (reactive and proactive aggression). Participants included 161 adolescents (Mage = 15 years) diagnosed with conduct disorder. CU traits were assessed using the self-report Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits. Conscious and automatic fear reactivity were measured during a virtual reality rollercoaster using the Self-Assessment Manikin and skin conductance reactivity (SCR), respectively. Hierarchical regressions found that high fear reactivity on SCR moderated the link between CU traits and reactive aggression, while feeling more excited during fear induction moderated the link between CU traits and proactive aggression. Overall, a possible explanation of our divergent findings between conscious and automatic fear may be the difference between the instinctual biological response to threat versus the cognitive and emotional appraisal and experience of threat. Implications for intervention strategies targeting emotional recognition and regulation in reducing aggression in CD populations are discussed.

The perceived control model of falling: developing a unified framework to understand and assess maladaptive fear of falling

BACKGROUND

fear of falling is common in older adults and can have a profound influence on a variety of behaviours that increase fall risk. However, fear of falling can also have potentially positive outcomes for certain individuals. Without progressing our understanding of mechanisms underlying these contrasting outcomes, it is difficult to clinically manage fear of falling.

METHODS

this paper first summarises recent findings on the topic of fear of falling, balance and fall risk-including work highlighting the protective effects of fear. Specific focus is placed on describing how fear of falling influences perceptual, cognitive and motor process in ways that might either increase or reduce fall risk. Finally, it reports the development and validation of a new clinical tool that can be used to assess the maladaptive components of fear of falling.

RESULTS

we present a new conceptual framework-the Perceived Control Model of Falling-that describes specific mechanisms through which fear of falling can influence fall risk. The key conceptual advance is the identification of perceived control over situations that threaten one's balance as the crucial factor mediating the relationship between fear and increased fall risk. The new 4-item scale that we develop-the Updated Perceived Control over Falling Scale (UP-COF)-is a valid and reliable tool to clinically assess perceived control.

CONCLUSION

this new conceptualisation and tool (UP-COF) allows clinicians to identify individuals for whom fear of falling is likely to increase fall risk, and target specific underlying maladaptive processes such as low perceived control.

Standing up to threats: Translating the two-system model of fear to balance control in older adults

The 'two-system' view of fear builds on traditional conceptualisations of emotion; proposing that the mechanisms responsible for behavioural and physiological responses to threat may be distinct from those underpinning the (conscious) emotional experience itself. We empirically tested this notion within a novel, applied context of social and economic importance: fear of falling in older adults. Older adults stood on the edge of a raised platform and were stratified based on whether they reported fear in response to this postural threat. Irrespective of whether participants reported fear, we observed behaviours indicative of postural 'stiffening' during the threat condition. Self-reports indicated that participants cognitively monitored these changes in balance, and fear of falling was experienced in those who interpreted these behaviours to imply that harm was likely to occur. Fearful participants exhibited additional changes in balance (increased movement complexity and altered utilisation of sensory feedback) - behaviours likely influenced by attempts to consciously control balance. Taken together, these findings provide novel insight into the systems that regulate behavioural and emotional responses to postural threats. The novel conceptual framework developed from these findings helps identify specific mechanisms that might be targeted through clinical intervention.

Rating expectations can slow aversive reversal learning

The process of learning allows organisms to develop predictions about outcomes in the environment, and learning is sensitive to both simple associations and higher order knowledge. However, it is unknown whether consciously attending to expectations shapes the learning process itself. Here, we directly tested whether rating expectations shapes arousal during classical conditioning. Participants performed an aversive learning paradigm wherein one image (CS+) was paired with shock on 50% of trials, while a second image (CS-) was never paired with shock. Halfway through the task, contingencies reversed. One group of participants rated the probability of upcoming shock on each trial, while the other group made no online ratings. We measured skin conductance response (SCR) evoked in response to the CS and used traditional analyses as well as quantitative models of reinforcement learning to test whether rating expectations influenced arousal and aversive reversal learning. Participants who provided online expectancy ratings displayed slower learning based on a hybrid model of adaptive learning and reduced reversal of SCR relative to those who did not rate expectations. Mediation analysis revealed that the effect of associative learning on SCR could be fully explained through its effects on subjective expectancy within the group who provided ratings. This suggests that the act of rating expectations reduces the speed of learning, likely through changes in attention, and that expectations directly influence arousal. Our findings indicate that higher order expectancy judgments can alter associative learning.

