1
|
Thompson KM, Badizadegan K. Review of Poliovirus Transmission and Economic Modeling to Support Global Polio Eradication: 2020-2024. Pathogens 2024; 13:435. [PMID: 38921733 PMCID: PMC11206708 DOI: 10.3390/pathogens13060435] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/25/2024] [Revised: 05/16/2024] [Accepted: 05/18/2024] [Indexed: 06/27/2024] Open
Abstract
Continued investment in the development and application of mathematical models of poliovirus transmission, economics, and risks leads to their use in support of polio endgame strategy development and risk management policies. This study complements an earlier review covering the period 2000-2019 and discusses the evolution of studies published since 2020 by modeling groups supported by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) partners and others. We systematically review modeling papers published in English in peer-reviewed journals from 2020-2024.25 that focus on poliovirus transmission and health economic analyses. In spite of the long-anticipated end of poliovirus transmission and the GPEI sunset, which would lead to the end of its support for modeling, we find that the number of modeling groups supported by GPEI partners doubled and the rate of their publications increased. Modeling continued to play a role in supporting GPEI and national/regional policies, but changes in polio eradication governance, decentralized management and decision-making, and increased heterogeneity in modeling approaches and findings decreased the overall impact of modeling results. Meanwhile, the failure of the 2016 globally coordinated cessation of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine use for preventive immunization and the introduction of new poliovirus vaccines and formulation, increased the complexity and uncertainty of poliovirus transmission and economic models and policy recommendations during this time.
Collapse
|
2
|
Hartner AM, Li X, Echeverria-Londono S, Roth J, Abbas K, Auzenbergs M, de Villiers MJ, Ferrari MJ, Fraser K, Fu H, Hallett T, Hinsley W, Jit M, Karachaliou A, Moore SM, Nayagam S, Papadopoulos T, Perkins TA, Portnoy A, Minh QT, Vynnycky E, Winter AK, Burrows H, Chen C, Clapham HE, Deshpande A, Hauryski S, Huber J, Jean K, Kim C, Kim JH, Koh J, Lopman BA, Pitzer VE, Tam Y, Lambach P, Sim SY, Woodruff K, Ferguson NM, Trotter CL, Gaythorpe KAM. Estimating the health effects of COVID-19-related immunisation disruptions in 112 countries during 2020-30: a modelling study. Lancet Glob Health 2024; 12:e563-e571. [PMID: 38485425 PMCID: PMC10951961 DOI: 10.1016/s2214-109x(23)00603-4] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2023] [Revised: 12/14/2023] [Accepted: 12/16/2023] [Indexed: 03/19/2024]
Abstract
BACKGROUND There have been declines in global immunisation coverage due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Recovery has begun but is geographically variable. This disruption has led to under-immunised cohorts and interrupted progress in reducing vaccine-preventable disease burden. There have, so far, been few studies of the effects of coverage disruption on vaccine effects. We aimed to quantify the effects of vaccine-coverage disruption on routine and campaign immunisation services, identify cohorts and regions that could particularly benefit from catch-up activities, and establish if losses in effect could be recovered. METHODS For this modelling study, we used modelling groups from the Vaccine Impact Modelling Consortium from 112 low-income and middle-income countries to estimate vaccine effect for 14 pathogens. One set of modelling estimates used vaccine-coverage data from 1937 to 2021 for a subset of vaccine-preventable, outbreak-prone or priority diseases (ie, measles, rubella, hepatitis B, human papillomavirus [HPV], meningitis A, and yellow fever) to examine mitigation measures, hereafter referred to as recovery runs. The second set of estimates were conducted with vaccine-coverage data from 1937 to 2020, used to calculate effect ratios (ie, the burden averted per dose) for all 14 included vaccines and diseases, hereafter referred to as full runs. Both runs were modelled from Jan 1, 2000, to Dec 31, 2100. Countries were included if they were in the Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance portfolio; had notable burden; or had notable strategic vaccination activities. These countries represented the majority of global vaccine-preventable disease burden. Vaccine coverage was informed by historical estimates from WHO-UNICEF Estimates of National Immunization Coverage and the immunisation repository of WHO for data up to and including 2021. From 2022 onwards, we estimated coverage on the basis of guidance about campaign frequency, non-linear assumptions about the recovery of routine immunisation to pre-disruption magnitude, and 2030 endpoints informed by the WHO Immunization Agenda 2030 aims and expert consultation. We examined three main scenarios: no disruption, baseline recovery, and baseline recovery and catch-up. FINDINGS We estimated that disruption to measles, rubella, HPV, hepatitis B, meningitis A, and yellow fever vaccination could lead to 49 119 additional deaths (95% credible interval [CrI] 17 248-134 941) during calendar years 2020-30, largely due to measles. For years of vaccination 2020-30 for all 14 pathogens, disruption could lead to a 2·66% (95% CrI 2·52-2·81) reduction in long-term effect from 37 378 194 deaths averted (34 450 249-40 241 202) to 36 410 559 deaths averted (33 515 397-39 241 799). We estimated that catch-up activities could avert 78·9% (40·4-151·4) of excess deaths between calendar years 2023 and 2030 (ie, 18 900 [7037-60 223] of 25 356 [9859-75 073]). INTERPRETATION Our results highlight the importance of the timing of catch-up activities, considering estimated burden to improve vaccine coverage in affected cohorts. We estimated that mitigation measures for measles and yellow fever were particularly effective at reducing excess burden in the short term. Additionally, the high long-term effect of HPV vaccine as an important cervical-cancer prevention tool warrants continued immunisation efforts after disruption. FUNDING The Vaccine Impact Modelling Consortium, funded by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. TRANSLATIONS For the Arabic, Chinese, French, Portguese and Spanish translations of the abstract see Supplementary Materials section.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Anna-Maria Hartner
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK; Centre for Artificial Intelligence in Public Health Research, Robert Koch Institute, Wildau, Germany
| | - Xiang Li
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Susy Echeverria-Londono
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Jeremy Roth
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Kaja Abbas
- London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK; School of Tropical Medicine and Global Health, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, Japan
| | | | - Margaret J de Villiers
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Matthew J Ferrari
- Center for Infectious Disease Dynamics, Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania, PA, USA
| | - Keith Fraser
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Han Fu
- London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK
| | - Timothy Hallett
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Wes Hinsley
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Mark Jit
- London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK; School of Public Health, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China
| | | | - Sean M Moore
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA
| | - Shevanthi Nayagam
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK; Section of Hepatology and Gastroenterology, Department of Metabolism, Digestion, and Reproduction, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | | | - T Alex Perkins
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA
| | - Allison Portnoy
- Center for Health Decision Science, T H Chan School of Public Health, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA
| | - Quan Tran Minh
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA
| | | | - Amy K Winter
- Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics and Center for the Ecology of Infectious Diseases, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA
| | - Holly Burrows
- School of Public Health, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
| | - Cynthia Chen
- Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore, Singapore
| | - Hannah E Clapham
- Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore, Singapore; Oxford University Clinical Research Unit, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam; Nuffield Department of Medicine, Oxford University, Oxford, UK
| | | | - Sarah Hauryski
- Center for Infectious Disease Dynamics, Pennsylvania State University, Pennsylvania, PA, USA
| | - John Huber
- Department of Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, USA; School of Medicine, Washington University, St Louis, MO, USA
| | - Kevin Jean
- Laboratoire Modélisation, épidémiologie, et surveillance des risques sanitaires and Unit Cnam risques infectieux et émergents, Institut Pasteur, Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, Paris, France
| | - Chaelin Kim
- International Vaccine Institute, Seoul, South Korea
| | | | - Jemima Koh
- Saw Swee Hock School of Public Health, National University of Singapore, Singapore
| | | | | | - Yvonne Tam
- Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
| | - Philipp Lambach
- Department of Immunization, Vaccines, and Biologicals, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - So Yoon Sim
- Department of Immunization, Vaccines, and Biologicals, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland
| | - Kim Woodruff
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Neil M Ferguson
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK
| | - Caroline L Trotter
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK; Veterinary Medicine, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Katy A M Gaythorpe
- Medical Research Council Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Jameel Institute School of Public Health, Imperial College London, London, UK.
