Disruption of Conscious Access in Schizophrenia

Hierarchical analysis of the sense of agency in schizophrenia: motor control, control detection, and self-attribution

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of initiating and controlling one's actions and their resulting effects on the external environment. Previous studies have uncovered behavioral evidence of excessive self-attribution and, conversely, a reduction in the sense of agency in patients with schizophrenia. We hypothesize that this apparent paradox is likely to result from impairment in lower-level processes underlying the sense of agency, combined with a higher-level compensational bias. The present study employed three behavioral tasks utilizing the same stimuli and experimental design to systematically evaluate multiple factors that influence the sense of agency, including motor control, sensorimotor processing, and self-attribution. Participants' real-time mouse movements were combined with prerecorded motions of others in ratios of 30/70, 55/45, or 80/20, with an additional angular bias of either 0° or 90°. Twenty-six patients with schizophrenia and 27 health control volunteers participated in the three tasks. Patients with schizophrenia performed significantly worse in the reaching and control detection tasks than healthy controls. However, their self-attribution in the control judgment task was comparable to that of the healthy controls. Patients with schizophrenia were impaired in motor control components and in the detection of control using sensorimotor information, but their evaluation of agency remained relatively less affected. This underscores the importance of distinguishing between different subcomponents when addressing the abnormal sense of agency in patients with schizophrenia. Subsequent cluster analysis revealed that the combined task performance accurately distinguished between the patients and healthy control participants.

Functional and structural brain connectivity in disorders of consciousness

Brain connectivity, allowing information to be shared between distinct cortical areas and thus to be processed in an integrated way, has long been considered critical for consciousness. However, the relationship between functional intercortical interactions and the structural connections thought to underlie them is poorly understood. In the present work, we explore both functional (with an EEG-based metric: the median weighted symbolic mutual information in the theta band) and structural (with a brain MRI-based metric: fractional anisotropy) connectivities in a cohort of 78 patients with disorders of consciousness. Both metrics could distinguish patients in a vegetative state from patients in minimally conscious state. Crucially, we discovered a significant positive correlation between functional and structural connectivities. Furthermore, we showed that this structure-function relationship is more specifically observed when considering structural connectivity within the intra- and inter-hemispheric long-distance cortico-cortical bundles involved in the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory of consciousness, thus supporting predictions of this model. Altogether, these results support the interest of multimodal assessments of brain connectivity in refining the diagnostic evaluation of patients with disorders of consciousness.

An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.

Disruption of consciousness depends on insight in OCD and on positive symptoms in schizophrenia

Disruption of conscious access contributes to the advent of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia but could also explain lack of insight in other psychiatric disorders. In this study, we explored how insight and psychotic symptoms related to disruption of consciousness. We explored consciousness in patients with schizophrenia, patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) with good vs. poor insight and matched controls. Participants underwent clinical assessments and performed a visual masking task allowing us to measure individual consciousness threshold. We used a principal component analysis to reduce symptom dimensionality and explored how consciousness measures related to symptomatology. We found that clinical dimensions could be well summarized by a restricted set of principal components which also correlated with the extent of consciousness disruption. More specifically, positive symptoms were associated with impaired conscious access in patients with schizophrenia whereas the level of insight delineated two subtypes of OCD patients, those with poor insight who had consciousness impairments similar to patients with schizophrenia, and those with good insight who resemble healthy controls. Our study provides new insights about consciousness disruption in psychiatric disorders, showing that it relates to positive symptoms in schizophrenia and with insight in OCD. In OCD, it revealed a distinct subgroup sharing neuropathological features with schizophrenia. Our findings refine the mapping between symptoms and cognition, paving the way for a better treatment selection.

Correlation analysis and gender differences of cognitive function based on mini-mental state examination (MMSE) and suicidal tendency in patients with schizophrenia

BACKGROUND

The aim of this study was to investigate the correlation and gender differences between cognition and suicidal tendency in patients with schizophrenia.

METHODS

A total of 554 patients with schizophrenia were recruited. The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE), Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS), and Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) were used to assess clinical symptoms.