At the Neural Intersection Between Language and Emotion

What role does language play in emotion? Behavioral research shows that emotion words such as "anger" and "fear" alter emotion experience, but questions still remain about mechanism. Here, we review the neuroscience literature to examine whether neural processes associated with semantics are also involved in emotion. Our review suggests that brain regions involved in the semantic processing of words: (i) are engaged during experiences of emotion, (ii) coordinate with brain regions involved in affect to create emotions, (iii) hold representational content for emotion, and (iv) may be necessary for constructing emotional experience. We relate these findings with respect to four theoretical relationships between language and emotion, which we refer to as "non-interactive," "interactive," "constitutive," and "deterministic." We conclude that findings are most consistent with the interactive and constitutive views with initial evidence suggestive of a constitutive view, in particular. We close with several future directions that may help test hypotheses of the constitutive view.

Animal models of human mood

Humans' everyday experience of the world is influenced by our moods. Moods are consciously accessible affective states that extend over time that are characterized by their valence and arousal. They also likely have a long evolutionary heritage and serve as an important adaptive affective mechanism. When they become maladaptive or overly biased, pathological affective states such as depression can emerge. Despite the importance of moods for human experience, little is known about their causal neurobiological mechanisms. In humans, limitations related to methods and interpretations of the data prevent causal investigations into the origins of mood, highlighting the importance of animal models. Nonhuman primates that share key neuroanatomical, affective, and social features with humans will be essential to uncovering their foundation. Identifying and validating mood-like states in animals is, however, challenging not least because mood is a human construct requiring verbal communication. Here we outline a theoretical framework for animal models of human mood, drawing upon established psychological literature where it exists before reviewing the extant studies of non-human primate models of mood-like states.

Callous-unemotional traits and fearlessness: A cardiovascular psychophysiological perspective in two adolescent samples using virtual reality

There has been a longstanding debate about the link between callous-unemotional traits and fearlessness. However, biological evidence for a relationship in adolescents is lacking. Using two adolescent samples, we measured emotional reactivity and cardiac measures of sympathetic (pre-ejection period) and parasympathetic (respiratory sinus arrhythmia) reactivity during 3D TV and virtual reality fear induction. Study 1 included 62 community adolescents from a stratified sample. Study 2 included 60 adolescents from Emotional and Behavioral Difficulties schools. Results were consistent across both studies. Adolescents with high callous-unemotional traits showed coactivation of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system. Consistent with these results, youths with callous-unemotional traits self-reported that they felt more in control after the fear induction. Thus, in both samples, youth with callous-unemotional traits displayed a physiological and emotional profile suggesting they maintained control during fear induction. Therefore, it is proposed here that a shift in thinking of youth with callous-unemotional traits as fearless to youth with callous-unemotional traits are better able to manage fearful situations, may be more appropriate.

Playing With Fear: A Field Study in Recreational Horror

Haunted attractions are illustrative examples of recreational fear in which people voluntarily seek out frightening experiences in pursuit of enjoyment. We present findings from a field study at a haunted-house attraction where visitors between the ages of 12 and 57 years (N = 110) were equipped with heart rate monitors, video-recorded at peak scare points during the attraction, and asked to report on their experience. Our results show that enjoyment has an inverted-U-shaped relationship with fear across repeated self-reported measures. Moreover, results from physiological data demonstrate that the experience of being frightened is a linear function of large-scale heart rate fluctuations, whereas there is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between participant enjoyment and small-scale heart rate fluctuations. These results suggest that enjoyment is related to forms of arousal dynamics that are “just right.” These findings shed light on how fear and enjoyment can coexist in recreational horror.

Prefrontal cortex projections to the nucleus reuniens suppress freezing following two-way signaled avoidance training

Signaled active avoidance (SAA) behavior requires the suppression of defensive reactions, such as freezing, that conflict with the avoidance response. The neural mechanisms of this inhibitory process are not well understood. Here, we demonstrate that ventromedial prefrontal cortex projections to the nucleus reuniens of the thalamus are recruited following SAA training to suppress freezing in rats. This projection may serve as a crucial common pathway for the inhibition of innate defensive reactions that interfere with proactive behavior, thus facilitating adaptive coping.