| |
Collapse
|
3
|
Kalkowska DA, Wiesen E, Wassilak SGF, Burns CC, Pallansch MA, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2024; 44:379-389. [PMID: 37344376 PMCID: PMC10733542 DOI: 10.1111/risa.14159] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/11/2023] [Revised: 05/02/2023] [Accepted: 05/04/2023] [Indexed: 06/23/2023]
Abstract
In May 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated the cessation of all use of type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2), except for emergency outbreak response. Since then, paralytic polio cases caused by type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses now exceed 3,000 cases reported by 39 countries. In 2022 (as of April 25, 2023), 20 countries reported detection of cases and nine other countries reported environmental surveillance detection, but no reported cases. Recent development of a genetically modified novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) may help curb the generation of neurovirulent vaccine-derived strains; its use since 2021 under Emergency Use Listing is limited to outbreak response activities. Prior modeling studies showed that the expected trajectory for global type 2 viruses does not appear headed toward eradication, even with the best possible properties of nOPV2 assuming current outbreak response performance. Continued persistence of type 2 poliovirus transmission exposes the world to the risks of potentially high-consequence events such as the importation of virus into high-transmission areas of India or Bangladesh. Building on prior polio endgame modeling and assuming current national and GPEI outbreak response performance, we show no probability of successfully eradicating type 2 polioviruses in the near term regardless of vaccine choice. We also demonstrate the possible worst-case scenarios could result in rapid expansion of paralytic cases and preclude the goal of permanently ending all cases of poliomyelitis in the foreseeable future. Avoiding such catastrophic scenarios will depend on the development of strategies that raise population immunity to type 2 polioviruses.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C. Burns
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
4
|
Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Wiesen E, Burns CC, Pallansch MA, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2024; 44:366-378. [PMID: 37344934 PMCID: PMC10733544 DOI: 10.1111/risa.14158] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 06/23/2023]
Abstract
Due to the very low, but nonzero, paralysis risks associated with the use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), eradicating poliomyelitis requires ending all OPV use globally. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated cessation of Sabin type 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) in 2016, except for emergency outbreak response. However, as of early 2023, plans for cessation of bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) remain undefined, and OPV2 use for outbreak response continues due to ongoing transmission of type 2 polioviruses and reported type 2 cases. Recent development and use of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) leads to additional potential vaccine options and increasing complexity in strategies for the polio endgame. Prior applications of integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling consistent with GPEI strategic plans that preceded OPV2 cessation explored OPV cessation dynamics and the evaluation of options to support globally coordinated risk management efforts. The 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan highlighted the need for early bOPV cessation planning. We review the published modeling and explore bOPV cessation immunization options as of 2022, assuming that the GPEI partners will not support restart of the use of any OPV type in routine immunization after a globally coordinated cessation of such use. We model the potential consequences of globally coordinating bOPV cessation in 2027, as anticipated in the 2022-2026 GPEI strategic plan. We do not find any options for bOPV cessation likely to succeed without a strategy of bOPV intensification to increase population immunity prior to cessation.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven G. F. Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C. Burns
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark A. Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
5
|
Dutta O, Prasanth A, Kumari A, Akanksha K, Deeba F, Salam N. Burden of dengue, leishmaniasis and lymphatic filariasis in India and its states from 1990-2019: Analysis from the Global Burden of Disease study (GBD 2019). PLoS One 2023; 18:e0292723. [PMID: 37851660 PMCID: PMC10584127 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0292723] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/08/2023] [Accepted: 09/26/2023] [Indexed: 10/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Vector-borne diseases such as dengue, leishmaniasis, and lymphatic filariasis, constitute significant sources of illness, disability, and mortality among the poor and vulnerable in many countries around the world, including India. Based on the global burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors study 2019, we analyse the burden of dengue, leishmaniasis, and lymphatic filariasis, in India from 1990 to 2019. Over this period, there was a reduction in the burden of lymphatic filariasis and leishmaniasis. Notably, dengue emerged as the most common vector-borne disease, exhibiting high fatality rate above 15 years of age and the highest DALY within 15-49 age group. Additionally, dengue cases surged substantially between 1990 and 2019. Leishmaniasis related mortality and DALY declined in the year 2019 compared to the year 1990, with high mortality and DALY in the 0-49-year-old age group. For lymphatic filariasis, DALY was more pronounce among those in the 15-49-year age group, which underwent reduction in 2019. Males had a higher burden in other vector-borne diseases than females, although females had a slightly elevated dengue burden. These findings highlight the evolving epidemiological trends related to vector-borne diseases in India, over the last three decades and underline the critical significance of sustained efforts for the elimination and control of vector-borne diseases.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Omprokash Dutta
- Department of Microbiology, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India
| | - Ajay Prasanth
- Department of Microbiology, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India