RESULTS

In male patients, MMSE score and the incidence of suicidal tendency were correlated (P = 0.04, OR = 1.06, 95%CI: 1.00-1.12). Among patients with cognitive dysfunction, IRI score (P = 0.01, OR = 1.04, 95%CI: 1.01-1.06), and types of antipsychotic drugs (P < 0.01, OR = 3.97, 95%CI: 1.76-8.97) in male patients were associated risk factors for suicidal ideation. Among patients without cognitive dysfunction, PANSS positive subscale score (P = 0.03, OR = 1.06, 95%CI: 1.01-1.11), and PANSS general psychopathology score (P = 0.02, OR = 1.05, 95%CI: 1.01-1.08) were associated risk factors for suicidal ideation in male patients and PANSS positive subscale score (P < 0.01, OR = 1.15, 95%CI: 1.05-1.26) were associated risk factors for suicidal ideation in female patients.

CONCLUSIONS

There were significant gender differences in the correlation between cognitive functioning and suicidal ideation in patients with schizophrenia. Cognitive function may play an important mediating role in other factors on suicide.

Theories of consciousness and psychiatric disorders - A comparative analysis

Disorders of consciousness represent an efficient way to test theories of consciousness' (ToCs) predictions. So far, ToCs have mostly focused on disorders of quantitative awareness such as coma, vegetative state, spatial neglect and hemianopia. Psychiatric disorders, by contrast, have received little attention, leaving their contribution to consciousness research almost unexplored. Therefore, this paper aims to assess the relation between ToCs and psychiatric disorders - that is, the extent to which current ToCs can account for psychiatric symptomatology. First, I review direct and indirect evidence linking each ToC to psychiatry disorders. Next, I differentiate ToCs based on their theoretical and methodological ground, highlighting how they distinctively address neural, cognitive, and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience and, in turn, psychiatric symptoms. Finally, I refer to one specific symptom to directly compare ToCs' explanatory power. Overall, Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) appears to provide a more comprehensive account of psychiatric disorders, suggesting that a novel dimension of consciousness (i.e., form of consciousness) may be needed to address more qualitative alterations in conscious experience.

Identifying Patients with Cognitive Motor Dissociation Using Resting-state Temporal Stability

Using task-dependent neuroimaging techniques, recent studies discovered a fraction of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) who had no command-following behaviors but showed a clear sign of awareness as healthy controls, which was defined as cognitive motor dissociation (CMD). However, existing task-dependent approaches might fail when CMD patients have cognitive function (e.g., attention, memory) impairments, in which patients with covert awareness cannot perform a specific task accurately and are thus wrongly considered unconscious, which leads to false-negative findings. Recent studies have suggested that sustaining a stable functional organization over time, i.e., high temporal stability, is crucial for supporting consciousness. Thus, temporal stability could be a powerful tool to detect the patient's cognitive functions (e.g., consciousness), while its alteration in the DOC and its capacity for identifying CMD were unclear. The resting-state fMRI (rs-fMRI) study included 119 participants from three independent research sites. A sliding-window approach was used to investigate global and regional temporal stability, which measured how stable the brain's functional architecture was across time. The temporal stability was compared in the first dataset (36/16 DOC/controls), and then a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier was built to discriminate DOC from controls. Furthermore, the generalizability of the SVM classifier was tested in the second independent dataset (35/21 DOC/controls). Finally, the SVM classifier was applied to the third independent dataset, where patients underwent rs-fMRI and brain-computer interface assessment (4/7 CMD/potential non-CMD), to test its performance in identifying CMD. Our results showed that global and regional temporal stability was impaired in DOC patients, especially in regions of the cingulo-opercular task control network, default-mode network, fronto-parietal task control network, and salience network. Using temporal stability as the feature, the SVM model not only showed good performance in the first dataset (accuracy = 90%), but also good generalizability in the second dataset (accuracy = 84%). Most importantly, the SVM model generalized well in identifying CMD in the third dataset (accuracy = 91%). Our preliminary findings suggested that temporal stability could be a potential tool to assist in diagnosing CMD. Furthermore, the temporal stability investigated in this study also contributed to a deeper understanding of the neural mechanism of consciousness.