Rethinking the Principles of Emotion Taxonomy

This article examines whether a functionalist approach to emotion classification is a research program that can feasibly be implemented in an experimental environment. I suggest that this is a promise perhaps impossible to keep. The crux of the argument is that if functional taxonomy is to go the full distance and shape experimental conditions to the new boundaries, then stimuli/experimental manipulations must be selected based on functional principles. But this seems implausible or even impossible. I conclude that emotion taxonomy, and thus the metastructure of emotion theory, is both constrained and determined by human emotional feelings, and suggest that feelings have a special epistemological status in emotion research.

From red vegetables to sexuality: Resymbolizing the meaning of concrete thought in eating disorders

This paper introduces and describes the theory and practice of a novel treatment approach to eating disorders-internal language enhancement therapy (ILET)-illustrated with a case study. This treatment approach is informed by the neurobiology of emotional processing integrated with elements of psychoanalytic theory and practice, early maternal preoccupation, development of the self, early right hemisphere language development, and techniques from cognitive behavioral therapy. ILET is based on the Discontinuous Model of Neural Emotional Processing, which means that emotions are processed in the brain either symbolically or concretely. The aim of ILET is to open up and reinforce the underused brain pathway to the symbolic functions by forensically working back to and accurately identifying the emotional material that triggers the concrete state. When the emotional trigger is identified it is explored using symbolic and metaphoric language that reconnects the patient to the symbolic state. ILET posits that eating disorders only appear in the concrete state.

Fear Processing, Psychophysiology, and PTSD

The processing and regulation of fear is one of the key components of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Fear can involve both acute and potential threats that can manifest in different behaviors and result from activity within different neural nodes and networks. Fear circuits have been studied extensively in animal models for several decades and in human neuroimaging research for almost 20 years. Therefore, the centrality of fear processing to PTSD lends the disorder to be more tractable to investigation at the level of brain and behavior, and provides several observable phenotypes that can be linked to PTSD symptoms. Moreover, psychophysiological metrics of fear conditioning offer tools that can be used to shift diagnostic paradigms in psychiatry toward neurobiology-consistent with a Research Domain Criteria approach to PTSD. In general, mammalian fear processing can be divided into fear learning (or acquisition), during which an association develops between previously neutral stimuli and aversive outcomes, and fear extinction, in which the latter associations are suppressed by a new form of learning. This review describes translational research in both fear acquisition and extinction, along with their relevance to PTSD and PTSD treatment, focusing specifically on the empirical value and potential clinical utility of psychophysiological methods.

Autonomic reactivity in blood-injection-injury and snake phobia

OBJECTIVE

This research aimed to study the salivary flow and other autonomic reactions -heart rate (HR) and skin conductance response (SCR)- in blood-injection-injury (BII) phobia and snake phobia participants, under the assumption that exposure to blood-related pictures in BII phobia will provoke an increase in parasympathetic activity that, in turn, will lead to a greater saliva production than other affective contents.

METHODS

We selected 18 BII phobia and 14 snake phobia participants along with 22 non-phobia individuals. All participants were exposed to 3 blocks of pictures (12 pictures per block) depicting either mutilations, snakes or neutral, household objects. Saliva samples were taken in the 2-min interval before and after each block.

RESULTS

In comparison to other contents, blood-related pictures provoked an increase in salivary flow in BII phobia participants, as well as an increase in the number of SCRs. In the snake phobia group, snake pictures provoked HR acceleration, but the SCRs they elicited did not differ from the SCRs provoked by the blood-related pictures.

CONCLUSION

BII phobia individuals react to their phobic object with a series of physiological changes resulting from a sympathetic-parasympathetic co-activation. This is in contrast with other specific phobias (e.g., small animal phobias) that usually show a sympathetically mediated, defensive reactivity when exposed to their disorder-relevant stimuli. These data support the use of therapeutic interventions in BII phobia that may differ in some respect from those used in other specific phobias.