| | - Ashu Kumari
- Department of Microbiology, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India
| | - Kumari Akanksha
- Department of Microbiology, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India
| | - Farah Deeba
- Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in Basic Sciences, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India
| | - Nasir Salam
- Department of Microbiology, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India
- Department of Biosciences, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India
| |
Collapse
|
6
|
Bisen AC, Agrawal S, Sanap SN, Ravi Kumar HG, Kumar N, Gupta R, Bhatta RS. COVID-19 retreats and world recovers: A silver lining in the dark cloud. HEALTH CARE SCIENCE 2023; 2:264-285. [PMID: 38939523 PMCID: PMC11080794 DOI: 10.1002/hcs2.57] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/15/2023] [Revised: 05/30/2023] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 06/29/2024]
Abstract
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19), which the World Health Organization classified as the Sixth Public Health Emergency Of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30, 2020, is no longer a PHEIC. Millions were affected due to unawareness. The increase in fatalities and shortage of medicine was the first outrage of COVID-19. As per the Johns Hopkins COVID-19 resource center database, it was observed that the disease has spread dynamically across 200+ nations worldwide affecting more than 600 million people from 2019 to 2023, and over thousands of people were victimized regularly at a 2% mortality rate (approx.). In the midway, the mutant variants of concern like omicron, and delta have also created havoc and caused significant impact on public health, global economy, and lifestyle. Since 2019, 3 years now passed and the dynamic disease statistics seem decelerated; moreover, the prevalence of COVID-19 is also fading. The Johns Hopkins resource center has also stopped recording the data of the global pandemic recently from March 10, 2023. Hence, based on the facts, we are presenting a concise report on the pandemic from 2019 to 2023, which includes a brief discussion of the global pandemic. We have highlighted global epidemiology, emphasizing the Indian COVID scenario, vaccination across the globe, and the psychosocial and geopolitical consequences of COVID-19 with a brief background to pathology, clinical management, and the worldwide response against triage. A lot has changed and still needs to change after three tough years of COVID-19. Even though science has progressed and advanced research in medicine is pointing toward future generations, there is no standard care supplied for COVID-19-like calamities. COVID-19 cases might have declined but its influence on the society is still stagnant. This COVID experience has taught us that, despite our bleak beginnings, there is always hope for the future and that we must act with foresight to improve things for future generations.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Amol Chhatrapati Bisen
- Pharmaceutics and Pharmacokinetics DivisionCSIR—Central Drug Research InstituteLucknowUttar PradeshIndia
- Academy of Scientific and Innovative Research (AcSIR)GhaziabadUttar PradeshIndia
| | - Sristi Agrawal
- Pharmaceutics and Pharmacokinetics DivisionCSIR—Central Drug Research InstituteLucknowUttar PradeshIndia
- Academy of Scientific and Innovative Research (AcSIR)GhaziabadUttar PradeshIndia
| | - Sachin Nashik Sanap
- Pharmaceutics and Pharmacokinetics DivisionCSIR—Central Drug Research InstituteLucknowUttar PradeshIndia
- Academy of Scientific and Innovative Research (AcSIR)GhaziabadUttar PradeshIndia
| | | | - Nelam Kumar
- Biochemistry and Structural Biology DivisionCSIR—Central Drug Research InstituteLucknowUttar PradeshIndia
- Present address:
International Centre for Translational Eye Research (ICTER)Institute of Physical Chemistry (IChF)Marcina Kasprzaka 44/5201‐224WarsawPoland
| | - Rajdeep Gupta
- Pharmaceutics and Pharmacokinetics DivisionCSIR—Central Drug Research InstituteLucknowUttar PradeshIndia
| | - Rabi Sankar Bhatta
- Pharmaceutics and Pharmacokinetics DivisionCSIR—Central Drug Research InstituteLucknowUttar PradeshIndia
- Academy of Scientific and Innovative Research (AcSIR)GhaziabadUttar PradeshIndia
| |
Collapse
|
7
|
Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Outbreak management strategies for cocirculation of multiple poliovirus types. Vaccine 2023:S0264-410X(23)00429-2. [PMID: 37121801 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2023.04.037] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/20/2023] [Accepted: 04/11/2023] [Indexed: 05/02/2023]
Abstract
Prior modeling studies showed that current outbreak management strategies are unlikely to stop outbreaks caused by type 1 wild polioviruses (WPV1) or circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) in many areas, and suggested increased risks of outbreaks with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. The surge of type 2 poliovirus transmission that began in 2019 and continues to date, in conjunction with decreases in preventive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) for poliovirus types 1 and 3, has led to the emergence of several countries with cocirculation of more than one type of poliovirus. Response to these emerging cocirculation events is theoretically straightforward, but the different formulations, types, and inventories of oral poliovirus vaccines (OPVs) available for outbreak response present challenging practical questions. In order to demonstrate the implications of using different vaccine options and outbreak campaign strategies, we applied a transmission model to a hypothetical population with conditions similar to populations currently experiencing outbreaks of cVDPVs of both types 1 and 2. Our results suggest prevention of the largest number of paralytic cases occurs when using (1) trivalent OPV (tOPV) (or coadministering OPV formulations for all three types) until one poliovirus outbreak type dies out, followed by (2) using a type-specific OPV until the remaining poliovirus outbreak type also dies out. Using tOPV first offers a lower overall expected cost, but this option may be limited by the willingness to expose populations to type 2 Sabin OPV strains. For strategies that use type 2 novel OPV (nOPV2) concurrently administered with bivalent OPV (bOPV, containing types 1 and 3 OPV) emerges as a leading option, but questions remain about feasibility, logistics, type-specific take rates, and coadministration costs.