Dorsal attention network activity during perceptual organization is distinct in schizophrenia and predictive of cognitive disorganization

Visual shape completion is a canonical perceptual organization process that integrates spatially distributed edge information into unified representations of objects. People with schizophrenia show difficulty in discriminating completed shapes, but the brain networks and functional connections underlying this perceptual difference remain poorly understood. Also unclear is whether brain network differences in schizophrenia occur in related illnesses or vary with illness features transdiagnostically. To address these topics, we scanned (functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) people with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or no psychiatric illness during rest and during a task in which they discriminated configurations that formed or failed to form completed shapes (illusory and fragmented condition, respectively). Multivariate pattern differences were identified on the cortical surface using 360 predefined parcels and 12 functional networks composed of such parcels. Brain activity flow mapping was used to evaluate the likely involvement of resting-state connections for shape completion. Illusory/fragmented task activation differences ('modulations') in the dorsal attention network (DAN) could distinguish people with schizophrenia from the other groups (AUCs > .85) and could transdiagnostically predict cognitive disorganization severity. Activity flow over functional connections from the DAN could predict secondary visual network modulations in each group, except in schizophrenia. The secondary visual network was strongly and similarly modulated in each group. Task modulations were dispersed over more networks in patients compared to controls. In summary, DAN activity during visual perceptual organization is distinct in schizophrenia, symptomatically relevant, and potentially related to improper attention-related feedback into secondary visual areas.

Functional geometry of the cortex encodes dimensions of consciousness

Consciousness is a multidimensional phenomenon, but key dimensions such as awareness and wakefulness have been described conceptually rather than neurobiologically. We hypothesize that dimensions of consciousness are encoded in multiple neurofunctional dimensions of the brain. We analyze cortical gradients, which are continua of the brain's overarching functional geometry, to characterize these neurofunctional dimensions. We demonstrate that disruptions of human consciousness - due to pharmacological, neuropathological, or psychiatric causes - are associated with a degradation of one or more of the major cortical gradients depending on the state. Network-specific reconfigurations within the multidimensional cortical gradient space are associated with behavioral unresponsiveness of various etiologies, and these spatial reconfigurations correlate with a temporal disruption of structured transitions of dynamic brain states. In this work, we therefore provide a unifying neurofunctional framework for multiple dimensions of human consciousness in both health and disease.

Consciousness as a Memory System

We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system-prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good system. We argue that consciousness originally developed as part of the episodic memory system-quite likely the part needed to accomplish that flexible recombining of information. We posit further that consciousness was subsequently co-opted to produce other functions that are not directly relevant to memory per se, such as problem-solving, abstract thinking, and language. We suggest that this theory is compatible with many phenomena, such as the slow speed and the after-the-fact order of consciousness, that cannot be explained well by other theories. We believe that our theory may have profound implications for understanding intentional action and consciousness in general. Moreover, we suggest that episodic memory and its associated memory systems of sensory, working, and semantic memory as a whole ought to be considered together as the conscious memory system in that they, together, give rise to the phenomenon of consciousness. Lastly, we suggest that the cerebral cortex is the part of the brain that makes consciousness possible, and that every cortical region contributes to this conscious memory system.

Preserved Unconscious Processing in Schizophrenia: The Case of Motivation

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS

Motivation deficit is a hallmark of schizophrenia that has a strong impact on their daily life. An alteration of reward processing has been repeatedly highlighted in schizophrenia, but to what extent it involves a deficient amplification of reward representation through conscious processing remains unclear. Indeed, patients with schizophrenia exhibit a disruption of conscious processing, whereas unconscious processing appears to be largely preserved.

STUDY DESIGN

To further explore the nature of motivational deficit in schizophrenia and the implication of consciousness disruption in this symptom, we used a masking paradigm testing motivation both under conscious and unconscious conditions in patients with schizophrenia (n = 31) and healthy controls (n = 32). Participants were exposed to conscious or subliminal coin pictures representing money at stake and were subsequently asked to perform an effort-task by squeezing a handgrip as hard as possible to win this reward.

STUDY RESULTS

We observed a preserved effect of unconscious monetary rewards on force production in both groups, without any significant difference between them. By contrast, in the conscious condition, patients with schizophrenia were less sensitive to rewards than controls. Our results confirm that unconscious incentives have effects on exerted forces in the general population, and demonstrate that patients with schizophrenia exhibit a dissociation between an impaired conscious motivation and a preserved unconscious motivation.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings suggest the existence of several steps in motivational processes that can be differentially affected and might have implication for patient care.