Interoceptive Anxiety and Body Representation in Anorexia Nervosa

Individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) typically display anxious traits prior to the onset of food avoidance and weight loss that characterize the disorder. Meal associated anxiety is an especially common clinical feature in these patients, and heightened sensitivity to sympathetically mediated interoceptive sensations has also been observed. However, it remains unclear how heightened interoceptive sensitivity relates to experiences of anxiety before and after meals. To investigate this relationship, we experimentally induced anxiety and panic symptoms with isoproterenol, a peripheral sympathetic agonist similar to adrenaline, across several different conditions: during panic provocation, during anticipation of a 1,000 Calorie meal, and after meal consumption. Fifteen AN and 15 age- and sex-matched healthy comparisons received bolus infusions of isoproterenol and saline in a double-blinded, randomized design. Participants rated anxiety symptoms after each infusion, completed panic rating scales, and traced the location of perceived palpitations on a manikin to index interoceptive "body map" representation. The AN group reported significantly elevated anxiety relative to healthy comparisons during infusions before and after the meal, but surprisingly, not during panic provocation. These symptoms were accompanied by geographical differences in patterns of perceived heartbeat sensations across each condition. In particular, the AN group localized heartbeat sensations disproportionately to the chest during meal related saline infusions, when no cardiorespiratory modulation actually occurred. The AN group also showed a trend toward higher panic attack rates during the meal anticipation period. Correcting for anxiety levels reported during saline infusions abolished group differences in anxiety change across all conditions, suggesting a significant contribution of anxious traits in AN. The observation of meal related "visceral illusions" provides further evidence that AN is associated with abnormal interoceptive representation of the heartbeat and suggests that meal consumption, particularly when anticipated, preferentially alters the processing of interoception related signals in AN.

Preregistered Replication of "Affective Flexibility: Evaluative Processing Goals Shape Amygdala Activity"

The human amygdala is sensitive to stimulus characteristics, and growing evidence suggests that it is also responsive to cognitive framing in the form of evaluative goals. To examine whether different evaluations of stimulus characteristics shape amygdala activation, we conducted a preregistered replication of Cunningham, Van Bavel, and Johnsen's (2008) study demonstrating flexible mapping of amygdala activation to stimulus characteristics, depending on evaluative goals. Participants underwent functional MRI scanning while viewing famous names under three conditions: They were asked to report their overall attitude toward each name, their positive associations only, or their negative associations only. We observed an interaction between condition and rating type, identified as the effect of interest in Cunningham et al. (2008). Specifically, postscan positivity, but not negativity, ratings predicted left amygdala activation when participants were asked to evaluate positive, but not negative, associations with the names. These results provide convergent evidence that cognitive framing, in the form of evaluative goals, can significantly alter whether amygdala activation indexes positivity or negativity.

Biobehavioral Mechanisms of Mindfulness as a Treatment for Chronic Stress: An RDoC Perspective

Mindfulness-based interventions have been heralded as promising means of alleviating chronic stress. While meta-analyses indicate that mindfulness-based interventions significantly reduce global measures of stress, how mindfulness-based interventions modulate the specific mechanisms underpinning chronic stress as operationalized by the National Institute of Mental Health research domain criteria (RDoC) of sustained threat has not yet been detailed in the literature. To address this knowledge gap, this article aims to (1) review evidence that mindfulness-based interventions ameliorate each of the 10 elements of behavioral dysregulation characterizing sustained threat via an array of mindful counter-regulatory strategies; (2) review evidence that mindfulness-based interventions modify biological domains implicated in sustained threat, such as the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis, as well as brain circuits involved in attentional function, limbic reactivity, habit behavior, and the default mode network; and (3) integrate these findings into a novel conceptual framework of mindful self-regulation in the face of stress—the Mindfulness-to-Meaning Theory. Taken together, the extant body of scientific evidence suggests that the practice of mindfulness enhances a range biobehavioral factors implicated in adaptive stress coping and induces self-referential plasticity, leading to the ability to find meaning in adversity. These mechanistic findings can inform the treatment development process to optimize the next generation of mindfulness-based interventions for greater therapeutic efficacy.