Collapse
|
8
|
Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Wiesen E, F Estivariz C, Burns CC, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Complexity of options related to restarting oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in national immunization programs after OPV cessation. Gates Open Res 2023; 7:55. [PMID: 37547300 PMCID: PMC10403636 DOI: 10.12688/gatesopenres.14511.1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 03/09/2023] [Indexed: 08/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Background: The polio eradication endgame continues to increase in complexity. With polio cases caused by wild poliovirus type 1 and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses of all three types (1, 2 and 3) reported in 2022, the number, formulation, and use of poliovirus vaccines poses challenges for national immunization programs and vaccine suppliers. Prior poliovirus transmission modeling of globally-coordinated type-specific cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) assumed creation of Sabin monovalent OPV (mOPV) stockpiles for emergencies and explored the potential need to restart OPV if the world reached a specified cumulative threshold number of cases after OPV cessation. Methods: We document the actual experience of type 2 OPV (OPV2) cessation and reconsider prior modeling assumptions related to OPV restart. We develop updated decision trees of national immunization options for poliovirus vaccines considering different possibilities for OPV restart. Results: While OPV restart represented a hypothetical situation for risk management and contingency planning to support the 2013-2018 Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan, the actual epidemiological experience since OPV2 cessation raises questions about what, if any, trigger(s) could lead to restarting the use of OPV2 in routine immunization and/or plans for potential future restart of type 1 and 3 OPV after their respective cessation. The emergency use listing of a genetically stabilized novel type 2 OPV (nOPV2) and continued evaluation of nOPV for types 1 and/or 3 add further complexity by increasing the combinations of possible OPV formulations for OPV restart. Conclusions: Expanding on a 2019 discussion of the logistical challenges and implications of restarting OPV, we find a complex structure of the many options and many issues related to OPV restart decisions and policies as of early 2023. We anticipate many challenges for forecasting prospective vaccine supply needs during the polio endgame due to increasing potential combinations of poliovirus vaccine choices.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven GF Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Concepcion F Estivariz
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C Burns
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
9
|
Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Wassilak SGF, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) choices and the consequences of delaying outbreak response. Vaccine 2023; 41 Suppl 1:A136-A141. [PMID: 33994237 PMCID: PMC11027208 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.04.061] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 12.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2021] [Revised: 04/22/2021] [Accepted: 04/28/2021] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) faces substantial challenges with managing outbreaks of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s) in 2021. A full five years after the globally coordinated removal of serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) for use in national immunization programs, cVDPV2s did not die out. Since OPV2 cessation, responses to outbreaks caused by cVDPV2s mainly used serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) from a stockpile. A novel vaccine developed from a genetically stabilized OPV2 strain (nOPV2) promises to potentially facilitate outbreak response with lower prospective risks, although its availability and properties in the field remain uncertain. Using an established global poliovirus transmission model and building on a related analysis that characterized the impacts of disruptions in GPEI activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore the implications of trade-offs associated with delaying outbreak response to avoid using mOPV2 by waiting for nOPV2 availability (or equivalently, delayed responses waiting for national validation of meeting the criteria for nOPV2 initial use). Consistent with prior modeling, responding as quickly as possible with available mOPV2 promises to reduce the expected burden of disease in the outbreak population and to reduce the chances for the outbreak virus to spread to other areas. Delaying cVDPV2 outbreak response (e.g., modeled as no response January-June 2021) to wait for nOPV2 can considerably increase the total expected cases (e.g., by as many as 1,300 cVDPV2 cases in the African region during 2021-2023) and increases the likelihood of triggering the need to restart widescale preventive use of an OPV2-containing vaccine in national immunization programs that use OPV. Countries should respond to any cVDPV2 outbreaks quickly with rounds that achieve high coverage using any available OPV2, and plan to use nOPV2, if needed, once it becomes widely available based on evidence that it is as effective but safer in populations than mOPV2.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | |
Collapse
|
10
|
Kalkowska DA, Wassilak SGF, Pallansch MA, Burns CC, Wiesen E, Durry E, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Outbreak response strategies with type 2-containing oral poliovirus vaccines. Vaccine 2023; 41 Suppl 1:A142-A152. [PMID: 36402659 PMCID: PMC10284582 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2022.10.060] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/13/2022] [Revised: 09/13/2022] [Accepted: 10/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
Abstract
Despite exhaustive and fully-financed plans to manage the risks of globally coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) containing type 2 (OPV2) prior to 2016, as of 2022, extensive, continued transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs) type 2 (cVDPV2) remains. Notably, cumulative cases caused by cVDPV2 since 2016 now exceed 2,500. Earlier analyses explored the implications of using different vaccine formulations to respond to cVDPV2 outbreaks and demonstrated how different properties of novel OPV2 (nOPV2) might affect its performance compared to Sabin monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). These prior analyses used fixed assumptions for how outbreak response would occur, but outbreak response implementation can change. We update an existing global poliovirus transmission model to explore different options for responding with different vaccines and assumptions about scope, delays, immunization intensity, target age groups, and number of rounds. Our findings suggest that in order to successfully stop all cVDPV2 transmission globally, countries and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative need to address the deficiencies in emergency outbreak response policy and implementation. The polio program must urgently act to substantially reduce response time, target larger populations - particularly in high transmission areas - and achieve high coverage with improved access to under-vaccinated subpopulations. Given the limited supplies of nOPV2 at the present, using mOPV2 intensively immediately, followed by nOPV2 intensively if needed and when sufficient quantities become available, substantially increases the probability of ending cVDPV2 transmission globally.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Steven G F Wassilak
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Cara C Burns
- Division of Viral Diseases, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Eric Wiesen
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | - Elias Durry
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
| | | | | |
Collapse
|
11
|
Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K, Thompson KM. Modeling scenarios for ending poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan. RISK ANALYSIS : AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE SOCIETY FOR RISK ANALYSIS 2023; 43:660-676. [PMID: 35739080 PMCID: PMC9780402 DOI: 10.1111/risa.13983] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 05/09/2023]
Abstract
Pakistan and Afghanistan pose risks for international transmission of polioviruses as the last global reservoir for wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and a reservoir for type 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s). Widespread transmission of WPV1 and cVDPV2 in 2019-2020 and resumption of intensive supplemental immunization activities (SIAs) in 2020-2021 using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) led to decreased transmission of WPV1 and cVDPV2 as of the end of 2021. Using an established dynamic disease transmission model, we explore multiple bounding scenarios with varying intensities of SIAs using bivalent OPV (bOPV) and/or trivalent tOPV (tOPV) to characterize potential die out of transmission. This analysis demonstrates potential sets of actions that may lead to elimination of poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and/or Afghanistan. Some modeled scenarios suggest that Pakistan and Afghanistan could increase population immunity to levels high enough to eliminate transmission, and if maintained, achieve WPV1 and cVDPV2 elimination as early as 2022. This requires intensive and proactive OPV SIAs to prevent transmission, instead of surveillance followed by reactive outbreak response. The reduction of cases observed in 2021 may lead to a false sense of security that polio has already or soon will die out on its own, but relaxation of immunization activities runs the risk of lowering population immunity to, or below, the minimum die-out threshold such that transmission continues. Transmission modeling may play a key role in managing expectations and supporting future modeling about the confidence of no virus circulation in anticipation of global certification decisions.
Collapse
|
12
|
Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K. Oral polio vaccine stockpile modeling: insights from recent experience. Expert Rev Vaccines 2023; 22:813-825. [PMID: 37747090 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2023.2263096] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/30/2023] [Accepted: 09/21/2023] [Indexed: 09/26/2023]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Achieving polio eradication requires ensuring the delivery of sufficient supplies of the right vaccines to the right places at the right times. Despite large global markets, decades of use, and large quantity purchases of polio vaccines by national immunization programs and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), forecasting demand for the oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) stockpile remains challenging. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS We review OPV stockpile experience compared to pre-2016 expectations, actual demand, and changes in GPEI policies related to the procurement and use of type 2 OPV vaccines. We use available population and immunization schedule data to explore polio vaccine market segmentation, and its role in polio vaccine demand forecasting. RESULTS We find that substantial challenges remain in forecasting polio vaccine needs, mainly due to (1) deviations in implementation of plans that formed the basis for earlier forecasts, (2) lack of alignment of tactics/objectives among GPEI partners and other key stakeholders, (3) financing, and (4) uncertainty about development and licensure timelines for new polio vaccines and their field performance characteristics. CONCLUSIONS Mismatches between supply and demand over time have led to negative consequences associated with both oversupply and undersupply, as well as excess costs and potentially preventable cases.