Predictive waves in the autism-schizophrenia continuum: A novel biobehavioral model

The brain is a predictive machine. Converging data suggests a diametric predictive strategy from autism spectrum disorders (ASD) to schizophrenic spectrum disorders (SSD). Whereas perceptual inference in ASD is rigidly shaped by incoming sensory information, the SSD population is prone to overestimate the precision of their priors' models. Growing evidence considers brain oscillations pivotal biomarkers to understand how top-down predictions integrate bottom-up input. Starting from the conceptualization of ASD and SSD as oscillopathies, we introduce an integrated perspective that ascribes the maladjustments of the predictive mechanism to dysregulation of neural synchronization. According to this proposal, disturbances in the oscillatory profile do not allow the appropriate trade-off between descending predictive signal, overweighted in SSD, and ascending prediction errors, overweighted in ASD. These opposing imbalances both result in an ill-adapted reaction to external challenges. This approach offers a neuro-computational model capable of linking predictive coding theories with electrophysiological findings, aiming to increase knowledge on the neuronal foundations of the two spectra features and stimulate hypothesis-driven rehabilitation/research perspectives.

Semantic priming and neurobiology in schizophrenia: A theoretical review

In this theoretical review we bridge the cognitive and neurobiological sciences to shed light on the neurocognitive foundations of the semantic priming effect in schizophrenia. We review and theoretically evaluate the neurotransmitter systems (dopaminergic, GABAergic and glutamatergic) and neurobiological underpinnings of behavioural and electrophysiological (N400) semantic priming in the pathology, and the main hypotheses on their geneses: a disinhibition of the semantic spread of activation, a disorganised semantic storage or noisy lexical-semantic associations, a psychomotor artefact, an artefact of relatedness proportions, or an inability to mobilise contextual information. We further assess the literature on the endophenotype of Formal Thought Disorder from multiple standpoints, ranging from neurophysiology to cognition: considerations are weaved on neuronal (PV basket cell, SST, VIP) and receptor deficits (DRD1, NMDA), neurotransmitter imbalances (dopamine), cortical and dopaminergic lateralisation, inter alia. In conclusion, we put forth novel postulates on the underlying causes of controlled hypopriming, automatic hyperpriming, N400 reversals (larger amplitudes for close associations), indirect versus direct hyperpriming, and the endophenotype of lexical-semantic disturbances in schizophrenia.

From internal models toward metacognitive AI

In several papers published in Biological Cybernetics in the 1980s and 1990s, Kawato and colleagues proposed computational models explaining how internal models are acquired in the cerebellum. These models were later supported by neurophysiological experiments using monkeys and neuroimaging experiments involving humans. These early studies influenced neuroscience from basic, sensory-motor control to higher cognitive functions. One of the most perplexing enigmas related to internal models is to understand the neural mechanisms that enable animals to learn large-dimensional problems with so few trials. Consciousness and metacognition-the ability to monitor one's own thoughts, may be part of the solution to this enigma. Based on literature reviews of the past 20 years, here we propose a computational neuroscience model of metacognition. The model comprises a modular hierarchical reinforcement-learning architecture of parallel and layered, generative-inverse model pairs. In the prefrontal cortex, a distributed executive network called the "cognitive reality monitoring network" (CRMN) orchestrates conscious involvement of generative-inverse model pairs in perception and action. Based on mismatches between computations by generative and inverse models, as well as reward prediction errors, CRMN computes a "responsibility signal" that gates selection and learning of pairs in perception, action, and reinforcement learning. A high responsibility signal is given to the pairs that best capture the external world, that are competent in movements (small mismatch), and that are capable of reinforcement learning (small reward-prediction error). CRMN selects pairs with higher responsibility signals as objects of metacognition, and consciousness is determined by the entropy of responsibility signals across all pairs. This model could lead to new-generation AI, which exhibits metacognition, consciousness, dimension reduction, selection of modules and corresponding representations, and learning from small samples. It may also lead to the development of a new scientific paradigm that enables the causal study of consciousness by combining CRMN and decoded neurofeedback.