Assessment of social transmission of threats in humans using observational fear conditioning

Across the human life span, fear is often acquired indirectly by observation of the emotional expressions of others. The observational fear conditioning protocol was previously developed as a laboratory model for investigating socially acquired threat responses. This protocol serves as a suitable alternative to the widely used Pavlovian fear conditioning, in which threat responses are acquired through direct experiences. In the observational fear conditioning protocol, the participant (observer) watches a demonstrator being presented with a conditioned stimulus (CS) paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US). The expression of threat learning is measured as the conditioned response (CR) expressed by the observer in the absence of the demonstrator. CRs are commonly measured as skin conductance responses, but behavioral and neural measures have also been implemented. The experimental procedure is suitable for divergent populations, can be administered by a graduate student and takes ∼40 min. Similar protocols are used in animals, emphasizing its value as a translational tool for studying socioemotional learning.

The birth, death and resurrection of avoidance: a reconceptualization of a troubled paradigm

Research on avoidance conditioning began in the late 1930s as a way to use laboratory experiments to better understand uncontrollable fear and anxiety. Avoidance was initially conceived of as a two-factor learning process in which fear is first acquired through Pavlovian aversive conditioning (so-called fear conditioning), and then behaviors that reduce the fear aroused by the Pavlovian conditioned stimulus are reinforced through instrumental conditioning. Over the years, criticisms of both the avoidance paradigm and the two-factor fear theory arose. By the mid-1980s, avoidance had fallen out of favor as an experimental model relevant to fear and anxiety. However, recent progress in understanding the neural basis of Pavlovian conditioning has stimulated a new wave of research on avoidance. This new work has fostered new insights into contributions of not only Pavlovian and instrumental learning but also habit learning, to avoidance, and has suggested that the reinforcing event underlying the instrumental phase should be conceived in terms of cellular and molecular events in specific circuits rather than in terms of vague notions of fear reduction. In our approach, defensive reactions (freezing), actions (avoidance) and habits (habitual avoidance) are viewed as being controlled by unique circuits that operate nonconsciously in the control of behavior, and that are distinct from the circuits that give rise to conscious feelings of fear and anxiety. These refinements, we suggest, overcome older criticisms, justifying the value of the new wave of research on avoidance, and offering a fresh perspective on the clinical implications of this work.

Who, What, and When: Skinner's Critiques of Neuroscience and His Main Targets

Skinner is commonly accused of being against neurophysiological explanations of behavior. However, in his writings, he did not criticize neuroscience itself as an important independent field from behavior analysis. The problem was in how some authors were using a pseudo-physiology in the explanation of behavior. Skinner was explicit in showing which authors and theories were using physiology incorrectly. Therefore, my goal is to present an analysis of the main targets of Skinner's critiques against neurophysiological explanations of behavior. This analysis will be divided as follows: (a) the targets of Skinner's critiques, (b) when the critiques were presented, and (c) the specific critiques that were made. The analysis was based upon 73 papers written by Skinner that were selected through keywords related to the issue. When placed in proper historical context, Skinner did not criticize neuroscience, but the misuse of pseudo-physiological theories in the explanation of behavior.

Adolescent Emotional Maturation through Divergent Models of Brain Organization

In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent maturation, and in particular emotional management, may have opposing explanations depending on the interpretation of the assumed brain architecture, that is, whether a componential computational account (CCA) or a dynamic systems perspective (DSP) is used. According to CCA, cognitive functions are associated with the action of restricted brain regions, and this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP argues that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions between several brain areas, whose engagement in specific functions is temporal and context-dependent and based on neural reuse. We outline the main neurobiological facts about adolescent maturation, focusing on the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional processes associated with adolescence. We then explain the importance of emotional management in adolescent maturation. We explain the interplay between emotion and cognition under the scope of CCA and DSP, both at neural and behavioral levels. Finally, we justify why, according to CCA, emotional management is understood as regulation, specifically because the cognitive aspects of the brain are in charge of regulating emotion-related modules. However, the key word in DSP is integration, since neural information from different brain areas is integrated from the beginning of the process. Consequently, although the terms should not be conceptually confused, there is no cognition without emotion, and vice versa. Thus, emotional integration is not an independent process that just happens to the subject, but a crucial part of personal growth. Considering the importance of neuropsychological research in the development of educational and legal policies concerning adolescents, we intend to expose that the holistic view of adolescents is dependent on whether one holds the implicit or explicit interpretation of brain functioning.

