On second thoughts: changes of mind in decision-making

The value of error-correcting responses for cognitive assessment in games

Traditional conflict-based cognitive assessment tools are highly behaviorally restrictive, which prevents them from capturing the dynamic nature of human cognition, such as the tendency to make error-correcting responses. The cognitive game Tunnel Runner measures interference control, response inhibition, and response-rule switching in a less restrictive manner than traditional cognitive assessment tools by giving players movement control after an initial response and encouraging error-correcting responses. Nevertheless, error-correcting responses remain unused due to a limited understanding of what they measure and how to use them. To facilitate the use of error-correcting responses to measure and understand human cognition, we developed theoretically-grounded measures of error-correcting responses in Tunnel Runner and assessed whether they reflected the same cognitive functions measured via initial responses. Furthermore, we evaluated the measurement potential of error-correcting responses. We found that initial and error-correcting responses similarly reflected players' response inhibition and interference control, but not their response-rule switching. Furthermore, combining the two response types increased the reliability of interference control and response inhibition measurements. Lastly, error-correcting responses showed the potential to measure response inhibition on their own. Our results pave the way toward understanding and using post-decision change of mind data for cognitive measurement and other research and application contexts.

Integrated Perceptual Decisions Rely on Parallel Evidence Accumulation

The ability to make accurate and timely decisions, such as judging when it is safe to cross the road, is the foundation of adaptive behavior. While the computational and neural processes supporting simple decisions on isolated stimuli have been well characterized, decision-making in the real world often requires integration of discrete sensory events over time and space. Most previous experimental work on perceptual decision-making has focused on tasks that involve only a single, task-relevant source of sensory input. It remains unclear, therefore, how such integrative decisions are regulated computationally. Here we used psychophysics, electroencephalography, and computational modeling to understand how the human brain combines visual motion signals across space in the service of a single, integrated decision. To that purpose, we presented two random-dot kinematograms in the left and the right visual hemifields. Coherent motion signals were shown briefly and concurrently in each location, and healthy adult human participants of both sexes reported the average of the two motion signals. We directly tested competing predictions arising from influential serial and parallel accounts of visual processing. Using a biologically plausible model of motion filtering, we found evidence in favor of parallel integration as the fundamental computational mechanism regulating integrated perceptual decisions.

Sex differences in change-of-mind neuroeconomic decision-making is modulated by LINC00473 in medial prefrontal cortex

Changing one's mind is a complex cognitive phenomenon involving a continuous re-appraisal of the trade-off between past costs and future value. Recent work modeling this behavior across species has established associations between aspects of this choice process and their contributions to altered decision-making in psychopathology. Here, we investigated the actions in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) neurons of long intergenic non-coding RNA, LINC00473, known to induce stress resilience in a striking sex-dependent manner, but whose role in cognitive function is unknown. We characterized complex decision-making behavior in male and female mice longitudinally in our neuroeconomic foraging paradigm, Restaurant Row, following virus-mediated LINC00473 expression in mPFC neurons. On this task, mice foraged for their primary source of food among varying costs (delays) and subjective value (flavors) while on a limited time-budget during which decisions to accept and wait for rewards were separated into discrete stages of primary commitments and secondary re-evaluations. We discovered important differences in decision-making behavior between female and male mice. LINC00473 expression selectively influenced multiple features of re-evaluative choices, without affecting primary decisions, in female mice only. These behavioral effects included changing how mice (i) cached the value of the passage of time and (ii) weighed their history of economically disadvantageous choices. Both processes were uniquely linked to change-of-mind decisions and underlie the computational bases of distinct aspects of counterfactual thinking. These findings reveal a key bridge between a molecular driver of stress resilience and psychological mechanisms underlying sex-specific decision-making proclivities.

A Double Hit of Social and Economic Stress in Mice Precipitates Changes in Decision-Making Strategies

BACKGROUND

Economic stress can serve as a second hit for people who have already accumulated a history of adverse life experiences. How one recovers from a setback is a core feature of resilience but is seldom captured in animal studies.

METHODS

We challenged mice in a novel 2-hit stress model by first exposing them to chronic social defeat stress and then testing adaptations to increasing reward scarcity on a neuroeconomic task. Mice were tested across months on the Restaurant Row task, during which they foraged daily for their primary source of food while on a limited time budget in a closed-economy system. An abrupt transition into a reward-scarce environment elicits an economic challenge, precipitating a drop in food intake and body weight to which mice must respond to survive.