Collapse
|
13
|
Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K. Looking back at prospective modeling of outbreak response strategies for managing global type 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) cessation. Front Public Health 2023; 11:1098419. [PMID: 37033033 PMCID: PMC10080024 DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1098419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 6] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/14/2022] [Accepted: 03/03/2023] [Indexed: 04/11/2023] Open
Abstract
Introduction Detection of poliovirus transmission and ongoing oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use continue to delay poliomyelitis eradication. In 2016, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of type 2 OPV (OPV2) for preventive immunization and limited its use to emergency outbreak response. In 2019, GPEI partners requested restart of some Sabin OPV2 production and also accelerated the development of a genetically modified novel OPV2 vaccine (nOPV2) that promised greater genetic stability than monovalent Sabin OPV2 (mOPV2). Methods We reviewed integrated risk, economic, and global poliovirus transmission modeling performed before OPV2 cessation, which recommended multiple risk management strategies to increase the chances of successfully ending all transmission of type 2 live polioviruses. Following OPV2 cessation, strategies implemented by countries and the GPEI deviated from model recommended risk management strategies. Complementing other modeling that explores prospective outbreak response options for improving outcomes for the current polio endgame trajectory, in this study we roll back the clock to 2017 and explore counterfactual trajectories that the polio endgame could have followed if GPEI had: (1) managed risks differently after OPV2 cessation and/or (2) developed nOPV2 before and used it exclusively for outbreak response after OPV2 cessation. Results The implementation of the 2016 model-based recommended outbreak response strategies could have ended (and could still substantially improve the probability of ending) type 2 poliovirus transmission. Outbreak response performance observed since 2016 would not have been expected to achieve OPV2 cessation with high confidence, even with the availability of nOPV2 prior to the 2016 OPV2 cessation. Discussion As implemented, the 2016 OPV2 cessation failed to stop type 2 transmission. While nOPV2 offers benefits of lower risk of seeding additional outbreaks, its reduced secondary spread relative to mOPV2 may imply relatively higher coverage needed for nOPV2 than mOPV2 to stop outbreaks.
Collapse
|
14
|
Thompson KM, Kalkowska DA, Badizadegan K. Health economic analysis of vaccine options for the polio eradication endgame: 2022-2036. Expert Rev Vaccines 2022; 21:1667-1674. [PMID: 36154436 PMCID: PMC10116513 DOI: 10.1080/14760584.2022.2128108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/04/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND : Multiple vaccine options are available for polio prevention and risk management. Integrated global risk, economic, and poliovirus transmission modeling provides a tool to explore the dynamics of ending all use of one or more poliovirus vaccines to simplify the polio eradication endgame. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS : With global reported cases of poliomyelitis trending higher since 2016, we apply an integrated global model to simulate prospective vaccine policies and strategies for OPV-using countries starting with initial conditions that correspond to the epidemiological poliovirus transmission situation at the beginning of 2022. RESULTS : Abruptly ending all OPV use in 2023 and relying only on IPV to prevent paralysis with current routine immunization coverage would lead to expected reestablished endemic transmission of poliovirus types 1 and 2, and approximately 150,000 expected cases of poliomyelitis per year. Alternatively, if OPV-using countries restart trivalent OPV (tOPV) use for all immunization activities and end IPV use, the model shows the lowest anticipated annual polio cases and lowest costs. CONCLUSIONS : Poor global risk management and coordination of OPV cessation remain a critical failure mode for the polio endgame, and national and global decision makers face difficult choices due to multiple available polio vaccine options and immunization strategies.
Collapse
|
15
|
Lorenzetti L, Haydarov R, Namey E, Lawton A, Nam H, Ridwan Hasan M, Monj C, Abeyesekera S, Amina Kabwau M, McIntosh R. Exploring public perceptions of vaccine-derived poliovirus and a novel oral polio vaccine in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and Nigeria. Vaccine 2022; 41 Suppl 1:A128-A135. [PMID: 35871107 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2022.05.020] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/13/2021] [Revised: 04/14/2022] [Accepted: 05/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND The Global Polio Eradication Initiative introduced novel oral polio vaccine Type 2 (nOPV2) to address circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus Type 2 (cVDPV2). Although nOPV2 is a more genetically stable vaccine, it may not have the immediate trust of communities and health workers due to its novelty, potential side effects, and introduction under an Emergency Use Listing (EUL). We explored how nOPV2 introduction might be perceived by stakeholders and identified communications barriers related to nOPV2 hesitancy. METHODS This work was conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and Nigeria between January and March 2020. We used a rapid qualitative approach to conduct focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with four stakeholder groups: caregivers of children under 5, polio frontline workers, healthcare practitioners, and social/health influencers. Data are presented according to awareness, attitudes/beliefs, and concerns about cVDPV2 and nOPV2. RESULTS Stakeholders were largely unaware of cVDPV2. The causes of recent polio outbreaks were characterized as poor sanitation, under-immunization/in-migration, or poor vaccine management procedures. Caregivers were aware of and concerned by repeated vaccination campaigns. All stakeholder groups anticipated initial hesitancy, fear, and suspicion from caregivers due to nOPV2 introduction, with primary concerns linked to vaccine testing, safety, effectiveness, side effects, and support from authorities. Stakeholders thought the term "genetic modification" could be controversial but that introduction under an EUL would be acceptable given the emergency nature of cVDPV2 outbreaks. Stakeholders called for adequate and timely information to counter concerns. CONCLUSIONS Despite initial concerns, stakeholders felt nOPV2 would ultimately be accepted by caregivers. However, public health officials have a small window for "getting things right" when introducing nOPV2. Strategic communication interventions addressing key concerns and targeted communications with stakeholder groups, especially frontline workers, could improve community acceptance of nOPV2.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lara Lorenzetti
- Behavioral, Epidemiological & Clinical Sciences Division, FHI 360, Durham, NC, United States.
