Abstract task representations for inference and control

Practice Reshapes the Geometry and Dynamics of Task-tailored Representations

Extensive practice makes task performance more efficient and precise, leading to automaticity. However, theories of automaticity differ on which levels of task representations (e.g., low-level features, stimulus-response mappings, or high-level conjunctive memories of individual events) change with practice, despite predicting the same pattern of improvement (e.g., power law of practice). To resolve this controversy, we built on recent theoretical advances in understanding computations through neural population dynamics. Specifically, we hypothesized that practice optimizes the neural representational geometry of task representations to minimally separate the highest-level task contingencies needed for successful performance. This involves efficiently reaching conjunctive neural states that integrate task-critical features nonlinearly while abstracting over non-critical dimensions. To test this hypothesis, human participants (n = 40) engaged in extensive practice of a simple, context-dependent action selection task over 3 days while recording EEG. During initial rapid improvement in task performance, representations of the highest-level, context-specific conjunctions of task-features were enhanced as a function of the number of successful episodes. Crucially, only enhancement of these conjunctive representations, and not lower-order representations, predicted the power-law improvement in performance. Simultaneously, over sessions, these conjunctive neural states became more stable earlier in time and more aligned, abstracting over redundant task features, which correlated with offline performance gain in reducing switch costs. Thus, practice optimizes the dynamic representational geometry as task-tailored neural states that minimally tesselate the task space, taming their high-dimensionality.

The neuroscience of active learning and direct instruction

Throughout the educational system, students experiencing active learning pedagogy perform better and fail less than those taught through direct instruction. Can this be ascribed to differences in learning from a neuroscientific perspective? This review examines mechanistic, neuroscientific evidence that might explain differences in cognitive engagement contributing to learning outcomes between these instructional approaches. In classrooms, direct instruction comprehensively describes academic content, while active learning provides structured opportunities for learners to explore, apply, and manipulate content. Synaptic plasticity and its modulation by arousal or novelty are central to all learning and both approaches. As a form of social learning, direct instruction relies upon working memory. The reinforcement learning circuit, associated agency, curiosity, and peer-to-peer social interactions combine to enhance motivation, improve retention, and build higher-order-thinking skills in active learning environments. When working memory becomes overwhelmed, additionally engaging the reinforcement learning circuit improves retention, providing an explanation for the benefits of active learning. This analysis provides a mechanistic examination of how emerging neuroscience principles might inform pedagogical choices at all educational levels.

Abstract representations emerge in human hippocampal neurons during inference

Humans have the remarkable cognitive capacity to rapidly adapt to changing environments. Central to this capacity is the ability to form high-level, abstract representations that take advantage of regularities in the world to support generalization1. However, little is known about how these representations are encoded in populations of neurons, how they emerge through learning and how they relate to behaviour2,3. Here we characterized the representational geometry of populations of neurons (single units) recorded in the hippocampus, amygdala, medial frontal cortex and ventral temporal cortex of neurosurgical patients performing an inferential reasoning task. We found that only the neural representations formed in the hippocampus simultaneously encode several task variables in an abstract, or disentangled, format. This representational geometry is uniquely observed after patients learn to perform inference, and consists of disentangled directly observable and discovered latent task variables. Learning to perform inference by trial and error or through verbal instructions led to the formation of hippocampal representations with similar geometric properties. The observed relation between representational format and inference behaviour suggests that abstract and disentangled representational geometries are important for complex cognition.

Binding of response-independent task rules

Binding theories claim that features of an episode are bound to each other and can be retrieved once these features are re-encountered. Binding effects have been shown in task-switching studies with a strong focus on bindings of observable features such as responses. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether task rules, translating stimulus information into motor output can be bound and subsequently retrieved even if they act independently from specific response codes. To address this question, we utilized a task-switching paradigm with varying visual context features. Unlike previous studies, tasks in the present study did not differ in their response options, and sequential response repetitions were eliminated by design. In three experiments, we observed larger task-switch costs on trials repeating the context of the previous trial than on context-change trials. According to binding accounts, this suggests that response-independent task rules adopted in the previous trial became bound to the context feature and were retrieved upon re-encountering the context feature in the current trial. The results of this study generalize previous findings indicating that binding processes can include response-independent control to task-switching situations.

Simplifying social learning

Social learning is complex, but people often seem to navigate social environments with ease. This ability creates a puzzle for traditional accounts of reinforcement learning (RL) that assume people negotiate a tradeoff between easy-but-simple behavior (model-free learning) and complex-but-difficult behavior (e.g., model-based learning). We offer a theoretical framework for resolving this puzzle: although social environments are complex, people have social expertise that helps them behave flexibly with low cognitive cost. Specifically, by using familiar concepts instead of focusing on novel details, people can turn hard learning problems into simpler ones. This ability highlights social learning as a prototype for studying cognitive simplicity in the face of environmental complexity and identifies a role for conceptual knowledge in everyday reward learning.