RESULTS

We found that mice with a history of social stress mounted a robust behavioral response to this economic challenge that was achieved through a complex redistribution of time allocation among competing opportunities. Interestingly, we found that mice with a history of social defeat displayed changes in the development of decision-making policies during the recovery process that are important not only for ensuring food security necessary for survival but also prioritizing subjective value and that these changes emerged only for certain types of choices.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings indicate that an individual's capacity to recover from economic challenges depends on that person's prior history of stress and can affect multiple decision-making aspects of subjective well-being, thus highlighting a motivational balance that may be altered in stress-related disorders such as depression.

Dynamic changes in task preparation in a multi-task environment: The task transformation paradigm

A key element of human flexible behavior concerns the ability to continuously predict and prepare for sudden changes in tasks or actions. Here, we tested whether people can dynamically modulate task preparation processes and decision-making strategies when the identity of a to-be-performed task becomes uncertain. To this end, we developed a new paradigm where participants need to prepare for one of nine tasks on each trial. Crucially, in some blocks, the task being prepared could suddenly shift to a different task after a longer cue-target interval, by changing either the stimulus category or categorization rule that defined the initial task. We found that participants were able to dynamically modulate task preparation in the face of this task uncertainty. A second experiment shows that these changes in behavior were not simply a function of decreasing task expectancy, but rather of increasing switch expectancy. Finally, in the third and fourth experiment, we demonstrate that these dynamic modulations can be applied in a compositional manner, depending on whether either only the stimulus category or categorization rule would be expected to change.

Does allowing for changes of mind influence initial responses?

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) have become the dominant theoretical framework for rapid decision-making, and while many theoretically distinct variants exist, comparisons have proved challenging due to strong mimicry in their predictions about choice response time data. One solution to reduce mimicry is constraining these models with double responses, which are a second response that is made after the initial response. However, instructing participants that they are allowed to change their mind could influence their strategy for initial responding, meaning that explicit double responding paradigms may not generalise to standard paradigms. Here, we provide a validation of explicit double responding paradigms, by assessing whether participants' initial decisions - as measured by diffusion model parameters - differ based on whether or not they were instructed that they could change their response after their initial response. Across three experiments, our results consistently indicate that allowing for changes of mind does not influence initial responses, with Bayesian analyses providing at least moderate evidence in favour of the null in all cases. Our findings suggest that explicit double responding paradigms should generalise to standard paradigms, validating the use of explicit double responding in future rapid decision-making studies.

Distinct neural markers of evidence accumulation index metacognitive processing before and after simple visual decisions

Perceptual decision-making is affected by uncertainty arising from the reliability of incoming sensory evidence (perceptual uncertainty) and the categorization of that evidence relative to a choice boundary (categorical uncertainty). Here, we investigated how these factors impact the temporal dynamics of evidence processing during decision-making and subsequent metacognitive judgments. Participants performed a motion discrimination task while electroencephalography was recorded. We manipulated perceptual uncertainty by varying motion coherence, and categorical uncertainty by varying the angular offset of motion signals relative to a criterion. After each trial, participants rated their desire to change their mind. High uncertainty impaired perceptual and metacognitive judgments and reduced the amplitude of the centro-parietal positivity, a neural marker of evidence accumulation. Coherence and offset affected the centro-parietal positivity at different time points, suggesting that perceptual and categorical uncertainty affect decision-making in sequential stages. Moreover, the centro-parietal positivity predicted participants' metacognitive judgments: larger predecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with less desire to change one's mind, whereas larger postdecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with greater desire to change one's mind, but only following errors. These findings reveal a dissociation between predecisional and postdecisional evidence processing, suggesting that the CPP tracks potentially distinct cognitive processes before and after a decision.

Thinking about Believing: Can Metacognitive Reflection Encourage Belief Updating?

People often cling to their beliefs even in the face of counterevidence. The current study explored metacognitive reflection as a potential driver for belief updating. In a randomized controlled experiment (n = 155), participants rated their degree of agreement with a statement regarding genetic modification in humans. Following this, participants were presented with a passage containing an argument counter to their indicated belief. Participants in the metacognition condition were asked to deeply reflect on the ways in which the passage was similar to or different from their current beliefs. Participants in the control condition were asked to engage in more shallow reflection on the composition of the passage. After reflecting on the counterevidence, participants were asked to again rate their agreement with the statement regarding human gene modification. Both groups updated their initial beliefs to be more consistent with the presented counterevidence. Although greater belief updating was observed in those who metacognitively reflected on the passage, this effect did not reach significance (p = .055). These findings suggest that reflecting on counterevidence has the potential to encourage belief updating, regardless of whether that reflection is metacognitive in nature, and provide promise for future work investigating the role of metacognition in belief updating.