Absence of covert face valuation in Autism

Autism is a neurodevelopmental condition defined on clinical criteria related to diminished social reciprocity and stereotyped behavior. An influential view explains autism as a social motivation disorder characterized by less attention paid to the social environment and less pleasure experienced with social rewards. However, experimental attempts to validate this theory, by testing the impact of social reward on behavioral choice and brain activity, has yielded mixed results, possibly due to variations in how explicit instructions were about task goals. Here, we specified the putative motivation deficit as an absence of spontaneous valuation in the social domain, unexplained by inattention and correctible by explicit instruction. Since such deficit cannot be assessed with behavioral measures, we used functional neuroimaging (fMRI) to readout covert subjective values, assigned to social and nonsocial stimuli (faces and objects), either explicitly asked to participants (during a likeability judgment task) or not (during age or size estimation tasks). Value-related neural activity observed for objects, or for faces under explicit instructions, was very similar in autistic and control participants, with an activation peak in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), known as a key node of the brain valuation system. The only difference observed in autistic participants was an absence of the spontaneous valuation normally triggered by faces, even when they were attended for age estimation. Our findings, therefore, suggest that in autism, social stimuli might fail to trigger the automatic activation of the brain valuation system.

[The relationship between visual dysfunction and cognitive deficit in schizophrenia]

OBJECTIVE

To investigate whether visual processing abnormalities are the result of visual dysfunction involving cognitive impairment or independent abnormalities and to identify the relationship of visual impairments with cognitive functions and severity of psychopathological symptoms.

MATERIAL AND METHODS

We compared results of visual size perception and actions on objects (motor assessment) in patients with schizophrenia (n=37), including patients with non-resistant schizophrenia (n=19) and healthy individuals (n=20). Cognitive impairments were assessed with BACS. Severity of schizophrenia symptoms was assessed with PANSS.

RESULTS

The error in the visual size perception test was smaller in healthy controls compared with non-resistant patients (p<0.03). There are no significant differences between non-resistant patients and other groups. Also, there are no significant differences in motor assessment between healthy controls and patients with schizophrenia. In the visual size perception test, the amount of error correlates with cognitive impairments (r= -0.84, p<0.001), and the severity of psychotic symptoms on PANSS (r=0.55, p<0.05).

CONCLUSION

Changes in visual threshold in patients with schizophrenia are correlated with cognitive dysfunction and reflect dysfunction in the parvocellular system.

Slower access to visual awareness but otherwise intact implicit perception of emotional faces in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders

Schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are characterized by deficits in social domains. Extant research has reported an impaired ability to perceive emotional faces in schizophrenia. Yet, it is unclear if these deficits occur already in the access to visual awareness. To investigate this question, 23 people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 22 healthy controls performed a breaking continuous flash suppression task with fearful, happy, and neutral faces. Response times were analysed with generalized linear mixed models. People with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders were slower than controls in detecting faces, but did not show emotion-specific impairments. Moreover, happy faces were detected faster than neutral and fearful faces, across all participants. Although caution is needed when interpreting the main effect of group, our findings may suggest an elevated threshold for visual awareness in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, but an intact implicit emotion perception. Our study provides a new insight into the mechanisms underlying emotion perception in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.

Large-scale functional brain networks for consciousness

The generation and maintenance of consciousness are fundamental but difficult subjects in the fields of psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, and medicine. However, recent developments in neuro-imaging techniques coupled with network analysis have greatly advanced our understanding of consciousness. The present review focuses on large-scale functional brain networks based on neuro-imaging data to explain the awareness (contents) and wakefulness of consciousness. Despite limitations, neuroimaging data suggests brain maps for important psychological and cognitive processes such as attention, language, self-referential, emotion, motivation, social behavior, and wakefulness. We considered a review of these advancements would provide new insights into research on the neural correlates of consciousness.

Neurophysiological basis of the N400 deflection, from Mismatch Negativity to Semantic Prediction Potentials and late positive components

The first theoretical model on the neurophysiological basis of the N400: the deflection reflects layer I dendritic plateaus on a preparatory state of synaptic integration that precedes layer V somatic burst firing for conscious identification of the higher-order features of the stimulus (a late positive shift). Plateaus ensue from apical disinhibition by vasoactive intestinal polypeptide-positive interneurons (VIPs) through suppression of Martinotti cells, opening the gates for glutamatergic feedback to trigger dendritic regenerative potentials. Cholinergic transients contribute to these dynamics directly, holding a central role in the N400 deflection. The stereotypical timing of the (frontal) glutamatergic feedback and the accompanying cholinergic transients account for the enigmatic "invariability" of the peak latency in the face of a gamut of different stimuli and paradigms. The theoretical postulations presented here may bring about unprecedented level of detail for the N400 deflection to be used in the study of schizophrenia, Alzheimer's disease and other higher-order pathologies. The substrates of a late positive component, the Mismatch Negativity and the Semantic Prediction Potentials are also surveyed.