Panic Anxiety in Humans with Bilateral Amygdala Lesions: Pharmacological Induction via Cardiorespiratory Interoceptive Pathways

We previously demonstrated that carbon dioxide inhalation could induce panic anxiety in a group of rare lesion patients with focal bilateral amygdala damage. To further elucidate the amygdala-independent mechanisms leading to aversive emotional experiences, we retested two of these patients (B.G. and A.M.) to examine whether triggering palpitations and dyspnea via stimulation of non-chemosensory interoceptive channels would be sufficient to elicit panic anxiety. Participants rated their affective and sensory experiences following bolus infusions of either isoproterenol, a rapidly acting peripheral β-adrenergic agonist akin to adrenaline, or saline. Infusions were administered during two separate conditions: a panic induction and an assessment of cardiorespiratory interoception. Isoproterenol infusions induced anxiety in both patients, and full-blown panic in one (patient B.G.). Although both patients demonstrated signs of diminished awareness for cardiac sensation, patient A.M., who did not panic, reported a complete lack of awareness for dyspnea, suggestive of impaired respiratory interoception. These findings indicate that the amygdala may play a role in dynamically detecting changes in cardiorespiratory sensation. The induction of panic anxiety provides further evidence that the amygdala is not required for the conscious experience of fear induced via interoceptive sensory channels.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

We found that monozygotic twins with focal bilateral amygdala lesions report panic anxiety in response to intravenous infusions of isoproterenol, a β-adrenergic agonist similar to adrenaline. Heightened anxiety was evident in both twins, with one twin experiencing a panic attack. The twin who did not panic displayed signs of impaired cardiorespiratory interoception, including a complete absence of dyspnea sensation. These findings highlight that the amygdala is not strictly required for the experience of panic anxiety, and suggest that neural systems beyond the amygdala are also involved. Determining these additional systems could provide key neural modulation targets for future anxiolytic treatments.

Dissociation between Emotional Remapping of Fear and Disgust in Alexithymia

There is growing evidence that individuals are able to understand others' emotions because they "embody" them, i.e., re-experience them by activating a representation of the observed emotion within their own body. One way to study emotion embodiment is provided by a multisensory stimulation paradigm called emotional visual remapping of touch (eVRT), in which the degree of embodiment/remapping of emotions is measured as enhanced detection of near-threshold tactile stimuli on one's own face while viewing different emotional facial expressions. Here, we measured remapping of fear and disgust in participants with low (LA) and high (HA) levels of alexithymia, a personality trait characterized by a difficulty in recognizing emotions. The results showed that fear is remapped in LA but not in HA participants, while disgust is remapped in HA but not in LA participants. To investigate the hypothesis that HA might exhibit increased responses to emotional stimuli producing a heightened physical and visceral sensations, i.e., disgust, in a second experiment we investigated participants' interoceptive abilities and the link between interoception and emotional modulations of VRT. The results showed that participants' disgust modulations of VRT correlated with their ability to perceive bodily signals. We suggest that the emotional profile of HA individuals on the eVRT task could be related to their abnormal tendency to be focalized on their internal bodily signals, and to experience emotions in a "physical" way. Finally, we speculated that these results in HA could be due to a enhancement of insular activity during the perception of disgusted faces.

The ecology of human fear: survival optimization and the nervous system

We propose a Survival Optimization System (SOS) to account for the strategies that humans and other animals use to defend against recurring and novel threats. The SOS attempts to merge ecological models that define a repertoire of contextually relevant threat induced survival behaviors with contemporary approaches to human affective science. We first propose that the goal of the nervous system is to reduce surprise and optimize actions by (i) predicting the sensory landscape by simulating possible encounters with threat and selecting the appropriate pre-encounter action and (ii) prevention strategies in which the organism manufactures safe environments. When a potential threat is encountered the (iii) threat orienting system is engaged to determine whether the organism ignores the stimulus or switches into a process of (iv) threat assessment, where the organism monitors the stimulus, weighs the threat value, predicts the actions of the threat, searches for safety, and guides behavioral actions crucial to directed escape. When under imminent attack, (v) defensive systems evoke fast reflexive indirect escape behaviors (i.e., fight or flight). This cascade of responses to threat of increasing magnitude are underwritten by an interconnected neural architecture that extends from cortical and hippocampal circuits, to attention, action and threat systems including the amygdala, striatum, and hard-wired defensive systems in the midbrain. The SOS also includes a modulatory feature consisting of cognitive appraisal systems that flexibly guide perception, risk and action. Moreover, personal and vicarious threat encounters fine-tune avoidance behaviors via model-based learning, with higher organisms bridging data to reduce face-to-face encounters with predators. Our model attempts to unify the divergent field of human affective science, proposing a highly integrated nervous system that has evolved to increase the organism's chances of survival.