Co-representation of Functional Brain Networks Is Shaped by Cortical Myeloarchitecture and Reveals Individual Behavioral Ability

Large-scale functional networks are spatially distributed in the human brain. Despite recent progress in differentiating their functional roles, how the brain navigates the spatial coordination among them and the biological relevance of this coordination is still not fully understood. Capitalizing on canonical individualized networks derived from functional MRI data, we proposed a new concept, that is, co-representation of functional brain networks, to delineate the spatial coordination among them. To further quantify the co-representation pattern, we defined two indexes, that is, the co-representation specificity (CoRS) and intensity (CoRI), for separately measuring the extent of specific and average expression of functional networks at each brain location by using the data from both sexes. We found that the identified pattern of co-representation was anchored by cortical regions with three types of cytoarchitectural classes along a sensory-fugal axis, including, at the first end, primary (idiotypic) regions showing high CoRS, at the second end, heteromodal regions showing low CoRS and high CoRI, at the third end, paralimbic regions showing low CoRI. Importantly, we demonstrated the critical role of myeloarchitecture in sculpting the spatial distribution of co-representation by assessing the association with the myelin-related neuroanatomical and transcriptomic profiles. Furthermore, the significance of manifesting the co-representation was revealed in its prediction of individual behavioral ability. Our findings indicated that the spatial coordination among functional networks was built upon an anatomically configured blueprint to facilitate neural information processing, while advancing our understanding of the topographical organization of the brain by emphasizing the assembly of functional networks.

Dorsolateral prefrontal activity supports a cognitive space organization of cognitive control

Cognitive control resolves conflicts between task-relevant and -irrelevant information to enable goal-directed behavior. As conflicts can arise from different sources (e.g., sensory input, internal representations), how a limited set of cognitive control processes can effectively address diverse conflicts remains a major challenge. Based on the cognitive space theory, different conflicts can be parameterized and represented as distinct points in a (low-dimensional) cognitive space, which can then be resolved by a limited set of cognitive control processes working along the dimensions. It leads to a hypothesis that conflicts similar in their sources are also represented similarly in the cognitive space. We designed a task with five types of conflicts that could be conceptually parameterized. Both human performance and fMRI activity patterns in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex support that different types of conflicts are organized based on their similarity, thus suggesting cognitive space as a principle for representing conflicts.

The utility of a latent-cause framework for understanding addiction phenomena

Computational models of addiction often rely on a model-free reinforcement learning (RL) formulation, owing to the close associations between model-free RL, habitual behavior and the dopaminergic system. However, such formulations typically do not capture key recurrent features of addiction phenomena such as craving and relapse. Moreover, they cannot account for goal-directed aspects of addiction that necessitate contrasting, model-based formulations. Here we synthesize a growing body of evidence and propose that a latent-cause framework can help unify our understanding of several recurrent phenomena in addiction, by viewing them as the inferred return of previous, persistent "latent causes". We demonstrate that applying this framework to Pavlovian and instrumental settings can help account for defining features of craving and relapse such as outcome-specificity, generalization, and cyclical dynamics. Finally, we argue that this framework can bridge model-free and model-based formulations, and account for individual variability in phenomenology by accommodating the memories, beliefs, and goals of those living with addiction, motivating a centering of the individual, subjective experience of addiction and recovery.

Grid codes underlie multiple cognitive maps in the human brain

Grid cells fire at multiple positions that organize the vertices of equilateral triangles tiling a 2D space and are well studied in rodents. The last decade witnessed rapid progress in two other research lines on grid codes-empirical studies on distributed human grid-like representations in physical and multiple non-physical spaces, and cognitive computational models addressing the function of grid cells based on principles of efficient and predictive coding. Here, we review the progress in these fields and integrate these lines into a systematic organization. We also discuss the coordinate mechanisms of grid codes in the human entorhinal cortex and medial prefrontal cortex and their role in neurological and psychiatric diseases.

Dysfunction of the triple-network model is associated with cognitive impairment in patients with cerebral small vessel disease

Purpose

This study aimed to demonstrate the correlations between the altered functional connectivity patterns in the triple-network model and cognitive impairment in patients with cerebral small vascular disease (CSVD).

Methods

Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data were obtained from 22 patients with CSVD and 20 healthy controls. The resting-state data were analyzed using independent component analysis and functional network connectivity (FNC) analysis to explore the functional alterations in the intrinsic triple-network model including the salience network (SN), default mode network (DMN), and central executive network (CEN), and their correlations with the cognitive deficits and clinical observations in the patients with CSVD.

Results

Compared to the healthy controls, the patients with CSVD exhibited increased connectivity patterns in the CEN-DMN and decreased connectivity patterns in the DMN-SN, CEN-SN, intra-SN, and intra-DMN. Significant negative correlations were detected between the intra-DMN connectivity pattern and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) total scores (r = -0.460, p = 0.048) and MoCA abstraction scores (r = -0.565, p = 0.012), and a positive correlation was determined between the intra-SN connectivity pattern and the MoCA abstraction scores (r = 0.491, p = 0.033).