Overly Strong Priors for Socially Meaningful Visual Signals Are Linked to Psychosis Proneness in Healthy Individuals

According to the predictive coding theory of psychosis, hallucinations and delusions are explained by an overweighing of high-level prior expectations relative to sensory information that leads to false perceptions of meaningful signals. However, it is currently unclear whether the hypothesized overweighing of priors (1) represents a pervasive alteration that extends to the visual modality and (2) takes already effect at early automatic processing stages. Here, we addressed these questions by studying visual perception of socially meaningful stimuli in healthy individuals with varying degrees of psychosis proneness (n = 39). In a first task, we quantified participants' prior for detecting faces in visual noise using a Bayesian decision model. In a second task, we measured participants' prior for detecting direct gaze stimuli that were rendered invisible by continuous flash suppression. We found that the prior for detecting faces in noise correlated with hallucination proneness (r = 0.50, p = 0.001, Bayes factor 1/20.1) as well as delusion proneness (r = 0.46, p = 0.003, BF 1/9.4). The prior for detecting invisible direct gaze was significantly associated with hallucination proneness (r = 0.43, p = 0.009, BF 1/3.8) but not conclusively with delusion proneness (r = 0.30, p = 0.079, BF 1.7). Our results provide evidence for the idea that overly strong high-level priors for automatically detecting socially meaningful stimuli might constitute a processing alteration in psychosis.

The neural correlates of the visual consciousness in schizophrenia: an fMRI study

In the current literature, two distinct and opposite models are suggested to explain the consciousness disorders in schizophrenia. The first one suggests that consciousness disorders rely on a low-level processing deficit, when the second model suggests that consciousness disorders rely on disruption in the ability to consciously access information, with preserved unconscious processing. The current study aims to understand the mechanisms associated with visual consciousness disorder in order to pave the road that will settle the debate regarding these hypotheses. During a functional magnetic resonance imaging session, 19 healthy participants (HC) and 15 patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) performed a visual detection task to compare the neural substrates associated with the conscious access to the visual inputs. The visual detection threshold was significantly higher in SCZ than in HC [t(32) = 3.37, p = 0.002]. Whole-brain ANOVA demonstrated that around the visual detection threshold patients with SCZ failed to activate a large network of brain areas compared to HC. (1) During conscious vision, HC engaged more the left cuneus and the right occipital cortex than patients with SCZ, (2) during unconscious vision, HC engaged a large network that patients with SCZ failed to activate, and finally, (3) during the access to consciousness process, patients with SCZ failed to activate the anterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest that the consciousness disorders in schizophrenia rely on specific dysfunctions depending on the consciousness stage. The disorders of the conscious vision are associated with dysfunction of occipital areas while the ones associated with unconscious vision rely on a large widespread network. Finally, the conscious access to the visual inputs is impaired by a dysfunction of the anterior cingulate cortex. The current study suggests that none of the two suggested models can explain consciousness disorders in schizophrenia. We suggest that there is an alternative model supporting that the conscious access to visual inputs is due to a disengagement of the supragenual anterior cingulate during the unconscious processing of the visual inputs associated with a sensory deficit.

Disruption of Conscious Access in Psychosis Is Associated with Altered Structural Brain Connectivity