Revisiting shyness and sociability: a preliminary investigation of hormone-brain-behavior relations

Shyness and sociability are two fundamental personality dimensions that are conceptually and empirically orthogonal and are conserved across cultures, development, and phylogeny. However, we know relatively little regarding how shyness and sociability are represented and maintained in the brain. Here we examined neural responses to the processing of different types of social threat using event-related fMRI, the salivary cortisol awakening response (CAR), and sociability in young adults selected for high and low shyness. Shy adults who exhibited a relatively higher CAR displayed neural activity in putative brain regions involved in emotional conflict and awareness, and were more sociable. In contrast, shy adults who displayed a relatively lower CAR exhibited neural activity in putative brain regions linked to fear and withdrawal, and were unsociable. Results revealed no systematic brain responses to social threat processing that correlated with the CAR in non-shy adults. These preliminary results suggest that individual differences in waking morning cortisol levels may influence neural processes that facilitate either social approach or withdrawal among people who are shy. Findings are discussed in relation to their theoretical and clinical implications for moving beyond longstanding descriptive to explanatory models of shyness and sociability and for understanding individual differences in social behavior in general.

Memory as a new therapeutic target

This review aims to demonstrate how an understanding of the brain mechanisms involved in memory provides a basis for; (i) reconceptualizing some mental disorders; (ii) refining existing therapeutic tools; and (iii) designing new ones for targeting processes that maintain these disorders. First, some of the stages which a memory undergoes are defined, and the clinical relevance of an understanding of memory processing by the brain is discussed. This is followed by a brief review of some of the clinical studies that have targeted memory processes. Finally, some new insights provided by the field of neuroscience with implications for conceptualizing mental disorders are presented.

Exciting fear in adolescence: does pubertal development alter threat processing?

Adolescent development encompasses an ostensible paradox in threat processing. Risk taking increases dramatically after the onset of puberty, contributing to a 200% increase in mortality. Yet, pubertal maturation is associated with increased reactivity in threat-avoidance systems. In the first part of this paper we propose a heuristic model of adolescent affective development that may help to reconcile aspects of this paradox, which focuses on hypothesized pubertal increases in the capacity to experience (some) fear-evoking experiences as an exciting thrill. In the second part of this paper, we test key features of this model by examining brain activation to threat cues in a longitudinal study that disentangled pubertal and age effects. Pubertal increases in testosterone predicted increased activation to threat cues, not only in regions associated with threat avoidance (i.e., amygdala), but also regions associated with reward pursuit (i.e., nucleus accumbens). These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that puberty is associated with a maturational shift toward more complex processing of threat cues--which may contribute to adolescent tendencies to explore and enjoy some types of risky experiences.

Emotion’s Response Patterns: The Brain and the Autonomic Nervous System

The article considers patterns of reactivity in organ systems mediated by the autonomic nervous system as they relate to central neural circuits activated by affectively arousing cues. The relationship of these data to the concept of discrete emotion and their relevance for the autonomic feedback hypothesis are discussed. Research both with animal and human participants is considered and implications drawn for new directions in emotion science. It is suggested that the proposed brain-based view has a greater potential for scientific advance than the traditional model that emphasizes specific states of mind as mediators or reflectors of visceral action.

Coming to terms with fear

The brain mechanisms of fear have been studied extensively using Pavlovian fear conditioning, a procedure that allows exploration of how the brain learns about and later detects and responds to threats. However, mechanisms that detect and respond to threats are not the same as those that give rise to conscious fear. This is an important distinction because symptoms based on conscious and nonconscious processes may be vulnerable to different predisposing factors and may also be treatable with different approaches in people who suffer from uncontrolled fear or anxiety. A conception of so-called fear conditioning in terms of circuits that operate nonconsciously, but that indirectly contribute to conscious fear, is proposed as way forward.