Conclusions

Our study findings suggest that the functional alterations in the triple-network model are associated with the cognitive deficits in patients with CSVD and shed light on the importance of the triple-network model in the pathogenesis of CSVD.

Abstract representations emerge in human hippocampal neurons during inference behavior

Humans have the remarkable cognitive capacity to rapidly adapt to changing environments. Central to this capacity is the ability to form high-level, abstract representations that take advantage of regularities in the world to support generalization 1 . However, little is known about how these representations are encoded in populations of neurons, how they emerge through learning, and how they relate to behavior 2,3 . Here we characterized the representational geometry of populations of neurons (single-units) recorded in the hippocampus, amygdala, medial frontal cortex, and ventral temporal cortex of neurosurgical patients who are performing an inferential reasoning task. We find that only the neural representations formed in the hippocampus simultaneously encode multiple task variables in an abstract, or disentangled, format. This representational geometry is uniquely observed after patients learn to perform inference, and consisted of disentangled directly observable and discovered latent task variables. Interestingly, learning to perform inference by trial and error or through verbal instructions led to the formation of hippocampal representations with similar geometric properties. The observed relation between representational format and inference behavior suggests that abstract/disentangled representational geometries are important for complex cognition.

Principles of cognitive control over task focus and task switching

Adaptive behaviour requires the ability to focus on a task and protect it from distraction (cognitive stability) and to rapidly switch tasks when circumstances change (cognitive flexibility). Burgeoning research literatures have aimed to understand how people achieve task focus and task switch readiness. In this Perspective, I integrate these literatures to derive a cognitive architecture and functional rules underlying the regulation of cognitive stability and flexibility. I propose that task focus and task switch readiness are supported by independent mechanisms. However, I also suggest that the strategic regulation of both mechanisms is governed by shared learning principles: an incremental, online learner that nudges control up or down based on the recent history of task demands (a recency heuristic) and episodic reinstatement when the current context matches a past experience (a recognition heuristic). Finally, I discuss algorithmic and neural implementations of these processes, as well as clinical implications.

Prefrontal cortex state representations shape human credit assignment

People learn adaptively from feedback, but the rate of such learning differs drastically across individuals and contexts. Here, we examine whether this variability reflects differences in what is learned. Leveraging a neurocomputational approach that merges fMRI and an iterative reward learning task, we link the specificity of credit assignment-how well people are able to appropriately attribute outcomes to their causes-to the precision of neural codes in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). Participants credit task-relevant cues more precisely in social compared vto nonsocial contexts, a process that is mediated by high-fidelity (i.e., distinct and consistent) state representations in the PFC. Specifically, the medial PFC and orbitofrontal cortex work in concert to match the neural codes from feedback to those at choice, and the strength of these common neural codes predicts credit assignment precision. Together this work provides a window into how neural representations drive adaptive learning.

Temporary amnesia from sleep loss: A framework for understanding consequences of sleep deprivation

Throughout its modern history, sleep research has been concerned with both the benefits of sleep and the deleterious impact of sleep disruption for cognition, behavior, and performance. When more specifically examining the impact of sleep on memory and learning, however, research has overwhelmingly focused on how sleep following learning facilitates memory, with less attention paid to how lack of sleep prior to learning can disrupt subsequent memory. Although this imbalance in research emphasis is being more frequently addressed by current investigators, there is a need for a more organized approach to examining the effect of sleep deprivation before learning. The present review briefly describes the generally accepted approach to analyzing effects of sleep deprivation on subsequent memory and learning by means of its effects on encoding. Then, we suggest an alternative framework with which to understand sleep loss and memory in terms of temporary amnesia from sleep loss (TASL). The review covers the well-characterized properties of amnesia arising from medial temporal lobe lesions and shows how the pattern of preserved and impaired aspects of memory in amnesia may also be appearing during sleep loss. The view of the TASL framework is that amnesia and the amnesia-like deficits observed during sleep deprivation not only affect memory processes but will also be apparent in cognitive processes that rely on those memory processes, such as decision-making. Adoption of the TASL framework encourages movement away from traditional explanations based on narrowly defined domains of memory functioning, such as encoding, and taking instead a more expansive view of how brain structures that support memory, such as the hippocampus, interact with higher structures, such as the prefrontal cortex, to produce complex cognition and behavioral performance, and how this interaction may be compromised by sleep disruption.

Goals, usefulness and abstraction in value-based choice

Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, while on the run, purportedly burned two million dollars in banknotes to keep his daughter warm. A stark reminder that, in life, circumstances and goals can quickly change, forcing us to reassess and modify our values on-the-fly. Studies in decision-making and neuroeconomics have often implicitly equated value to reward, emphasising the hedonic and automatic aspect of the value computation, while overlooking its functional (concept-like) nature. Here we outline the computational and biological principles that enable the brain to compute the usefulness of an option or action by creating abstractions that flexibly adapt to changing goals. We present different algorithmic architectures, comparing ideas from artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive neuroscience with psychological theories and, when possible, drawing parallels.