According to global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory, conscious access relies on long-distance cerebral connectivity to allow a global neuronal ignition coding for conscious content. In patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, both alterations in cerebral connectivity and an increased threshold for conscious perception have been reported. The implications of abnormal structural connectivity for disrupted conscious access and the relationship between these two deficits and psychopathology remain unclear. The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which structural connectivity is correlated with consciousness threshold, particularly in psychosis. We used a visual masking paradigm to measure consciousness threshold, and diffusion MRI tractography to assess structural connectivity in 97 humans of either sex with varying degrees of psychosis: healthy control subjects (n = 46), schizophrenia patients (n = 25), and bipolar disorder patients with (n = 17) and without (n = 9) a history of psychosis. Patients with psychosis (schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with psychotic features) had an elevated masking threshold compared with control subjects and bipolar disorder patients without psychotic features. Masking threshold correlated negatively with the mean general fractional anisotropy of white matter tracts exclusively within the GNW network (inferior frontal-occipital fasciculus, cingulum, and corpus callosum). Mediation analysis demonstrated that alterations in long-distance connectivity were associated with an increased masking threshold, which in turn was linked to psychotic symptoms. Our findings support the hypothesis that long-distance structural connectivity within the GNW plays a crucial role in conscious access, and that conscious access may mediate the association between impaired structural connectivity and psychosis.

Modeling regional changes in dynamic stability during sleep and wakefulness

Global brain states are frequently placed within a unidimensional continuum by correlational studies, ranging from states of deep unconsciousness to ordinary wakefulness. An alternative is their multidimensional and mechanistic characterization in terms of different cognitive capacities, using computational models to reproduce the underlying neural dynamics. We explore this alternative by introducing a semi-empirical model linking regional activation and long-range functional connectivity in the different brain states visited during the natural wake-sleep cycle. Our model combines functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, in vivo estimates of structural connectivity, and anatomically-informed priors to constrain the independent variation of regional activation. The best fit to empirical data was achieved using priors based on functionally coherent networks, with the resulting model parameters dividing the cortex into regions presenting opposite dynamical behavior. Frontoparietal regions approached a bifurcation from dynamics at a fixed point governed by noise, while sensorimotor regions approached a bifurcation from oscillatory dynamics. In agreement with human electrophysiological experiments, sleep onset induced subcortical deactivation with low correlation, which was subsequently reversed for deeper stages. Finally, we introduced periodic forcing of variable intensity to simulate external perturbations, and identified the key regions relevant for the recovery of wakefulness from deep sleep. Our model represents sleep as a state with diminished perceptual gating and the latent capacity for global accessibility that is required for rapid arousals. To the extent that the qualitative characterization of local dynamics is exhausted by the dichotomy between unstable and stable behavior, our work highlights how expanding the model parameter space can describe states of consciousness in terms of multiple dimensions with interpretations given by the choice of anatomically-informed priors.

Decoding the circuitry of consciousness: From local microcircuits to brain-scale networks

Identifying the physiological processes underlying the emergence and maintenance of consciousness is one of the most fundamental problems of neuroscience, with implications ranging from fundamental neuroscience to the treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). One major challenge is to understand how cortical circuits at drastically different spatial scales, from local networks to brain-scale networks, operate in concert to enable consciousness, and how those processes are impaired in DOC patients. In this review, we attempt to relate available neurophysiological and clinical data with existing theoretical models of consciousness, while linking the micro- and macrocircuit levels. First, we address the relationships between awareness and wakefulness on the one hand, and cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical connectivity on the other hand. Second, we discuss the role of three main types of GABAergic interneurons in specific circuits responsible for the dynamical reorganization of functional networks. Third, we explore advances in the functional role of nested oscillations for neural synchronization and communication, emphasizing the importance of the balance between local (high-frequency) and distant (low-frequency) activity for efficient information processing. The clinical implications of these theoretical considerations are presented. We propose that such cellular-scale mechanisms could extend current theories of consciousness.

Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

We review the central tenets and neuroanatomical basis of the global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis, which attempts to account for the main scientific observations regarding the elementary mechanisms of conscious processing in the human brain. The GNW hypothesis proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors. We examine this hypothesis in light of recent data that contrast brain activity evoked by either conscious or non-conscious contents, as well as during conscious or non-conscious states, particularly general anesthesia. We also discuss the relationship between the intertwined concepts of conscious processing, attention, and working memory.

Cue awareness in avoiding effortful control

Based on a recent metacognitive account, cognitive effort is the result of an inferential evaluation made over explicitly available cues. Following from this account, we present here a pre-registered experiment that tested the specific hypothesis that explicit awareness of cues that are aligned with cognitive demand is a prerequisite in avoiding effortful lines of action. We attempted to modulate levels of effort avoidance behavior by introducing an incentive (between-subjects) to monitor two lines of action that, unbeknownst to individuals, varied in the probability of a task switch. Importantly, previous research has demonstrated that the difference in these probabilities is relatively opaque to individuals. We did not find strong evidence for our incentive manipulation having an effect on demand avoidance as indexed by individuals' choices in a block of the task where avoiding effort was instructed. However, we do find that being aware of the task-switching cue appears to increase the likelihood of demand avoidance. We consider these results within the context of the metacognition of cognitive effort.