| | - Rustam Haydarov
- Polio Team, Programme Division, UNICEF HQ, New York, NY, United States
| | - Emily Namey
- Behavioral, Epidemiological & Clinical Sciences Division, FHI 360, Durham, NC, United States
| | - Anna Lawton
- Behavioral, Epidemiological & Clinical Sciences Division, FHI 360, Durham, NC, United States
| | - Hayon Nam
- Communication for Development (C4D) Team, UNICEF Nigeria Country Office, Abuja, Nigeria
| | - Muhamad Ridwan Hasan
- Communication for Development (C4D) Team, UNICEF Nigeria Country Office, Abuja, Nigeria
| | - Claude Monj
- Communication for Development (C4D) Team, UNICEF Western and Central Africa Regional Office, Dakar, Senegal
| | - Surangani Abeyesekera
- Communication for Development (C4D) Team, UNICEF Kenya Country Office, Nairobi, Kenya
| | | | - Ross McIntosh
- Polio Team, Programme Division, UNICEF HQ, New York, NY, United States
| |
Collapse
|
16
|
Routine Immunization Programs for Children during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Ecuador, 2020-Hidden Effects, Predictable Consequences. Vaccines (Basel) 2022; 10:vaccines10060857. [PMID: 35746465 PMCID: PMC9227181 DOI: 10.3390/vaccines10060857] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/01/2022] [Revised: 05/15/2022] [Accepted: 05/17/2022] [Indexed: 02/05/2023] Open
Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a global disruption of several services, including routine immunizations. This effect has been described in several countries, but there are few detailed studies in Latin America and no reports in Ecuador. Therefore, this work aims to quantify the reduction in routine immunizations for infants during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in Ecuador. 2018, 2019, and 2020 data were obtained from the Ministry of Health, Ecuador. The number of doses and the extent of immunization coverage was descriptively compared for four vaccines: rotavirus (ROTA), poliovirus (PV), pneumococcal (PCV), and pentavalent (PENTA) vaccines. There was no significant difference in doses applied during the 2018 and 2019 years. However, a significant (p < 0.05) drop of 137,000 delivered doses was observed in 2020 compared to the pre-pandemic years. Reductions in the percentage of coverage were more pronounced for the PENTA vaccine (17.7%), followed by PV (16.4%), ROTA (12%), and PCV vaccines (10.7%). Spatial analysis shows a severe impact on vaccination coverage on provinces from the Coast and Highland regions of the country. The pandemic has significantly impacted the immunization programs for infants across Ecuador. This retrospective analysis shows an urgent need to protect vulnerable zones and populations during public health emergencies.
Collapse
|
17
|
Badizadegan K, Kalkowska DA, Thompson KM. Polio by the Numbers - A Global Perspective. J Infect Dis 2022; 226:1309-1318. [PMID: 35415741 PMCID: PMC9556648 DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jiac130] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/05/2022] [Accepted: 04/05/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND Investments in national immunization programs and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) have resulted in substantial reductions in paralytic polio worldwide. However, cases prevented because of investments in immunization programs and GPEI remain incompletely characterized. METHODS Using a global model that integrates polio transmission, immunity, and vaccine dynamics, we provide estimates of polio incidence and numbers of paralytic cases prevented. We compare the results with reported cases and estimates historically published by the World Health Organization. RESULTS We estimate that the existence and use of polio vaccines prevented 5 million cases of paralytic polio between 1960-1987 and 24 million cases worldwide for 1988-2021 compared to a counterfactual world with no polio vaccines. Since the 1988 resolution to eradicate polio, our estimates suggest GPEI prevented 2.5 to 6 million cases of paralytic polio compared to counterfactual worlds without GPEI that assume different levels of intensity of polio vaccine use in routine immunization programs. DISCUSSION Analysis of historical cases provides important context for understanding and communicating the benefits of investments made in polio eradication. Prospective studies will need to explore the expected benefits of future investments, the outcomes of which will depend on whether and when polio is globally eradicated.
Collapse
|
18
|
Ho LL, Gurung S, Mirza I, Nicolas HD, Steulet C, Burman AL, Danovaro-Holliday MC, Sodha SV, Kretsinger K. Impact of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic on vaccine-preventable disease campaigns. Int J Infect Dis 2022; 119:201-209. [PMID: 35398300 PMCID: PMC8985404 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijid.2022.04.005] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 13.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/01/2021] [Revised: 03/31/2022] [Accepted: 04/04/2022] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to the widespread disruption of immunization services, including the postponement of mass vaccination campaigns. METHODS In May 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) and partners started monitoring COVID-19-related disruptions to mass vaccination campaigns against cholera, measles, meningitis A, polio, tetanus-diphtheria, typhoid and yellow fever through the Immunization Repository Campaign Delay Tracker. The authors reviewed the number and target population of reported preventive and outbreak response vaccination campaigns scheduled, postponed, canceled and reinstated, at four time-points: May 2020, December 2020, May 2021 and December 2021. FINDINGS Mass vaccination campaigns across all vaccines were disrupted heavily by COVID-19. In May 2020, 105 of 183 (57%) campaigns were postponed or canceled in 57 countries due to COVID-19, with an estimated 796 million postponed or missed vaccine doses. Campaign resumption was observed beginning in July 2020. In December 2021, 77 of 472 (16%) campaigns in 54 countries, mainly in the African Region, were still postponed or canceled due to COVID-19, with about 382 million postponed or missed vaccine doses. INTERPRETATION There is likely high risk of vaccine-preventable disease outbreaks due to an increased number of susceptible persons resulting from the large-scale mass vaccination campaign postponement caused by COVID-19 across all regions.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Lee Lee Ho
- World Health Organization, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland.
| | - Santosh Gurung
- World Health Organization, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
| | - Imran Mirza
- United Nations Children's Fund, 125 Maiden Lane, New York, NY 10038, USA
| | | | - Claudia Steulet
- World Health Organization, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
| | - Ashley L Burman
- World Health Organization, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
| | | | - Samir V Sodha
- World Health Organization, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
| | | |
Collapse
|
19
|
Camphor HS, Bareja C, Glynn-Robinson A, Polkinghorne BG, Durrheim DN. A novel semi-quantitative methodology for national poliovirus reintroduction and outbreak risk assessment. Travel Med Infect Dis 2021; 44:102181. [PMID: 34678503 DOI: 10.1016/j.tmaid.2021.102181] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/30/2021] [Revised: 10/13/2021] [Accepted: 10/18/2021] [Indexed: 12/16/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND Under the International Health Regulations (2005), World Health Organization Member States need to verify certification of polio-free status annually. In 2018, Australia sought to reassess and comprehensively characterise the risk posed by wild-type and vaccine-derived poliovirus introductions to national health security. However formal guidelines for national polio risk assessment were not publicly available. METHODS Four risk elements were identified and weighted using an expert-informed modified Delphi method: reintroduction hazard; population susceptibility; detection capability; and response capability. Australian data and qualitative evidence were analysed, documented and scored against risk element indicators to characterise polio risk as a semi-quantitative estimate and qualitative risk category statement. RESULTS The semi-quantitative risk characterisation calculated likelihood and impact scores of 0.43 and 0.13, respectively (possible range: 0.02-4.5). The assessment concluded that the risk of poliovirus reintroduction, resultant outbreaks of poliovirus infection, and sustained transmission occurring in Australia is very low. CONCLUSIONS Until poliovirus is eradicated, it remains in countries' strategic health security interest to maintain optimal investment in polio prevention, preparedness, surveillance and response capability to manage their level of risk. We present a structured, transparent and reproducible methodology for national or sub-national polio risk characterisation that generates evidence for targeted investment to maintain polio-free status.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Hendrik S Camphor
- Office of Health Protection, Australian Government Department of Health, Canberra, Australia; The National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
| | - Christina Bareja
- Office of Health Protection, Australian Government Department of Health, Canberra, Australia.