The uniqueness of the human brain: a review

The purpose of this review is to highlight the most important aspects of the anatomical and functional uniqueness of the human brain. For this, a comparison is made between our brains and those of our closest ancestors (chimpanzees and bonobos) and human ancestors. During human evolution, several changes occurred in the brain, such as an absolute increase in brain size and number of cortical neurons, in addition to a greater degree of functional lateralization and anatomical asymmetry. Also, the cortical cytoarchitecture became more diversified and there was an increase in the number of intracortical networks and networks extending from the cerebral cortex to subcortical structures, with more neural networks being invested in multisensory and sensory-motor-affective-cognitive integration. These changes permitted more complex, flexible and versatile cognitive abilities and social behavior, such as shared intentionality and symbolic articulated language, which, in turn, made possible the formation of larger social groups and cumulative cultural evolution that are characteristic of our species.

Rapid, systematic updating of movement by accumulated decision evidence

Acting in the natural world requires not only deciding among multiple options but also converting decisions into motor commands. How the dynamics of decision formation influence the fine kinematics of response movement remains, however, poorly understood. Here we investigate how the accumulation of decision evidence shapes the response orienting trajectories in a task where freely-moving rats combine prior expectations and auditory information to select between two possible options. Response trajectories and their motor vigor are initially determined by the prior. Rats movements then incorporate sensory information as early as 60 ms after stimulus onset by accelerating or slowing depending on how much the stimulus supports their initial choice. When the stimulus evidence is in strong contradiction, rats change their mind and reverse their initial trajectory. Human subjects performing an equivalent task display a remarkably similar behavior. We encapsulate these results in a computational model that, by mapping the decision variable onto the movement kinematics at discrete time points, captures subjects' choices, trajectories and changes of mind. Our results show that motor responses are not ballistic. Instead, they are systematically and rapidly updated, as they smoothly unfold over time, by the parallel dynamics of the underlying decision process.

Diabetes alters neuroeconomically dissociable forms of mental accounting

Those with diabetes mellitus are at high-risk of developing psychiatric disorders, yet the link between hyperglycemia and alterations in motivated behavior has not been explored in detail. We characterized value-based decision-making behavior of a streptozocin-induced diabetic mouse model on a naturalistic neuroeconomic foraging paradigm called Restaurant Row. Mice made self-paced choices while on a limited time-budget accepting or rejecting reward offers as a function of cost (delays cued by tone-pitch) and subjective value (flavors), tested daily in a closed-economy system across months. We found streptozocin-treated mice disproportionately undervalued less-preferred flavors and inverted their meal-consumption patterns shifted toward a more costly strategy that overprioritized high-value rewards. We discovered these foraging behaviors were driven by impairments in multiple decision-making systems, including the ability to deliberate when engaged in conflict and cache the value of the passage of time in the form of sunk costs. Surprisingly, diabetes-induced changes in behavior depended not only on the type of choice being made but also the salience of reward-scarcity in the environment. These findings suggest complex relationships between glycemic regulation and dissociable valuation algorithms underlying unique cognitive heuristics and sensitivity to opportunity costs can disrupt fundamentally distinct computational processes and could give rise to psychiatric vulnerabilities.

Differences in metacognitive functioning between obsessive-compulsive disorder patients and highly compulsive individuals from the general population

BACKGROUND

Our confidence, a form of metacognition, guides our behavior. Confidence abnormalities have been found in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A first notion based on clinical case-control studies suggests lower confidence in OCD patients compared to healthy controls. Contrarily, studies in highly compulsive individuals from general population samples showed that obsessive-compulsive symptoms related positively or not at all to confidence. A second notion suggests that an impairment in confidence estimation and usage is related to compulsive behavior, which is more often supported by studies in general population samples. These opposite findings call into question whether findings from highly compulsive individuals from the general population are generalizable to OCD patient populations.

METHODS

To test this, we investigated confidence at three hierarchical levels: local confidence in single decisions, global confidence in task performance and higher-order self-beliefs in 40 OCD patients (medication-free, no comorbid diagnoses), 40 controls, and 40 matched highly compulsive individuals from the general population (HComp).