Connectomics of bipolar disorder: a critical review, and evidence for dynamic instabilities within interoceptive networks

The notion that specific cognitive and emotional processes arise from functionally distinct brain regions has lately shifted toward a connectivity-based approach that emphasizes the role of network-mediated integration across regions. The clinical neurosciences have likewise shifted from a predominantly lesion-based approach to a connectomic paradigm-framing disorders as diverse as stroke, schizophrenia (SCZ), and dementia as "dysconnection syndromes". Here we position bipolar disorder (BD) within this paradigm. We first summarise the disruptions in structural, functional and effective connectivity that have been documented in BD. Not surprisingly, these disturbances show a preferential impact on circuits that support emotional processes, cognitive control and executive functions. Those at high risk (HR) for BD also show patterns of connectivity that differ from both matched control populations and those with BD, and which may thus speak to neurobiological markers of both risk and resilience. We highlight research fields that aim to link brain network disturbances to the phenotype of BD, including the study of large-scale brain dynamics, the principles of network stability and control, and the study of interoception (the perception of physiological states). Together, these findings suggest that the affective dysregulation of BD arises from dynamic instabilities in interoceptive circuits which subsequently impact on fear circuitry and cognitive control systems. We describe the resulting disturbance as a "psychosis of interoception".

Serological and molecular diagnosis of Toxoplasma gondii in patients with schizophrenia

Schizophrenia is a persistent neuropsychiatric syndrome of uncertain source. Toxoplasmosis is the most prevalent parasitic protozoan infecting one-third of the worldwide human population. Infectious agents such as toxoplasma are the probable cause of schizophrenia. This study was aimed to evaluate the association between schizophrenia and toxoplasmosis using SAG1 and B1 Target gene. During February to December 2016, 92 patients with schizophrenia are imported in our study. All cases were assessed by serological (IgG and IgM antibodies) and molecular examinations. ELISA was performed by Commercial kits according to manufactures procedure. DNA was extracted and nested PCR was done using two pairs of primers. From 92 patients, 59 (64.13%) cases were positive for toxoplasmosis by serological examinations (14 samples positive for IgM and IgG, 40 samples positive for only IgG and 5 samples Positive for only IgM) and 58 (63.04%) were positive by Nested PCR technique. Based on the nested PCR method, 68.47 and 47.82% of samples were positive by B1 and SAG1 genes, respectively. Our results showed the importance of use both serological and molecular diagnostic methods for accurate recognition of T. gondii in patients with schizophrenia. Moreover our results indicated that B1 gene is more sensitive than SAG1 gene.

Impaired conscious access and abnormal attentional amplification in schizophrenia

Previous research suggests that the conscious perception of a masked stimulus is impaired in schizophrenia, while unconscious bottom-up processing of the same stimulus, as assessed by subliminal priming, can be preserved. Here, we test this postulated dissociation between intact bottom-up and impaired top-down processing and evaluate its brain mechanisms using high-density recordings of event-related potentials. Sixteen patients with schizophrenia and sixteen controls were exposed to peripheral digits with various degrees of visibility, under conditions of either focused attention or distraction by another task. In the distraction condition, the brain activity evoked by masked digits was drastically reduced in both groups, but early bottom-up visual activation could still be detected and did not differ between patients and controls. By contrast, under focused top-down attention, a major impairment was observed: in patients, contrary to controls, the late non-linear ignition associated with the P3 component was reduced. Interestingly, the patients showed an essentially normal attentional amplification of the P1 and N2 components. These results suggest that some but not all top-down attentional amplification processes are impaired in schizophrenia, while bottom-up processing seems to be preserved.

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An elevated consciousness threshold is observed in schizophrenia.

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Under unattended conditions, brain activity was similarly reduced in schizophrenic patients and controls.

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Under attended conditions, the late ignition associated with the P3 component is impaired in patients.

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In schizophrenia, top-down attentional amplification is abnormal while bottom-up processing is essentially spared.