| | - Anna Glynn-Robinson
- Office of Health Protection, Australian Government Department of Health, Canberra, Australia.
| | - Benjamin G Polkinghorne
- The National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
| | | |
Collapse
|
20
|
Burkholder B, Wadood Z, Kassem AM, Ehrhardt D, Zomahoun D. The immediate impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on polio immunization and surveillance activities. Vaccine 2021; 41 Suppl 1:A2-A11. [PMID: 34756614 PMCID: PMC8531002 DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.10.028] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/07/2021] [Revised: 09/23/2021] [Accepted: 10/12/2021] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
In addition to affecting individual health the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted efforts to deliver essential health services around the world. In this article we present an overview of the immediate programmatic and epidemiologic impact of the pandemic on polio eradication as well as the adaptive strategic and operational measures taken by the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) from March through September 2020. Shortly after the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic on 11 March 2020, the GPEI initially redirected the programme’s assets to tackle COVID-19 and suspended house-to-house supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) while also striving to continue essential poliovirus surveillance functions. From March to May 2020, 28 countries suspended a total of 62 polio vaccine SIAs. In spite of efforts to continue poliovirus surveillance, global acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases reported from January-July 2020 declined by 34% compared with the same period in 2019 along with decreases in the mean number of environment samples collected per active site in the critical areas of the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions. The GPEI recommended countries should resume planning and implementation of SIAs starting in July 2020 and released guidelines to ensure these could be done safely for front line workers and communities. By the end of September 2020, a total of 14 countries had implemented circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) outbreak response vaccination campaigns and Afghanistan and Pakistan restarted SIAs to stop ongoing wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) transmission. The longer-term impacts of disruptions to eradication efforts remain to be determined, especially in terms of the effect on poliovirus epidemiology. Adapting to the pandemic situation has imposed new considerations on program implementation and demonstrated not only GPEI’s contribution to global health security, but also identified potential opportunities for coordinated approaches across immunization and health services.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Brent Burkholder
- Global Public Health Consultant, 834 Miller Drive, Davis, CA 95616, United States.
| | - Zubair Wadood
- WHO Polio Eradication Division, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.
| | - Ahmed M Kassem
- Global Immunization Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, NE Atlanta, GA 30333, United States.
| | - Derek Ehrhardt
- Global Immunization Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, NE Atlanta, GA 30333, United States.
| | - Delayo Zomahoun
- WHO Polio Eradication Division, Avenue Appia 20, 1211 Geneva, Switzerland.
| |
Collapse
|
21
|
Procter SR, Abbas K, Flasche S, Griffiths U, Hagedorn B, O'Reilly KM, Jit M. SARS-CoV-2 infection risk during delivery of childhood vaccination campaigns: a modelling study. BMC Med 2021; 19:198. [PMID: 34384441 PMCID: PMC8359640 DOI: 10.1186/s12916-021-02072-8] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/17/2021] [Accepted: 07/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the delivery of immunisation services globally. Many countries have postponed vaccination campaigns out of concern about infection risks to the staff delivering vaccination, the children being vaccinated, and their families. The World Health Organization recommends considering both the benefit of preventive campaigns and the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission when making decisions about campaigns during COVID-19 outbreaks, but there has been little quantification of the risks. METHODS We modelled excess SARS-CoV-2 infection risk to vaccinators, vaccinees, and their caregivers resulting from vaccination campaigns delivered during a COVID-19 epidemic. Our model used population age structure and contact patterns from three exemplar countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Brazil). It combined an existing compartmental transmission model of an underlying COVID-19 epidemic with a Reed-Frost model of SARS-CoV-2 infection risk to vaccinators and vaccinees. We explored how excess risk depends on key parameters governing SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility, and aspects of campaign delivery such as campaign duration, number of vaccinations, and effectiveness of personal protective equipment (PPE) and symptomatic screening. RESULTS Infection risks differ considerably depending on the circumstances in which vaccination campaigns are conducted. A campaign conducted at the peak of a SARS-CoV-2 epidemic with high prevalence and without special infection mitigation measures could increase absolute infection risk by 32 to 45% for vaccinators and 0.3 to 0.5% for vaccinees and caregivers. However, these risks could be reduced to 3.6 to 5.3% and 0.1 to 0.2% respectively by use of PPE that reduces transmission by 90% (as might be achieved with N95 respirators or high-quality surgical masks) and symptomatic screening. CONCLUSIONS SARS-CoV-2 infection risks to vaccinators, vaccinees, and caregivers during vaccination campaigns can be greatly reduced by adequate PPE, symptomatic screening, and appropriate campaign timing. Our results support the use of adequate risk mitigation measures for vaccination campaigns held during SARS-CoV-2 epidemics, rather than cancelling them entirely.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Simon R Procter
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, WC1E 7HT, London, UK.