RESULTS

In line with the first notion we found that OCD patients exhibited relative underconfidence at all three hierarchical levels. In contrast, HComp individuals showed local and global overconfidence and worsened metacognitive sensitivity compared with OCD patients, in line with the second notion.

CONCLUSIONS

Metacognitive functioning observed in a general highly compulsive population, often used as an analog for OCD, is distinct from that in a clinical OCD population, suggesting that OC symptoms in these two groups relate differently to (meta)cognitive processes. These findings call for caution in generalizing (meta)cognitive findings from general population to clinical samples.

Temporal aspects of two types of backward crosstalk in dual-tasks: An analysis of continuous mouse-tracking data

A common explanation for processing limitations in dual-tasking is the existence of a bottleneck during response selection, meaning that the selection of responses can only occur serially for different tasks. However, a large body of data shows that features of a (secondary) Task 2 can already influence the processing of a (primary) Task 1. Such effects are referred to as backward crosstalk effects (BCEs). In the present study, two types of such BCEs were investigated: the compatibility-based BCE, which depends on the dimensional (often spatial) overlap between task features, and a BCE based on a go/no-go task in Task 2 (no-go BCE). Joining a line of research that suggests different mechanisms for these two types of BCEs, we investigated them using a mouse-tracking setup. Time continuous analyses revealed that the compatibility-based BCE triggered a spatial activation of the Task 2 response early during Task 1 processing, whereas the no-go BCE triggered an inhibitory effect in the case of a no-go Task 2, which spills over to Task 1 execution. This occurred, however, earlier in the time course than expected. The results are discussed with regard to recent models of dual-task processing.

Sunk cost sensitivity during change-of-mind decisions is informed by both the spent and remaining costs

Sunk cost sensitivity describes escalating decision commitment with increased spent resources. On neuroeconomic foraging tasks, mice, rats, and humans show similar escalations from sunk costs while quitting an ongoing countdown to reward. In a new analysis taken across computationally parallel foraging tasks across species and laboratories, we find that these behaviors primarily occur on choices that are economically inconsistent with the subject's other choices, and that they reflect not only the time spent, but also the time remaining, suggesting that these are change-of-mind re-evaluation processes. Using a recently proposed change-of-mind drift-diffusion model, we find that the sunk cost sensitivity in this model arises from decision-processes that directly take into account the time spent (costs sunk). Applying these new insights to experimental data, we find that sensitivity to sunk costs during re-evaluation decisions depends on the information provided to the subject about the time spent and the time remaining.

Distinct forms of regret linked to resilience versus susceptibility to stress are regulated by region-specific CREB function in mice

Regret describes recognizing alternative actions could have led to better outcomes. It remains unclear whether regret derives from generalized mistake appraisal or instead comprises dissociable, action-specific processes. Using a neuroeconomic task, we found that mice were sensitive to fundamentally distinct types of regret following exposure to chronic social defeat stress or manipulations of CREB, a transcription factor implicated in stress action. Bias to make compensatory decisions after rejecting high-value offers (regret type I) was unique to stress-susceptible mice. Bias following the converse operation, accepting low-value offers (regret type II), was enhanced in stress-resilient mice and absent in stress-susceptible mice. CREB function in either the prefrontal cortex or nucleus accumbens was required to suppress regret type I but bidirectionally regulated regret type II. We provide insight into how maladaptive stress response traits relate to distinct forms of counterfactual thinking, which could steer therapy for mood disorders, such as depression, toward circuit-specific computations through a careful description of decision narrative.

Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Prefrontal control of social influence in risk decision making

To optimize our decisions, we may change our mind by utilizing social information. Here, we examined how changes of mind were modulated by Social Misalignment Sensitivity (SMS), egocentric tendency, and decision preferences in a decision-making paradigm including both risk and social information. Combining functional magnetic resonance imaging with computational modeling, we showed that both SMS and egocentric tendency modulated changes of mind under the influence of social information. While SMS was represented in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) and superior parietal gyrus (SPG) in the socially aligned situation, a distributed brain network was activated in the misaligned condition, including not only the dACC and SPG but also superior frontal gyrus and precuneus. These results suggest that SMS is related to a monitoring brain system, the scope of which varies according to the level of misalignment with social majority. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex selectively interacted with SMS among the participants with a low switching threshold, indicating that its regulation on SMS may be sensitive to inter-individual variation. Our findings highlight the predominant roles of SMS and the prefrontal control system towards changes of mind under social influence.