| | - Kaja Abbas
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, WC1E 7HT, London, UK
| | - Stefan Flasche
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, WC1E 7HT, London, UK
| | | | | | - Kathleen M O'Reilly
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, WC1E 7HT, London, UK
| | - Mark Jit
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, WC1E 7HT, London, UK
| |
Collapse
|
22
|
Procter SR, Abbas K, Flasche S, Griffiths U, Hagedorn B, O'Reilly KM, Jit M. SARS-CoV-2 infection risk during delivery of childhood vaccination campaigns: a modelling study. MEDRXIV : THE PREPRINT SERVER FOR HEALTH SCIENCES 2021:2021.05.14.21257215. [PMID: 34031666 PMCID: PMC8142667 DOI: 10.1101/2021.05.14.21257215] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
BACKGROUND The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted delivery of immunisation services globally. Many countries have postponed vaccination campaigns out of concern about infection risks to staff delivering vaccination, the children being vaccinated and their families. The World Health Organization recommends considering both the benefit of preventive campaigns and the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission when making decisions about campaigns during COVID-19 outbreaks, but there has been little quantification of the risks. METHODS We modelled excess SARS-CoV-2 infection risk to vaccinators, vaccinees and their caregivers resulting from vaccination campaigns delivered during a COVID-19 epidemic. Our model used population age-structure and contact patterns from three exemplar countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Brazil). It combined an existing compartmental transmission model of an underlying COVID-19 epidemic with a Reed-Frost model of SARS-CoV-2 infection risk to vaccinators and vaccinees. We explored how excess risk depends on key parameters governing SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility, and aspects of campaign delivery such as campaign duration, number of vaccinations, and effectiveness of personal protective equipment (PPE) and symptomatic screening. RESULTS Infection risks differ considerably depending on the circumstances in which vaccination campaigns are conducted. A campaign conducted at the peak of a SARS-CoV-2 epidemic with high prevalence and without special infection mitigation measures could increase absolute infection risk by 32% to 45% for vaccinators, and 0.3% to 0.5% for vaccinees and caregivers. However, these risks could be reduced to 3.6% to 5.3% and 0.1% to 0.2% respectively by use of PPE that reduces transmission by 90% (as might be achieved with N95 respirators or high-quality surgical masks) and symptomatic screening. CONCLUSIONS SARS-CoV-2 infection risks to vaccinators, vaccinees and caregivers during vaccination campaigns can be greatly reduced by adequate PPE, symptomatic screening, and appropriate campaign timing. Our results support the use of adequate risk mitigation measures for vaccination campaigns held during SARS-CoV-2 epidemics, rather than cancelling them entirely.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Simon R Procter
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, WC1E 7HT, United Kingdom
| | - Kaja Abbas
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, WC1E 7HT, United Kingdom
| | - Stefan Flasche
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, WC1E 7HT, United Kingdom
| | | | | | - Kathleen M O'Reilly
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, WC1E 7HT, United Kingdom
| | - Mark Jit
- Centre for Mathematical Modelling of Infectious Disease, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, WC1E 7HT, United Kingdom
| |
Collapse
|
23
|
Rojas-Bonilla M, Coulliette-Salmond A, Belgasmi H, Wong K, Sayyad L, Vega E, Grimoldi F, Oberste MS, Rüttimann R. Environmental Surveillance for Risk Assessment in the Context of a Phase 2 Clinical Trial of Type 2 Novel Oral Polio Vaccine in Panama. Viruses 2021; 13:v13071355. [PMID: 34372561 PMCID: PMC8310065 DOI: 10.3390/v13071355] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2021] [Revised: 07/07/2021] [Accepted: 07/09/2021] [Indexed: 01/12/2023] Open
Abstract
Environmental surveillance was recommended for risk mitigation in a novel oral polio vaccine-2 (nOPV2) clinical trial (M5-ABMG) to monitor excretion, potential circulation, and loss of attenuation of the two nOPV2 candidates. The nOPV2 candidates were developed to address the risk of poliovirus (PV) type 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) as part of the global eradication strategy. Between November 2018 and January 2020, an environmental surveillance study for the clinical trial was conducted in parallel to the M5-ABMG clinical trial at five locations in Panama. The collection sites were located upstream from local treatment plant inlets, to capture the excreta from trial participants and their community. Laboratory analyses of 49 environmental samples were conducted using the two-phase separation method. Novel OPV2 strains were not detected in sewage samples collected during the study period. However, six samples were positive for Sabin-like type 3 PV, two samples were positive for Sabin-like type 1 PV, and non-polio enteroviruses NPEVs were detected in 27 samples. One of the nOPV2 candidates has been granted Emergency Use Listing by the World Health Organization and initial use started in March 2021. This environmental surveillance study provided valuable risk mitigation information to support the Emergency Use Listing application.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
- Magda Rojas-Bonilla
- Hospital de Especialidades Pediátricas, Servicio de Infectología Pediátrica, Panama City, Panama;
| | - Angela Coulliette-Salmond
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Viral Diseases, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA; (E.V.); (M.S.O.)
- United States Public Health Service, Rockville, MD 20852, USA
- Correspondence:
| | - Hanen Belgasmi
- IHRC, Inc., Atlanta, GA 30303, USA; Contracting Agency to the Division of Viral Diseases, Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA; (H.B.); (K.W.)
| | - Kimberly Wong
- IHRC, Inc., Atlanta, GA 30303, USA; Contracting Agency to the Division of Viral Diseases, Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA; (H.B.); (K.W.)
- Cherokee Nation Assurance, Tulsa, OK 74116, USA; Contracting Agency to the Division of Viral Diseases, Centers for Diseases Control, and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA;
| | - Leanna Sayyad
- Cherokee Nation Assurance, Tulsa, OK 74116, USA; Contracting Agency to the Division of Viral Diseases, Centers for Diseases Control, and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA;
| | - Everardo Vega
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Viral Diseases, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA; (E.V.); (M.S.O.)
| | - Fabian Grimoldi
- DVM, Quality Assurance Manager, VacciNet, Panama City, Panama;
| | - M. Steven Oberste
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Viral Diseases, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA; (E.V.); (M.S.O.)
| | - Ricardo Rüttimann
- Fighting Infectious Diseases in Emerging Countries, Miami, FL 33145, USA;
| |
Collapse
|
24
|
Kalkowska DA, Pallansch MA, Cochi SL, Thompson KM. Modeling Poliovirus Surveillance and Immunization Campaign Quality Monitoring Costs for Pakistan and Afghanistan for 2019-2023. Open Forum Infect Dis 2021; 8:ofab264. [PMID: 34295942 DOI: 10.1093/ofid/ofab264] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/07/2021] [Accepted: 05/19/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Background The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan for 2019-2023 includes commitments to monitor the quality of immunization campaigns using lot quality assurance sampling surveys (LQAS) and to support poliovirus surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Methods We analyzed LQAS and poliovirus surveillance data between 2016 and 2020, which included both acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) case-based detection and the continued expansion of environmental surveillance (ES). Using updated estimates for unit costs, we explore the costs of different options for future poliovirus monitoring and surveillance for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Results The relative value of the information provided by campaign quality monitoring and surveillance remains uncertain and depends on the design, implementation, and performance of the systems. Prospective immunization campaign quality monitoring (through LQAS) and poliovirus surveillance will require tens of millions of dollars each year for the foreseeable future for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Conclusions LQAS campaign monitoring as currently implemented in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides limited and potentially misleading information about immunization quality. AFP surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides the most reliable evidence of transmission, whereas ES provides valuable supplementary information about the extent of transmission in the catchment areas represented at the time of sample collection.
Collapse
Affiliation(s)
| | - Mark A Pallansch
- National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | - Stephen L Cochi
- Global Immunization Division, Center for Global Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
| | | |
Collapse
|